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Coercive diplomacy is a deceivingly attractive strategy. If it can be made to work, it 
has the potential of achieving foreign policy objectives with considerably fewer costs. 
But when adopted in unconducive circumstances, the strategy has the potential to 
backfire and make peaceful resolution of conflicts more difficult.  
 
Since 2002, when the full scope of Iran’s nuclear program and ambitions were 
revealed to the public, the United States has primarily relied on coercive diplomacy to 
force Iran to accept limitations and oversight that go beyond the NPT and Iran’s 
safeguards agreement.   This dissertation assesses how Iran’s nuclear policy and 
program has been affected by US and UNSC sanctions. It argues that not only has 
coercive diplomacy failed to persuade Iran to accept binding selective constraints on 
its fuel cycle activities, but it has also triggered a series of reactions that have 
strengthened Iran’s determination to advance, enhance, and expand its nuclear fuel 
cycle program.  
 
 
 
The findings of this dissertation corroborate the conclusions of most other scholars 
that have studied coercive diplomacy. Indeed, the recurrent failure of coercive 
diplomacy is rooted in the strategy’s neglect of the reality that national-level 
decisions are the resultant of the pulling and hauling of various forces within the 
target state and that in dealing with objectionable policies of states, one must seek to 
weaken the forces that promote and strengthen those that oppose the objectionable 
policy. In the case of Iran, sanctions have done the opposite. They have intensified 
Iranian distrust of the US and the post-war international order and have consequently 
augmented the forces in Iran that promote and have weakened those that oppose 
Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle program. Taking the factors that drive and shape Iran’s 
nuclear policy, this dissertation argues that the proliferation risks of Iran’s nuclear 
program could be resolved more quickly, reliably, and effectively through 
arrangements that are based on mutually acknowledged rights and equitable 
principles than through arrangements based on coercion.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Coercive diplomacy is a deceivingly attractive strategy. If it can be made to work, it has 
the potential of achieving foreign policy objectives with considerably fewer costs. This 
potential, as well as the lack of other alternatives in between cooperative mechanisms and 
military actions, has induced US policymakers to rely on coercive diplomacy even in 
situations where its odds of success are dismal at best. Interestingly, even when adopted 
to deal with situations that lend themselves poorly to coercive diplomacy, US 
policymakers have often portrayed coercive diplomacy as the best available strategy to 
further US national interests, neglecting that reliance on coercive diplomacy could 
sometimes exacerbate the situation at hand to the detriment of US national interests and 
security.  
 
US reliance on coercive diplomacy to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions is one such 
situation. Successive US administrations since the fall of the Shah have often emphasized 
on their tough Iran-related foreign policies and their ability to impose more stringent 
sanctions as a way to showcase their foreign policy credentials.  Since 2002, when the 
full scope of Iran’s nuclear program and ambitions were revealed to the public, Iran’s 
nuclear program and the US response to it has gained much salience in foreign policy 
circles and debates.  What is often missing in such debates, however, is the question of 
whether sanctions and use of coercion against Iran have actually influenced Iran’s nuclear 
policy and whether sanctions have in fact furthered US national interests and 
international peace and security. 
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This dissertation seeks to assess how Iran’s nuclear policy has been affected by US and 
UNSC sanctions that seek to persuade Iran to suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
fuel cycle activities. Since 2002, the US and its allies have portrayed Iran’s uranium 
enrichment and plutonium production capability as a grave threat to US national interests 
and international peace and security. As an ongoing and yet unresolved international 
dispute, how the US and its allies deal with the proliferation-sensitive aspects of Iran’s 
nuclear program will have significant ramifications for US national interests and security, 
the global nonproliferation regime, and international peace and security. Hence, it is very 
important and quite timely to assess whether coercive diplomacy, which is by far the 
single most salient and the primary method employed by the US and its allies to persuade 
Iran to suspend, if not forsake, its proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, has 
been or should be expected to prove effective.  
 
This dissertation argues that not only has coercive diplomacy failed to persuade Iran to 
accept binding selective constraints on its fuel cycle activities beyond its treaty and 
safeguard obligations, but it has also triggered a series of reactions that have strengthened 
Iran’s determination to advance, enhance, and expand its nuclear fuel cycle program. The 
findings of this dissertation corroborate the conclusions of most other scholars that have 
studied coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is a very difficult strategy to employ 
successfully. It has a tendency to backfire and make matters worse if utilized for the 
wrong reasons, in unconducive circumstances, and/or through ill-chosen measures and 
processes. For this very reason, not only does the strategy have a very low success rate, 
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particularly when dealing with high policy issues, but it also prolongs conflicts and 
makes their peaceful resolution more difficult and, hence, less likely. 
 
The recurrent failure of coercive diplomacy is rooted in the strategy’s neglect of how 
national-level decisions actually come to being. Contrary to the most fundamental 
assumptions of the theory of coercive diplomacy, national-level decisions are rarely a 
byproduct of crude, issue specific, cost-benefit analysis conducted by a unitary sovereign. 
The example of Iran shows that much more is involved in a national-level decision-
making than a simple issue-specific cost-benefit analysis. This dissertation, therefore, 
argues that a whole new strategy, positioned in between cooperation and war, should be 
envisioned and that strategic empathy is the more viable substitute for coercive 
diplomacy in the 21
st
 century. Regarding national-level decisions as the resultant of the 
pulling and hauling of various forces (e.g. interests, values, objectives, justifications, 
concerns, perceived threats and opportunities, constituencies and individuals) within the 
target state, this dissertation argues that in dealing with objectionable policies of states, 
the strategy should be to first understand the involved forces and then seek to weaken the 
forces, in the broadest sense of the term, that promote the objectionable policy and 
strengthen those that oppose the objectionable policy.  
  
Applying strategic empathy to the case of Iran, the author suggests that Iran’s nuclear 
fuel cycle program is only one of the manifestations of Iran’s security concerns, its 
determination to be self-reliant and its policy to limit US influence in the region. Iran’s 
security concerns, as well as its domestic and foreign policies, are based on a deep lack of 
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trust and confidence in the US and the post-war international order that the US has 
championed. Sanctions and coercive diplomacy have made matters worse by intensifying 
Iranian distrust of the US and the post-war international order. Coercive measures have 
also augmented the forces in Iran that promote and have weakened the forces that oppose 
Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle program.  
 
Therefore, to achieve a stable peace with Iran and to effectively deal with the 
proliferation risks of Iran’s nuclear program, the US needs to regain the confidence and 
the trust of the Islamic Republic and seek to resolve the disputes over Iran’s nuclear fuel 
cycle activities through means that respect Iran’s rights under the NPT, including its right 
to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, provided that it submits to international 
safeguards and inspections and does not divert safeguarded materials and capabilities to 
produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the 
proliferation risks of Iran’s nuclear program could be resolved much more quickly, 
reliably, and effectively through arrangements that are based on mutually acknowledged 
rights and equitable principles than through arrangements based on coercion.   
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Section 1.1: Background 
 
While US foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken many shapes and 
forms since 1979, most could be characterized as being essentially coercive in nature. 
Having taken the United States by surprise,
1
 the Islamic Revolution toppled an 
indispensable ally of the US and sent shock waves across the Middle East. Fearing a 
domino effect of Islamic uprisings in other regional countries allied with the US, the US 
was quick to resort to coercive means to ostensibly change the behavior of the Islamic 
Republic and to diminish its ability to influence regional dynamics. Yet, it is questionable 
whether these efforts have been effective in changing the behavior of the Islamic 
Republic. Despite doubt regarding its efficacy, however, coercive diplomacy has 
remained central to US policy toward the Islamic Republic and has been utilized by the 
US in most of its disputes with Iran.  
 
Among all of the instances where coercive diplomacy has been employed toward the 
Islamic Republic, its use has been most pronounced, enduring, and systematic toward 
Iran’s nuclear program. Accusing Iran of pursuing a nuclear weapons program long 
before Iran had developed an indigenous capacity to enrich uranium, the US has 
primarily relied on coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive 
aspects of its nuclear program, if not the entire program all together.  
 
While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly the first time after the Islamic Revolution that US 
accused Iran of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, records indicate that the US has 
                                                 
1
 Six months before the Islamic Revolution , a CIA assessment had concluded that Iran was not in a 
“revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary situation.” (Andrew, 1995, p.439)  
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actively tried to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear capabilities at least since 1983. 
Records show that in 1983 when Iran, based on Article IV of the NPT, requested the 
IAEA for assistance to reactivate its dormant nuclear research program, the US directly 
intervened and prevented the IAEA from providing Iran with any such help (Hibbs, 
2003).  
 
US efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions intensified during President Clinton’s 
administration as part of that administration’s “Dual Containment” strategy toward Iraq 
and Iran. Such efforts intensified after August 14, 2002, when the spokesperson for the 
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)
2
 publicly revealed what was long known 
to the US Intelligence Community that Iran was constructing both a uranium enrichment 
facility and a heavy water reactor without IAEA oversight (Hosenball, 2005). Pursuant to 
that announcement, the US sought the support of United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) to curtail Iran’s nuclear activities. To this date, the UNSC has adopted six 
resolutions against Iran, four of which impose Chapter VII sanctions. The last in a series 
of UNSC resolutions against Iran, was UNSC Resolution 1929, which was adopted on 
June 9, 2010. All UNSC resolutions against Iran demand Iran to “suspend all enrichment-
related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” Iran, however, 
has to this date defied US and UNSC demands and has further developed and expanded 
its proliferation sensitive activities since the adoption of the first UNSC resolution against 
Iran in 2006.  
 
                                                 
2
 According to the State Department, NCRI is an alias for the Mujahedine Khalq (MEK). The MEK was 
classified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department at the time of the announcement.   
7 
 
Understanding Iran’s decision-making process, particularly with respect to its nuclear 
program, however, is critical to the formation of an effective policy toward the Islamic 
Republic. Without understanding how Iran’s nuclear policies come to being and the 
factors that contribute and shape such policies, the US and its allies may formulate 
measures that further complicate the already difficult situation with Iran.  
 
 
Section 1.2: Research Question 
 
This dissertation seeks to explore conditions under which coercive diplomacy not only 
fails, but backfires. It will use US reliance on coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to 
forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program as a case to better understand 
how coercion and sanctions can affect policies in target states in ways that produce 
counterproductive outcomes.  
 
More specifically, by answering the following questions in regards to US use of coercive 
diplomacy to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, this dissertation will seek to draw 
lessons on the efficacy of coercive diplomacy in the 21
st
 century: 
1) To what extent and in what ways has US reliance on coercive diplomacy helped the 
US achieve its intended policy objectives in regards to Iran’s nuclear program?  
2) What impact have past and current coercive strategies had on Iran’s nuclear program?  
3) Do the factors that drive and shape Iran’s nuclear policies make coercive diplomacy 
more or less likely to succeed?  
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Section 1.3: Variables and Scope 
 
Although the focus of this dissertation is Iran’s nuclear program and the efficacy of US 
reliance on coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of 
its nuclear program, this dissertation also seeks to contribute to and refine the generic 
knowledge of coercive diplomacy. As Alexander L. George (1991) has asserted, the 
“generic knowledge of coercive diplomacy remains provisional and incomplete. It will 
and should continue to be refined with the study of additional historical cases” (p. xv).  
 
Section 1.3.1: Generic Variables 
 
Hence, the generic dependent variable of this dissertation is the cessation or reversal of 
the objectionable policy or behavior and the main independent variable is the utilization 
of coercive diplomacy against the actor of the objectionable policy or behavior. Simply 
put, this dissertation, much like the studies undertaken by George and others who have 
followed in his footsteps, is seeking to evaluate the utility of coercive diplomacy as a 
strategy to persuade an opponent to stop or undo a policy or a behavior deemed 
objectionable and the conditions that affect its probability of success.      
 
Section 1.3.2: Case Related Variables 
 
In order to both contribute to the generic knowledge of coercive diplomacy and evaluate 
current US policy toward Iran and its nuclear program, the dependent variable of the case 
being studied is Iran suspending, if not forgoing, proliferation-sensitive aspects of its 
nuclear program. Indeed, all UNSC resolutions against Iran’s nuclear program have 
demanded Iran to suspend:  
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(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research 
and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and 
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of 
a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the 
IAEA (UNSC resolution 1737, adopted on December 27, 2006)  
Hence, the dependent variable of the case study of this dissertation is essentially the 
extent to which Iran concedes to these UNSC demands.  
 
The main independent variable of the case study of this dissertation is US use of coercive 
diplomacy. Essentially, to persuade Iran to concede to US and UNSC demands, the US 
has relied on coercive diplomacy and is seeking to persuade Iran to concede by inflicting 
Iran with various economic and political costs. Hence, the case study of this dissertation 
seeks to illuminate the degree to which US reliance on coercive diplomacy has 
contributed to the US goal of preventing Iran from developing, advancing, and expanding 
its proliferation-sensitive technologies and capabilities. 
 
Section 1.3.3: Scope and Boundaries 
 
This dissertation is primarily focused on Iran’s nuclear program and the effect of coercive 
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear policy from 2002 to 2013. It is important to note that much 
might be changing since November 2013, when Iran and the P5+1 countries (United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) agreed on a Joint Plan of 
Action (JPA) to resolve issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program and “to reach a 
mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear 
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program will be exclusively peaceful.” As will be elaborated on in the conclusion of this 
dissertation, however, the author does believe that the finding of this dissertation will not 
only remain relevant, but will inform why or why not Iran and P5+1 were or were not 
able to achieve the abovementioned stated aim of the JPA.    
 
Section 1.4: Significance and Contribution 
 
This dissertation will have both theoretical and practical contributions to the field of 
International Security. By examining the case of Iran’s nuclear program and the US and 
UNSC efforts to curtail it through the use of coercive diplomacy, this dissertation 
contributes to and refines the generic knowledge of coercive diplomacy. Indeed, the 
theory and the body of knowledge relating to the conditions that favor or impede 
effective use of coercive diplomacy could only benefit and become further refined by the 
study of additional cases in which coercive diplomacy has been employed. Considering 
that Iran is the most sanctioned country in the world, it serves as an exceptional case to be 
studied in an effort to further advance the generic knowledge of coercive diplomacy.   
 
On the practical side, it is important to recognize that since its inception, the Islamic 
Republic has in one way or another challenged the post Second World War political order 
in the Middle East and beyond. Immediately after the Islamic revolution in Iran, Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini actively challenged both the United States and the Soviet Union by 
seeking to “export” the Islamic revolution to other Muslim countries that were governed 
by pro-American autocrats, criticizing the Soviet Union, disbanding the Iranian pro-
soviet Tudeh (communist) party, and extending Iran’s support to the Mujahedin in 
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Afghanistan (Rubinsteing, 1981). Iran has also challenged US interests in the region 
expanding and deepening its soft power and influence in perhaps the most geopolitically 
sensitive part of the world (Chorin and Malka, 2008). Indeed, as Iran’s soft power 
becomes ever more potent, the United States’ ability to achieve its policy objectives in 
the region becomes increasingly diminished.  
 
One of the main elements of Iran’s soft power is its image as an independent Muslim 
country that is able to make significant advancements in many important areas despite 
pressures from the world’s sole superpower. Iran’s progress in the nuclear field and its 
ability to indigenize some of the most sensitive aspects of that technology has not only 
become a very salient aspect of Iran’s image since 2002, but has also become a source of 
grave security concern for the US and its allies. As Iran makes steady advancements in 
the nuclear field and as it disregards America’s opposition to the program, the US and its 
allies have become significantly worried about the various ramifications of a nuclear Iran 
for the nonproliferation regime, the security interests of the US, and the international 
peace and security.  
 
For these very reasons, as successive US administrations have learned, Iran is not a 
country that can be ignored. The Islamic Republic has cornered the US into a strategic 
game that forces the US to frequently take positions and stances that it cannot sustain. It 
has showcased its ability to defy US demands and has augmented its domestic legitimacy 
as well as its soft power and influence in the region, at the cost of US credibility. There 
are, therefore, pressing reasons for the US to reevaluate its policies toward the Islamic 
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Republic, understand the reasons behind Iran’s nuclear defiance, and reassess the utility 
of coercive diplomacy in its dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This dissertation will 
answer key question required for such an assessment and will be a relevant source of 
insight for those seeking to evaluate US foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.  
 
It is important to emphasize here that much of this dissertation deals with the perceptions 
of the Iranian people and policymakers and the effect such perceptions have had on Iran’s 
nuclear policy and on how Iran has reacted to US and UNSC sanctions. Indeed, 
considering that people from varying cultures, geopolitical contexts, and historical 
experiences will have differing perceptions about the involved costs and benefits, 
effective use of coercive diplomacy is necessarily dependent on having a clear 
understanding of the opponent’s perception of what is being “demanded of him, which 
may be at variance with what the coercing power thinks it is demanding” (George, 1971, 
p.25). It is needless to say that such perceptions need not be valid for them to affect Iran’s 
behavior and cost-benefit calculus and the author’s description of these perceptions 
should not necessarily be regarded or read as an attempt to justify or prove the validity of 
such perceptions. Instead, this dissertation attempts to make Iran’s nuclear policy and its 
response to US and UNSC sanctions and demands more comprehensible and, hence, 
predictable to observers who have chronically been unable to understand Iran in its own 
terms.     
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Section 1.5: Methodology and Sources of Inference 
 
This dissertation uses a mixed-method approach. It relies heavily on the case study 
approach with quantitative methods playing a supporting role. Following in the footsteps 
of George, the case study method offers the best and most viable means for achieving the 
above-mentioned objectives of this dissertation. This is particularly the case considering 
the multifaceted nature of the questions this dissertation explores and the sources of 
inferences that such studies generally rely on.  
 
This dissertation draws its inferences from both primary and secondary sources. For the 
research that has contributed to this dissertation, the author has spent extensive time in 
Iran since 2006, discussing issues related to this dissertation with Iranian policymakers, 
academics, business elites, religious scholars, and political figures and activists.  In those 
years, the author also played a critical role in the fielding and analysis of dozens of 
probability sample national surveys, either conducted face-to-face or through call centers 
located inside and outside of Iran, on issues closely related to the topic of this 
dissertation. The author has also acted as the principal analyst of 29 focus groups 
conducted in the cities of Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Babol, Mashhad, Zahedan, 
Ahwaz, and Bandar Abbas. While most of the focus groups and surveys in which the 
author was involved are proprietary, these studies have given the author an understanding 
of the Iranian culture and public attitudes that have proven vastly beneficial in the writing 
of this dissertation.      
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This dissertation is also heavily informed by discussions the author has had with Iranian 
policymakers, academics, business elites, religious scholars, and political figures and 
activists during his extensive stay in Iran. It is important to note that none of these 
interactions took the form of structured interviews. While at first glance this might seem 
to be a deficiency of this dissertation, considering the sensitivity of the issues covered in 
this dissertation as well as its primary audience, informal, cordial, and unstructured 
discussions were the only viable way of engaging influential Iranian figures on the topic 
of this dissertation. Such discussions have not only informed the thinking of the author, 
but have also led the author to various open sources and documents that have been 
heavily used in this dissertation. 
 
This dissertation also heavily relies on archival research, interview and speech 
transcripts, historical texts and documents, official documents, legislations, publications, 
and announcements of various governmental and intergovernmental organizations, 
scholarly journals and texts, and various datasets and indicators collected by reputable 
think-tanks and international organizations.  
 
 
Section 1.6: Limitations 
 
This dissertation has some noteworthy limitations. First and foremost, this dissertation 
has a single-case research design and it seeks to draw general references for the generic 
knowledge of coercive diplomacy by doing an in-depth analysis of a single case. 
Regardless of how one looks at it, this is indeed a limitation of this dissertation and this 
dissertation could have been improved greatly had it looked into and included additional 
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cases. This limitation, however, does not jeopardize the contribution of this study. While 
some scholars doubt the utility of single observation case studies,
3
 others have found 
them quite valuable depending on the nature of the selected case. For example, Alexander 
L. George and Andrew Bennet (2005) argue that “several kinds of no-variance research 
designs can be useful in theory development and testing using multiple observations from 
a single case. These include the deviant, crucial, most-likely, and least-likely research 
designs, as well as single-case study tests of claims of necessity and sufficiency” (pp. 32-
33). It is important, nevertheless, to emphasize that while this dissertation only evaluates 
one case, the author considers it among many other cases that have been evaluated by 
other scholars. It is also important to note that as the most sanctioned country in the 21
st
 
century, Iran is a unique case that deserves specific attention. Furthermore, even staunch 
opponents of single-observation case studies agree that single-observation case studies 
that involve many intra case observations, as does this dissertation, have significantly less 
inferential limitations (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, pp. 211-212).  
 
The second limitation of this dissertation is rooted in its sources of inference. Considering 
the sensitivity of the topic and its ongoing nature, it is quite possible that the information 
available in the public domain does not cover the whole story. Since the author did not 
have nor sought to gain access to information that was not available in the public domain 
and since this dissertation is entirely based on open source information, some of its 
findings may deviate from reality. Indeed, as time passes and as more classified 
information finds its way into the public domain, some of the findings of this dissertation 
as well as the lessons such findings indicate may need to be revisited.  
                                                 
3
 See for example, King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, pp. 208-212. 
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Section 1.7: Organization 
 
This dissertation is broken into five main chapters. After the introduction, the second 
chapter provides a definition and focuses on the existing literature on coercive 
diplomacy. Besides reviewing the background of the theory, the second chapter also 
examines the track record of coercive diplomacy and the conditions named in the 
literature for its successful use. The second chapter ends by noting some of the questions 
and situations that have not been thoroughly analyzed in the literature.     
 
The third chapter of this dissertation aims to evaluate the impact of US and international 
sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program. Before conducting the evaluation, however, the 
third chapter first provides a background on Iran- US relations in order to put into context 
the situation in which coercive diplomacy and sanctions have been employed against 
Iran. After going over Iran-US relations, the chapter provides an overview of the coercive 
measures that have been adopted by the US and the UNSC to persuade Iran to curtail its 
nuclear ambitions, followed by an impact evaluation of those coercive measures.  
 
The fourth chapter of this dissertation evaluates the effect of coercive diplomacy on 
Iran’s nuclear policy. The first section of chapter four evaluates the effect of coercive 
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear policy through the prism of existing literature on coercive 
diplomacy. The second section of chapter four evaluates the impact of coercive 
diplomacy on Iranian public attitudes toward their country’s nuclear program. The third 
section looks into suggested channels of transmission that supposedly translate the pain 
and costs of sanctions and coercion into a change in the objectionable policy. Drawing 
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upon the theory of collective action, the third section questions the validity of the two 
main suggested processes through which sanctions and coercion are said to generate 
adversary concession. Section four of chapter four discusses Iran’s strategic culture and 
its effect not only on Iran’s nuclear policy, but also on Iran’s reaction to US and UNSC 
coercive postures and demands. Section four examines why US and UNSC demands are 
regarded as being illegitimate; why, besides the reasons explained in the previous section, 
individual members of Iran’s decision-making elite are unlikely to openly advocate 
conceding to US and UNSC demands as they have been thus far framed; and why US and 
UNSC sanctions are likely to ultimately result in more resistance. Finally, section five of 
chapter four discusses how Iran’s quest for regional prominence has propelled it to 
master and expand its nuclear capabilities and showcase its defiance of US and UNSC 
demands. 
 
Chapter five of this dissertation includes the lessons and the implications of the findings 
of this study both for coercive diplomacy in the 21
st
 century and for how the US should 
go about dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Section 2.1: The Theory of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Warfare and use of coercion have been an integral part of human life since the very 
beginning of recorded history. Yet, like many fields of study, systematic thinking and 
analysis of coercive strategies primarily began shortly after the end of the Second World 
War with the emergence of a bipolar international system shaped by the rivalries of two 
superpowers; the United States and the Soviet Union. While before the Second World 
War, major powers more readily resorted to war to achieve their foreign policy 
objectives, post Second World War realities and the institutionalization of an 
international legal system have significantly limited the utility of military might for 
achieving foreign policy objectives. Consequently, in today's international system, 
interstate warfare has become a rare occurrence and relative military might is no longer 
the chief predictor of a country's ability to impose its will on other countries.  
 
As the utility of brute force for achieving political ends diminished, coercive strategies 
gained traction, attracting the attention of strategists and academicians alike. 
Consequently, in late 1950's, as both the United States and the Soviet Union realized that 
total war among them was no longer an option, strategists and academics started to more 
systematically study and explore the alternatives to total war and their efficacy. Daniel 
Ellsberg was perhaps the first scholar to formulate what later became known as the 
compellence theory in a lecture sponsored by the Lowell Institute, Boston, on  March 10, 
1959, by the title of “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail” (See Ellsberg, 1968). Yet, 
Thomas Schelling is perhaps the best known theorists who has most contributed to this 
19 
 
field of study by utilizing concepts from game theory to understand how state actors 
bargain with one another in strategic settings. Schelling (1960) advanced the theory that 
since “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations” where each party at 
least somewhat controls what the other party wants and where there is at least some 
common interest that cannot be achieved without some form of a coordination, if not 
cooperation, the strategy of dealing with conflict situations should focus more on 
“exploitation of potential forces” and not so much on “application of force” (p. 5-7). 
Schelling’s theory in effect revolved around the premise that the coercing party will only 
achieve his aim if he could convince the target that the cost of the pain he will suffer if he 
does not comply will be higher than the benefits of non-compliance and resistance. In 
other words, the theory predicts that coercion should work when the expected cost 
associated with the threat exceeds the anticipated gains of defiance.  
  
As Schelling (1966) states, however, the distinction between coercion and brute force is 
not always clear cut since intent, which is not always objectively decipherable, is often 
the distinguishing factor (p. 5). While two parties may take a similar action, the action of 
one may well be characterized as brute force while the very same action of the other party 
could be characterized as coercion. For example, while Iraq's invasion of Iranian towns 
during the Iraq-Iran war is generally seen as brute force, since Saddam's intention was to 
annex those territories, Iran's invasion of the Iraqi Al-Faw peninsula is often 
characterized as coercion, since Iran lay no claims to those territories and invaded Al-
Faw with the intention of forcing Saddam to return to internationally agreed borders. As 
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it is obvious from the above example, the characterization of Iran and/or Iraq’s action 
necessarily depends on imputed intentions.    
 
While it could be quite difficult to judge which actions should be characterized as brute 
force and which qualify as coercion, the distinction between the two is quite clear in 
abstract. When a party primarily resorts to and takes forcible action to achieve his 
objectives, his actions could be characterized as brute force. Yet, when a party brandishes 
his ability to cause pain and uses threats and limited force to convince the adversary that 
it would not be in his best interest to escalate the conflict and that it would be best for 
him to concede, that party’s actions could be characterized as coercion. Coercion is, thus, 
getting the opponent to do, stop doing, and/or undo something that he would have 
otherwise done, without resorting to brute force (Pape, 1996, p.13). Consequently, as 
Schelling (1966) clearly articulates, "[b]rute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the 
power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of 
more damage to come, that can make someone to yield or comply" (p.3). 
 
Once distinguished from brute force, it is important to note that scholars have broken 
down coercion into various subcategories primarily based on what coercion intents to 
achieve. Schelling (1966), for example, breaks down coercion into two major 
subcategories of deterrence, defined as an effort to discourage an action through fear of 
retaliation, and compellence, which is an effort to actively convince a party to do 
something of interest to the compeller or stop doing something that negatively affects the 
interests of the compeller (p. 69-78). Another way of looking at the difference between 
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deterrence and compellence is that while deterrence passively seeks to maintain the status 
quo, compellence actively seeks to change the status quo in favor of the compeller. It is 
noteworthy to say that it was the distinction between passive and active forms of pressure 
that Schelling opted not to use the term “coercion,” which equally applies to both forms 
of pressure, and instead coined the term “compellence” to describe his theory (Schelling, 
1966 p. 69-71).    
 
Another vein of theory in this field stems from the works of Alexander George and his 
colleagues. Troubled by the inconsistent track record of compellence and bothered by 
United States’ compellence failure in Vietnam, George and his colleagues utilized the 
method of structured and focused comparison and conducted an in-depth case study of 
U.S. involvement in Laos, Cuba, and Vietnam in their 1971 book titled The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam. Their primary objective was to unearth the 
“many variables at play” in actual compellence situations and to create a “policy-
relevant” theory geared toward improving foreign policymaking (p. ix-xviii). George and 
his colleagues use the term “coercive diplomacy” to describe their theory, which is to a 
large part consistent in definition with Schelling’s definition of compellence except that 
George and his colleagues’ theory is primarily limited to the “defensive uses of the 
strategy – that is, “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is 
already embarked upon” (George, 1991, p. 5). In other words, while Schelling coined the 
term compellence to distinguish between passive and active forms of coercion, George 
took Schelling’s theory to its next logical step by distinguishing between defensive and 
offensive uses of compellence and named its defensive form coercive diplomacy. 
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The general abstract theory of coercive diplomacy is quite straightforward. Resting on the 
Rational Actor Model of decision-making, coercive diplomacy is the attempt to persuade 
a target to change its objectionable behavior and/or action through either the threat to use 
force or the actual use of limited exemplary force. It is important to note that the term 
“force” is being used here in its broadest possible sense such that it would include 
imposition of anything unfavorable, undesirable and in general costly to the target. It is 
also important to emphasize that the term “coercive diplomacy” only applies to the phase 
in a conflict situation when one seeks to stop or undo an undesirable action by 
persuading the responsible party to comply with one’s demands without actually 
employing full force and without bludgeoning him into compliance (George, 1991, p. 5). 
Therefore, if in a conflict situation force is used beyond its limited and demonstrative 
form, then by definition coercive diplomacy has failed. It is not, however always clear 
where one can draw the line between full-scale use of force and demonstrative use of 
force.  
 
Resting on the Rational Actor Model, the theory of coercive diplomacy argues that an 
opponent would be persuaded to stop and/or undo an action he has already embarked 
upon if his cost-benefit calculation could be manipulated in a way for him to realize that 
the costs of his action is greater than its benefits. Such a manipulation, the theory argues, 
would only occur if the opponent could credibly be threatened that if he does not stop 
and/or undo his objectionable action, the punishments that would ensue will, at the 
minimum, wipe away the benefits of the action for the opponent. Logically then for 
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coercive diplomacy to work, the cost of the threatened punishment must equal, if not 
exceed, the benefits of resistance. Therefore, if what is being demanded of the opponent 
is significant, the threatened punishment must also be equally and credibly significant for 
coercive diplomacy to work.   Hence, as George, Hall, and Simons (1971) maintain, 
while “asking very little of an opponent makes it easier for him to permit himself to be 
coerced,” asking a “great deal” in real, psychological or symbolic terms “makes the task 
of coercing him all the more difficult” (p.25).  
 
It is important to note here that the coercer and the opponent are likely to have vastly 
different understanding in regards to the totality of what is being demanded. The 
outcome, nevertheless, depends not on what the coercer thinks but what the opponent 
thinks it is being demanded. Just as an example, if the opponent thinks that conceding to 
a demand is going to lead to more demands, even if the coercer has no such intentions 
and even if the demand is trivial in nature, the opponent is likely to regard conceding to 
the demand as having significantly more costs than the actual costs of complying with the 
initial demand.  
 
Interestingly, one aspect of coercive diplomacy which is only lightly mentioned in the 
literature on coercive diplomacy but is an integral part of the deterrence and compellence 
theories is that the credibility of the stipulated threat depends heavily on its cost of 
application for the threatening party. As Schelling (1960) articulates in one of his earlier 
works “a threat has to be credible to be efficacious, and…[credibility itself] depend[s] on 
the costs and risks associated with fulfillment for the party making the threat” (p.6). 
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Hence, the Rational Actor Model would predict that within the context of coercive 
diplomacy, only threats whose application would be less costly to the sender than the 
costs that the sender is absorbing as a result of the objectionable behavior of the target, 
are going to be regarded as credible by the target. This raises paramount problems for the 
strategy since the benefits of the objectionable action for its doer often equals or even 
exceeds the costs that it imposes on the party that finds the action objectionable. Hence, if 
the party that finds the action objectionable would wish to persuade the opponent to stop, 
he, by definition, would have to brandish a threat whose costs of imposition to him will 
be greater than the costs that is being imposed on him by the objectionable behavior. Yet, 
a threat is unlikely to be deemed as credible by the opponent if he thinks that the 
threatening party is unlikely to accept undergoing a cost for stopping an objectionable 
action that is higher than the damage that is being inflicted on him by the action.  
 
The solution devised to circumvent this problem for high stake deterrence strategies has 
been to try to make the opponent believe that one’s action is somewhat guided by some 
form of “irrational automaticity and a [firm] commitment to blind and total retaliation” 
(Schelling, 1966, p.39) so as to make one’s ultimate real intentions less predictable to the 
opponent. The same strategy, however, cannot be readily utilized in most cases where 
coercive diplomacy is considered due to the complexity of such cases. Indeed for 
coercive diplomacy to even have a distant chance of success, the conflict situation should 
be very much like a bargaining situation where the interests of the involved parties are 
not absolutely opposed. In the words of Schelling (1966), “[i]t is when his pain gives us 
little or no satisfaction compared with what he can do for us, and the action or inaction 
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that satisfies us costs him less than the pain we can cause, that there is room for coercion” 
(p.4). In such settings, there is little room for automaticity and both parties know quite 
well that they have no other option but to find quid pro quo formulations that would take 
into account the threatened penalties, their cost of imposition to the coercer, their 
potential cost on the target, the benefits of the objectionable action for the target, and the 
costs of the objectionable action for the coercer. What makes such settings even more 
complex is that many of the involved variables are dynamic in nature as each side 
engages in series of moves and counter moves based on and in anticipation of the other 
side’s moves as well as the constantly changing security environment (Byman and 
Waxman, 2002, p. 38), which leaves little room for anything close to automaticity as a 
strategy and makes effective use of coercive diplomacy very dependent on the coercer’s 
skills in constant improvisation (George, 1991, p. 83-84).  
 
In theory, coercive diplomacy could be employed to make two different types of demand 
from an opponent; the opponent may either be asked to stop his objectionable behavior or 
he could be asked to undo and reverse what he has already managed to accomplish. It is 
needless to say that the inducement required to persuade an opponent to stop his 
objectionable action is generally less than what would be required to persuade him to 
reverse what he has already achieved (George, 1991, p. 6).  It is also important to note 
here that coercive diplomacy is indeed different from pure coercion and since it is 
primarily focused on changing the cost-benefit calculation of the opponent, the strategy 
of coercive diplomacy does allow for the possibility of providing an opponent with 
positive inducements as well. Indeed, in the words of George and his colleagues (1971), 
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“what the stick cannot achieve by itself, unless it is a very formidable one, can possibly 
be achieved by combining a carrot with the stick” (p. 25) and resolution of disputes are 
more likely to occur when coercion is mixed with positive inducements (Baldwin, 1971). 
Yet, just the same way that the threat of punishment must be perceived as credible by the 
opponent for it to find its way into his cost-benefit calculation, positive inducements must 
also be perceived as credible by the opponent for them to affect his calculations.  
 
While positive inducements are generally perceived as the exact opposite of imposition of 
costs and punishment, in reality they do not work as exact opposites. Threatening 
someone with a fine of 100 dollars does not have the same exact effect as promising him 
a reward of equal amount, even though they have the same opportunity cost for the target. 
This behavioral inconsistency with what seems to only be rational can be attributed to the 
fact that the target’s immediate response to threats often differ significantly from his 
response to promises of rewards (Baldwin, 1971). While fear, anxiety, and resistance are 
the usual responses to threats, the typical human response to promises tends to be one of 
hope, reassurance, and attraction. While threats are more likely to cause the target to feel 
stressed, affecting his problem solving capability, promises of rewards is more likely to 
induce the target to evaluate the expected benefit of the rewards and consider whether in 
aggregate the expected benefit of the rewards can act as an equally or more beneficial 
substitute to the expected benefit that the target envisions to draw from the objectionable 
behavior. While threats tend to generate resistance both against the demanded change in 
behavior as well as the threat itself, promises of rewards are more likely to generate 
attraction (French and Raven, 2002). Also, while positive inducements tend to signal 
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empathy, if not sympathy and concern, toward the target’s needs and interests, threats of 
punishment tend to convey indifference, if not outright hostility, toward the target’s 
wellbeing and security. As Cartwright (1959) well argues, such impressions indeed have 
a profound effect on how a target responds to attempts of influence (p. 33-34).  
 
Another difference between positive and negative inducements is that while positive 
inducements tend to enhance the likelihood of cooperation between the target and the 
coercing power to cooperate on other issues in the future, threats of punishment tend to 
act as an impediment for such future cooperation. As George Homans (1961) has 
suggested, “while the exchange of rewards tends toward stability and continued 
interaction, the exchange of punishments tends toward instability and the eventual failure 
of interaction …” (p. 57). Also, while it is generally easier to legitimize demands based 
on positive inducements making it easier for the target to concede without much damage 
to his reputation, demands made with the backing of threats of punishment are more 
difficult to legitimize and agreeing to them is likely to have significant reputational cost 
for the targets (French and Raven, 2002).  And finally while threats of punishment 
provide the target with an incentive to operate under the radar and avoid detection, 
promises of reward provide less of an incentive for deceit and concealment.  
 
Yet, while the differences between positive inducements and negative sanctions tend to 
suggest that positive inducements are more likely to be effective in bringing about change 
in the behavior of the target, there are very good reasons why coercing powers have 
generally been less eager to employ them and why their adoption is inadvisable under 
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some circumstances. First, there is a significant difference between positive inducements 
and negative sanctions in terms of their cost to the coercing power. As Schelling (1960) 
clearly describes, “a promise is costly when it succeeds, and a threat is costly when it 
fails” (p.177). Hence, the bigger the threat, the higher the odds of success, the lower the 
probability of having have to implement the threat, making it seem quite cheap for the 
coercing power to make big threats. Alternatively, the bigger the promise, the higher the 
odds of success, the higher the probability of having have to implement the promise, 
making it quite costly to give promises large enough to affect change in the behavior of 
the target. This difference between positive and negative inducements, hence, makes 
coercing powers more likely to rely on threats than on rewards to achieve their foreign 
policy objectives (Schelling, 1960, p.177).  
 
The other reason why a coercing power is more likely to make use of threats in 
comparison to rewards is closely related to the first. Since promises tend to cost more 
when they succeed, they tend to be used more often when the odds of success is 
perceived to be low by the coercing power. Yet, there is significant evidence that 
coercing powers tend to overestimate the probability that their coercive attempts will 
succeed
4
, and hence have a bias toward using sanctions. Another reason why coercing 
powers are more likely to make use of sanction and not positive inducements is the 
symbolic differences between the two. Sanctions and threats have become 
psychologically and culturally linked “with such characteristics as courage, honor, and 
masculinity” (Baldwin, 1971). In fact, in the international arena, a country that relies on 
                                                 
4
 See as evidence for example: Jervis, Robert. (1968). Hypothesis on Misperception.  World Politics, 20 
(3), 454-479. 
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positive inducements risks being perceived by others as being weak and since no country 
desires to be perceived as weak, coercing powers are less eager to rely on positive 
inducements to achieve their objectives. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reliance 
on positive inducement is likely to encourage others to place themselves in conflict with 
the coercing power and in effect blackmail the coercing power in hopes of benefiting 
from his tendency to buy off those who oppose him (Galtung, 1967). Hence developing 
such a reputation could end up being quite costly for any player in the international arena.      
 
Another aspect of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, which is lightly mentioned in the 
pertinent literature but is of great significance, is the fact that since coercion is about 
manipulating the cost-benefit calculi and the decision-making of an opponent, the 
analysis of the strategy should not focus on the “real” involved costs and benefits but on 
what the opponent perceives as the costs and the benefits.  Indeed, people from varying 
cultures, geopolitical contexts, and historical experiences will have differing perceptions 
about the involved costs and benefits. What matters the most for effective use of the 
coercive strategy is a clear understanding of the opponent’s perceptions about the 
involved costs and benefits and what is being “demanded of him, which may be at 
variance with what the coercing power thinks it is demanding” (George, 1971, p.25).  It is 
important to note and emphasize here that perhaps the most difficult aspect of effectively 
utilizing coercive diplomacy as a strategy is the very same difficulty that is associated 
with cost-benefit models; just the same way that use of cost-benefit models with any 
hopes of predictive accuracy depends heavily on the quality of information about the 
involved “real” and perceived costs and benefits, the success odds of any use of the 
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coercive diplomacy without a detailed knowledge of who the pertinent policymakers are, 
what they are after and what their goals and priorities include is unlikely to be high 
(Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 11-12).   
 
One of the involved variables that is often neglected in the literature on coercive 
diplomacy is the fact that the cost of concession to the opponent is not only the loss of the 
benefits the target once drew or envisions to draw from the objectionable action; indeed 
the mere act of capitulating to external pressure could potentially create all sorts of grave 
internal and external costs for the capitulating party. One such cost is what some have 
referred to as the “audience costs.” Both due to political considerations that are domestic 
in nature and also due to foreign relation considerations, no leader of a country desires to 
be perceived as having surrendered to foreign pressure and resistance is often over-
glorified in such circumstances. Hence, when coercive threats are issued against a 
country, particularly when what is being demanded is perceived as illegitimate either 
domestically or internationally (or both), the audience costs of capitulation becomes so 
“high that the stakes for the adversary leadership become truly vital and far exceed the 
issue in dispute” (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 36). In such situations it becomes more 
likely for the coercive threat to backfire and result in the leadership of targeted country to 
escalate the conflict in order to preserve its domestic legitimacy and international 
standing. 
 
Another cost of capitulation, which is also very difficult to quantify, is the precedent that 
it sets with regards to how the coercing power as well as other countries will deal with 
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the targeted country in the future. Leaders generally believe that if they capitulate in face 
of a coercive threat, they are more likely to be coerced again in the future both by the 
coercing power as well as other observers. Interestingly, this very issue is also a source of 
concern for the coercing power. Indeed, the success or failure of the coercive threat 
affects the reputation of the coercing power and its ability to successfully make use of the 
same strategy in the future both against the current target and potential future targets. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the empirical validity of this perception is still unresolved,
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countries and their leaderships have historically escalated conflicts and risked going to 
major wars primarily to showcase their resolve.  
 
While often times coercive diplomacy could be employed using a wide variety of 
coercive mechanisms, these mechanisms typically fall under power base erosion, 
destabilization, decapitation, debilitation, denial, and/or second-order coercion. Power 
base erosion policies are those that attempt to force a target to change its behavior by 
undermining its relationship with individuals and entities whose support is necessary for 
the target to maintain its political control and grip on power (Byman and Waxman, 2002, 
p. 59). Destabilization mechanisms are those that seek to force the target to concede by 
fomenting unrest through the creation of general popular dissatisfaction against the target. 
Such efforts generally put pressure on and punish the target’s civilian population as a 
whole in hopes that such pressures will incentivize the target’s civilian population to put 
pressure on the target to change its policies (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 65). Another 
                                                 
5
 For a good overview of the works on the reputation effects of coercion, see: Huth, Paul K. (1997). 
Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment. Security Studies, 7:1, 72-99. The 
body of literature on this issue suggests that empirically the reputation effect is stronger when it involves 
the same countries but weak with respect to observers.  
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mechanism of coercion, which is often referred to as decapitation, is to try to exact 
concession from a target by threatening to undermine the personal safety and security of 
the target’s leadership directly (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 72). Another way of trying 
to force a target to change its objectionable policies is debilitation, which occurs when 
the coercer threatens to (and if needed actually does) damage or destroy the target 
country’s infrastructures, industries, communication, and anything else that contributes to 
the target country’s economic well-being and social cohesion in order to force it to 
reconsider its policies and change its behavior (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 76). A 
target might also be forced to rethink its policies if it could be denied the benefits it 
associates with the objectionable behavior. Thus denial is referred to efforts that are 
geared toward rendering impotent a target’s strategy for winning a conflict and to prevent 
it from gaining the desired benefits of its objectionable behavior (Byman and Waxman, 
2002, p. 78). Finally, when a coercer has only minimal direct leverage, he may well 
decide to rely on second-order coercion, which occurs when coercer seeks to indirectly 
affect the policies of the target by pressuring a third party that has influence over the 
target. It is needless to say that for second-order coercion to work, the third party must 
both have influence over the target and must be willing to exercise that influence to shape 
the policies of the target in line with the demands of the coercer (Byman and Waxman, 
2002, p. 82-84).   
 
It is obvious that a particular coercive attempt might fall under several of the above noted 
mechanisms and in practice as well as theory, the abovementioned coercive mechanisms 
are not mutually exclusive. Also, one should not assume that when several coercive 
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mechanisms are used simultaneously, their net impact would be cumulative. Indeed 
depending on the circumstances, one mechanism may well undermine the effect of 
another and simultaneous employment of multiple mechanisms may result in diminished 
outcomes. Also, the abovementioned mechanisms do not always work the way intended 
and, depending on the circumstances, they could readily backfire and become 
counterproductive. For example it is quite well documented that attempts to coerce a 
country by targeting the wellbeing of its people often fail, if not backfire, primarily since 
coercive campaigns that target the populace of a country “provoke hostile public backlash 
against the coercer,” making any form of a concession prohibitively costly for the 
decision makers of the targeted country (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p. 68).      
 
Coercive diplomacy also comes in four variants. The first variant is the classic full-
fledged classic ultimatum, where the coercing power 1) makes a specific demand from 
the opponent, 2) places a deadline for compliance, and 3) puts forth a credible threat of 
punishment for noncompliance which is potent enough to impress upon the opponent that 
compliance is preferable for him. Another variant of coercive diplomacy is a tacit 
ultimatum, which differs from its full-fledged version in that it does not include a definite 
deadline for compliance even though it does convey a sense of urgency. Ultimatums, 
however, are often inappropriate and even risky due to their inflexible nature. For 
example, notwithstanding credibility related issues, oftentimes opponents do not respond 
to coercion with a clear and complete yes or no; instead opponents are more likely to 
respond to coercive threats by putting forth a conditional, partial, and/or equivocal 
acceptance in order to “create strong domestic and international pressure for negotiations 
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aimed at finding a peaceful resolution of the dispute” (George, 1991, p. 72).  In such 
cases, the coercing power is going to be left with two options; either to back down from 
his ultimatum and be viewed as not being resolute enough or act upon it despite its 
changed and most often elevated costs.  Consequently, ultimatums have become a rarity 
in international politics and the complexity of most conflict situations in the current era 
are such that they require more flexible resolution strategies. 
 
The other two variants of coercive diplomacy, which are more common than ultimatums, 
include what George (1991) calls the “try-and-see” and the “gradual turning of the 
screw” approaches (p. 7-9). In the try-and-see approach, the coercing power makes a 
demand but does not set a deadline and does not convey a sense of urgency. Also, in the 
try-and-see approach, the punishment for noncompliance is often implied and is not 
explicit; the coercing power makes a clear demand and waits to see how the opponent 
reacts and if the demand needs to be backed with a threat prior to taking the next step. A 
stronger variant of coercive diplomacy that is still weaker than an ultimatum, is the 
gradual turning of the screw approach. In this approach, the coercing power makes a 
demand and at the same time either partially initiates or threatens to partially initiate and 
further step up the pressure and the punishment as time goes by if the opponent does not 
capitulate.  It is important to note here that nothing binds a coercing power from not 
shifting from one variant of coercive diplomacy to another and that such shifts have 
historically been quite common. 
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In general, the concept and the theory of coercive diplomacy are quite straightforward. 
Coercive diplomacy is a form of coercion that seeks to persuade a target to stop or undo 
what it is doing by means other than full-scale use of force. Hence, as it often does, 
“coercion can succeed [even] if coercive diplomacy fails” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 360). 
Indeed, if the target changes its behavior only after being forced militarily or through 
regime change, then by definition coercive diplomacy has failed. Yet, even if a coercer is 
confident that its attempt at coercive diplomacy will fail and that war will be necessary to 
achieve the intended outcome, it will often find it politically worthwhile to attempt 
coercive diplomacy to showcase that it tried every alternative to war and that it resorted 
to military action only when all “peaceful” means failed to achieve the intended outcome. 
 
As George (1991) asserts, however, our knowledge about coercive diplomacy is quite 
limited and a lot more needs to be done in order to explore various aspects of this strategy 
(p. xv). One aspect of coercive diplomacy that has received little attention in the literature 
is ways in which attempts at coercive diplomacy not only fail but backfire and produce 
counterproductive results. More specifically, the literature provides little guidance on 
situations in which coercive diplomacy is attempted in order to force an adversary to stop 
or undo actions that have primarily been undertaken by the target to offset the negative 
security and/or economic impacts of past coercive attempts. In other words, it is not yet 
well understood how effective coercive diplomacy can be when the adversary’s decision 
to undertake the undesirable action is at least partially rooted in past and current coercive 
attempts of the coercer.   
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Section 2.2: The Practice and Track Record of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
The effectiveness of coercive diplomacy, the most prominent and frequent manifestation 
of which has been economic sanctions, has been evaluated extensively in the literature. 
Most scholars concur that unilateral sanctions rarely produce the intended outcomes 
(Haass, 1998, p. 200). In fact, there seems to be a consensus that relatively speaking, 
even limited multilateral sanctions tend to be more effective than comprehensive 
unilateral sanctions (O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 300; Bapat and Morgan, 2009). But in absolute 
terms, as George, Hall, and Simon (1971) have indicated, history has shown that it is 
quite difficult to coerce an opponent to yield when the opponent’s perception of what is 
being demanded is significant either in material and real terms and/or in psychological 
and symbolic terms (p. 25). In fact, scholars generally agree that sanctions have limited 
utility in compelling target states to change their behaviors, particularly when they have a 
strong disinclination to do so (Galtung, 1967; Wallensteen, 1968; Doxey, 1972; 
Schreiber, 1973; Knorr, 1977; Renwick, 1981; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990; Pape, 
1997; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Pape, 1998; Drury, 1998; Haass, 1998; Ang and 
Peksen, 2007; Nincic, 2010).  
 
For example, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE) (1990), who have used a case study 
approach to conduct one of the most extensive study of sanctions to this date, indicate 
that of all the 115 cases they have examined where sanctions were used by international 
bodies, United States, and other countries, only 34 percent “made [at least] a modest 
contribution” to achieving the intended outcome and that sanctions were even less likely 
to succeed when they were used to compel a target to “change its policies in major ways” 
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(p. 93). Reexamining the same 115 cases that were analyzed by HSE, however, Pape 
(1997) argues that HSE are far too generous and concludes that in fact less than 5 percent 
of those sanctions qualify as successful using HSE’s own standards.  
 
While Pape’s (1997) finding could suggest that HSE’s research method lacked objective 
reliability, since two studies using the same methods and coding standards have arrived at 
vastly different results, it could also be taken as an illustration of how difficult and 
subjective it is to discern 1) the intended policy objective(s) in a particular sanction 
episode and 2) the degree to which sanctions made at least a “modest contribution” to the 
realization of the intended policy objective(s).  
 
Yet, perhaps what makes most studies on sanctions even less objective is the definition 
and criteria used in evaluating the success of sanctions in a particular episode. While the 
criteria used vary from study to study, efficacy of sanctions have generally been 
evaluated in two distinct ways. Some studies have evaluated the efficacy of sanctions 
based on the amount of “pain” they manage to inflict by using economic indicators to 
gauge the degree to which sanctions have negatively affected the economy of the target 
(Baldwin, 1985, p. 130-144; Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, 1997). Most other 
scholars, however, base their measure of success on the degree to which they evaluate 
sanctions as having contributed to the realization of stated or implicit policy objectives 
using the case study approach (Wallensteen, 1968; Doxey, 1972; Schreiber, 1973; Knorr, 
1977; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; 
Pape, 1998; Drury, 1998; Hart Jr., 2000; Drezner, 2003; Ang and  Peksen, 2007).  
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One ought to be very mindful of the evaluation criteria used in such studies since what is 
and is not regarded as a success is heavily dependent on the standard utilized to discern 
the cases of success. While it is true that sanctions, particularly those that have 
multilateral backing, do generally succeed in imposing extra costs on the target 
(Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990, p. 75), they have infrequently been able to 
independently induce the target to change its behavior in significant ways (Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott, 1990, p. 93). Therefore, if success is defined as a mere capacity to 
inflict pain, then sanctions, particularly those that have the backing of the international 
community, do generally tend to succeed. But if success is defined as achieving the 
intended policy aims, unless infliction of pain was the policy aim, then sanctions, even 
those that have the backing of the UNSC, have a low likelihood of success.  
 
Consequently, the scholars who evaluate sanction episodes based on the degree to which 
sanctions manage to induce a change in the policy or behavior of the target, do not 
generally judge them to be a useful way of achieving such goals. The track record in that 
regard is fairly clear. Those who do promote sanctions as a useful policy instrument, tend 
to emphasize their effectiveness to impose costs on the target, their symbolic utility, 
and/or their usefulness when used in conjunction with other policy instruments (Baldwin, 
1985, p. 130-144; Lindsay, 1986; Nossal, 1989; Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, 
1997; Addis, 2003).   
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Several scholars, however, have questioned the methodology used by most other 
researchers and have argued that since most of the empirical studies that have 
investigated the efficacy of sanctions have usually only examined cases where sanctions 
were actually imposed, they suffer from a selection bias since they systematically omit 
cases where sanctions were implicitly or explicitly threatened but not actually imposed. 
These scholars argue that since sanctions are usually threatened before they are imposed, 
if a target refuses to comply after being credibly threatened with sanctions, it is a sign 
that it will refuse to concede even after the imposition of sanctions. In other words, they 
argue that since a target would concede if it would credibly regard the costs of a 
threatened sanction to be sufficiently high, the cases where sanctions are actually 
imposed are instances where the target did not perceive the costs of the threatened 
sanctions to be high and/or credible enough. This is why, they argue, sanctions are more 
likely to result in concessions at the threat stage than at the implementation stage and 
studies that only examine imposed sanctions underestimate the utility of sanctions as a 
way of inducing change in the behavior of the target (Morgan and Miers, 1999; Drezner, 
2003; Lacy and Niou, 2004; Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz, 2005; Marinov, 2005).  
 
It is important to note that the problem of selection bias is perhaps even deeper and 
graver than is suggested. Over the last two decades much research has surfaced to 
indicate that as countries become more interdependent they are more likely to resolve 
their disputes through non-coercive means (Mansfield, 1994; Oneal et al., 1996; Reuveny 
and Kang, 1996; Oneal and Ray, 1997; Way, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1997; Domke, 
1988; Kim, 1998; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Boehmer, Li and Gartzke, 2001). Indeed 
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today most countries use diplomacy, negotiations, cooperative mechanisms, international 
institutions, mediations and other non-coercive means of conflict resolution to resolve 
their disputes with other countries and interstate conflicts and coercive statecraft are 
anomalies (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr, 2010). Therefore, when coercion is even 
threatened, let alone utilized, it means that 1) the issue at hand is more severe than most 
other disputes between nations and 2) there is probably very little interdependence 
between the parties that are in conflict. It is important to note that both of these 
conditions (severity of conflict and lack of interdependence) are conditions that have 
been specifically named by scholars as conditions that make coercion less likely to 
succeed. For example, George, Hall, and Simon (1971) suggest that the more an 
opponent has a disinclination to yield, the more difficult it will be for the “coercing 
power to threaten sanctions sufficiently potent and sufficiently credible to overcome the 
opponents strong disinclination to comply with what is demanded of him” (p. 25). As for 
the effect of interdependence, HSE (1990) found that “sanctions directed against target 
countries that have long been adversaries of the sender country or against targets that 
have little trade with the sender country, are generally less successful” (p.99).  
 
But if the threat of sanctions and sanctions themselves have had such low success rates 
and if they typically fail to bring about the intended foreign policy outcomes, why then 
do policymakers so readily employ sanctions to begin with? Unfortunately the literature 
on this issue is very sparse and very few scholars have attended to this seeming paradox. 
HSE (1990) have evaded this question all together and have “left to others the arduous 
task of unearthing” the senders’ side of the story (p. 3). Contemplating this question, 
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Pahre (1998) suggests that considering the costs of sanction to sender(s), if through 
sanctions policymakers are not maximizing their chance in compelling the target country 
to change its policies, those employing sanctions “must be maximizing some utility other 
than change in the target country’s behavior.” Pahre (1998) concludes that sanctions are 
employed because they tend to be more effective in achieving other ends, which may be 
as valuable to the sender. He indicates that while sanction rarely succeed in forcing the 
target country to yield, they may be more effective in deterring future “misbehaviors” by 
other countries, maintaining particular international norms, and serving “political ends in 
the sender country.”   
 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) hold a position similar to that of Pahre (1998) and 
argue that sanctions are employed not in hopes that they may achieve their nominal 
objectives but “to serve the interests of pressure groups within the sanctioning country.” 
While some of these groups might derive specific benefits from the imposition of 
sanctions (for example, producers of import-competing goods gain from a ban on 
imports), others obtain utility directly from taking a moral stance against the target 
country’s objectionable behavior. Lindsay (1986) also agrees and indicates that the low 
“success” rates that research associates with sanctions is a result of researchers’ “naiveté” 
in assuming that the primary goal of sanctions is to achieve compliance.  Lindsay (1986) 
argues that while sanctions more than often fail to bring about compliance, achieve 
subversion, or deter the objectionable behaviors, they do succeed in carrying 
“international and domestic symbols,” which “explains why states continue to employ 
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sanctions.” Doxey (1980) also suggests that economic sanctions primarily have domestic 
political utility and are not really aimed at influencing the target (p.101).  
 
Lacy and Niou (2004) also critique most of the existing literature on sanction efficacy 
and argue that policymakers know quite well that sanctions alone are not going to achieve 
their most preferred outcomes, the realization of which is regarded as “success” by most 
of the existing literature on sanction efficacy. Yet, they argue, policymakers employ 
sanctions because sanctions achieve outcomes that are preferable to the status quo and a 
“resolute coercer is certainly no worse off imposing sanctions that are ignored than 
…continuing under the status quo [and not taking a stance].” Lacy and Niou’s 
explanation of why sanctions are employed, however, ignores a fact that they themselves 
confess to in their paper. As Lacy and Niou indicate, sanctions are “costly to enforce.” 
Therefore, contrary to Lacy and Niou’s explanation, the status quo might be better for the 
coercer if the potential benefits of sanctions are not greater than the definite costs of 
imposing sanctions to the coercer.  
 
Unlike most other scholars, Drury (2005), who has perhaps most thoroughly investigated 
why policymakers employ sanctions despite their bleak track record, holds that “use of 
sanctions for domestic political purposes is difficult, if not impossible” arguing that since 
a “sanction-worthy dispute must exist” before sanctions can be employed and since 
policymakers are most likely to employ sanctions against their adversaries, sanctions are 
more likely to have foreign policy goals and not domestic (p. 107). He further argues that 
sanctions should be “considered alongside of military action” since 1) policymakers 
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resort to sanctions as hostilities increase and 2) sanctions are followed by military 
coercion if the situation becomes hostile enough (P. 108). Drury does not, however, 
altogether negate the effect of domestic politics on policymaker’s decision to employ 
sanctions. His research does indeed find some evidence in that direction. Drury, 
nevertheless, contends that the existing evidence does not suggest that policymakers 
would “fabricate conflicts with other countries just so that… [they could] levy economic 
sanctions against them when… [their domestic] approval is low” (p. 110). Therefore, he 
argues, when it comes to the decision to employ or not to employ sanctions 
“[i]nternational factors trump all other concerns” (p. 110). 
 
While in general it can be said that coercive diplomacy and sanctions rarely achieve their 
intended policy objectives vis-à-vis a target, they have played a central role in 
international politics since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, coercive diplomacy 
is deceivingly attractive in many ways. It is generally perceived that if it succeeds it can 
avert wars and achieve policy objectives with minimal cost and, even when it fails, it has 
at the minimum weakened the target and paved the way for use of more forceful future 
actions.  
 
Yet, coercive diplomacy is at best a risky strategy with many pitfalls. When it fails, as it 
often does, the coercer will face the grim choice of either backing down, and hence 
tarnishing his own reputation and credibility, or enduring the costs of executing his 
threats, which often-time is higher than the expected gains. Moreover, coercive 
diplomacy can also erode the trust between the coercer and the target needed for them to 
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achieve any negotiated solution to their problems, thereby prolonging the conflict, which 
in turn both increases the costs of the conflict to both parties and hardens positions, 
making any form of a peaceful resolution more difficult to achieve. Coercive diplomacy 
is also a risky political strategy, both domestically and internationally. While at first 
coercive diplomacy might be the least costly action to take when the political 
environment requires “something” to be done, public and international attention could, 
and often does, shift away from the conflict before its resolution, leaving the coercer with 
a threat that must be backed-up with dissipated domestic and/or international support. 
This is particularly problematic when the execution of the threat made is at least 
somewhat dependent on the actions of other coalition of players, whose “views regarding 
the importance of the objective may not be shared equally” (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and 
Oegg, 2007, p. 171).   
 
Section 2.3: Conducive Conditions for Effective Use of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Coercive diplomacy is a highly context-dependent strategy. While some conditions 
enhance the probability of its eventual success, there are many situations under which 
coercive diplomacy is unlikely to achieve its intended policy objectives. For this very 
reason, researchers from different fields have long investigated the effect of various 
contextual and tactical variables that affect the odds of achieving an intended policy 
objective through the use of coercive diplomacy.  
 
Thomas Schelling is one of the earlier pioneers in this field. In his Arms and Influence 
(1966), he points to several contextual and tactical variables that could affect the success 
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odds of coercive diplomacy. Schelling contends that coercion is most effective when 1) 
the coercer inflicts minimal or no pain on the target if the target concedes, 2) the coercer 
inflicts great pain if the target does not comply with the demands of the coercer, 3) the 
target is provided with a feasible time table for compliance, 4) the target believes that the 
coercer is not capable of retracting his threat and that he alone can avert the costs and 
consequences of the imposed pain by complying with the demands of the coercer, 5) the 
target believes that compliance would automatically stop the pain, 6) the target believes 
that compliance would not result in more demands in the future, 7) the target concludes 
that the threatened pain is more unattractive to him than the pain of compliance, and 8) 
each side believes that more can be gained by bargaining than by acting unilaterally (pp. 
1–4, 69–89). Schelling, however, is quite clear in the introduction of his book that his 
work is not empirically based and says: “I have used some historical examples, but 
usually as illustration, not evidence” (1966, p. vii). He does not put to test his theory nor 
does he suggest that his work provides policymakers with any specific policy 
prescriptions.  
 
Another pioneer in this area was Alexander George. Soon after Schelling’s Arms and 
Influence, George and his colleagues published Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1971), 
which tries to help policymakers better understand the situations in which coercive 
diplomacy might be more effectively utilized by conducting a systematic, structured, and 
focused study of historical cases involving the use of coercive diplomacy. In the first 
edition of their book, George and his colleagues focus on US use of coercive diplomacy 
during the Laos crisis (1960-61), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), and the intervention in 
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Vietnam (1964-65) and in the second edition of their book published in 1994, they add 
more cases to their studies. At the end of both the first and the second editions of Limits 
of Coercive Diplomacy, George points to a series of conditions that favor successful 
implementation of different variants of coercive diplomacy and suggests that 
policymakers should pick their variant of coercive diplomacy to implement, if at all, 
based on the extent to which his list of conducive conditions are present in a crisis. It is 
quite interesting to note that between 1971 and 1994, the list of conditions that George 
identifies remain almost identical. They are (1971, pp. 216-228; 1994, pp. 279-288): 
First Edition (1971) Second Edition (1994) 
Clarity of coercer’s objective Clarity of coercer’s objective 
Coercer having a strong motivation Coercer having strong motivation 
Asymmetry of motivation in coercer’s favor Asymmetry of motivation in coercer’s favor 
Target’s sense of urgency to concede  Target’s sense of urgency to concede  
 Coercer having strong leadership* 
Coercer having adequate domestic support  Coercer having adequate domestic support  
Coercer having usable military options* Coercer having adequate international support* 
Target’s fear of unacceptable escalation Target’s fear of unacceptable escalation 
Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement 
      * Item(s) unique to the edition 
 
But perhaps the most extensive work that both studies the efficacy of various coercive 
instruments and provides policy relevant lessons on the contextual and tactical variables 
that affect successful utilization coercive diplomacy using a systematic case study 
approach is the work of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE), titled Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered. HSE published the first edition of their work in 1985, the second edition in 
1990, and the third edition was published in 2007, updating each edition with the study of 
more sanction episodes. The extensiveness of HSE’s work is indeed unique, the number 
of sanction episodes that they analyze is unparalleled, and their method of investigation is 
perhaps the most systematic. Like George, HSE offer their own list of conditions that 
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affect the degree to which sanctions are likely to succeed and like the study and 
recommendations that George offers, the policy prescriptions of HSE have remained 
almost intact throughout the three editions of the book. According to HSE’s most recent 
work (2007, pp. 158-178), sanctions are more likely to succeed when:  
1. The coercer’s demands are limited, modest and clear; 
2. The coercer has an otherwise cordial relationship with the target; 
3. The target is politically weak and instable 
4. The target is significantly smaller and weaker than the coercer; 
5. The sanction is imposed quickly, decisively, and causes the maximum pain 
possible from the onset; 
6. The sanction is imposed by a large coalition of countries who have very similar 
policy objectives and motivation; 
7. The sanction is not intended as a prelude to war; 
8. The sanction does not impose high costs on the coercer’s own domestic 
constituents and foreign allies.   
 
Numerous other scholars have also studied the contextual and tactical variables that affect 
the success odds of employment of coercive diplomacy. Many of their recommendations, 
however, are essentially captured by what Shelling, George, and HSE have offered in 
their works and only a few of the conditions and recommendations mentioned by other 
scholars are unique and important.  
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For example, Art and Cronin (2003) find that sanctions are more likely to succeed if they 
are coupled with positive inducement that are offered after or simultaneous to the 
sanctions (pp. 393–397). They also find that coercive methods that emphasize denial 
work better than those that focus on punishment (pp. 399-401). Cortright and Lopez 
(2000) suggest that sanctions are more likely to succeed if they target, pressure, and deny 
assets and resources of value to the decision-making elite and avoid measures that cause 
humanitarian hardship or negatively affect opposition constituencies in the target country 
(pp. 224-228).  
 
Genugten and Groot (1999) indicate that sanctions are most likely to fail if the coercer’s 
demands and concerns are not shared by a significant constituency within the target 
country. They also emphasize that sanctions are more effective if the demanded change in 
the policy or conduct of a country’s decision-making elite is voiced both by external and 
internal forces (pp. 145-146). The finding of Genugten and Groot (1999) corroborates 
what the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in November 1994 as it was 
assessing various aspects of imposing an oil embargo against Nigeria. In that report, 
GAO also asserts that “[I]f the targeted country has a domestic opposition to the policies 
of the government in power, sanctions can strengthen this opposition and improve the 
likelihood of a positive political response to the sanctions” (p. 12).   
 
 
  
49 
 
Section 2.4: Missing in the Literature 
 
While sanctions and effective utilization of coercive diplomacy have long been studied 
from a wide variety of dimensions, there are many issues that are yet to be addressed. 
Surveying the recommendations offered by various scholars on effective utilization of 
coercive diplomacy, it is remarkable how one of the most heated debates among 
international relations theorist has basically been ignored by those debating the various 
aspects of coercive diplomacy. Indeed, differing perceptions about the factors that drive 
the target state’s policies have long underlined policy debates among international 
relations experts. Should one consider the adversary as being somehow intrinsically 
hostile or should the hostile actions of an adversary be primarily viewed as his response 
to the security environment in which he resides? Is the target state doing what is 
objectionable because it seeks to ultimately impose its will on others or are the 
undesirable actions of the target state rooted in its fear of others to seriously undermine 
its legitimate interests? Without knowing the answer to these core questions regarding the 
intentions of the adversary and without fully understanding the nature and the root causes 
of a conflict, any prescription geared toward increasing the success odds of coercive 
diplomacy is likely to have an unacceptably high failure rate. 
 
As this dissertation illustrates, a coercing power must ensure that his coercive measures 
do not augment and/or add to the very factors that have positively contributed to the 
adoption of the objectionable policy by the target. Coercion could potentially initiate a 
positive feedback loop that would create many more reasons for the target to more 
aggressively pursue the objectionable policy. Indeed, if a coercive measure and/or the 
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costs that it imposes on the target positively induces it to continue on with or even 
intensify its pursuit of the objectionable policy, then it would be unrealistic to expect that 
that coercive measure would eventually persuade the target to stop the objectionable 
policy. What makes the situation even more tragic is that those who adopt such coercive 
measures are often unaware of the positive feedback loop that they might have created 
and when they see their coercive measures not working, they often conclude that their 
coercive measure was not tough enough, resulting in the intensification of the coercive 
measure, which in turn further adds to the motives of the target to pursue the 
objectionable policy with much more vigor.  
 
Existence of such a mechanism has long been known to international relations theorists 
that have studied the nature of international conflicts under such labels as the “spiral 
model” or the “security dilemma.” More than half a century ago, John H. Herz described 
this tendency in international relation in his Political Realism and Political Idealism and 
asserted that “the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, 
regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own 
measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening” (1951 p.7). 
Indeed, policymakers often interpret events and actions based on what they think to be 
true. So if they think a state has hostile intentions, neutral or even friendly postures of 
that state is more likely to be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity if not 
outright as hostile (Jarvis, 1976 p. 68). It is due time for those studying various aspects of 
coercive diplomacy to start incorporating those concepts into their works and more 
vigorously study their effects on successful utilization of the strategy.  
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Section 2.5: Conclusion  
 
The literature on the theory, use and efficacy of coercive diplomacy is indeed extensive. 
Since early days of the Cold War, theorists from various fields have studied the strategy 
in depth and have provided their own policy prescriptions on when and how best to use 
the strategy to achieved foreign policy objectives. Coercive diplomacy is an alluring 
strategy because, if successfully employed, it promises to achieve intended policy 
objectives in conflict situations without having to burden the costs war. Yet, the track 
record of the strategy has been quite bleak and history suggests that the strategy is 
significantly more likely to fail than to succeed. For this very reason, scholars have 
studied the efficacy of the strategy from various angles, trying to suggest ways to 
increase and enhance the success odds of the strategy and inform policymakers of 
contextual and tactical variables that affect the strategy’s probability of success and 
failure. Interestingly, their recommendations are quite similar and have roughly remained 
intact during the past half century, despite the radical changes in our world political, 
economic, and strategic environment. But perhaps more interestingly, scholars 
contributing to the literature on coercive diplomacy seem to have neglected the debates 
international relations theorists have had regarding the core nature of international 
conflicts and have not thoroughly accounted for the effects of security dilemma in their 
analyses.  
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Chapter 3: US Use of Coercive Diplomacy Against Iran 
 
Coercive diplomacy and sanctions have been the most constant feature of US foreign 
policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979. While the indicated objectives of 
US sanctions against Iran have evolved over the past thirty five years, the overarching 
strategy of the US toward Iran has not changed much since the inception of the Islamic 
Republic. Soon after the fall of the Shah, the US sought to maintain the old order under 
the new political conditions in Iran. When those efforts failed and when US embassy in 
Tehran was seized by militant students, the US was quick to rely on coercive measures 
against Iran to achieve its foreign policy objectives in that country. From the time 
President Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Act in 1979 to freeze all 
Iranian deposits, assets, and properties in the US, coercive diplomacy has remained the 
primary and most salient aspect of US foreign policy on Iran. It is, however, questionable 
whether the utilization and continued reliance on coercive diplomacy has positively 
contributed to the realization of US foreign policy objectives in Iran.   
 
The ultimate aim of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of US and international 
sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program. It is, nevertheless, important to provide a 
background on Iran – US relations in order to better understand the context in which 
coercive diplomacy and sanctions have been employed against Iran. Therefore, this 
chapter will begin with a survey of Iran – US relations, followed by a study of the 
coercive measures that have been adopted by the US and the UNSC to persuade Iran to 
curtail its nuclear ambitions, before an impact evaluation of these coercive measures is 
undertaken. 
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Section 3.1: Background: Iran – US Relations 
 
Section 3.1.01: Relations Prior to the Second World War  
 
American missionaries from the American Presbyterian Church were the first recorded 
Americans to travel to Iran in 1830s. They arrived in northeastern Iran and gradually 
expanded their sphere of activities. Since their religious activities were primarily directed 
at proselytizing Iranian Jews and Armenian Christians (Yeselson, 1956 p. 9), they did not 
face excessive opposition from the predominantly Muslim population of Iran. In fact, 
through their charity programs, schools, and direly needed medical services,
6
 they were 
able to win the admiration of the people they served and, in comparison to missionaries 
from other countries and churches, were regarded with much less suspicion.  
 
While it could be said that diplomatic relations between Iran and the US started with the 
1856 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, which was signed in Constantinople – present 
day Istanbul – between Iran and the US, it was not until 1883 that the American legation 
opened in Tehran, with Samuel G. W. Benjamin assuming the role of the first Consul 
General of the US to Persia. Generally speaking, Iranians regarded the US, a historically 
anti-imperialist nation, as a key potential ally in their effort to curb the malign influences 
of Imperial Russia and Great Britain (Yeselson, 1956 p. 27). However, despite Iran’s 
eagerness for the US to play a more salient role in Iran, the Monroe Doctrine and 
American isolationism prevented the US from becoming too politically involved in a 
                                                 
6
 The earliest modern medical school in Iran was set up by Joseph Plumb Cochran, an American 
Presbyterian missionary, in late 1870s. In fact, Dr. Cochran is credited as the father of modern medicine in 
Iran. 
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country that was squarely under the sphere of influence of both Russia and the Great 
Britain.   
 
Interestingly, even Iran’s 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the subsequent effort by 
Mohammad Ali Shah to eliminate the Majlis, and the ensuing unrest throughout the 
country that threatened the safety and security of American lives and properties in Iran 
were not enough to bring any change in America’s strict nonintervention policy toward 
Iran. The same, however, was not the case with regards to the American missionaries, 
who refused to abide by the explicit instructions of the US government forbidding them 
from any act that may have the appearance of them taking sides in Iran’s civil war and 
actively aided the Constitutionalists in their struggle against royal forces of Mohammad 
Ali Shah (Yeselson, 1956 pp. 85-104). Howard Baskerville, for example, who was an 
American teacher in the Presbyterian mission school in the northeastern Iranian city of 
Tabriz, was shot dead on April 10, 1909, as he led a small group of Constitutionalists 
against the royal forces of Mohammad Ali Shah. Quite interestingly, although the efforts 
of the American missionaries were not sanctioned by the US government and although 
they had been explicitly forbidden to become involved even in humanitarian efforts 
during that civil conflict, their efforts had a lasting effect on the psyche of the Iranian 
public and officials, who increasingly viewed the US as a “third force” that could prevent 
imperialist interventions in Iran (Lawson, 29).  
 
Neither Constitutionalism nor US policy of strict nonintervention lasted for long.  
Discovery of oil in Iran and the First World War turned Iran into a geopolitically strategic 
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location that the Allied Powers could not ignore. Iran, which had declared neutrality, was 
occupied by Allied Forces during the First World War. Nevertheless, President Wilson’s 
famous assertion that “the people of small and weak states have the right to expect to be 
dealt with exactly as the people of big and powerful states” (September 2, 1916), offered 
great hopes for countries like Iran that were enduring significant hardships due to their 
inability to preserve their independence and national sovereignty. Interestingly, while the 
events surrounding the First World War did not have much of an effect on US policy of 
nonintervention in Iran, US domestic politics and the Senate’s opposition to the League 
of Nations did bring a change in America’s Iran policy.  
 
At the end of the First World War, Great Britain used its influence over Iran and 
effectively bribed Iranian officials to sign the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, which 
would have turned Iran into a de facto protectorate of Great Britain (Olso, 1980, pp. 237-
240). Wilson’s opponents in the Senate had the treaty printed in Congressional Records 
and used it as evidence of how the League of Nations could pull the US into a war that 
was contrary to American ideals and interests. Senator Borah of Idaho, for example, 
passionately argued on September 29, 1919, that the agreement violated Iran’s 
independence, asserted that the treaty was imposed on Iran since it was signed when Iran 
was under British occupation, and maintained that joining the League of Nations would 
force the US to help Great Britain should Iran seek to regain its independence sometime 
in the future (Congressional Record, pp. 6086-6089). This debate brought Iran’s cause to 
the forefronts of American politics and forced the US government to publicly disapprove 
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and challenge the Anglo-Persian Agreement in contradiction of its strict nonintervention 
policy toward Iran (Yeselson, 1956, pp.161-166).  
 
Since the Anglo-Persian Agreement did also include substantial aid for the reconstruction 
of Iran, Iranians took American opposition to the agreement as a sign that the US was 
ready to provide Iran with a counter offer. That, however, was not something the US was 
willing to do. Instead, the US was willing and did signal an association between rejection 
of the agreement by Iran and US investment in Iran’s fledgling oil industry. To further 
persuade Iranians that the US opposed the agreement and that it was seriously 
contemplating investments in Iran oil sector, State Department impressed upon Standard 
Oil to “immediately and directly” start negotiating with the Iranian Government. Being 
heartened by the American support, the Iranian government denounced the agreement, 
and the Majlis, which for the first time in six years convened on June 22, 1921, rejected 
ratification of the Anglo-Persian Agreement (Yeselson, 1956, pp. 167-169)  
 
The rejection of the Anglo-Persian agreement coincided with massive growth of 
American oil companies with both the capacity and the inclination to invest across the 
globe, including in the Middle East. Yet, despite the efforts of the US government to 
open Iranian oil to giant American oil companies and despite Iran’s eagerness to counter 
British influence through American commercial presence in Iran, Great Britain, which 
had exclusive rights over southern Iranian oil fields, prevented American oil companies 
from gaining access to Iranian oil in a variety of ways. In one instant when the Majlis did 
manage to provide an oil concession to the American Standard Oil, the British effectively 
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maneuvered Standard Oil into an agreement with the British Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, which was running the refineries in southern Iran. The Majlis, which was 
infuriated by the agreement between Standard Oil and the British Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, promptly annulled the concession as soon as the alliance was announced.  
 
Section 3.1.02: From the Second World War to the 1953 Coup Against 
Mossadeq  
 
During the Second World War, Iran was occupied again. Great Britain and the USSR saw 
the newly inaugurated Trans-Iranian Railway, which connected the Persian Gulf to the 
Caspian Sea, as an indispensable transport route for direly needed military supplies on the 
Eastern Front.  Being vexed by increased German presence and influence in Iran, Great 
Britain and Soviet Union took no chances and occupied Iran on August 25, 1941. They 
sent Reza Shah into exile and replaced him with his young son, Mohammad Reza Shah. 
After declaring war against Japan and entering into the Second World War, the US also 
sent forces into Iran to secure the so called Persian Corridor. To bring the occupation of 
Iran in line with the Atlantic Charter, which had been drafted and agreed to by the United 
States and Great Britain less than two weeks before the invasion of Iran, Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union signed an Alliance treaty, known as the Tripartite Treaty, with Iran 
on January 29, 1942, promising to safeguard the economic interests of the Iranian people, 
to “respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran” and to withdraw their forces 
from Iran “no later than six months” after the end of the Second World War. Yet, having 
absolutely no trust in Soviet Union and Great Britain due to their history in Iran, Iran was 
quick to turn to the US to act as the enforcer of that treaty. 
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Hence, on January 31, 1942, the young Shah wrote a letter to President Franklin 
Roosevelt, emphasizing that Iran relied on the US to “ensure the fulfillment of the 
pledges given” by Great Britain and Soviet Union (Alexander and Names, 1980, pp. 81-
82). While despite the Shah’s insistence, President Franklin Roosevelt refused to attach 
his signature to the Tripartite Treaty, the US did come to realize Iran’s geopolitical 
significance around the end of the Second World War and was keen to take the place of 
Great Britain as it moved out of the Persian Gulf region. In fact, on August 16, 1943, in a 
memorandum to President Roosevelt on “American Policy in Iran,” Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull asserted that “it is to our interest that no great power be established on the 
Persian Gulf opposite to the important American petroleum development in Saudi 
Arabia” and recommended the US to “adopt a policy of positive action in Iran” (Foreign 
Relations, 1943, p. 378). Hence, in order to signal to the Great Britain and, more 
importantly, to the Soviet Union that the US was no longer pursuing a policy of 
nonintervention in Iran, the US welcomed Iran’s request at the Tehran Conference, 1943, 
for an Allied declaration respecting its sovereignty and President Roosevelt affixed his 
signature next to that of Churchill and Stalin on December 1, 1943, to the “Declaration of 
the Three Powers Regarding Iran,” which besides promises of economic aid, stressed that 
“the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one 
with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.” 
 
With this change in US policy toward Iran, the US upgraded it legation in Tehran to 
Embassy status in February 1944 and openly opposed possible post-war Soviet ambitions 
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in Iran. Among US measures to this effect was the support it lent to a Majlis bill, which 
was principally authored by MP Mohammad Mossadeq, prohibiting any Iranian official 
from even discussing, let alone signing, any oil related agreements with any foreign 
government, company, or person until the end of the Second World War. Interestingly, 
while Western powers primarily supported the bill as a way to curtail Soviet ambitions in 
Iran, MP Mossadeq’s primary objective in securing the bill was to not only prevent future 
oil concessions but to also seriously reexamine the concessions that had already been 
given to the Great Britain (Kermani, 1950, pp. 577-601).  
 
US involvement in Iran reached its climax when at the end of the Second World War, it 
became clear that the Soviet Union had no intention of honoring its commitment to 
preserve Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. During Soviet occupation of northern 
Iran, pro-Soviet groups gained control over two Iranian Northern provinces of Azerbaijan 
and Kurdistan and, with the support of nearby Soviet forces, declared autonomy from 
Tehran. When the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its forces from northern Iran by the 
agreed-upon date and prevented the Iranian army from bringing Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan back under the control of Iran’s central government, President Truman felt that 
“the Russian activities in Iran” not only threatened US interests in the region but 
“threatened the peace of the world” (Truman, 1956, p. 93). Hence, on March 6, 1946, the 
US sent a note to the Soviet Union asserting that the United States “cannot remain 
indifferent” to the Soviet decision to maintain a troop presence in Iran despite its various 
promises to do otherwise (Truman, 1956, p. 94). Purportedly, in another message to 
Stalin, President Truman informed Stalin that he has given orders to US military chiefs to 
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prepare for the movement of US ground, sea, and air forces into Iran in case the Soviet 
Union did not end its occupation of northern Iran (Lenczowski, 1990, p. 13).  
 
With the support of the US, Iran was able to diplomatically outmaneuver the Soviet 
Union, promising it oil concessions in return for Soviet withdrawal from Iranian 
territories. Consequently, on March 24, 1946, Moscow declared that all Soviet troops 
would at once withdraw from Iran, pending a final deal between Iran and the Soviet 
Union. Although a final deal promising Russia a 51% stake in northern Iranian oil fields 
as well as autonomy for the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions was signed between Iran 
and the Soviet Union in April 1946, soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, troops 
from Tehran crushed the secessionist governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and, in 
December of 1946, brought those provinces back under the control of the central 
government of Iran. But perhaps, most significantly, when it came time for the newly 
inaugurated Majlis to ratify the Irano-Soviet agreement of April 1946, George V. Allen, 
the US ambassador in Tehran, publicly denounced the coercive measures employed by 
foreign governments to secure “commercial concession in Iran and promised full 
American support for Iranians in freely deciding about the disposition on their national 
resources” (Lenczowski, 1990, p. 12). Hence, with the political backing of the US, the 
Majlis almost unanimously refused to ratify the Irano-Soviet agreement of April 1946 on 
October 22, 1947, and declared it null and void. 
 
While Iran was not specifically mentioned in the Truman Doctrine, it was one of the 
earlier places where the doctrine was put to test. Truman being convinced of the Soviet 
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expansionist intentions, perceived a long-term strategy of containment as the best way to 
curb Soviet aggression and expansionism. Hence, in that broader conceptual framework, 
Iran’s geopolitical significance became further accentuated and the US economic, 
political, and military involvement in Iran was increasingly regarded to be vital to core 
US national interests. Consequently, successive US Presidents pursued a policy of active 
engagement with Iran. As US economic and military aid came pouring into Iran, Iran 
became confident that it could rely on the US to limit the excesses of the Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union, alike. Having significantly limited Soviet influence and pressure 
over Iran with the backing of the US, Iran relied on the US again as it tried to renegotiate 
a better oil deal with the Great Britain.  
 
The Majlis, which had become the strongest public institution in Iran due to the 
weaknesses of both the Monarchy and the Executive, was outraged by the fact that the 
British government was deriving more revenues from taxing the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC), a British owned and operated company that was contracted to extract 
and export Iranian oil, than the Iranian government was receiving in royalties (Keddie, 
2006, pp. 123-124). The Majlis appointed Mossadeq to head a committee to look into the 
issue and to renegotiate with AIOC a deal quite similar to the fifty-fifty profit sharing 
deal that the US (Aramco) had with the Saudi government.  
 
AIOC, however, refused to accept a fifty-fifty arrangement, pushing both the Majlis and 
public sentiments toward full nationalization of Iran’s oil industry (Keddie, 2006, p. 124). 
PM Ali Razmara, who was against nationalization on “technical grounds,” was 
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assassinated in March 7, 1951.  A week later, on March 15, 1951, the Majlis passed a bill 
to nationalize the Iranian oil industry and the Iranian Senate approved the bill less than a 
week later on March 20, 1951. When PM Ala, who had succeeded Razmara, failed to 
reach an agreement with the British to enforce the bill, the Majlis voted to replace Ala 
with Mossadeq on April 30, 1951 and on May 1 PM Mossadeq declared AIOC 
nationalized. Britain, however, rejected the nationalization as illegal, crippled the 
industry by ordering all British advisors and technicians out of Iran, froze Iranian assets 
in British banks, warned fleets from other countries that they would be severely dealt 
with should they transport, let alone market, Iranian oil, and filed a complaint against Iran 
in the International Court at The Hague. Great Britain also secured agreements with other 
western oil companies not to enter into any agreement with Iran and to increase their 
productions elsewhere to compensate for the loss of Iranian oil in the global oil market. 
These measures reduced Iran’s oil revenue to almost nothing and further intensified 
Iran’s economic plight (Saikal, 1980, pp. 35-45).   
 
These measures only made Mossadeq, who also enjoyed the backing of Iran’s religious 
establishment, even more popular at home. His growing popularity and firmness on the 
oil issue, however, created frictions between him and the Shah.  In the summer of 1952, 
the Shah refused to grant Mossadeq’s wish to have control over Iran’s Armed Forces. 
Mossadeq resigned in response but after three days of pro-Mossadeq demonstrations the 
Shah was forced to reappoint Mossadeq as Iran’s Prime Minister. However, the sorry 
state of affairs, created by the British embargo, made it very difficult for Mossadeq to 
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provide for the basic needs of the Iranian people, let alone implement his promised 
domestic reforms.  
 
Mossadeq, whose firm stance on nationalization was encouraged by Henry Grady, the 
outspoken US Ambassador to Tehran (Saikal, 1980, p.41), paid several visits to the US, 
looking for support from the power that had previously helped Iran during its most 
difficult times. The US initially responded positively and President Truman expressed his 
sympathy with Iran’s nationalist aspirations. Around the same time, the British Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) prepared a covert coup plan against Mossadeq and reached the 
conclusion that it needed US support and collaboration for the plan to succeed. It, 
however, became quite clear that despite the approval of Allen Dulles, who was at the 
time the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, President Truman was not going to 
approve covert action against Mossadeq (Andrew, 1995, p. 203).   President Eisenhower, 
however, was not as sympathetic to the Iranian cause. He was persuaded by the British 
that Mossadeq was vulnerable to a coup by the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party, and 
shifted US policy closer to that of Great Britain (Andrew, 1995, p. 203). Hence, in June 
of 1953, President Eisenhower endorsed a British proposal for a covert operation, code-
named Operation Ajax, to bring down Mossadeq. Then, on June 29, 1953, Eisenhower 
wrote a letter in response to Mossadeq’s request for help informing Mossadeq that while 
“the Government and people of the United States… sincerely hope that Iran will be able 
to maintain its independence…the failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to reach an 
agreement with regard to compensation has handicapped the Government of the United 
States in its efforts to help Iran.”  
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Simultaneous with the letter, President Eisenhower secretly sent CIA agent Kermit 
Roosevelt to coordinate a coup against Mossadeq. Roosevelt spoke with the Shah and 
General Zahedi and went over the details of Operation Ajax. As part of the plan, on 
midnight of August 13, 1953, the Shah sent a royal order to Mossadeq, ordering him to 
abdicate in favor of General Zahedi.  Mossadeq dismissed the order as forgery, arrested 
the messenger, and took extraordinary precautionary measures against a possible coup 
plot.  This triggered the second stage of the operation, which called for a military coup. 
The second stage of the coup also initially failed and fearing for his life, the Shah 
immediately left the country.  Within four days, however, the CIA managed to topple 
Mossadeq’s government and returned the Shah to the country on August 19, 1953.  
 
Upon return, the Shah, with the heavy hand of the US on his side, went back to his 
father’s way of governance.  He banned all political parties, put Mossadeq under house 
arrest until his death in 1967, executed Mossadeq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hosain 
Fatemi and several other military leaders loyal to Mossadeq, imprisoned hundreds of 
National Front leaders and other Mossadeq loyalists and “turned Iran into a police state” 
(Ghods, 1989, p.189).  The coup not only transformed Iran – US relations, but also the 
Iranian public perceptions regarding the US. Indeed, the Iranian public felt betrayed by 
the US (Bill, 1988, p. 86) as it had taken away from them a government they had strived 
to achieve since the Tobacco Movement of 1891.  
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Section 3.1.03: From Coup to the Revolution  
 
The US established a very close tie with the Shah of Iran after the CIA sponsored coup of 
1953. It provided Iran with both economic and military aid and assistance.  In the context 
of the Cold War, Iran was regarded as a crucial ally in curtailing the Soviet influence in 
the region. The Shah allowed Iran’s territory to be used by the US for espionage activities 
against the Soviet Union. Among such activities were indispensable listening stations that 
were built by the CIA in northern Iran to monitor and intercept “radio signals broadcasted 
by missiles during the first minute or so of test launches from Turatam. The signals, 
known as telemetry, provided data on key missile characteristics, such as the size, 
payload and fuel consumption of new rockets” (Burt, 1979). 
 
Among American aid to Iran was assistance in the field of nuclear technology. Iran and 
the United States signed an agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation on March 5, 1957. 
Two years later, the Shah ordered the establishment of University of Tehran Nuclear 
Center, which in 1960 ordered a 5 MWt research reactor from the US. The research 
reactor, known as the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), became operational in 1967, 
fueled by 5.5 kg of American supplied 93% enriched uranium (Fuhrmann, 2012, p. 82). 
The US also pledged $350,000 assistance to Iran’s nuclear program as part of its Atoms 
for Peace agreement. Once Iran developed the prerequisites of a more extensive nuclear 
program, the US agreed to deepen its nuclear cooperation with Iran and to assist Iran in 
its declared quest to generate twenty-three thousand MWe from nuclear power facilities 
by 1994. Henry Kissinger and Iranian Finance Minister signed a $15 billion trade 
agreement, which required US firms to supply Iran with eight nuclear power reactors 
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(Fuhrmann, 2012, p. 83). On January 1, 1978, President Carter and the Shah reached 
another agreement, which pledged that Iran would receive ‘most favored nation” status 
for reprocessing, meaning that the US would not discriminate against Iran for permission 
to reprocess plutonium from enriched uranium fuel of American origin (Poneman, 1982, 
p. 88).  
US support of Iran went much beyond economic and energy cooperation. Soon after the 
coup, it became clear that extra precautionary measures were needed to defuse all 
possible future threats against the monarchy. As a result, the CIA, with the assistance of 
the Israeli intelligence officers, helped in setting up SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, in 
1957. The SAVAK was given wide latitude to identify, torture, and execute opponents of 
the Shah and created a “pervasive climate of fear and intimidation” throughout the 
Iranian society (Gasiorowski, 1991, p. 152) The SAVAK was notorious for its grisly 
torture techniques and was feared by all segment of the society, including the elites. The 
Shah heavily relied on SAVAK and did as he willed without worrying much about 
possible domestic opposition. Considering SAVAK owed much of its efficiency and 
capability to extensive American assistance and to the CIA’s special training and liaison 
relationship with SAVAK, as SAVAK increased its operations, the people became more 
distrusting of the United States as they saw it behind its brutality (Saikal, 1980, p. 62; 
Gasiorowski, 1991, p. 121).  
 
With time, the relationship between the Shah and the US became even more 
indispensable for both sides. The US embassy in Iran became the largest US embassy in 
the world, with over 1400 American staff (Moon, 2000). As a party to the Central Treaty 
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Organization (CENTO), the US encouraged the Shah to purchase more and more military 
hardware from the US. By 1977, Iranian military and security establishments were 
absorbing some 40% of Iran’s budget (Bill, 1988, p. 202), making Iran the largest foreign 
buyer of American arms (Marshall, Scot and Hunter, 1987, p. 152). As the Shah 
purchased more and more military hardware from the US, the US sent increasing number 
of military advisors to Iran.  
 
On October 13, 1964, the Majlis, under pressure from the Shah and the US, granted 
American military personnel full diplomatic immunity and approved the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), which barred Iranian courts from prosecuting any member of the US 
military personnel, advisors, or their dependents. The move instantaneously enraged all 
Iranians, regardless of their political orientation (Bill, 1988, 157). Among the most vocal 
opponents of the bill was Ayatollah Khomeini, who in a speech said the agreement has 
“reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog” (Bill, 1988, 
159). Anti-US and anti-Shah demonstrations broke out and the Shah used his military to 
suppress the demonstrators and sent the Ayatollah into exile. As the public support for 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini grew, the SAVAK became even more brutal in its methods 
and more intolerant of any form of opposition to the Shah and his policies. The US, 
however, refused to put any pressure on the Shah. The unspoken understanding in the US 
was “that the deal with the Shah…[is] ‘you rely on me for what goes on here, and I’ll let 
you have all the telemetry and monitoring equipments [to monitor Soviet missile and 
nuclear activities] up north [of Iran] that you want’” (Ranelagh, 1986, p. 649).  
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Section 3.1.04: The Islamic Revolution  
 
In 1976, Jimmy Carter was elected President.  During his campaign, Carter emphasized a 
foreign policy that was going to stress on human rights and reduction of US arms sales. 
In his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1977, President Carter declared that “our 
commitment to human rights must be absolute… because we are free, we can never be 
indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear cut 
preference for these societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual 
human rights.” President Carter’s election worried the Shah because Carter had been 
elected on “a platform that appeared to be hostile to many of the Shah’s policies” (Sick, 
1985, p. 22). Yet, the Carter administration, which believed that the US did not have any 
viable strategic alternative to the special relationship with the Shah, went to great lengths 
to “reassure the Shah that there was no intent to alter the basic nature of the relationship” 
(Sick, 1985, pp. 22-23). In fact, President Carter instructed Bill Sullivan, Carter’s 
Ambassador to Tehran, to reassure the Shah that President Carter was not going to apply 
any pressure on the Shah on human rights (Precht, 2004). 
 
As anti-Shah demonstration started to mount, the Shah used more lethal force and the US 
continued to publicly showcase its special relationship with the Shah. Quite famously, on 
December 31, 1977, less than ten days before the uprising in Qom, which led to death of 
at least seventy individuals and arrest of hundreds of demonstrators (Keddie, 2006, p. 
224), in a visit to Iran, President Carter said: “Iran, because of the great leadership of the 
Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a 
great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and the 
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admiration and love which your people give to you… We have no other nation with 
whom we have closer consultation on regional problems that concern us both. And there 
is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal 
friendship.”  
 
As people in the city of Tabriz marked the 40
th
 day
7
 of those killed in Qom, the Shah’s 
security forces clashed with mourners, killing hundreds of the protestors (Ghods, 1989, p. 
217). The 40
th
 day of those killed in Tabriz was commemorated throughout the country, 
and the Shah’s security forces reacted to those processions in even a more violent 
fashion. The more forcefully the Shah’s security forces suppressed the protests, the 
stronger became the ability of revolutionary leaders to organize new protests (Vance, 
1983, p. 324). Day by day, more and more people were killed and imprisoned.  
 
The US, however, was unable to understand the dynamics. The “US intelligence 
[community], in part because of policy decisions made by several administrations that 
severely limited collection, was largely blind to the growing likelihood” of the Shah’s fall 
(Lowenthal,  2006, p. 25). In fact a CIA assessment in August 1978, had concluded that 
Iran was “not in a revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary situation” (Andrew, 1995, p. 
439). Even as late as September 28, 1978, some ten days after one of the bloodiest 
demonstration in the city of Tehran, the conclusion of US Defense Intelligence Agency 
was that the Shah “is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years” (Bill, 
1988, 258).  
 
                                                 
7
 It is customary in Shia Islam to mourn and commemorate the dead 40 days after their death. 
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In the fall of 1978, the Shah declared martial law in order to quell the ongoing 
demonstrations. On September 8, 1978, people in Tehran ignored the martial law and 
took to the streets. The Shah’s security forces surrounded the demonstrators in Jaleh 
Square and opened fire on an estimated 20,000 demonstrators that had congregated in the 
Square. Reports of casualty varies, with the government claiming 122 killed and 3,000 
wounded, the opposition claiming the number killed to be around 1,000, and doctors 
estimating around 400 killed and some 4,000 injured (Sick, 1985, p. 51). In response, the 
US embassy prepared a statement declaring that “the monarchy is a deeply important 
institution in Iran and the Shah is, in our view, the individual most suited to lead the 
Iranian people to a more democratic system” (Nolan and MacEachin, 2006, pp. 22-23). 
President Carter also called the Shah on September 10, to express his support for the 
Shah and concerns over the events. The White House released a statement publicizing the 
telephone conversation and “reaffirming the close and friendly relationship between Iran 
and the United States” (Sick, 1985, p. 51). The statements infuriated the opposition and 
made them more convinced that they were fighting against a greater power than the Shah, 
i.e. the United States. 
 
The revolution reached its climax in early 1979. Daily demonstrations made it impossible 
for the Shah to assert his authority. The people had become resolute and united to defeat 
the Shah and the overt US support for the Shah injected the revolution with an anti-
American flavor. People looked at the revolution as something beyond a movement 
against the Shah. Instead, they regarded the revolution as a movement of the “oppressed” 
against the “oppressors,” whomever and wherever they may be.  They called it the 
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Islamic Revolution instead of the Iranian Revolution in order to internationalize the cause 
and the movement.  As more and more people poured into the streets to demonstrate 
against the Shah, he decided to leave the country. On January 16, 1979, the Shah left 
Iran, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile on February 1, 1979, and the 
revolution succeeded in toppling the monarchy on February 11, 1979. Immediately after 
the fall of the Shah, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, with the help of the Interim Government 
of Iran (IGI) and the Council of Revolution of Iran (CRI), which were respectively, the 
executive and policymaking arms of the revolution, started to govern a country that was 
in total chaos. 
  
Section 3.1.05: The Hostage Crisis  
 
The Shah, who had been invited to the US, went to Egypt instead, hoping that like 1953 
order might be restored and he might need to quickly return to Iran to again take charge 
of the country (Vance, 1983, p. 338; Precht, 2004). Losing all hopes soon after the 
triumph of the revolution, the Shah moved to Morocco, then to the Bahamas, and from 
there to Mexico. In the meantime, the US decided to reconstruct a normal relationship 
with Iran. The State Department having established contact with Interim Foreign Minister 
Ebrahim Yazdi prior to the fall of the Shah, capitalized and expanded on that relationship 
(Precht, 2004). Consequently, while the US was trying to reformulate its relations with 
the post-Shah Iran, the Interim Iranian Prime Minister, Mahdi Bazargan, as well as the 
Interim Foreign Minister, Ebrahim Yazdi, were also undertaking efforts on their side to 
improve the relationship between the two countries.  
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While in Morocco, the Shah asked the US to allow him entry into the US.  But at the 
NSC’s Special Coordinating Committee meeting of February 23, 1979, it was decided to 
politely inform the Shah that while the original invitation remained open, it was not in 
anyone’s interest, including the Shah’s, for the Shah to take residence in the US. Being 
under pressure from the Moroccan monarch to find another place of refuge, the Shah 
moved to the Bahamas. There, the Shah used his friends in Washington, particularly 
National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski; chairman and chief executive of Chase 
Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller; the influential former Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger; and esteemed presidential advisor, John J. McCloy, to convince President 
Carter to allow him entry into the US. President Carter, however, saw Shah’s entry into 
the US as a potentially inflammatory act and did not want to endanger American lives 
and US interests in Iran and the Middle East. Famously, as President Carter notes in his 
memoir, when Brzezinski once tried to convince Carter to allow Shah entry into the US, 
President Carter angrily reacted saying that he did not want to endanger the lives of 
Americans in Iran just so that the Shah could play tennis in the US (Sick, 1985, p.178).  
 
The Shah, quite dissatisfied with things in the Bahamas, relocated to Mexico. There, one 
of the “best-kept state secrets of all times” (Sick, 1985, 182) surfaced. On October 1, 
1979, President Carter learned for the first time that the Shah might be seriously ill. 
Twenty days later, on October 20, 1979, President Carter received a memorandum that 
substantiated earlier reports of the Shah’s illness, indicating that the Shah was suffering 
from a malignant lymphoma and that New York was the only place where his dire 
medical needs could be met (Andrew, 1995, pp. 448-449). Hence, President Carter finally 
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decided to admit the Shah into the US on October 21 and the Shah arrived in New York 
the next day.  
 
From the time the Shah had requested permission to enter the US from Morocco on 
February 22, 1979, to the very eve of the Shah’s arrival in New York, the question of 
whether or not the US should admit the Shah was discussed extensively among high-
ranking US officials. On all occasions, the response of those closely following the events 
in Iran, particularly the State Department officials as well as analysts stationed in the US 
embassy in Tehran, was that – to use the words of Bruce Laingen, the US chargé 
d'affaires in Tehran – “the Shah’s entry would be prejudicial to US interests” (Sick, 1985, 
p. 181). Those with an understanding of Iran’s history and Iranian people’s paranoia, 
were quite aware of the fear of Iranians that the US might want to pull off another coup 
against their fledgling republic. When the embassy officials informed the IGI of the 
decision to allow the Shah entry into the US, both PM Bazargan as well as FM Yazdi 
made it quite clear that the decision was not welcomed and that the admission of the Shah 
into the US was going to “cause problems” (Sick, 1985, p. 181).  
 
Upon permitting the Shah into the US, IGI and the US embassy in Tehran worked hard to 
defuse possible tensions. During these meetings FM Yazdi proposed two ideas.  First, he 
suggested that the US must officially ask the Shah to publicly give up any claims to the 
throne.  The second request of FM Yazdi was that a group of Iranian physicians be 
allowed to travel to the US and verify US claims that the Shah was in fact suffering from 
a life threatening ailment. Unfortunately none of FM Yazdi’s proposals were taken 
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seriously (Yazdi, 2000). Brzezinski, as he recalled in a BBC interview for the “Iran and 
the West” documentary (2009), was steadfastly against any “procedure of this sort which 
would be… negatively reflecting on the veracity of the US government.”  
 
Permitting the Shah entry into the US gave substance to a long held belief in Iran, where 
there was a widespread disbelief in the Shah’s illness, that the US was preparing a redo of 
the 1953 events (Ansari, 2007, p.283). The Iranian fear and anxiety were not totally 
misplaced. In fact, Brzezinski was pushing the “CIA to come up with a comprehensive 
covert action plan to unseat the Khomeini regime,” but CIA chief Turner persisted in 
arguing that “pulling a Mussadiq [sic]” was by then beyond the reach of the US (Moses, 
1996, p.186). What made matters even worse was that the IGI, with whose members the 
US had established contact and links, was frequently finding itself at odds with the CRI 
as well as with Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and was fast losing the domestic political 
support it once enjoyed. Hence, as IGI and US embassy staff held more regular meetings 
to diffuse possible tensions over the admission of the Shah into the US, public suspicion 
grew and many became convinced that the US was planning to sponsor, perhaps with the 
help of some members of the IGI, another coup plot and that IGI members were trying to 
garner US support to advance their own political agendas in Iran. While this was a 
general public sentiment, student organizations, particularly Student Followers of the 
Path of the Imam organization, became more proactive. Hence, without conferring with 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, they decided to take the matters into their own hands.  
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While the students were pondering about how they should go about diffusing the 
perceived US threats, the IGI and the US increased their contacts. “What the Americans 
were trying to do was to reconstruct their old relationship with new partners.  They acted 
as if the revolution had never happened” (Branigin, 1980). On November 1, 1979, 
Brzezinski and Iran’s Interim PM, Mahdi Bazargan, met along the sides of an event in 
Algiers. When the news of the meeting became public in Iran, the students became 
convinced that a coup was underway and decided to preempt it by seizing the US 
embassy and demanding the Shah’s return.  
 
Initially, it is said, the students had intended the takeover to be temporary, more along the 
lines of a sit-in. But within hours of the seizure, tens of thousands of Iranians marched 
toward the embassy in support of the students. Many of them remained in and around the 
compound for several weeks. Immediately, the seizure of the embassy turned into a 
national pride issue from which no one could back down.  What was intended to be a 
temporary event, quickly turned into a protracted crisis for the leadership in both 
countries.  
 
It is a historical fact that Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was as surprised about the takeover 
as President Carter.  Nine months earlier, when a group of leftists had occupied the US 
embassy on the Valentine’s Day, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had directed the heads of 
IGI and CRI to go and “kick the occupiers out” (Yazdi, 2000).  When Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini first heard of the news of the seizure of the US embassy from PM Yazdi, he 
issued a similar order (Yazdi, 2000).  But as tens of thousands of Iranians, including 
76 
 
many key revolutionary figures, marched toward the embassy in support of the hostage 
takers and as “the overwhelming popularity of the act among the Iranian masses” (Bill, 
1988, p. 295) became apparent to all, the Ayatollah found it very difficult to go against 
the popular sentiments and hence decided to condone the take-over of the embassy by the 
students. Consequently, all members of the IGI submitted their resignation on November 
5
th
 to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ayatollah accepted their resignation and made 
CRI in charge of the duties of IGI on November 6, 1979.  
 
The hostage crisis significantly increased public pressure on President Carter, who was 
facing a reelection in about a year. The Carter administration tried in vain to negotiate the 
release of the hostages. Since the US had refused to send the Shah back to Iran, Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini had declared that it was the prerogative of the Majlis, which had not 
yet been inaugurated, to decide the faith of the hostages. Carter then tried to pressure Iran 
by condemning it in the UN, freezing its multi-billion dollar assets in the US, cutting of 
diplomatic relations with Iran,
8
 and turning the international community against Iran. 
What Carter did not understand was that Iran was a country in chaos. No single 
individual or political faction had the needed capacity to make a decision about the 
hostages.  Iran did not yet have a constitutional structure and there existed no neutral 
ground where people could have debated a policy of such significance.  Any move by any 
member of the leadership could have resulted in more chaos and perhaps in the lives of 
the hostages. Consequently, since Iran was suffering from a decision-making paralysis on 
                                                 
8
 It is important and quite significant to realize that as far as the official position of Iran was concerned, the 
takeover of the embassy was not an act by the Iranian government and it was not the policy of the Iranian 
government to cut ties with the US. In fact, Iran maintained an active embassy in Washington DC until 
April 7, 1980, until the US government decided to cut ties.   
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the issue, none of the measures and pressure employed by the Carter administration 
yielded any meaningful results. In fact, the “application of pressure only increased the 
determination of the hostage takers, whose popularity grew at home in direct proportion 
to the amount of pressure applied by the US” (Bill, 1988, p. 300).  
 
In retrospect, it seems the only person who understood this dynamic was Secretary of 
State Vance. Vance believed that, as painful as it was, the national interests and the need 
to protect American lives required the US “to continue exercise restraint” and give Iran 
more time, room, and peace of mind to come to terms with itself (Vance, 1983, p. 408). 
He asserted that “the hostages would be freed only when [Ayatollah] Khomeini was 
certain all the institutions of an Islamic republic were in place” and that the US had no 
other realistic alternative to wait until Grand Ayatollah Khomeini determined “that the 
revolution had accomplished its purpose and that the hostages were of no further value” 
(Vance, 1983, p. 408). Vance also believed that raising the salience of the crisis by 
appearing as if the hostages were the only concern of the US, would prolong and 
complicate the issue. He believed that the more the US would declare its fear for the 
safety of the hostages and the more it would showcase its determination to do whatever 
possible to gain their freedom, the greater their value would become for the 
revolutionaries (Vance, 1983, p.380).  A few months after the end of his presidency, 
President Carter, in an interview with the New York Times magazine (May 17, 1981), 
seems to have come to agree with Vance’s views, arguing that the “best approach” might 
have been for him to just stop making any statements on the issue (Smith, 1981).  
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At the time, however, Carter could not bear the political costs of inaction. With US 
presidential elections approaching, he had to show the American public that he was on 
top of the issue.  After much hesitation, and against the advice of the State Department, 
he ordered a rescue mission, code named Operation Eagle Claw, on April 11, 1980. 
Brzezinski, who had long advocated a more decisive and assertive US action to free the 
hostages, was able to win Carter over by increasingly emphasizing “the growing 
domestic political costs to the president” of not doing something more assertive (Moses, 
1996, p.186). Indeed, Carter was “not blind to the political benefits that would flow from 
a bold, dramatic raid” either and believed that a successful rescue mission would assure 
his reelection (Ryna, 1985, p.105).   
 
Vance was not in Washington DC when the rescue decision was made. When he was 
informed, he vehemently tried to convince NSC that the mission had everything against it 
and would only exacerbate an already bad situation. While Vance was convinced “that 
the decision was wrong and that it carried great risks for the hostages and… [US] 
national interest” his position was not supported by anyone, and Carter decided to 
reaffirm his April 11 decision (Vance. 1983, pp. 409-410). As a result, Vance handed in 
his letter of resignation on April 21, 1980, asserted that he was resigning regardless of the 
outcome of the mission, but agreed to Carter’s request for him to remain in his post and 
not make his resignation public until after the rescue attempt (Vance, 1983, p. 411). As 
Vance predicted, the mission, which was launched on April 24, was a total failure. It 
resulted in the loss of eight American lives, seven helicopters, and a C-130 aircraft. It 
also jeopardized the lives of the hostages, who were subsequently dispersed throughout 
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the city to prevent a similar rescue mission. It also sent a very bad message to the Iranian 
public and policymakers and further convinced them that the US was willing to risk the 
lives of hundreds of Iranian civilians, as the plan itself had envisioned, to achieve what it 
deemed to be in its national interest.  
 
The hostage crisis was eventually resolved neither through sanctions and coercion, nor 
through military action. As Vance had predicted, once the Islamic Republic was able to 
establish its institutions and once the country developed its decision-making apparatus 
and procedures, the crisis was resolved through negotiations. It is also important to note 
that Iraq’s invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, added to the urgency of resolving the 
hostage crisis. On the US side, the upcoming presidential election in November of that 
year, made Carter even more determined to try to secure the release of the hostages.  
Hence, both Iranians and the US, determined to resolve the crisis, engaged in intense 
negotiations. These negotiations, however, for quite suspicious reasons, did not come to a 
conclusion until after the US presidential elections. Iran and the US did not sign the 
Algiers Accord until January 19, 1981, and the hostages were not released until after 
President Reagan took the Oath of Office on January 20, 1981. Whether there was a 
covert collaboration between the Republicans and Iranian officials to delay the release of 
the hostages until after the presidential elections or even inauguration has been a matter 
of much debate and investigation. At the very minimum, what is clear is that Iran, for one 
reason or another, did not wish the hostages to arrive in the US while Carter was still in 
office and did not wish the hostages to be in Iran as Reagan took charge of the affairs in 
the US.  
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Section 3.1.06: The Iran-Iraq War 
 
President Reagan started his presidency with good news from Iran. He announced the 
release of the hostages the afternoon of his inauguration at a Congressional luncheon. 
Iran, however, was defending itself against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iranian 
territories and direly needed weapons and spare parts for the military hardware it had 
procured from the US during the reign of the Shah. Without going into the details of 
whether or not senior members from the Reagan’s presidential campaign had colluded 
with the Iranian officials to delay the release of hostages until after the presidential 
elections in return for the delivery of direly needed arms to Iran once Reagan would 
come to office,
9
 Reagan’s Iran policy was centered on capitalizing on the Iran – Iraq war.  
 
The general belief in Iran to this date is that it was the US who encouraged, if not 
instigated, Iraq to invade Iran on September 22, 1980. The belief is not without cause. 
Hitchens (1993), for example, quotes Gary Sick as having said: “After the hostages were 
taken in Tehran, there was a very strong view, especially from Brzezinski, that in effect 
Iran should be punished from all sides. He made public statements to the effect that he 
would not mind an Iraqi move against Iran.” Hitchens continues on to say that according 
to a Financial Times report in the fall of 1980, “US intelligence and satellite data – data 
purporting to show that Iranian forces would swiftly crack – had been made available to 
Saddam through third-party Arab governments” (pp.78-79), effectively enticing Saddam 
                                                 
9
 The claim, known as the October Surprise of 1980, has been advanced by many individuals, most notably 
former Iranian President Abulhassan Banisadr, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, former Naval 
intelligence officer and National Security Council member Gary Sick, former Reagan/Bush campaign and 
White House staffer Barbara Honegger. For more on the claim, see Gary Sick’s “October Surprise: 
American Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan” (1991). The claim was investigated by 
Congress and both the House and Senate inquiries concluded that the evidence fell short of proving that any 
collusion had taken place between the Reagan campaign and Iran to delay the release of the hostages.   
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to take advantage of the Iran’s weakness to settle old scores.  According to Howard 
Teicher, a White House NSC staff during early 1980s, “the reports passed on Baghdad 
depicted Iran’s military in chaos, riven by purges and lack of replacement parts for its 
American-made weapons. [With] the inference… that Iran could be speedily overcome” 
(Lando, 2007, p.53).  
 
While officially the US and Iraq did not have diplomatic relations at the time, the fall of 
the Shah and the hostage crisis on one hand, and the cooling of the relations between the 
Soviet Union and Iraq on the other hand, gave rise to the idea in the US that Iraq could be 
used to counterbalance Iran’s revolutionary ambitions. Hence, in late 1979, with the 
blessing of Saddam, the CIA opened a station in Baghdad (Aburish, 2000, p. 187). Also, 
as Saddam was engaged in execution and deportation of thousands of Shiites, Brzezinski 
declared on April 14, 1980, that: “We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests 
between the United States and Iraq. ... We do not feel that American-Iraqi relations need 
to be frozen in antagonism” (Dawisha, Winter, 1980-1981). A few months later, in the 
summer of 1980, the Carter administration worked tirelessly to overturn Senate 
opposition and sold Iraq eight General Electric gas turbine engines to power Iraqi 
frigates, despite Iraq being on US list of state sponsors of terrorism (Timmerman, 1991, 
pp. 77-78). These moves were interpreted by Saddam as signs of US encouragement for 
Iraq to move against Iran. In fact, Alexander Haig, President Reagan’s first Secretary of 
State, wrote in a memo after meeting with Saudi Prince Fahad and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat 
during his April 1981 tour of the Middle East, that “it was also interesting to confirm that 
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President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through 
Fahad” (Lando, 2007, p. 52).  
 
Whatever the reality might be, it is fair to suggest that at the very minimum the US did in 
fact know that Iraq was preparing to attack Iran and did let Saddam assume that the US 
would not oppose such an attack. As far as the US was concerned, despite its vast 
humanitarian cost, two countries unfriendly to the US “were undermining each other’s 
capabilities to threaten American interests” (Telhami, 2002, pp. 145-146). Soon, 
however, it became clear that the perception that Saddam was going to be able to declare 
mission accomplished in matter of months, if not weeks,
10
 was false and Iran was not 
going to allow Iraq to achieve its war objectives. By the spring of 1982, Iran liberated 
much of its territories annexed by Saddam during the first year of the war and gained the 
upper hand. Alarmed by Iran’s advances, the US started to support Saddam in a much 
more overt fashion. The US removed Iraq from its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 
March 1982 in order to more easily assist Saddam in its war efforts (Sciolino, 1991, p. 
164), and President Reagan signed National Security Study Directive 4-82, demanding a 
review of US policy in the region, on March 19, 1982.  
 
The volunteer forces of Iran were able to march ahead and on May 24, 1982, they 
liberated the strategic port city of Khoramshahr, which had been under Saddam’s 
occupation for more than 18 months. Consequently, the US decided to provide Iraq with 
even more economic aid, intelligence, and weapons. According to a sworn affidavit 
                                                 
10
 According to Robin Write (1989), “A CIA estimate predicted that Iran would last only three weeks 
against the Iraqi assult” (p. 83).  
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submitted by Howard Teicher, who was the Director for the Near East and South Asia 
and Senior Director for Political-Military Affairs on the staff of the National Security 
Council from 1982 to 1987, to United States District Court in the Southern District of 
Florida on January 31, 1995 in regards to Case number 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH: 
In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to 
allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States 
would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war 
with Iran… CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that 
Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the 
Iran-Iraq war… the United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by 
supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military 
intelligence and advice to the Iraqis… CIA Director Casey was adamant that 
cluster bombs were a perfect "force multiplier" that would allow the Iraqis to 
defend against the "human waves" of Iranian attackers. The CIA, including both 
CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and 
assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles 
to Iraq… In certain instances where a key component in a weapon was not readily 
available, the highest levels of the United States government decided to make the 
component available, directly or indirectly, to Iraq.  
 
Less than two months after Jonathan T. Howe, a senior State Department official, 
informed Secretary of State George P. Shultz on November 1, 1983, that intelligence 
reports showed almost daily use of chemical weapons by Saddam against Iran and the 
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Kurdish opposition, President Reagan sent Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad on December 
20, 1983, to inform Saddam that the United States desired to resume full diplomatic 
relations with Iraq (Dobbs, 2002).  Even as Saddam relied more heavily on chemical 
warfare, “President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security 
aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 
60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed 
information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and 
bomb-damage assessments for Iraq” (Tyler, 2002). In fact, just as an example, it has now 
been revealed by declassified CIA documents that when in 1987 CIA learned through its 
reconnaissance satellites and reported that Iran was just about to take advantage of a 
gaping hole in the Iraqi lines, President Reagan wrote a note to Secretary of Defense 
Carlucci that “an Iranian victory is unacceptable.” Consequently, the documents show, 
knowing full well that Saddam was going to rely on chemical weapons, the US provided 
Saddam with targeting packages suitable for use by Iraqi air force to destroy those targets 
using Sarin gas (Harris and Aid, 2013).  
 
But Iraq was not the only country to which the US was selling arms. As the US was 
helping Saddam with arms and intelligence, it was also taking advantage of Iran’s dire 
need for arms and spare parts, channeling military hardware to Iran at prices often six 
times the DoD’s pricing list (Walsh, 1994, p. 21). Because of the US arms embargo 
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, it had become very difficult for Iran to gain access 
to weaponry and spare parts for most of its American made military equipment on the 
open market or directly from the producers (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 126). Indeed, an 
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important element of official US policy toward Iran was to limit Iran’s access to 
weaponry and as part the State Department’s Operation Staunch, which was launched 
concurrently with Rumsfeld’s trip to Baghdad in December 1983, Secretary of State 
George Shultz embarked upon a successful worldwide campaign to persuade countries 
not to sell arms to Iran. Iraq, on the other hand, facing no such embargos, was able to 
continually improve both the quantity and quality of its weaponry, purchasing well over 
100 billion dollars of weapons from 1985 to 1988, making Iraq the largest importer of 
weapons on the world market (Sprinborg, 1990). Iran, however, was forced to procure 
much of its war needs from the black market at excessively inflated prices (Tarock, 1998, 
p.92).   
 
Under such conditions, the US decided to make an overture to Iran. The US was 
significantly alarmed by the increasing influence and presence of the Soviet Union in Iran 
and was fearful of Iran falling into the hands of the Soviets should the government in Iran 
collapse under the pressure of the war or by Soviet covert action. The US also needed 
Iran’s help to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Consequently, in 
order to cultivate friendship with Iran, senior US security officials negotiated an “arms 
for hostages” deal with Iran. After delivery of hundreds of TOW anti-tank missiles, and 
release of hostage Benjamin Weir in Mid-September 1985 (Teicher and Teicher, 1993, p. 
361) an American delegation headed by Robert McFarlane, arrived in Tehran for secret 
talks on May 25, 1986, on false Irish passports. The main objective of the mission was to 
initiate a strategic dialogue with Iranians that might lead to a thaw in US-Iranian 
relations. The mission, however, was a failure since the middle man, an arms dealer by 
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the name of Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, had misled both Iranians and the American 
delegation “about each other’s expectations” (Teicher and Teicher, 1993, p. 369).  
 
Despite the failure of McFarlane’s mission, the arm-for-hostages scheme continued. In 
the meantime, the Reagan administration funneled the proceedings from the arms 
transfers to Iran, to the Contras in Nicaragua. Both channeling of weapons to Iran despite 
the US arms embargo against the Islamic Republic and aiding of the Contras despite the 
“Boland Amendment” to the FY 1983 Defense Appropriation bill, which had prohibited 
the US government from spending any money “for the purpose of overthrowing the 
government in Nicaragua,” were illegal under US law. When what had happened came to 
light on November 3, 1986, the deal, which to that date had resulted in the freeing of 
three US hostages and delivery of at least 2000 TOW and 240 HAWK spare parts at 
excessively high prices, fell apart.  
 
But perhaps what has had the most lasting effect on Iranians and the Iranian 
policymakers’ impression of the US and the United Nations (UN) was the international 
community’s lack of intervention against the Saddam. The US systematically blocked or 
hindered all attempts by the Islamic Republic to seek justice at the UN and to stop 
Saddam’s aggression and use of chemical weapons. Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
explicitly indicates that “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression [emphasis added] and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Yet, none of the first six 
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UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, which were adopted from September 28, 
1980 – October 8, 1986, were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Only the 
seventh and the last UNSC resolutions, Resolution 598 (July 20, 1987), was adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. All of the pertinent UNSC Resolutions, with the 
exception of the UNSC Resolution 598, termed Saddam’s war of aggression against Iran 
merely as “the situation between Iran and Iraq,” not an aggression or even a conflict that 
would require UNSC action. Interestingly, the first UNSC resolution regarding the Iran-
Iraq war simply demanded a ceasefire without even requiring withdrawal of forces to 
internationally recognized boundaries. Also, it was not until after Iran had liberated the 
strategic port city of Khoramshahr and after Iran had ejected Iraq from much of its 
territory that UNSC Resolution 514, adopted on July 12, 1982, called on both countries to 
withdraw their forces to the internationally recognized boundaries. Even worse, none of 
the UNSC resolutions until UNSC Resolution 582 (February, 24, 1986), which was 
adopted three years after Saddam had began to routinely use chemical weapons, made 
any mention of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons. Moreover UNSC Resolution 582 and 
the resolutions adopted after that, instead of condemning the only user of chemical 
weapons in that war, in general “deplore[d]” “the use of chemical weapons contrary to 
the obligations under 1925 Geneva Protocol,” suggesting that Iran was using chemical 
weapons against Iraq as well.  
 
Iran initially rejected all UNSC resolutions arguing that they all fail to satisfy the 
prerequisites of a just, honorable, and durable peace. Right from the early days of 
Saddam’s invasion, Iran had set two preconditions for peace; “1) withdrawal of Iraqi 
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troops from all Iranian territories and 2) compensation for the damages inflicted” 
(Tarock, 1998, p.78). Consequently, Iran tirelessly demanded that the UNSC should 
name the aggressor and should require it to compensate the victim for the damages that it 
has caused. None of the UNSC resolutions, including UNSC Resolution 598, satisfied 
those Iranian preconditions.  
 
Yet, UNSC Resolution 598, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
which was adopted when the balance of the war had tilted in Iran’s favor, at least 
envisioned a process that, if pursued impartially, would had resulted in satisfaction of 
Iran’s preconditions.  Article 6 of UNSC Resolution 598 stated that the UNSC: “Requests 
the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of 
entrusting an impartial body with the inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to 
report to the Council as soon as possible.” Yet Iran, due to its past experiences with the 
UN and global powers, could not trust the “impartial body” to conduct its investigation 
impartially, and demanded that the aggressor to be named prior to a cease-fire and 
refused to accept UNSC Resolution 598 immediately after its adoption.  
 
Increased foreign aid to Saddam, more severe imposition of the arms embargo against 
Iran, and political castigation of Iran for not accepting UNSC Resolution 598, all resulted 
in deterioration of Iran’s war efforts and standing. On April, 18, 1988, Iraq recaptured the 
Al-Faw peninsula. Also, when an American frigate in the Persian Gulf struck a mine 
believed to have been laid by Iran despite Iran’s denial near Bahrain on April 14, 1988, 
the US started to actively engage Iran’s military in the Persian Gulf. In a “measured 
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response” to the damage caused to its warship, the US sank three Iranian boats, severely 
damaged two of the four Iranian frigates, and destroyed two Iranian oil rigs, warning Iran 
against any further “provocation” and made it known to Iran that it must accept UNSC 
Resolution 598 or face further pressure (Tarock, 1998, p.176).  
 
Nothing, however, impacted Iran’s decision makers more than the downing of the Iranian 
civilian airliner by USS Vincennes, which resulted in the death of 290 civilian 
passengers, on July 3, 1988. Iranian’s never believed US public statements that the 
downing was an accident
11
 since claims made by the US regarding the incident did not 
correspond with the facts.
12
 As was later admitted by the US, contrary to initial US 
claims, USS Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters when it shot down Iranian Airbus 
A300; the Iranian airliner was well within the commercial air corridor; and the aircraft 
was ascending, not descending. Iran regarded the act as a preplanned stern US warning 
that Iran must accept UNSC Resolution 598 or face more horrific consequences (Rajaee, 
1997, p. 125; Tarock, 1998, p.178-179).  
 
One of the individuals that I interviewed, who at the time of the incident held a senior 
governmental position, said to me that “to us the shooting of the airliner carried three 
unmistakable messages from the Americans. First, the Americans wanted us to know that 
if we did not accept UNSC Resolution 598, they would enter the war on Iraq’s side. 
                                                 
11
 According to a survey of the Iranian published jointly by UTCPOR and CISSM in September 2014, 
“Respondents were asked about the shooting down in 1988 of an Iranian commercial airliner by a U.S. 
Navy guided missile cruiser; the United States says the plane was shot in the mistaken belief that it was a 
military aircraft. Given four options, a 60% majority says that ‘America definitely downed the airliner 
knowingly and intentionally,’ with another 16% thinking this was probably the case. Only 14% put some 
credence in the U.S. account of events” (Mohseni, Gallagher and Ramsay, 2014). 
12
 Read “Sea of Lies” by John Barry and Roger Charles (Newsweek Magazine, Vol. 120, Issue 2, P. 28, 
7/13/1992) for a more detailed account of the incident. 
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Second, they wanted to reassure us that should they decide to militarily force us to accept 
UNSC Resolution 598, being a superpower, no other country or international body was 
going to challenge the position of the US, just as no one chastised America for downing 
the airliner. Third, they wanted to reassure us that they would be able to convince the 
conscience of the American people to back military action against Iran, just as they were 
able to convince the American people that the attack was an accident.”  
 
Not only did US refuse to apologize for the incident, it blamed Iran for the tragedy. 
Marlin Fitzwater, the Assistant to the President for Press Relations, declared on July 11, 
1988 that “The responsibility for this tragic incident, and for the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of other innocent victims as a result of the Iran-Iraq war, lies with those who 
refuse to end the conflict. A particularly heavy burden of responsibility rests with the 
Government of Iran, which has refused for almost a year to accept and implement 
Security Council Resolution 598…The urgent necessity to end this conflict is reinforced 
by… the deplorable precedent of the increasingly frequent use of chemical weapons by 
both sides, causing still more casualties.”  
 
Washington’s increasing support of Saddam Hussein, the international community’s 
willingness to overlook Saddam’s violation of international laws, Saddam’s threat to send 
missiles with chemical warheads into Tehran and other major cities (Riedel, 2013), and 
the aggressive posturing of the US naval forces in the Persian Gulf, convinced Iran to 
accept UNSC Resolution 598 on July 18, 1988, two weeks after the downing of its 
airliner. As part of the mandates of the resolution, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de 
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Cuellar gave his much anticipated report to the UNSC on December 11, 1991, shortly 
after Saddam invaded Kuwait, declaring Iraq as the aggressor. Many Iranians openly 
ponder what would have happened if the UN would have made that declaration a decade 
earlier. They also doubt such a declaration would have ever been made had Saddam not 
invaded Kuwait and had he continued to enjoy cordial relations with the US.  
 
While the Iran-Iraq war may be a distant event for many American policymakers, it 
remains a source of profound resentment toward the US among the Iranian people and 
policymakers. Every Iranian has a family member or a dear friend that was either killed 
or injured during that war. Moreover, many of the Islamic Republic’s current 
policymakers had no diplomatic and/or strategic experience prior to the Iran-Iraq war. 
Indeed during the 1980s, many of them were either fighting in the battlefields or 
assuming political responsibilities for the first time. The Iran-Iraq war and the events 
surrounding that conflict have both traumatized and seasoned current Iranian 
policymakers and their experience with the US, the UN, and the outside world has 
primarily been shaped by the politics of that conflict.  
 
The Iran-Iraq war affected Iran’s strategic culture in two very important ways. First, since 
the early days of the war, Iranians have become convinced that they cannot fully rely on 
any country or international body to preserve Iran’s honor, independence, security and 
wellbeing. The experience of the war has turned almost all Iranian policymakers into 
astute realists schooled by the realpolitik of the Iran-Iraq war. The experience of Iran-Iraq 
war has convinced many Iranians that Iran must be self-reliant and that no aspect of 
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Iran’s economy, security, and power should ever be entirely reliant on any outside entity. 
This view is shared both by Iranian policymakers and the Iranian people. In a survey 
conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes in 2007, two out of three 
Iranians maintained that it is more important for Iran “to become economically self-
sufficient because Iran should not be dependent on other countries” (Kull, 2007). In the 
summer of 2013, University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) 
also found that 72% of Iranians favored self-sufficiency over “becoming more integrated 
with the global economy.”  
    
The Iran-Iraq war has had a second more profound and enduring effect on the strategic 
culture of Iranians. Since the eight year war with Iraq was the only territorial conflict in 
the past two hundred years of Iran’s history in which Iran did not lose any territory to the 
enemy, the war experience has made Iranians believe that through resistance, they will 
eventually prevail against their enemies regardless of the odds. That experience has made 
them relatively insensitive to pressure and coercion and has infused them with a strategic 
optimism that has enhanced their determination to steadfastly preserve their sovereign 
rights and to pursue their strategic objectives despite external hindrances.        
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Section 3.1.07: Relations During the Presidency of George H. W. Bush 
 
Less than a year after accepting UNSC Resolution 598, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini died 
on June 3, 1989, and Iran’s President, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, was selected by the 
Assembly of Experts to become Iran’s next Supreme Leader. Earlier that year, President 
Reagan’s tenure had also come to an end and President George H. W. Bush, his Vice-
President, had won the election and had become America’s 41
st
 President. During his 
inaugural speech on January 20, 1989, President Bush reached out to Iran for assistance. 
He famously said: “There are today Americans who are held against their will in foreign 
lands, and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here, and will 
be long remembered. Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that 
endlessly moves on. Great nations like great men must keep their word. When America 
says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a vow made on 
marble steps.”  
 
President Rafsanjani, who was elected Iran’s President on August 3, 1989, saw this as an 
opportunity to fix the relationship between Iran and the US once and for all. In early 
August 1989 President Bush contacted UN Secretary General (UNSG) Perez de Cuellar, 
asking the UN to help secure the release of western hostages in Lebanon, knowing that he 
had direct access to the Iranian leadership. Then the National Security Adviser, Brent 
Scowcroft, explained to the UNSG that “Bush was prepared to embark on a series of 
reciprocal gestures that would ease relations [with Iran] and free the hostages…the 
president wanted a message directly delivered to [President] Rafsanjani… [and] wanted 
to hear his reaction to it.” (Picco, 1999, p.111). On August 25, Giandomenico Picco, the 
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personal envoy of UNSG, met with Rafsanjani and told him that “President Bush has 
sought the release of the American hostages… He would react swiftly by taking action on 
Iranian monetary assets blocked by the United States and other appropriate gesture” and 
went on to reassure Rafsanjani that “taking an initiative  on the hostages would inevitably 
elicit a positive response on the part of the United States” (Picco, 1999, p.113). In order 
to ensure optimum secrecy about the message, Picco used no translators and spoke to 
President Rafsanjani through the Iranian diplomat, Mohammad Javad Zarif. In response, 
President Rafsanjani explained to Picco that the hostage takers were not “the traditional 
Hezbollah” and that they do not follow directions from Iran. He, however, told Picco that 
Iran needed a signal from the US to try to help with the situation and that, as starters, the 
US “must halt their unreasonable animosity toward us” (Picco, 1999, p.113-114).  
 
Rafsanjani, however, took the risk and proceeded to show “goodwill” with only a 
promise that the US would reciprocate. In early April 1990, Iran helped negotiate the 
release of two American hostages, Robert Polhill and Frank Reed and went out of its way 
to secure the release of other western hostages in Lebanon. Indeed, when Terry 
Anderson, the last American hostage was released on December 4, 1991, Picco delivered 
a statement asserting that the release of the hostages “could not have been achieved 
without the cooperation of Syria and Iran” (Picco, 1999, p.263). Iran’s “goodwill” 
gesture, however, was never reciprocated. As Iran pressed Picco and as Picco pressed 
Scowcroft on when Iran should expect reciprocation, Scowcroft kept on asking for more 
time.  
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In fact, a heated debate had erupted in Washington and there was severe disagreements 
among President Bush’s national security team on whether or not the US should 
reciprocate Iran’s goodwill gesture. After much back and forth, those favoring Bush 
keeping his inaugural address promise lost to those arguing that since 1989, Iran had 
engaged in acts that cannot be condoned by the US and any form of reciprocation would 
be interpreted both by Iran and other nations in ways that would be contrary to US 
national interests. Hence, on April 10, 1992, some four months after the release of Terry 
Anderson, Scowcroft met Picco in Washington DC and informed him that “the timing 
was not propitious” (Picco, 1999, p.3), that “there would be no goodwill to beget 
goodwill” and that the US was not going to reciprocate Iran’s goodwill (Picco, 1999, 
p.286).  
 
By that time, Iran had already played a positive role in the first Persian Gulf War against 
Saddam. Also, the Soviet Union had collapsed, relieving the US of any anxieties about 
Soviet advances into Iran and the Persian Gulf. In effect, considering that an election was 
approaching, the Bush administration perceived reneging on its original promise to have 
more benefits than costs. In the same month, Picco delivered the message to President 
Rafsanjani, again with Zarif translating. Picco asked Zarif to tell Rafsanjani that he 
(Picco) had lied to Rafsanjani, “although unknowingly,” and that he “had been informed 
by Washington that no reciprocity would be forthcoming” (Picco, 1999, p.5). Rafsanjani 
felt that he had been played for a sucker. He had risked so much internally, believing that 
“when America says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a 
vow made on marble steps.”  
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Section 3.1.08: Relations During the First Term of Bill Clinton Presidency 
 
President Bush lost the election in November 1992, and President Clinton was 
inaugurated on January 20, 1993. “US relations with Iran hit new lows and highs under 
the Clinton administration” (Slavin, 2007, p.181). President Clinton came to office with a 
clear policy of containment toward Iran and was pressed both by the Israeli lobby AIPAC 
as well as by members of his national security team to increase and use economic 
pressure against Iran as a way to persuade it to: 1) forgo it support of Islamist 
organization opposed to Israel; 2) support the Arab-Israeli peace process mediated by the 
US; and 3) abandon its missile and alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs. Martin Indyk, who was the senior director of Near East and South Asian 
Affairs at the President Clinton’s NSC, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who 
had negotiated the 1981 Algiers Accord with Iran and who had developed a “bitter 
feeling toward Iran and Iranians,” worked together to engender a “hostile policy of 
maintaining and intensifying economic sanctions against Iran” (Fayazmanesh, 2008, p. 
71; Slavin, 2007, p.182). As early as May 1993, Indyk declared during a speech at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy that: 
President Clinton also understands that, in the wake of the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the Gulf War, the United States stands as the dominant power in the 
region, uniquely capable of influencing the course of events… We reviewed 
existing policies, analyzed the regional dynamics…[and that] review is now all 
but complete… A short-hand way of encapsulating the Clinton administration 
strategy is thus: “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran in the east [and] promotion of 
Arab-Israeli peace in the west… When we assess Iranian intentions and 
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capabilities we see a dangerous combination for Western interests. Iran is engaged 
in a five-part challenge to the United States and the international community. It is 
the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the globe. 
Through its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran is doing its best to thwart our 
efforts to promote peace between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states. 
Through its connections with Sudan, Iran is fishing in troubled waters across the 
Arab world, actively seeking to subvert friendly governments. Through its active 
efforts to acquire offensive weapons, Iran is seeking an ability to dominate the 
Gulf by military means. And, perhaps most disturbing, Iran is seeking a weapons 
of mass destruction capability including clandestine nuclear weapons capability 
and ballistic missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East… 
We are firmly opposed to these specific aspects of the Iranian regime's behavior, 
as well as its abuse of the human rights of the Iranian people. We do not seek a 
confrontation but we will not normalize relations with Iran until and unless Iran's 
policies change, across the board… We will work energetically to persuade our 
European and Japanese allies, as well as Russia and China, that it is not in their 
interests to assist Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or the conventional means to 
pose a regional threat. Nor do we believe it is in their interests to ease Iran's 
economic situation so that it can pursue normal commercial relations on one level 
while threatening our common interests on another level… We will seek to 
impress upon our allies the necessity for responding to the Iranian threat and the 
opportunity now presented by Iran's current circumstances… [Also] To the extent 
that the international community…succeeds in containing Iraq but fails to contain 
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Iran, it will have inadvertently allowed the balance of power in the Gulf to have 
tilted in favor of Iran, with very dangerous consequences. That imbalance 
therefore argues for a more energetic effort to contain Iran and [to persuade it to] 
modify its behavior even as we maintain the sanctions regime against Iraq.  
 
Rafsanjani, being in his second and last term in office, adopted a dual track policy as 
well. On one hand, he retaliated against US efforts designed to isolate Iran by supporting 
those organizations in the Middle East that opposed the US mediated Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process. On the other hand, he tried to signal to the US that it was possible to envision 
Iran and the US developing a cordial relationship based on mutual interests and respect. 
Hence, when Clinton found it costly to circumvent UNSC resolutions and his European 
allies’ opposition to the arming of the Bosnian Muslims, Iran signaled that it was willing 
to help and it did. After the Clinton administration gave the Croatian President Franjo 
Tudjman the “green light” to accept arm shipments from Iran destined for the Bosnians in 
Spring of 1994, Iran delivered “hundreds of tons” of weapons and ammunition to Bosnia 
through Croatia, creating a more leveled battlefield, which paved the way for the 
negotiations that resulted in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (Leverett and Leverett, 
2013, p. 110-111; Weiner, 1996; William and Lippman, 1995). Likewise, Rafsanjani 
sought to engage the US economically by favoring American energy companies over 
European and Asian companies. For example, when Iran’s National Oil Company 
recommended Iran to either sign a $1 billion contract with the French Total or the 
American Conoco Corporation to develop two oil and gas fields off Iran’s Siri Island, 
“Rafsanjani persuaded the Supreme Leader that going with the American company rather 
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than its competitor, the French Total, was a good public relations exercise” (Seliktar, 
2012, p. 102) and “as a deliberate overture to the US” Rafsanjani personally made the 
decision to award the contact to the American Conoco (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, p. 
112).  
 
Neither of Rafsanjani’s overtures, however, were reciprocated during the first term of 
President Clinton. In fact the US responded to both overtures with more sanctions against 
Iran.  On Bosnia, when the news broke out two years later that President Clinton had 
given the green light to covert Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia,  the Clinton 
administration publicly condemned Iran for trying to “establish an Islamist beachhead in 
Europe’s backyard,” despite Iran doing exactly what Washington had requested (Leverett 
and Leverett, 2013, pp. 112-113). On Conoco, US response was even more devastating. 
When in March 1995 Iran awarded Conoco with the billion dollar contract, attentions 
were drawn to the fact that while the US was dissuading other countries from investing in 
Iran, its own companies were doing business there. Under severe pressure from a 
Republican Congress and AIPAC, on March 15, 1995, President Clinton signed 
Executive Order 12957, prohibiting US trade in Iran’s oil industry. Then, on April 30, 
1995, at a dinner of World Jewish Congress with Shimon Peres present, Clinton pledged 
to impose a total US trade embargo on Iran and made good on his promise on May 6, 
1995, by signing Executive Order 12959, which prohibited any US trade and investment 
in Iran.  
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As the United States imposed more sanctions on Iran, Iran publicly protested against US 
actions, further strengthened its ties with groups like the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Hamas, and went out of its way to ensure that the Oslo Accord would fail. 
Two other incidents around the end of Rafsanjani’s second term led to further antagonism 
between the US and Iran. On June 25, 1996, the Khobar Tower bombings killed 19 US 
servicemen and wounded 498 people from various countries. Then, on July 17, 1996, 
TWA Flight 800 exploded midair and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. Both the Khobar 
Tower bombings and the TWA Flight 800 crash were initially blamed on Iran.
13
 In 
response to these events and the hostile environment that was created by AIPAC against 
Iran in Washington, Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act on July 16, 1996, 
which imposed penalties on any company, foreign or domestic, that invested in Iran or 
Libya’s energy sectors. It is important to note that after months of investigation, the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ruled out terrorism and concluded in its 
August 23, 2000, report that the most probable cause of TWA Flight 800 was “[an] 
explosion of the center wing fuel tank (CWT), resulting from ignition of the inflammable 
fuel/air mixture in the tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be 
determined with certainty, but, of the sources evaluated by the investigation, the most 
likely was a short circuit outside of the CWT that allowed excessive voltage to enter it 
through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system” (NTSB, 
2000). As for the Khobar Towers, the intelligence is mixed. After three years of 
investigation, FBI came to believe that Iran was to blame for the attack (Seliktar, 2012, 
p.95). Yet, on May 22, 1998, Prince Nayef, the Saudi Interior Minister, rejected the idea 
that Iran was behind the attack and declared that the attack “took place at Saudi 
                                                 
13
 See for example Polk, J. (2006, July 16). U.S. focused on Iran after TWA 800 explosion. CNN. 
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hands…No foreign party had any role in it” (Lancaster, 1998). Since 9/11 more people 
believe that Al-Qaeda was the most likely entity behind the attack (UPI, 2007; Atwan, 
2006, pp. 168-169). 
 
Section 3.1.09: Relations During the Second Term of Bill Clinton Presidency 
 
Rafsanjani’s second term ended on August 2, 1997, and President Khatami was 
inaugurated on the same day. Rafsanjani’s experience with two US administrations that 
were either unwilling or unable (or perhaps both) to keep their diplomatic commitments 
and to sustain cooperation based on mutual interest and mutual respect, engendered 
increasing skepticism and suspicion in Tehran about Washington’s ultimate and ulterior 
intentions toward the Islamic Republic. That suspicion significantly affected how 
Iranians interpreted future US statements, actions, and policies toward the Islamic 
Republic. (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, p. 113). It is for that reason that Khatami, in his 
interview with Christiane Amanpour, published by CNN on January 7, 1998, indicated 
that: 
U.S. foreign policy behavior toward Iran has inflicted damages upon us. But it 
also had a positive effect. It caused us to mainly focus on our domestic 
capabilities and resources to advance our objectives… There is a bulky wall of 
mistrust between us and the U.S. administration, a mistrust rooted in improper 
behaviors of the American governments… The attitude of the U.S. after the 
victory of the revolution has not been a civilized one. They have adopted a hostile 
policy against Iran. They have tried to inflict economic damage upon us, a clear 
example of which is the D’Amato act, which represents a continuation of Cold 
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War mentality and the lack of appreciation of realities to the point that they even 
want to impose their will upon other countries such as European countries and 
Japan or the allocation of the already mentioned $20 million to topple the Iranian 
government… The success of our revolution has come at a great cost to our 
nation. And the U.S. has a major share in the cost imposed upon the Iranian 
nation. There is a grave mistrust between us. If negotiations are not based on 
mutual respect, they will never lead to positive results…There must first be a 
crack in this wall of mistrust to prepare for a change and create an opportunity to 
study a new situation. Unfortunately, the behavior of American Government in 
the past up to this date has always exacerbated the climate of mistrust and we do 
not detect any sign of change of behavior.  
 
To build the minimal level of trust needed for any form of rapprochement, President 
Khatami focused on cultural and intellectual collaborations and adopted “dialogue among 
civilizations” as his signature foreign policy initiative. As part of that policy, Iran invited 
American wrestlers to take part in international wrestling competition in Iran and 
encouraged Iranian artists and academicians to travel to the US and establish links with 
their American counterparts. “A delighted Clinton swiftly embraced Khatami’s idea” and 
took steps to facilitate “people-to-people” relations” (Slavin, 2007, p.185). Then on April 
12, 1999, at the Seventh Millennium Evening at the White House, President Clinton took 
a very bold step to show sympathy toward Iran and it grievances and said: 
I think it is important to recognize… that Iran, because of its enormous 
geopolitical importance over time, has been the subject of quite a lot of abuse 
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from various Western nations. And I think sometimes it’s quite important to tell 
people, “Look, you have a right to be angry at something my country or my 
culture or others that are generally allied with us today did to you 50 or 60 or 100 
or 150 years ago”… So we have to find some way to get dialog, and going into 
total denial when you’re in a conversation with somebody who’s been your 
adversary, in a country like Iran that is often worried about its independence and 
its integrity, is not exactly the way to begin… we have to listen for possible ways 
we can give people the legitimacy of some of their fears or some of their angers or 
some of their historic grievances, and then say they rest on other grounds; now, 
can we build a common future? I think that's very important. Sometimes I think 
we in the United States, and Western culture generally, we hate to do that. But 
we’re going to have to if we want to have an ultimate accommodation. 
 
President Clinton, nevertheless, initiated his first official communication with Khatami 
with an accusation and demanded Iran’s prompt response. Three years after the Khobar 
Tower bombings, despite being uncertain about the main culprit (UPI, June 6, 2007), 
President Clinton decided to use the bombings to press Iran. In a letter send directly to 
President Khatami via Sultan Qaboos of Oman in the summer of 1999, Clinton wrote to 
Khatami that: 
The United States has received credible evidence that members of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), along with members of Lebanese and Saudi 
Hizballah, were directly involved in the planning and execution of the terrorist 
bombing in Saudi Arabia of the Khobar Towers military residential complex on 
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June 25, 1996. Nineteen American citizens were killed. The United States views 
this in the gravest terms… The involvement of the IRGC in terrorist planning and 
activity abroad remains a cause of deep concern to us…In order to lay a sound 
basis for better relations between our countries, we need a clear commitment from 
you that you will ensure an end to Iranian involvement in terrorist activity, 
particularly threats to American citizens, and will bring those in Iran responsible 
for the bombing to justice either in Iran or by extraditing them to Saudi Arabia. 
 
Iran replied promptly, denying the accusation. Interestingly, while Clinton’s letter was 
only delivered to President Khatami, to use the words of Ken Pollack in his September 
15, 1999, NSC memo for Samuel R. Berger, “the entire Iranian leadership” responded to 
Clinton’s letter. Their letter read: 
The allegations contained in the message attributed to President Clinton are 
inaccurate and unacceptable. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) views the 
recurrence of such unfounded allegations in the gravest terms. Reliable 
investigations and serious scrutiny leaves no doubt that the allegation… is solely 
based on inaccurate and biased information. No agency of or entity connected 
with IRI had any part, whatsoever, in the planning, logistics or execution of the 
said incident... As its irreversible and fundamental strategy, the Government of 
Iran, backed by a strong national consensus, shall vigorously pursue the policy of 
détente and institutionalization of the rule of law. The government is confident 
and there exists no threat from the IRI against any government or their nationals.   
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To move on to the next step and initiate government-to-government relations, Iranians 
demanded the US to make a practical and tangible goodwill gesture, something that 
Khatami could sell “to his friends, his enemies and the Supreme Leader” (Slavin, 2007, 
p.187). Indeed, due to Iran’s past experiences with the US, “most Iranian decision 
makers, including Ayatollah Khamenei, had made a sober calculation: the days of 
cooperation with the United States ‘for free’ were over” (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, p. 
114). While Iran was making demands for a concrete measure, US industries, particularly 
oil and agriculture, also intensified their lobbying efforts against US sanctions on Iran 
(Fayazmanesh, 2008, p. 91).  
 
In response, the Clinton administration did take several steps, which by all accounts were 
too little too late. On October 8, 1997, State Department designated the Mujahedin-e 
Khalq Organization (MEK), which advocates armed overthrow of the Islamic Republic 
and has American blood on its hands, as a terrorist organization. Then in December 1998, 
President Clinton removed Iran from the US list of “Major drug-producing countries.” 
Then on April 12, 1999, President Clinton delivered his famous speech at the Seventh 
Millennium Evening at the White House, indicating that it was important to recognize 
that “Iran, because of its enormous geopolitical importance over time, has been the 
subject of quite a lot of abuse from various Western nations.” Following that speech, on 
April 28, 1999, the Clinton administration announced that “it had decided to ease its 
sanctions policy to permit the sale of food and medical supplies to Iran, Libya, Sudan, 
and other nations accused of supporting terrorists” (Shenon, 1999).  
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Perhaps the most significant and tangible step that the Clinton administration took came 
around the end of his second term in office. In a lecture delivered at an event sponsored 
by the American Iranian Council (AIC) on March 17, 2000, Secretary of State, Madeline 
Albright, became the first US official since the 1953 CIA coup against Mossadeq to 
acknowledge US role in that episode. She said:  
In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow 
of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh… it is easy to see now 
why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their 
internal affairs. Moreover, during the next quarter century, the United States and 
the West gave sustained backing to the Shah's regime. Although it did much to 
develop the country economically, the Shah's government also brutally repressed 
political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United States must bear its fair 
share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations. 
Even in more recent years, aspects of U.S. policy towards Iraq, during its conflict 
with Iran appear now to have been regrettably shortsighted, especially in light our 
subsequent experiences with Saddam Hussein. 
 
After making this unprecedented admission, Albright went on to declare some changes to 
US sanctions against Iran and said:  
The purpose of our sanctions, however, is to spur changes in policy. They are not 
an end in themselves, nor do they seek to target innocent civilians… Today, I am 
announcing a step that will enable Americans to purchase and import carpets and 
food products such as dried fruits, nuts and caviar from Iran… Second, the United 
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States will explore ways to remove unnecessary impediments to increase contact 
between American and Iranian scholars, professional artists, athletes, and non-
governmental organizations. We believe this will serve to deepen bonds of mutual 
understanding and trust. Third, the United States is prepared to increase efforts 
with Iran aimed at eventually concluding a global settlement of outstanding legal 
claims between our two countries. 
 
Section 3.1.10: 9/11 and the Afghan and Iraq Wars 
 
This declaration was an unprecedented move by the US. For nearly two decades, there 
had been little in US policy toward the Islamic Republic but threats and sanctions. Yet 
this change of heart came a bit too late and the measures declared by Albright were short-
lived. Before the above said measures could even be implemented and before Iran could 
reciprocate, Clinton’s second term ended, the Republicans defeated the Democrats, and 
George W. Bush became the 43
rd
 President of the United States. The Republican Party 
Platform for the 2000 Presidential elections, which was published by the party on July 31, 
2000, unequivocally indicated that “the next Republican administration… will stop 
making unilateral gestures toward the Iranian government which, to date, have failed to 
result in a change in Iranian behavior.” Indeed, when President Bush took office on 
January 20, 2001, few expected that the days of “dialogue among civilizations” would 
continue.  
 
No event shaped the Bush presidency more than 9/11. Within hours after the terrorist 
attacks, President Khatami condemned them, becoming one of the first foreign leaders to 
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do so. Iran was also quick to inform the US during a meeting in Geneva that “they were 
in favor of swift and decisive military action by the United States against the Taliban” 
and Al-Qaeda (Crist, 2012, p. 431). Ryan Crocker, who was dispatched by Secretary of 
State Colin Powell to attend the Geneva meeting, recalls a member of the Iranian 
delegation, who was a Revolutionary Guard general, producing a map with Taliban troop 
locations and advising the US to concentrate their bombing campaigns in those regions 
(Crist, 2012, p. 431). Crocker and his Iranian counterparts met regularly to coordinate 
their efforts in Afghanistan. Iran in turn used its extensive leverage and influence over the 
Afghan Northern Alliance and coordinated its campaign against the Taliban with that of 
US military. On November 12, 2001, Taliban forces fled Kabul when Northern Alliance 
forces took control of the city and in less than a month, all major fighting in Afghanistan 
came to an end. 
 
When it was time to put together an Afghan government, Iran did not hesitate to use its 
influence in the region to make the December 2001 Bonn Conference a success. James 
Dobbins, who was appointed by Powell to represent the US in the UN-supervised 
negotiations with Afghanistan’s neighbors and Afghan warlords and factions to structure 
a new post-Taliban government and constitution, consulted regularly with his Iranian 
counterpart, Javad Zarif. Together they hammered out the framework for a new Afghan 
government. In fact, it was Zarif who brought to Dobbins’ attention that the draft 
agreement of the Bonn Conference did not include any mention of democratic elections 
and that the agreement neglected to require the Afghan government to cooperate with the 
international community on the war against terrorism (Dobbins, 2008, pp. 83-84).  
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Once the content of the agreement was finalized, a heated debate ensued regarding the 
composition and make-up of the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA), which was going 
to govern Afghanistan for six months before a Loya Jirga would meet to form the 
Transitional Government that would draft a new constitution and organize national 
elections. The Northern Alliance, having fought the Taliban since 1995 and having 
gained control over Kabul and much of Afghanistan, was in “no great hurry to engage in 
power-sharing arrangements with émigré figures who had no force on the ground and 
consequently had played little role in toppling of the Taliban” (Dobbins, 2008, p.23). 
This reluctance to share power created a deadlock in the conference. The deadlock was so 
severe that Yunus Qanuni, who represented the Northern Alliance in the Bonn 
Conference, proposed to adjourn the Conference without finalizing the list of cabinet 
members for the AIA (Dobbins, 2008, pp. 92-93). The insistence of the Northern 
Alliance to not only hold the three most important cabinet posts of defense, foreign 
affairs, and interior, but also three-fourths of the total was unacceptable to other Afghan 
factions. All national and factional representatives tried to persuade Qanuni to reduce his 
demands to no avail and Qanuni remained adamant in his demands. It was not until Zarif 
used his leverage over the Northern Alliance that Qanuni agreed to a compromise. 
Narrating how Qanuni finally conceded, Dobbins (2008) recounts: “Zarif stood up and 
signaled Qanooni [sic] to join him in the corner of the room. They whispered for no more 
than a minute. Qanooni [sic] then returned to the table and agreed to give up two 
ministries. He also agreed to the creation of three new ones that would go to other 
factions” (p. 96).  
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As Dobbins asserted later, “Zarif had achieved the final breakthrough without which the 
Karzai government might never have been” (Dreazen, 2013) and the US celebrated the 
accomplishment of a mission it could not have accomplish without Iran’s assistance. Yet, 
within weeks after Iran had helped the US stabilize Afghanistan and after Hamid Karzai 
was sworn in as the interim leader in Afghanistan, President Bush named Iran as part of 
an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world”  in his January 29, 2002, State 
of the Union Address. The swift victory and stabilization of Afghanistan had the 
unfortunate effect of making regime change and nation-building seem easy and left the 
short-lived, yet dominant, “impression of near omnipotence” in the US (Dobbins, 2008, 
p.23).  
 
This overconfidence increased the momentum for invading Iraq. As that momentum was 
building, however, many debated whether Iran or Iraq should be the next target of US 
global war on terrorism. Indeed many in the Pentagon argued that “the most urgent 
threat” was Iran and that by overthrowing the Islamic Republic, other Arab countries in 
the region would unite behind the US and against Saddam, “leading to his demise as 
well” (Crist, 2012, p. 451). While the Bush administration did not disagree with those 
who perceived Iran to be a more urgent threat, it believed that invading Iran would 
require all US military resources, bog down the war on terrorism and not allow any 
follow on operations, while invading Iraq would allow the US to maintain its momentum 
in the war. Hence, on March 19, 2003, the US invaded Iraq and in less than three weeks 
occupied Baghdad. 
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The occupation of Iraq presented Iran with a stark choice.  On the one hand, Iran believed 
that a stable and democratic Iraq, due to the composition of its population, would only 
add to Iran’s influence and standing in the region. On the other hand, a stable Iraq would 
have freed US military resources, making the US mare capable of attacking Iran. Indeed, 
once the US successfully invaded Iraq, the most immediate question among Iranian 
decision makers was whether Iran was next (Rose, 2007).  Consequently, Iran adopted a 
two-part strategy.  It worked to empower those Iraqi elements over which it had the 
greatest influence, while at the same time doing everything possible to increase the cost 
of invading Iraq for the US.  
 
Both out of fear and in order to gauge true US intentions, Iran sent a letter to the US 
through the Swiss Embassy in the spring of 2003, soon after the fall of Baghdad. The 
letter indicated that Iran was willing to put everything “on the table” and negotiate with 
the US on issues such as “full cooperation on nuclear safeguards, ‘decisive action’ 
against terrorists, coordination in Iraq, ending ‘material support’ for Palestinian militias 
and accepting the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict” (Kessler, 2006). The US, however, refused to even acknowledge the receipt of 
that letter.  Moreover, instead of closing down the primary training camp of People’s 
Mujahidin of Iran (MEK) in Iraq, which advocates military overthrow of the Islamic 
Republic and was designated by the US and the European Union as a terrorist 
organization until recently, the US agreed to a ceasefire with the organization and 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, declared members of the organization as 
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Protected Persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Goulka, Hansell, Wilke and 
Larson, 2009). These measures convinced Iranian policymakers that the US was 
unwilling to compromise or even reason, that the actions of the Islamic Republic did not 
have an effect on American’s attitudes and policies toward Iran, and that the only aim of 
the US was to destabilize and weaken the Islamic Republic. 
 
Consequently, Iran used every means at its disposal to constrain America’s ability to pose 
an existential threat to the Islamic Republic and chose Iraq as its primary battleground.  
Iran followed its two-part strategy and used the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which has long standing ties with the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, to bog down the US military in Iraq (Baker and Hamilton, 
2006, pp. 28-29). From Iran’s perspective, there were several advantages to keeping US 
forces in Iraq.  First, a US military fully engaged in Iraq was regarded as being less able 
to pose an existential threat to the Islamic Republic.  Second, maximizing the cost of the 
invasion of Iraq was regarded to reduce the likelihood of support for future possible 
military adventures, both among the American people and policymakers.  Third, the loss 
of credibility of the American military and its inability to bring about stability in the 
region might have made regional countries rethink their security alignments.  Finally, 
Iran believed that keeping US ground troops within its reach would act as an effective 
deterrent against possible aerial or missile attacks against Iran.  Therefore, as the Iraq 
Study Group indicated, it was only rational, given the circumstances, for Iran to use 
whatever means possible to ensure that the US would remain fully occupied in Iraq 
(Baker and Hamilton, 2006, p. 52).  
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Section 3.1.11: Iran’s Nuclear Dossier Under President Khatami 
 
While the US and Iran were fighting a proxy war in Iraq, they were also engaged in a 
diplomatic war in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UNSC. On 
August 14, 2002, the spokesperson for NCRI revealed that Iran was constructing both a 
uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water reactor without IAEA oversight. The 
revelation created a conflict that was temporarily resolved through Tehran Declaration, 
which was adopted by Iran and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) on 
October 21, 2003. In accordance with the Declaration, Tehran voluntarily suspended all 
“uranium enrichment and processing activities” and signed and implemented the 
Additional protocol on December 18, 2003. Yet, Iran and the EU3 disagreed on how to 
define the scope of enrichment activities to be suspended. While Iran claimed that 
preparatory stages of uranium conversion did not constitute enrichment under the Tehran 
declaration, the EU3 wanted to see Iran suspend all activities related to Iran’s nuclear fuel 
cycle program. The debate on what constitutes nuclear enrichment dragged on until the 
Paris Agreement was signed on November 14, 2004. According to the Paris Agreement, 
Iran was to voluntarily suspend “all uranium conversion activities, the assembly and 
testing of centrifuges, and even the import of centrifuge components” (ElBaradei, 2011, 
p. 141). In return, according to the same agreement, the Europeans agreed that the 
suspension was “a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.” 
They also agreed to begin negotiations on long-term arrangements that would provide 
Iran “with firm guarantees on nuclear, technological, and economic cooperation and firm 
commitment on security issues.” 
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Iran quickly implemented the Paris Agreement and one week later, “IAEA inspectors 
confirmed that the suspension was in place” (ElBaradei, 2011, p. 141). As Iran waited for 
the Europeans to put together their offer under the Paris Agreement, its “cooperation with 
the IAEA remained strong” and only a few inspection issues remained (ElBaradei, 2011, 
p. 141). When the European failed to present Iran with any offer, Rouhani, who was then 
Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, submitted a paper to the EU3 in March 2005 with a 
proposal that would be acceptable to Iran. Yet, the Europeans still refused to present Iran 
with their own offer. Indeed the Europeans were under much pressure themselves. On 
one hand, the US was adamantly opposed to any offer that would allow Iran to have any 
nuclear fuel cycle activity. On the other hand, they knew quite well and Iran had 
unequivocally forewarned them that any offer that would require Iran to indefinitely 
forgo enrichment, let alone other components of the fuel cycle, would be rejected by Iran. 
Stuck between a rock and a hard place, the Europeans had deliberately decided to make 
no offers to the Islamic Republic until after Iran’s coming presidential election and 
“asked for more time to develop a detailed proposal” (ElBaradei, 2011, p. 141).    
 
Considering that the Iranian Presidential election was coming up in June 2005, Khatami 
and Rouhani were, nevertheless, desperate to show the public what it was that they had 
attained through their conciliatory approach and cooperation with the EU3. By that 
election, the nuclear issue had gained much salience among the public. A New York 
Times report published on May 29, 2005, declared: “From nuclear negotiators to student 
dissidents, from bazaar merchants to turbaned mullahs, Iranians agree: the right to 
develop nuclear power is a point of national pride” (MacFarquhar, 2005). This public 
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mood in Iran made it even more difficult for Rouhani to accept any offer that was not 
going to go well with the public and Rouhani did let the EU3 know about the constraints 
he was facing back at home. Just as an example, Kamal Kharazi, Iran’s Foreign Minister, 
said in a May 2005 interview: “We have insisted [to the EU3] that we are looking for 
something tangible to convince our public opinion… We are under heavy pressure from 
our parliament and media to show results for the time we spent on the negotiations… we 
cannot wait forever and we have to take some measures toward the realization of our 
rights” (Linzer, 2005a). Rouhani and those who advocated a conciliatory approach within 
Iran, however, “lost all faith in the process” when the French informed Iran of what was 
coming and when they realized “how little they would be offered after months of 
negotiation” as well as full suspension of all nuclear fuel cycle related activities 
(ElBaradei, 2011, p. 145).  
 
These developments discredited the conciliatory approach of Khatami and his advisors 
and the perception that they were duped into agreeing to freeze a program of such 
significance in return for a promise that was never honored became widespread among 
the Iranian public. Considering that Iran was in an election season did not help President 
Khatami and his political allies. Khatami’s “naiveté,” “weakness,” and “sense of 
inferiority when dealing with foreigners,” were frequently invoked during the election 
and such rhetoric was used “to transform the nuclear issue into one of national pride and 
to sideline moderate political camps in election campaigns” (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, 
p. 127). This, among many other reasons, led to the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on 
June 24, 2005, with almost 62% of the votes.  
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Section 3.1.12: Iran’s Nuclear Dossier Under President Ahmadinejad 
 
During his campaign, Ahmadinejad “had passionately defended Iran’s nuclear program” 
(Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2008, p. 81). Upon winning the election, no one had any doubts 
that he was not going to continue with Khatami’s conciliatory foreign policy approach. 
As president-elect, Ahmadinejad urged the policymakers to resume Iran’s nuclear fuel 
cycle activities and to unilaterally end the voluntary suspension that Iran had agreed to in 
the Paris Agreement. Hence, on August 1, 2005, two days before Ahmadinejad took 
office, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA, informing it of Iran’s intention to resume work at 
Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). President Khatami and Rouhani, however, 
had decided not to act on Iran’s letter to the IAEA and believed that it would be better to 
wait until the EU3 would officially submit their proposal. On August 3, 2005, 
Ahmadinejad took office with a firm belief that he had a mandate to revitalize Iran’s 
nuclear program. That day he phoned Rouhani, asking him why the UCF in Isfahan had 
not yet begun operations. In response, Rouhani blamed the continued suspension of the 
UCF on IAEA staff, saying that IAEA was using delaying tactics to postpone the removal 
of its seals from that facility (Rouhani, 2013, p. 599).  
 
Finally, on August 5, 2005, the EU3 officially submitted their proposal to the Islamic 
Republic. As Paris had already informed Tehran, the offer was nothing close to what Iran 
deemed acceptable. It offered Iran potential trade and technology “incentives,” if Iran 
signed a “binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities” and gave IAEA 
inspectors, whose access is limited by international law, the right “to visit any site or 
interview any person they deem relevant to their monitoring of nuclear activities in Iran” 
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(Linzer, 2005b). The US backed up the deal by threatening to refer Iran to the UNSC if 
Iran ended its voluntary suspension of its nuclear fuel cycle related activities. Iranian 
officials, however, regarded the EU3 offer as “insulting.” Javad Zarif, who was at the 
time Iran’s ambassador to the UN, said in protest: “Maybe the Europeans are willing to 
sell out their own [sovereign] rights at a cheap price, but not Iran…[The EU3 offer] is 
absurd, demeaning and self-congratulatory” (Linzer, 2005b). After receiving the EU3 
offer, Iran, which had suspended its enrichment activities for close to two years and its 
entire fuel cycle related activities for close to one year in hopes of receiving a proposal 
from the EU3 that would – as was promised – recognize Iran’s rights under the NPT, 
decided to resume operations at its UCF in Isfahan on August 8, 2005, but the suspension 
of enrichment activities was continued.  
 
The failure of the Paris Agreement has left a long lasting impression in the minds of 
Iranians and the Iranian policymakers. From Iran’s point of view, Iran had suspended its 
nuclear program and had fully cooperated with the IAEA and had received “an insulting 
and humiliating” offer in return. The failure of the Paris Agreement did put an end to the 
careers of those who had advocated a conciliatory approach toward the west during 
Ahmadinejad’s tenure and made it extremely costly for anyone to promote any policy 
that would require even the slightest level of trust in the US and its allies. Indeed, the 
failure of the Paris Agreement “forever killed the idea of suspension in Iranian minds, 
and those more moderate figures within the establishment who advocated cooperation 
would forever have the argument thrown back at them by the hardliners: we suspended 
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once and it brought us nothing, they would repeatedly argue” (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 
219).  
 
Iran’s decision to end its voluntary suspension of uranium conversion infuriated the US 
and its European allies. A day after Iran ended the voluntary suspension of its fuel cycle 
activities, IAEA Board of Governors held an emergency meeting and urged Iran in its 
August 11, 2005, report to “re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related 
activities.” When Iran refused, the IAEA issued a damming report against the nuclear 
activities of the Islamic Republic and on September 24, 2005, declared Iran to be in “non-
compliance” with its safeguard agreements. It also indicated that “absence of confidence 
that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to 
questions that are within the competence of the [UN] Security Council.” From then on, 
both Iran and the US adopted a series of policies that escalated the conflict and the hostile 
rhetoric between the two countries.  
 
Soon after Ahmadinejad took office, the EU3 leaders demanded the new Iranian 
government to clarify and openly discuss its nuclear policies. In response to all such 
demands, President Ahmadinejad suggested that he had declarations to make during the 
annual heads of state meetings at the UN General Assembly. During his address to the 
60
th
 session of the UN General Assembly on September 17, 2005, President Ahmadinejad 
outlined Iran’s nuclear policy under his administration and said:  
1) The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its previously and repeatedly declared 
position that in accordance with our religious principles, pursuit of nuclear 
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weapons is prohibited... 3) Technically, the fuel cycle of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is not different from that of other countries which have peaceful nuclear 
technology. Therefore, as a further confidence building measure and in order to 
provide the greatest degree of transparency, the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other 
countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran. This 
represents the most far reaching step, outside of all requirements of the NPT, 
being proposed by Iran as a further confidence building measure. 4) In keeping 
with Iran's inalienable right to have access to a nuclear fuel cycle, continued 
interaction and technical and legal cooperation with the IAEA will be the 
centerpiece of our nuclear policy. Initiation and continuation of negotiations with 
other countries will be carried out in the context of Iran's interaction with the 
Agency. 
  
Yet, Ahmadinejad’s proposal to create an international consortium to manage Iran’s 
uranium enrichment program was never taken seriously and the push by the US and its 
European allies to force Iran to fully abandon its entire fuel cycle activities continued. 
Iran in return defied all foreign pressure and slowly expanded its fuel cycle activities. By 
changing the realities on the ground, Iran hoped to persuade other countries to abandon 
demands based on a “zero-enrichment” policy, persuading them to instead focus on 
nuclear safeguards and verifications. As part of this new strategy, on November 22, 2005, 
the Iranian parliament passed a law requiring the government to end all voluntary 
confidence building cooperation with the IAEA, such as enforcing the Additional 
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Protocol prior to its ratification by the Majlis, should the IAEA refer Iran’s case to the 
UNSC. In addition, on January 3, 2006, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to 
resume its nuclear enrichment related R&D and on January 10, 2006, Iran removed IAEA 
seals on enrichment related equipment and materials at Natanz and two other storage and 
testing locations, and resumed its enrichment related activities under IAEA surveillance.  
 
In response, on February, 3, 2006, the EU3 countries, with the backing of the US, tabled 
a damning resolution at the IAEA and the IAEA adopted a resolution on February 4, 
2006, requesting its Director General to report Iran’s case to the UNSC. In response, as 
Iran had previously warned, Iran ended all voluntary and confidence building safeguards 
and verification measures, including the implementation of the Additional Protocol, it 
declared that it would start its nuclear enrichment activities, and further accelerated all 
components of its nuclear fuel cycle program. The UNSC’s response to Iran’s nuclear 
defiance was abrupt. On March 29, 2006, the President of the UNSC issued a statement, 
demanding that Iran suspend its entire nuclear fuel cycle related activities. In response, in 
less than two weeks, on April 11, 2006, Iran declared that it had successfully enriched 
uranium to 3.5% and President Ahmadinejad declared Iran a “nuclear state.”   
 
Section 3.1.12.1: First UNSC Chapter VII Sanction Against Iran’s Nuclear 
Program 
 
Iran’s strategy of presenting the world with a fait accompli, did force the west to provide 
Iran with better offers. A simple comparison of the August 2005 offer and the June 2006 
offer clearly illustrated to Iranians that resistance was paying off. For example, the offer 
that was presented to Iran by all permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany (P5+1) 
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on June 1, 2006, offered Iran US easing of sanctions, permit of sales of light water 
reactors, and investments in Iran’s oil and gas projects in return for Iran only halting 
uranium enrichment and implementing the Additional Protocol. The deal was so good 
that Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, had confided to Javier Solana that its 
terms were acceptable to Iran (Crist, 2012, p. 506). Yet, because of the failure of the Paris 
Agreement and its wide ranging political and psychological ramifications, Iran refused to 
accept any offer that did not recognize its right to enrichment. When Larijani took the 
deal to Tehran, he had difficulty convincing other Iranian policymakers that Iran should 
trust the west once again. Among those who opposed, was Rouhani himself. In his “Iran's 
Nuclear Program: The Way Out” that was published by the Time Magazine on May 09, 
2006, Rouhani, who at that time was the representative of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), stated:  
Iran is intent on producing nuclear fuel domestically for reasons both historic and 
long-term economic. The U.S. and some Europeans argue that they cannot trust 
Iran's intentions. They argue that they cannot accept Iran's promise to remain 
committed to its treaty obligation once it gains the capability to enrich uranium 
for fuel production. They ask Iran to give up its right under the NPT, and instead 
accept their promise to supply it with nuclear fuel. This is illogical and crudely 
self-serving: I do not trust you, even though what you are doing is legal and can 
be verified to remain legal, but you must trust me when I promise to do that which 
I have no obligation to do and cannot be enforced. It is this simple and this unfair. 
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Almost immediately after Iran rejected the offer because it did not trust the west to fulfill 
its part of the deal, UNSC passed Resolution 1696, its first Chapter VII resolution, 
sponsored by the EU3 countries, against Iran on July 31, 2006. UNSC Resolution 1696 
demanded that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including 
research and development, to be verified by the IAEA” or face punitive action by the 
UNSC. Iran responded in defiance and President Ahmadinejad declared “Iranians today 
possess the nuclear know-how…If some believe they can use the language of force and 
threats they are badly mistaken… They are facing a knowledgeable and proud people” 
(Nasseri, 2006). In defiance to UNSC Resolution 1696, Iran moved ahead and expanded 
its enrichment program.  
 
The context in which UNSC Resolution 1696 was adopted is very important. From the 
time NCRI publicized Iran’s nuclear program until the summer of 2006, Israel and the 
US repeatedly threatened Iran with military action. All members of the US national 
security team were on the record emphasizing that when it came to Iran, “all options are 
on the table.” Israeli officials were also openly threatening Iran with surgical military 
attack. There were also numerous reports in the media about the US and Israel actively 
planning a military attack against Iran. Just as an example, Seymour Hersh, in his “The 
Iran Plans” article, which was published in the New Yorker Magazine on April 17, 2006, 
stated: 
The Bush administration, while publicly advocating diplomacy in order to stop 
Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, has increased clandestine activities inside 
Iran and intensified planning for a possible major air attack. Current and former 
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American military and intelligence officials said that Air Force planning groups 
are drawing up lists of targets, and teams of American combat troops have been 
ordered into Iran, under cover, to collect targeting data and to establish contact 
with anti-government ethnic-minority groups. The officials say that President 
Bush is determined to deny the Iranian regime the opportunity to begin a pilot 
program, planned for this spring, to enrich uranium.         
 
When Israel attacked Hezbollah forces in Lebanon on July 12, 2006, many analysts, 
particularly those in Iran, perceived it as a prelude to war with Iran. Both the Israelis and 
the Americans regard the Hezbollah “as a frontal commando unit of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards” and believe that Iran’s support for the Hezbollah is a “mean[s] to 
ensure that [Iran] would have a ready strategic response if Israel took action against it” 
(Schiff, 2006). When Israel attacked Lebanon, an influential Iranian official proclaimed 
that the US and Israel “want to cut one of Iran’s arms” and Iran’s former head of the 
IRGC said in an interview that “Israel and the US knew that as long as Hamas and 
Hezbollah were there, confronting Iran would be costly. So, to deal with Iran, they first 
want to eliminate forces close to Iran that are in Lebanon and Palestine” (Slackman, 
2006). 
 
UNSC Resolution 1696 was being negotiated at the UNSC while Israel was in Lebanon’s 
territory, engaging Hezbollah. This had two important effects on how Iran responded to 
UNSC Resolution 1696. First and foremost, it further delegitimized the UNSC in the eyes 
of Iran and other regional countries, and provided them with just another example of 
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“UNSC being an instrument of the US.” Indeed, while from the very first day of the war 
in Lebanon, the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah called for a ceasefire and 
exchange of prisoners and while Lebanon and other regional countries sought UNSC 
intervention for a ceasefire, the UNSC systematically failed to demand a ceasefire, 
primarily due to obstructions from the US and the United Kingdom. The US had 
explicitly adopted a “policy of delaying a [UNSC] cease-fire [resolution] so that the 
Israeli military can continue its anti-Hizballah campaign,” and Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, proclaimed that the conflict as the “birth pangs of a new Middle East” 
(Karon, 2006). As John Bolton, who at the time was US ambassador to the UN recalls, 
“repeated US statements made clear we weren’t interested in yet another Middle East 
cease-fire that would simply return us to the status quo ante; we wanted to make real 
progress in the region…” (Bolton, 2007, p. 395). Iranians could not help but ask how it 
was that while Israel was flying sorties over Lebanon, bombing areas with high civilian 
concentration, and while Israeli forces had violated Lebanon’s territorial integrity, it was 
Iran’s fledgling nuclear program, which was operating under the surveillance of IAEA, 
that UNSC selected as the utmost threat to international peace and security at that time.
14
 
This further delegitimized the UNSC in the eyes of Iranians, which in turn made defying 
UNSC Resolution 1696 significantly easier.   
 
The other effect of passing UNSC Resolution 1696 during the 2006 Lebanon War, was 
the link it created between the resolution and the military campaign against Lebanon. Had 
Israel been able to neutralize Hezbollah and achieve its war objectives, Iran might have 
                                                 
14
 It was not until August 11, 2006, that UNSC passed Resolution 1701, demanding a cease-fire and 
withdrawal of Israeli forces to internationally recognized borders. 
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taken the resolution more seriously. But Israel and, by extension, the US failed to achieve 
their primary war objective to “destroy or gravely weaken Hezbollah as either a military 
or a political force” (Cordesman, 2007, p. 9). The US being bogged down in Iraq and 
Israel failing in its effort to disarm a small proxy of Iran on its northern border, 
significantly discredited US and Israeli threats and allowed Iran to defy UNSC 
Resolution 1696 with more ease of mind.  
 
Section 3.1.12.2: Iran’s Nuclear Dossier and Negotiations Under Larijani 
 
UNSC Resolution 1696 had given Iran until August 31, 2006, to comply with the 
resolution or face Chapter VII sanctions. That date passed without Iran suspending its 
nuclear fuel cycle activities and without Iran agreeing to implement the Additional 
Protocol prior to its ratification. Immediately after the August 31 deadline passed, Bolton 
spearheaded a campaign at the UN to impose Chapter VII sanctions on Iran. The US, 
however, faced significant resistance from other UNSC members, particularly Russia and 
China, and was not immediately able to get the UNSC to impose sanctions after the 
August 31 deadline. In the meantime, Larijani and Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, were engaged in intense 
negotiations, looking at various ways of defusing the tensions. Iran was also installing 
more and more centrifuges, rapidly expanding its enrichment capabilities. Troubled by 
lack of progress in the UN toward imposing sanctions against Iran, the US Department of 
Treasury stepped up its efforts to dissuade European banks from doing any business with 
Iran. Efforts on that front started to bear fruit for US policy much faster than their efforts 
in the UN. By late September, 2006, two of Europe’s largest banks decided to end 
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business with Iran, with UBS canceling business with Iranian individuals, companies, and 
banks and Credit Suisse embarked on a “controlled withdrawal” by refusing new business 
with Iran (Rice-Oxley, 2006).          
 
While UNSC Resolution 1696 had only given Iran until the end of August to comply 
with its demands or face Chapter VII sanctions, it took the US and its allies until the end 
of the year to get UNSC on board for sanctions. Finally, on December 23, 2006, UNSC 
adopted Resolution 1737, which imposed an embargo on “all items, materials, 
equipment, goods, and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related or 
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery system.” 
It also froze foreign assets of Iranian individuals and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear 
and missile programs. UNSC Resolution 1737 gave Iran 60 days to suspend all its 
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or face further sanctions.  
 
Iran responded to UNSC Resolution 1737 by installing even more centrifuge cascades 
and by declaring that it was planning to start enriching uranium on an industrial scale. In 
fact, the Iranian parliament passed a law on December 27, 2006, requiring the 
government to accelerate its efforts in the nuclear field and suspend implementation of 
code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements. Immediately after Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA’s 
General Director, issued his report after the 60 day deadline of UNSC Resolution 1737 
affirming that Iran had not complied with the demands of UNSC Resolution 1737, the US 
pushed for more UNSC sanctions on Iran. The US push for sanctions, coupled with 
increasingly “widespread speculation about possible US plans to launch a military attack 
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against Iran” (Fayazmanesh, 2008, p. 215) worried other P5+1 countries about possible 
ulterior US motives. Reports of possible US action against Iran had become so 
widespread and frequent in 2007, that some prominent US Senators also became worried 
about the Iraq war spreading into Iran and Syria. Just as an example, on January 11, 2007, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden found it necessary to warn 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, that “if the president concluded he had to invade 
Iran… the present authorization [that] granted the president to use force in Iraq does not 
cover that and he does need Congressional authority to do that” (Mohammed and 
Morgan, 2007). As the US pushed for much harsher UNSC sanctions and as reports of 
possible unilateral US action became widespread, Russia and China agreed to a more 
moderated UNSC resolution. Hence, on March 24, 2007, UNSC unanimously passed 
Resolution 1747. 
 
UNSC Resolution 1747 reaffirmed previous resolutions and added a number of new 
penalties against Iran. In addition to the penalties that were imposed by UNSC Resolution 
1737, UNSC Resolution 1747 decided that Iran should not sell “any arms or related 
material” and asked other states to “exercise vigilance and restraint” in supply of a 
specified list of weapons to Iran. UNSC Resolution 1747 also demanded other states not 
to provide Iran with “any grants, financial assistance, or loans, except for humanitarian or 
developmental purposes.” UNSC Resolution 1747 gave Iran 60 days to comply with all 
UNSC resolutions or face further punitive action.  
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Iranian policymakers drew a very interesting lesson from the rapid adoption of UNSC 
Resolution 1747. They arrived at the conclusion that time was not on their side and that 
they should achieve a fait accompli in a speedy fashion. One policymaker in the Office of 
Presidency informed me that after the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1747, 
the general belief in Tehran was that the sooner Iran could show the world that it had 
mastered various elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, the sooner the US would abandon its 
coercive postures design to deprive Iran from attaining that very know-how. Hence, Iran 
responded to UNSC Resolution 1747 by declaring on April 9, 2007, that having 
succeeded with enrichment on a laboratory scale, it was now going to embark upon 
enriching uranium on an industrial scale and named April 9 National Nuclear Energy day. 
By May 13, 2007, according to the Director General’s May 23, 2007, report to the IAEA 
Board of Governors, Iran was simultaneously operating eight 164-machine centrifuge 
cascades, feeding them with UF6, had two other similar cascades vacuum tested and 
ready to be fed with UF6, and had three other cascades under construction.  
 
Simultaneous with advancements in the technical field, Iran intensified its negotiations 
with Solana and the IAEA. From April 25 to June 22, 2007, Larijani held three rounds of 
intensive negotiations with Solana. On June 22, 2007, Iran and the IAEA announced that 
they would start working on drafting a plan of action that would address all outstanding 
issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Soon after announcement, IAEA and Iran started 
their negotiations and agreed to a Workplan on August 21, 2007. As stated in the 
agreement, the Workplan covered “all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that 
there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran’s past nuclear program 
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and activities.” The agreement also indicated that “the Agency and Iran agreed that after 
the implementation of the above work plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the 
outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a 
routine manner.” Based on the agreed Workplan, Iran started to address the IAEA 
concerns and one by one resolved all outstanding issues and ambiguities regarding Iran’s 
past nuclear activities. Finally, ElBaradei’s Feb 22, 2008, report to the IAEA Board of 
Governors, declared that Iran had answered all 6 outstanding issues listed in the 
Workplan in an acceptable manner and that IAEA no longer considered them as 
outstanding. In an interview on that same day, ElBaradei declared “we have managed to 
clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is 
the scope and nature of Iran’s enrichment programme” (ElBaradei, 2008). 
 
The Workplan, however, included one other issue. Apart from the agreed outstanding 
issues, the IAEA also requested Iran to address issues surrounding the so called Alleged 
Studies. According to a series of documents provided to the IAEA by US intelligence 
agencies, Iran had conducted a series of nuclear weaponization studies. The documents 
had come from a laptop that was reportedly handed to the US in mid-2004. While the 
documents were damning, their authenticity was severely under question. Moreover the 
US never allowed Iran access to the documents, but demanded Iran to respond to them. 
What little IAEA could show Iran, Iran rejected as “fabricated and baseless” (ElBaradei, 
2011, pp. 279-281).  
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While Iran and the IAEA were resolving the agreed outstanding issues, the US was 
pushing for more UNSC sanctions. Indeed, the deadline of UNSC Resolution 1747 had 
long passed and Iran had not complied with its demands. Soon after ElBaradei’s Feb 22, 
2008, report to the IAEA Board of Governors, efforts to push through another UNSC 
sanctions intensified and while Iran and IAEA were still working on resolving issues 
pertaining to the Alleged Studies, UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1803 on March 3, 
2008.  
 
The Resolution, which placed more sanctions on Iran, had extremely adverse effects on 
Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. In ElBaradei’s words, “Iranians’ cooperation on the 
Workplan had been rewarded with yet more Security Council sanctions” (ElBaradei, 
2011, p. 291) and “the council [had] issued the verdict before the deliberations. Not only 
was this a procedural fault, it gave the impression – perhaps accurately – that the council 
was taking action based on predetermined policy objectives rather than on the facts” 
(ElBaradei, 2011, pp. 280-281). UNSC Resolution 1803 made Iran even more convinced 
that no matter what it did, the US was intent on using the UNSC to punish Iran.  
 
The belief that the United States was seeking regime change and not a change in Iran’s 
policies was particularly reinforced since not only the IAEA but also the US intelligence 
community had at the time issued reports, indicating that Iran did not have an active 
nuclear weapons program. As Iran and IAEA were resolving outstanding issue in the 
second half of 2007, the US National Intelligence Council had released an unclassified 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s “nuclear intentions and capabilities.” The 
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report stated “with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a 
nuclear weapon” and “with moderate confidence [that] Tehran had not restarted its 
nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007.” For these reasons, policymakers in Iran could 
not make themselves believe that the US and other P5+1 countries honestly regarded 
Iran’s nuclear program as a danger to international peace and security, requiring the 
UNSC to deal with it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. To Iran, it was clear that the 
UNSC and Iran’s nuclear program were simply being used by the US to achieve other 
anti-Iran objectives. Consequently, Iran stopped cooperating with the IAEA on resolving 
issues pertaining to the Alleged Studies and declared that it was going to double the 
number of its centrifuges at Natanz from 3000 to 6000 (ElBaradei, 2011, pp. 280-281).  
 
Section 3.1.12.3: Iran’s Nuclear Dossier and Negotiations Under Jalili 
 
Soon after Iran decided to further expand its enrichment capabilities by installing more 
centrifuges, P5+1 countries developed a new offer package and delivered it to Iran on 
June 14, 2008. Less than a month later, on July 4, 2008, Iran responded to the offer by 
pointing to the commonalities between the P5+1 package and the package Iran had 
offered less than two months earlier and agreed to restart negotiations with P5+1 based 
on the commonalities of the two packages. Hence, on July 19, 2008, Iran’s new chief 
nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, met with the representatives of P5+1 in Geneva. What 
made this session different from all previous talks, was that the US had finally decided to 
join the talks as well. It is worth recalling that less than three years earlier, Condoleezza 
Rice had demanded total suspension of all nuclear fuel cycle activities as a precondition 
of the US joining the talks. By the summer of 2008, that precondition was dropped and 
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William Burns represented the US at the P5+1 talks with Iran. Yet, at the talks, UK 
representative, Mark Grant, demanded that Iran respond to their June offer in less than 
two weeks. When the deadline passed, the US pushed for a new UNSC sanction. Hence, 
on September 27, 2008, UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1835, which, due to resistance 
from Russia and China, did not include any new sanctions and simply reaffirmed 
previous UNSC resolutions against Iran. As in the past, Iran responded to the UNSC 
Resolution 1835 by further expanding its enrichment activities. 
 
Section 3.1.13: President Obama and Iran’s June 2009 Presidential Elections 
 
In November 2008, Barack Obama won the US presidential election. Throughout his 
campaign, he had promised to bring about “change.” Iranians followed the US 
presidential elections closely and were “as intrigued by Obama’s background and 
personal history as were others around the world” (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, p. 134). 
Iranians, too, wanted to believe in Obama’s promise of change. Hence, when Obama 
declared in his 2009 Inaugural Address that “to the Muslim world, [I say] we seek a new 
way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” Iranians believed that 
Obama’s remarks were directed at them. Yet, the history of Iran-US relations made it 
difficult for Iranians to believe that Obama would be able to deliver.  
 
President Obama further reached out to “the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran” in his Nowruz video, which was released on March 20, 2009. He said: 
In this season of new beginnings I would like to speak clearly to Iran's leaders.  
We have serious differences that have grown over time.  My administration is 
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now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and 
to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international 
community.  This process will not be advanced by threats.  We seek instead 
engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect. 
      
Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, was quick to respond to President Obama’s 
overture. In his annual New Year speech the next day, Ayatollah Khamenei said: 
Changes in words are not adequate…[this change] should not come with 
unhealthy intentions. You may say that you want to change policies, but not your 
aims, that you will change tactics. This is not change. This is deceit. There can be 
true change, which should be seen in action… If the US government continues its 
same behavior, methods, course, and policies against us, as in the past thirty 
years, we are the same people, the same nation that we have been for the past 
thirty years… We do not have any experience with this new US president and 
government. We shall see and judge. You change, and we shall change as well. 
 
President Obama, however, waited until the Iranian presidential election in June 2009 to 
build on his initial expression of goodwill. The media in the US and other western 
countries were full of stories and analyses wishfully predicting Ahmadinejad’s defeat. 
Just as an example, David Ignatius wrote in a Washington Post article that was published 
on May 31, 2009, that “Change is in the Air in Iran” and continued on saying: “As Iran 
heads toward its presidential election on June 12, there are signs that Iranian voters are 
embracing their own version of ‘Change we can believe in.’ The fiery incumbent, 
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President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, appears to be losing ground to a more pragmatic and 
experienced rival, former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi.”    
 
The June 2009 presidential elections, however, did not produce the results that were 
expected in the West. As opinion polls conducted both In Iran and from outside had 
correctly predicted,
15
 Ahmadinejad won the presidential election with a solid majority of 
the votes. However, when his rivals refused to concede defeat, civil unrest engulfed 
Tehran, where Mir Hussein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s main contender, had won with a 
slight majority. Mir Hussein Mousavi, however, failed to produce much court worthy 
evidence in support of his allegations. Ayatollah Khamenei, believing that the sanctity of 
the ballot box must be preserved and its outcome must be respected, refused to take any 
extralegal measures to address the demands of the so called Green Movement, which was 
comprised of various opposition groups and protesters. The US and the west, however, 
romanticized the Green Movement. They accepted its claim that the election had been 
stolen. The belief that a popular movement calling for an end to the core policies of the 
Islamic Republic had failed only because it was brutally crushed, “weakened support 
among Western elites and publics for diplomatic engagement with Iran” (Leverett and 
Leverett, 2013, p. 259) and any mention of rapprochement with Ahmadinejad’s 
government became politically toxic in the west.  
 
  
                                                 
15
 See for example: Kull, S., Ramsey, C., Weber, S. and Lewis, E. (February 3, 2010). Analysis of Multiple 
Polls Finds Little Evidence Iranian Public Sees Government as Illegitimate. WorldPublicOpinion.org. 
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Section 3.1.14: Tehran’s Research Reactor (TRR) Nuclear Fuel Swap Deal 
 
Soon after the June 2009 presidential election, Iran’s fuel need for Tehran’s Research 
Reactor (TRR) gained salience. Iran has been relying on TRR to produce the medical 
isotopes that it is no longer capable of procuring from international producers as a result 
of the sanctions. More than 850,000 Iranian patients are dependent on these medical 
isotopes and the closure of TRR could have a devastating effect on their well-being 
(Erdbrink, 2010). The last time Iran had refueled TRR was in 1993 and the fuel required 
to keep TRR operating started to run out in 2009. Hence, as in 1993, in June 2009, Iran 
officially requested the IAEA to facilitate the refueling of TRR, which is a safeguarded 
facility that has always operated under the supervision and oversight of the IAEA. Iran 
informed the IAEA that it was willing to purchase the fuel from anyone who was willing 
to sell it to Iran, including the United States. In fact, President Ahmadinejad labeled the 
request as “a litmus test” to gauge the sincerity of the US and other western powers when 
they claim they have no problem with Iran benefiting from a peaceful nuclear program 
(FNA, September 30, 2009 
Iran’s request was seen as an opportunity by the P5+1 to reduce Iran’s breakout potential 
by demanding it to ship out 1200 kg of its low enriched uranium (LEU) in return for fuel 
for TRR. On October 1, 2010, on the sidelines of P5+1 talks with Iran, Iran agreed “in 
principle” to a deal offered by US representative William Burns, according to which Iran 
would trade 1,200 kilograms of its 3.5 percent LEU for 120 kilograms of 20 percent LEU 
fuel from abroad. This was perceived as a victory in Iran (FNA, October 9, 2009), 
because for once the P5+1 had not demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment activities.  
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Between the Geneva talk on October 1, 2009 and the trilateral talks [Iran plus US, 
France, and Russian (aka the Vienna group) plus IAEA)] in Vienna on October 19, 2009, 
high raking Iranian officials expressed satisfaction with the Geneva talks and showed 
optimism about the potentials of the Vienna meeting, during which Iran and the Vienna 
group were going to workout the details of the offer under the auspices of the IAEA. The 
Vienna meeting ended on October 21 and ElBaradei circulated a draft agreement which 
he regarded as a “balanced way forward” and requested parties to respond back by 
October 23. ElBaradei, however, emphasized to reporters at the end of the meeting on 
October 21, 2009, that the draft agreement was not final and said: “there has been a lot of 
technical issues, legal issues, policy issues, and issues of confidence and trust, and that is 
why it has taken us some time and that is why we need to send the agreement to capitals 
for final approval.” 
  
The draft agreement, which required Iran to ship out twelve hundred kilograms of its 
LEU in a single batch in return for 120 kg of fuel for the TRR to be delivered two years 
after the date of delivery, was not received well in Iran. On October 23, France, US, and 
Russia declared their approval of the draft agreement but Iran requested more time saying 
that “it is considering the proposal in depth and in a favorable light, but it needs time until 
the middle of next week to provide a response.” Between October 21 when the Vienna 
talks ended and October 29, when Iran submitted its formal response to IAEA, Iranian 
political figures from all sides rejected the deal on grounds that it lacked “sufficient 
guarantees.” On October 25, Larijani, who was now the Speaker of Majlis, said:  “My 
guess is that the Americans have made a secret deal with certain countries to take [low-
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]enriched uranium away from us under the pretext of providing nuclear fuel. We hope 
Iranian officials will pay due attention to this issue” (Daragahi, 2009).  Alaeddin 
Boroujerdi, the Chairman of Iran’s Foreign Relations Committee in Majlis, also voiced 
his opposition to the deal saying, “because the West has repeatedly violated agreements 
in the past, Iran should send its low enriched uranium abroad gradually and in several 
phases and necessary guarantees should be taken…It is better if Iran purchases 20 percent 
enriched fuel from Russia or any other supplier” (Hefezi, 2009). Also, a day after Iran 
submitted its formal response to the IAEA, opposition leader Mir Hussein Mousavi 
issued a statement saying: 
Today it seems like we have to surrender a major portion of the product of our 
country's nuclear program, which has caused so much uproar and has brought 
upon our people so many sanctions, to another country in hopes that they may out 
of kindness provide us with this basic need sometime in the future and give us a 
little fuel? Is this a victory? Or a lie portraying surrender as a victory? Not only 
have the officials been unable to solve global problems, but they are not even 
safeguarding the undeniable rights of our people and have generously given these 
rights up. This shows that the officials are extremists even when it comes to 
surrendering [to foreigners]. 
 
On October 29, 2009, Iran submitted its response to ElBaradei’s proposal. While the 
details of that response have not been disclosed, from Ahmadinejad’s speech on that day 
warning the west against any “plot,” it could be inferred that Iran required the agreement 
to include some guarantees (FNA, October 30, 2009). Ahmadinejad delivered another 
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speech on that same day pointing to numerous past episodes of unfulfilled agreements 
and contracts to illustrate why Iran could not accept a deal that lacked “sufficient” 
guarantees (FNA, October 29, 2009). ElBaradei also confirmed in his interview with 
CNN on November 5, 2009, that “Iran wants guarantees and is concerned about trust.” 
By the time Iran responded to ElBaradei’s proposal, a consensus had developed in Iran 
that without further assurances and guarantees, the details of the proposal was not 
acceptable to Iran.  
 
Iran, however, never got a response to its request for further guarantees. On the contrary, 
the US imposed a deadline on Iran to either accept the proposal as it was or face further 
UNSC sanctions (Bohan and Schedrov, 2009). Between October 29, 2009 and February 
8, 2010, Iranian officials stipulated many possibilities to salvage the swap deal. The 
proposals included: 
1) Simultaneous exchange of nuclear fuel on Iran’s territory; 
2) A staged exchange of nuclear fuel; 
3) On November 15, Mohsen Rezayi, Secretary of the powerful Expediency 
Council, suggested that due to a lack of trust in US, France, and Russia (P3) 
because of their past behaviors and considering that ElBaradei’s proposal lacks 
sufficient guarantees, Iran should not accept the proposal unless the Vienna Group 
first makes a symbolic move, such as suspending UNSC sanctions, to show their 
goodwill; 
4) Simultaneous exchange of nuclear fuel on the soil of a third country; 
139 
 
5) Putting the entire 1200 kilo of Iran’s LEU under IAEA’s seal and custody in Iran 
and allowing the IAEA to take the material out once Iran received the fuel for 
TRR; 
6) Downsizing the deal and swapping only some of the LEU for some of the fuel and 
swapping the rest several years later, when more confidence was built. 
 
But the US remained adamant that Iran must accept ElBaradei’s proposal as it was. 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton declared: “This is a pivotal moment for Iran. We urge 
Iran to accept the agreement as proposed and we will not alter it and we will not wait 
forever…We are speaking with one voice on this critical issue” (Eckert, 2009). Not 
receiving any guarantees, not even a verbal assurance or any signals suggesting goodwill, 
Iran’s foreign minister declared that “the international community has only one more 
month to make a decision. Otherwise, Tehran will enrich uranium to a higher purity 
needed for the fuel,” adding that, “this is an ultimatum” (Xinhua, January 3, 2010). This 
was not the first time Iran had issued such “ultimatums,” but it was the first time that Iran 
was setting a date. Before going into the Vienna talks, for example, Iran’s nuclear agency 
spokesman Ali Shirzadian had said that “if the negotiations do not yield the desired 
results, Iran will start enriching uranium to the 20 percent level for its Tehran reactor” 
(AFP, October 20, 2009).  
 
Iran’s ultimatum did not result in any change in the tone and the posture of the Vienna 
group, which refused to provide Iran with any assurances, not even a verbal one. 
Therefore, as promised, Iran informed the IAEA on February 8, 2010, that it was going to 
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start using its own enrichment facilities to make the required fuel for TRR. It started to 
enrich uranium to 20% on the very next day. Soon after Iran informed the IAEA of its 
plan, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said that the international community 
was willing to help Iran procure medical isotopes from abroad and that he hoped the offer 
would help to “build some confidence” and show that Iran’s plan to enrich uranium to 
20-percent purity for a reactor making isotopes for cancer patients was “unnecessary” 
(Quinn, 2010). This statement made Iranian officials even more suspicious of the US 
intentions and more certain that the west did not intent to deliver the fuel as they were 
promising, since Crowley was asserting a position that was at odds with ElBaradei’s 
proposal: that Iran did not need to produce its own isotopes, that it should decommission 
TRR, and that it could rely on a market that had stopped selling it these isotopes since the 
imposition of UNSC sanctions. On February 18, 2010, IAEA confirmed that “Iran [had] 
provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results which indicate that enrichment 
levels of up to 19.8% U-235 were obtained at PFEP
16
 between 9 and 11 February 2010.”  
 
After proving that it was technically capable of enriching to higher levels, Iran continued 
to insist that it would prefer to buy the fuel and it would stop enriching up to 20% as soon 
as it received assurances that it would be provided with the fuel. In fact, on the very same 
day the IAEA confirmed that Iran was capable of enriching to higher levels, Iran sent a 
letter to the IAEA reaffirming that while Iran was “still seeking to purchase the required 
fuel in cash,’’ it was also willing to exchange its low-enriched uranium for the fuel rods 
“simultaneously in one package or several packages in the territory of the Islamic 
                                                 
16
 Iran’s Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz 
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Republic of Iran” (Jahn, 2010). The US, however, rejected Iran’s request and Crowley 
called Iran’s response “a red herring” (Jahn, 2010). 
 
ElBaradei, whose tenure at the IAEA ended in November 2009, suggested other ways of 
satisfying the demands and expectations of both the US and Iran. In an interview with 
CNN’s Amanpour on November 5, 2009, ElBaradei suggested that one way Iran could be 
assured that it would get fuel for TRR once it relinquished custody of 1200 kg of its LEU 
would be to send the LEU to Turkey instead, an idea with which President Obama was 
comfortable (ElBaradei, 2011, p. 311). Iran warmed up to the idea of a swap deal that 
would use Turkey as a interim storage location and sent signals to Turkey and Brazil, 
both non-permanent UNSC members at the time, to that effect. Turkey’s Prime Minister 
Erdogan and Brazil’s President Lula da Silva approached the US with the idea. In 
response, President Obama wrote a letter on April 20, 2010, both to President Lula and to 
Prime Minister Erdogan, laying out his conditions for a deal. In the letter, which was 
publicized by President Lula on May 28, 2010, President Obama stated: 
I agree with you that the TRR is an opportunity to pave the way for a broader 
dialogue in dealing with the more fundamental concerns of the international 
community regarding Iran’s overall nuclear program. From the beginning, I have 
viewed Iran’ s request as a clear and tangible opportunity to begin to build mutual 
trust and confidence, and thereby create time and space for a constructive 
diplomatic process. That is why the United States so strongly supported the 
proposal put forth by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Director General EIBaradei. The IAEA’s proposal was crafted to be fair and 
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balanced, and for both sides to gain trust and confidence. For us, Iran’s agreement 
to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country 
would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing 
Iran’s LEU stockpile. I want to underscore that this element is of fundamental 
importance for the United States…We understand from you, Turkey and others 
that Iran continues to propose that Iran would retain its LEU on its territory until 
there is a simultaneous exchange of its LEU for nuclear fuel. As General Jones 
noted during our meeting, it will require one year for any amount of nuclear fuel 
to be produced. Thus, the confidence-building strength of the IAEA’s proposal 
would be completely eliminated for the United States and several risks would 
emerge…There is a potentially important compromise that has already been 
offered. Last November, the IAEA conveyed to Iran our offer to allow Iran to ship 
its 1,200 kg of LEU to a third country – specifically Turkey – at  the outset of the 
process to be held “in escrow” as a guarantee during the fuel production process 
that Iran would get back its uranium if we failed to deliver the fuel. Iran has never 
pursued the "escrow" compromise and has provided no credible explanation for 
its rejection…I would urge Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity presented 
by this offer to "escrow" its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear fuel is being 
produced… Meanwhile, we will pursue sanctions on the timeline that I have 
outlined…I look forward to the next opportunity to see you and discuss these 
issues as we consider the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program to the security of 
the international community, including in the UN Security Council. 
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With Obama’s letter, Iran attained the confidence it needed to pursue with the deal. In 
less than a month, Iran, Brazil, and Turkey worked together to draft an agreement that 
delivered on every single term that was laid out in Obama’s April 20 letter to Lula and 
Erdogan. On May 17, 2010, Iran, Brazil, and Turkey signed the Tehran Declaration, 
which met all of President Obama’s conditions. According to the agreement, “Iran would 
send twelve hundred kilograms of LEU to Turkey, in a single shipment, to be held in 
escrow while Iran’s research reactor fuel was being fabricated” (ElBaradei, 2011, p. 312). 
A day after the signing of the declaration, however, the US rejected the deal. In a Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called more 
UNSC sanctions “as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the 
last few days as any we could provide” (Sanger and Landler, 2010).  Indeed, “the west 
had refused to take yes for an answer” (ElBaradei, 2011, p. 313), further persuading 
Iranians that there was nothing they could possibly do to satisfy the US and that the US 
was simply using nonproliferation concerns as a cover for an underlying intent to 
undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran.    
 
On June 9, 2010, UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, which placed more sanctions on Iran. 
The rejection of a deal that was based entirely on Obama’s letter severely undermined US 
credibility and made Iranians doubtful about the true intention of the US government. 
Turkey and Brazil were also so infuriated that they voted against the Resolution at the 
UNSC. Iran, nevertheless, continued to declare that it did not wish to enrich uranium to 
higher levels and that it would abandon 20% enrichment immediately upon receiving 
assurances that it would be provided with the fuel for TRR. Just as an example, in an 
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interview with the Washington Post on September 13, 2011, President Ahmadinejad 
stated: 
At the beginning we had no interest to produce uranium grade 20 percent. But the 
West refrained from giving us that uranium, so we had to start producing uranium 
grade 20 percent… We felt that they wouldn’t give us the fuel required here for 
our reactor. There were some political leaders who gave interviews in the United 
States and Europe and they said they want to keep Iran from having access to 
such fuel. So we realized that they wouldn’t give us that fuel so we had to do it 
ourselves. Even if they gave us now uranium grade 20 percent, we would not 
continue with the production of this fuel... We don’t want to produce uranium of 
20 percent. Because they did not give us that uranium, we had to make our own 
investments. If they start to give us that uranium today, we will stop production. I 
repeat: If you give us uranium grade 20 percent now, we will stop production. 
Because uranium grade 20 percent can only be used for such reactors, nothing 
else. 
 
Section 3.1.15: US Sanctions and Covert Actions Against Iran’s Nuclear 
Program 
 
UNSC Resolution 1929 was significantly watered down by China and Russia and was not 
as tough as the US wished it to be (Patrikarakos, 2012, p. 263). Concurrent with pursuing 
sanctions at the UN, the Obama administration and the Congress pursued some of the 
toughest sanctions against Iran. As will be explored in more detail, the US pursued two 
different paths of putting more pressure on Iran. The first path went through the US 
Congress, which adopted some of the toughest sanction legislations against Iran. The 
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other path was pursued by the State Department and the Department of Treasury, which 
actively dissuaded US trade partners from doing any business with Iran.  
 
Besides imposing economic pressure, the US and Israel resorted to cyberattacks and 
assassination of Iranian scientists to slow down Iran’s nuclear advances. Soon after 
taking office, President Obama authorized the continuation of sophisticated cyberattacks 
against Iran’s enrichment facilities that had started under President Bush. In fact, 
President Obama decided to accelerate the attacks, code named Operation Olympic 
Games, even after the computer worm the US had developed in conjunction with the 
Israelis – named by computer security experts as Stuxnet – escaped Iran’s nuclear 
facilities and created problems throughout the world (Sanger, 2012). The worm is 
reported to have destroyed a fifth of Iran’s centrifuges and is viewed as the main reason 
why Iran’s enrichment activities was temporarily halted in late 2009 (Broad and Markoff 
and Sanger, 2011). According to an “insider,” besides its crippling effect on Iran’s 
enrichment facilities, Stuxnet was deliberately designed “to make Iranians feel stupid” 
(Deibert, 2013, p. 179).  
 
Israel also began an assassination campaign, financing, training, arming, and guiding 
members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) to target and assassinate Iranian 
nuclear scientists (Engel and Windrem, 2012). The campaign has to this date resulted in 
the death of four Iranian nuclear scientists, including Dr. Shahriyari, who was one of the 
chief experts tasked with ridding Iranian enrichment facilities from the Stuxnet computer 
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worm and whose scientific and mathematical expertise allowed Iran to convert Iran’s 
stockpile of 20% enriched uranium into the fuel rods needed for TRR.  
 
Section 3.1.16: Nuclear Negotiations Between Iran and P5+1 
 
Between the summer of 2010 to the summer of 2013, when Iran’s presidential election 
were held, Iran and P5+1, engaged in a series of promising negotiations. P5+1 and Iran 
met in Geneva on December 6, 2010, and agreed to “talk and cooperate on mutually 
acceptable points.” Then a second round of negotiations were held in Istanbul on January 
21, 2011. In Istanbul, Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief negotiator, steadfastly refused to talk about 
any other issues that were not agreed to during the Geneva talks. He suggested possible 
areas of cooperation and demanded P5+1 to either respond to those or suggest their own 
possible areas of cooperation. Because of the negotiation postures of both Jalili and P5+1, 
the Istanbul talks did not produce any results and no further negotiations were scheduled. 
After much behind the scene talks and negotiations between Iran and various P5+1 
countries, as well as talks among P5+1 countries, Russia proposed a “step-by-step” 
solution to the Iranian nuclear impasse in July 2011. The “step-by-step” solution 
proposed by Russia was welcomed by Iran during a meeting between President 
Ahmadinejad and the Russian Security Council Secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, in Tehran 
on August 16, 2011. While the actual Russian proposal was rejected by the US because it 
was perceived it to be too “front-end loaded,” the concept of a step-wise de-escalating 
and confidence building solution was accepted by P5+1 and Iran and became the basis of 
future negotiations.    
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On November 20, 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order 13590, imposing new 
sanctions that targeted Iran’s petrochemical and energy sectors. On January 22, 2012, the 
European Union (EU) joined the US and passed sanctions on Iran’s oil, which were set to 
take effect from July 1, 2012.  Some two weeks later, on February 5, 2012, President 
Obama signed Executive Order 13599 to block all assets of the Government of Iran and 
all Iranian financial institutions that were within the jurisdiction of the US. In the 
meantime, Iran expanded the operation and production capacity of its uranium 
enrichment facilities. According to the November 8, 2011, report of the IAEA General 
Director to the Board of Governor, while in February 2012 Iran was feeding UF6 into 
6208 centrifuges in Natanz, by November 2012 Iran had increased the number of its 
centrifuges that were being fed with UF6 to 8808 and was vacuum testing another 348 of 
its centrifuges.  
 
On April 14, 2012, Iran and P5+1, held another rounds of negotiations in Istanbul. The 
negotiations in Istanbul were important because they were happening after some 14 
months since the previous round of talks between Iran and P5+1. In Istanbul, Iran and 
P5+1 agreed to restart the negotiations, and agreed to adopt a step-by-step process with 
reciprocal actions, in order to create momentum towards a long-term solution. They also 
selected Baghdad as the next venue for their negotiations.  
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During the negotiations in Baghdad, which took place on May 23-24, 2012, Iran 
presented P5+1 with its five step proposal and P5+1 presented their own 2 step proposal: 
P5+1 talks in Baghdad (May 23-24, 2012) 
Iran’s Proposal  P5+1 Proposal 
Step 1 - Guidelines 
 Iran emphasizes commitments under the 
NPT and its opposition to nuclear 
weapons based on the Supreme Leader's 
fatwa. 
 P5+1 recognizes and openly announces 
Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its 
enrichment activities, based on NPT 
Article IV. 
 
Step 2 - Transparency Measures 
 Iran continues broad cooperation with 
IAEA and will transparently cooperate 
with the IAEA on “possible military 
dimensions.” 
 P5+1 will end unilateral and multilateral 
sanctions against Iran outside of the 
UNSC resolutions. 
 
Step 3 - Confidence Building Steps 
 Beyond continuous IAEA monitoring of 
enrichment activities for Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRR) fuel, Iran will cooperate 
with P5+1 to provide enriched fuel needed 
for TRR. 
 P5+1 will terminate the UN sanctions and 
remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC 
agenda. 
 
Step 4 - Strengthening Cooperation on Mutual 
Interests 
 Parties will start and boost cooperation on: 
designing and building nuclear power 
plants and research reactors (Iran’s 
priorities); 
 And light water research reactors, nuclear 
safety and security, nuclear fusion (P5+1 
priorities). 
 
Step 5 - Strengthening Joint Cooperation 
 Parties will start cooperating on: regional 
issues, especially Syria and Bahrain 
(Iran’s priorities); 
 And combating piracy and countering 
narcotics activities (P5+1 priorities). 
Iranian actions: 
 Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment 
activities. 
 Iran transfers all 20 percent enriched 
uranium to a third country under IAEA 
custody. 
 Iran shuts down the Fordow facility. 
 
P5+1 Actions: 
 P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the 
Tehran Research Reactor. 
 P5+1 will support IAEA technical 
cooperation to modernize and maintain the 
safety of the TRR. 
 P5+1 could review the IAEA technical 
cooperation projects and recommend to 
the IAEA Board restarting some of them. 
 P5+1 has put together a detailed package 
to provide medical isotopes for cancer 
patients in Iran. 
 The United States is prepared to permit 
safety-related inspection and repair in Iran 
for Iranian commercial aircraft and 
provide spare parts. 
 The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a 
light water research reactor to produce 
medical isotopes. 
 
149 
 
While neither side agreed with one another’s proposals, Iran considered the Baghdad 
talks as a success, since for the first time since 2002, P5+1 did not demand Iran to 
suspend its 5% enrichment activities and instead focused on the suspension of Iran’s 20% 
enrichment activities and the closure of the Fordow enrichment facility. Less than a 
month later, on June 18, 2012, Iran and P5+1 met again in Moscow to elaborate on their 
respective proposals and to get them closer to each other. Quite optimistic and having 
engaged in a series of bilateral talks, Iran and P5+1 then met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 
February 26-27, 2013 and then again on April 5-6, 2013. While at the second Almaty 
talks, Iran and P5+1 still did not see completely eye to eye, but their proposals did get 
quite close to each other:  
P5+1 talks in Almaty (April 5-6, 2013) 
Iran’s Proposal  P5+1 Proposal 
Iranian Actions 
 Iran freezes centrifuge installation at 
Fordow. 
 Iran continues talks with the IAEA. 
 Iran continues converting 20 percent 
enriched uranium hexafluoride to uranium 
oxide. 
 Iran suspends enrichment of uranium to 20 
percent. 
 
P5+1 Actions 
 The P5+1 lifts all sanctions against Iran. 
 The P5+1 recognizes Iran's nuclear rights. 
Iranian actions: 
 Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment 
activities. 
 Iran transfers part of its stockpile of 20 
percent enriched uranium to a third 
country under IAEA custody. 
 Iran suspends all operations at the Fordow 
facility. 
 Iran provides the IAEA with information 
to address the outstanding allegations of 
possible military activities, commits to the 
additional protocol and the modified 
version of the subsidiary arrangement to 
Iran’s safeguards agreement, known as 
Code 3.1. 
 
P5+1 Actions: 
 P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the 
Tehran Research Reactor. 
 P5+1 will support IAEA technical 
cooperation to modernize and maintain the 
safety of the TRR. 
 P5+1 could review the IAEA technical 
cooperation projects and recommend to 
the IAEA Board restarting some of them. 
 P5+1 has put together a detailed package 
to provide medical isotopes for cancer 
patients in Iran. 
 The United States is prepared to permit 
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P5+1 talks in Almaty (April 5-6, 2013) 
Iran’s Proposal  P5+1 Proposal 
safety-related inspection and repair in Iran 
for Iranian commercial aircraft and 
provide spare parts. 
 The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a 
light water research reactor to produce 
medical isotopes. 
 The P5+1 will provide sanctions relief on 
sales of precious metals and 
petrochemicals. 
 The P5+1 will not impose any new 
proliferation related sanctions on Iran. 
 
On June 14, 2013, Iranians went to the polls to elect their next president. After an intense 
campaign, Hassan Rouhani, who was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator during the Khatami 
Presidency, was elected by 50.88% of the votes. President Rouhani selected Javad Zarif, 
who had served as Iran’s ambassador to the UN from 2002 to 2007, as his Foreign 
Minister and a decision was made to make Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible 
for the nuclear negotiations. Zarif, who is a US-educated experienced diplomat, wasted 
no time to start the negotiations with P5+1.  
 
After the first meeting between Zarif and Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the sides of the sixty-ninth session of the 
UN General Assembly, Iran and P5+1 agreed to continue their negotiations. Hence, 
during their first meeting in Geneva on October 15-16, 2013, Iran presented a modified 
proposal, which outlined the broad framework for a comprehensive end-state agreement 
and specific steps for each side to take in a first-phase agreement. P5+1 and Iran met 
again on November 7-10 and then against on November 20-24, 2013. Finally, on 
November 24, 2013, at the presence of the Foreign Ministers from all P5+1 countries, 
including John Kerry from the United States, Zarif and Ashton signed an interim 
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agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPA). The JPA has a duration of six 
months, which can be extended if Iran and the P5+1 agree to renew it by mutual consent:  
Joint Plan of Action 
Elements of the First Phase 
Iranian actions: 
 Convert half of its stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent to oxide form and downblend the 
remainder to an enrichment level of no more than five percent; 
 suspend production of uranium enriched to above five percent; 
 no further advances in nuclear activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, the enrichment plant 
at Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor; 
 convert uranium enriched up to five percent produced during the six months to oxide form when 
the construction of the conversion facility is completed; 
 no new enrichment facilities; 
 research and development practices, including on enrichment, will continue under IAEA 
safeguards; 
 no reprocessing of spent plutonium fuel or construction of any facility capable of reprocessing; 
and 
 enhanced monitoring including, providing information to the IAEA on plans for nuclear sites and 
the Arak reactor, negotiating a safeguards approach for the Arak reactor, allow daily IAEA access 
to Natanz and Fordow, and allow managed access to centrifuge workshops and uranium mines and 
mills.  
P5+1 Actions: 
 No new nuclear-related sanctions from the UN Security Council, the EU, and the U.S.; 
 pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s oil sales and partial repatriation of frozen Iranian assets from 
oil sales; 
 suspension of U.S. and EU sanctions on petrochemical exports and gold and precious metals;  
 suspension of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry; 
 supply and installation of spare parts for Iranian civil airplanes, including repairs and safety 
inspections; 
 establish a financial channel for humanitarian goods using Iran’s oil revenues that are frozen 
abroad, which can also be used for tuition payments for Iranian student abroad and payment of 
Iran’s UN dues; and 
 increase of the EU thresholds for non-sanctioned trade with Iran.  
Elements of a Comprehensive Solution 
 An agreed upon duration; 
 reflection of the rights and obligations of all NPT parties and IAEA Safeguards Agreements; 
 lift all multilateral and unilateral sanctions on nuclear-related measures; 
 define Iran’s enrichment program with agreed upon limits  
 resolve concerns about the Arak reactor;  
 implement agreed up on transparency measures, including Iran’s ratification and implementation 
of the Additional Protocol of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 
 cooperate on civil nuclear projects, including a light water reactor for power, research reactors, 
and nuclear fuel.  
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In his January 20, 2014, as well as February 20, 2014, reports to the IAEA Board of 
Governors, IAEA Director General confirmed that Iran has taken the steps required by 
the JPA and has remained committed to its terms.     
 
Section 3.2: US Employment of Coercive Diplomacy in Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear 
Program 
 
Coercive diplomacy and sanctions have been the constant feature of US foreign policy 
toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, the stated objectives and goals of US sanctions 
toward Iran have evolved over time. While in the 1980s, US sanctions were primarily 
adopted to limit Iran’s strategic reach in the Middle East, since early 1990s, US sanctions 
have targeted Iran for its purported sponsorship of international terrorism, opposition to 
the Arab-Israeli peace process mediated by the US, and pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). Since the summer of 2002, however, much of US sanctions have 
focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Besides banning US persons and entities from doing 
business with Iran, the Congress and successive administrations since President Clinton 
have put in place measures that force foreign entities to choose between doing business 
the US and doing any business with Iran. While the US began to unilaterally impose a 
variety of sanction on Iran soon after the fall of the Shah, since 2002 the US has become 
significantly more active in persuading the UNSC, EU, and other countries to limit their 
business with Iran.  
 
The first form of sanctions that the US adopted against Iran was the freezing of Iranian 
assets on November 14, 1979. While Iranian asset freeze of 1979 has been often 
attributed to the hostage crisis, it is a matter of public records that almost a year before 
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the hostages were seized and during the final days of the Shah’s regime, the Department 
of Treasury had concluded that conditions for invoking the International Emergency 
Economic Power Act (IEEPA) existed due to the vulnerability of the US banking and 
financial systems to the threat of a withdrawal of Iranian assets from US banks and 
financial institutions (Fayazmanesh, 2008, p. 13; Alerasool, 1993, pp. 20-22; Flaherty, 
1981). The hostage crisis, however, enabled the US government to more easily 
implement a freeze it had already considered to protect US financial institutions against a 
sudden withdrawal of Iranian assets. 
 
While the US arms embargo against Iran continued after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions began to gain more salience and increasingly attracted more attention. Hence, 
one of the measures adopted by Congress soon after the first Persian Gulf War, was the 
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992. The Act declared that: 
It shall be the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the 
agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any 
goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that 
transfer could materially contribute to either country’s acquiring chemical, 
biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional 
weapons.     
The act imposed penalties on any entity that would supply Iran with any goods or 
technology that would contribute to Iran’s efforts to “acquire weapons of mass 
destruction.” The act also provides for a “presumption of denial” for all dual use exports 
to Iran. 
154 
 
 
The most dramatic sanctions against Iran, however, were imposed during the first term of 
President Clinton.  Under severe pressure from a Republican Congress and AIPAC, on 
March 15, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12957, prohibiting US trade 
in Iran’s oil industry. Then, again, on April 30, 1995, at a dinner of the World Jewish 
Congress with Shimon Peres present, Clinton pledged to impose a total US trade embargo 
on Iran and made good on his promise on May 6, 1995, by signing Executive Order 
12959, which prohibited any US trade and investment in Iran. The two Executive Orders 
did not elaborate on why the sanctions were being imposed on Iran and sufficed to saying 
that the sanctions were being imposed since “the actions and policies of the Government 
of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States” requiring a declaration of “a national 
emergency to deal with that threat.”  
 
Another sanction that was adopted during the first term of President Clinton was the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). Passed by Congress on July 16, 1996, ILSA imposed 
penalties on any company, foreign or domestic, that invested in Iran or Libya’s oil and 
gas sectors. ILSA was renamed Iran Sanction Act (ISA) after it was terminated with 
respect to Libya in 2006. ISA is quite clear with respect to its purpose and the objectives 
it seeks to attain. Section 2(a) of ISA declares that: 
[I]t is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of 
international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of 
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Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum 
resources of Iran.    
ISA then states that the ISA’s requirements to impose sanctions would terminate 
whenever the US president would certify that, among other things, “Iran has ceased its 
efforts to design, develop, manufacture, or acquire a nuclear explosive device or related 
materials and technology.” ISA as well as Clinton’s Executive Orders not only set the 
tone of US policy toward Iran, but have also acted as the cornerstone of most subsequent 
US sanctions against Iran.  
 
Soon after the full extent of Iran’s nuclear program was publicized by NCRI in the 
summer of 2002, the US relied on sanctions to, on one hand, impede Iran’s ability to 
advance its nuclear fuel cycle program and, on the other hand, persuade it to forgo 
proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle activities. In the summer of 2005, 
President Bush signed Executive Order 13382, which expanded upon Executive Order 
12938 of November 14, 1994, and Executive Order 13094 of July 28, 1998, to more 
effectively block the assets of those individuals or entities identified as WMD 
proliferators and any individual or entity that would in any way support them.  
 
As Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle program became further developed, and as Iran refused to 
accept P5+1 demands to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle 
program, the US more aggressively employed sanctions to both slow down and persuade 
Iran to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities. The Iran Freedom Support Act, which 
was signed on September 30, 2006, amended ISA and made its sanctions also applicable 
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to any individual or entity that “exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Iran any 
goods, services, technology, or other items knowing that the provision of such goods, 
services, technology, or other items would contribute materially to the ability of Iran to 
acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies.”  
 
Then, in the summer of 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA). CISADA both extended the termination 
date of ISA to December 31, 2016, and amended it to make its sanctions applicable to 
any individual or entity that would either sell gasoline, jet fuel, and other forms of fuel to 
Iran or provide it with equipment or services which could potentially enable Iran to make 
or import gasoline. This amendment to ISA was adopted to exploit Iran’s dependency on 
imported fuel, which formerly accounted for 40% of Iran’s fuel needs. CISADA also put 
into law the total trade bans that were previously being enforced under President 
Clinton’s Executive Orders 12957 and 12959. Hence, as a result of CISADA, the ban on 
trade in such items as nuts, fruit products, carpets, and caviar, which were relaxed in 
2000, were reinstated. CISADA also prohibits US banks from opening new 
“correspondent accounts” or “payable through accounts” and forces the cancellation of 
existing such accounts for foreign banks that process transactions with Iran’s energy and 
shipping sectors or Iranian entities that have been sanctioned by various UNSC 
resolutions. CISADA also promotes divestment of shares of firms that have invested in 
Iran’s energy sector by providing a “safe harbor” for financial managers who sell shares 
of firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector.  
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CISADA names multiple objectives. Besides pointing to Iran’s “serious, systematic, and 
ongoing violations of human rights,” “support for international terrorism” and “threat to 
the security of the United States, [and] its strong ally Israel,” it primarily focuses on 
Iran’s nuclear program and the aim “to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons,” 
and “acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.” In fact CISADA asserts that the 
“[e]conomic sanctions imposed pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the Iran Sanctions 
Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), and other authorities available to the United States to 
impose economic sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, are 
necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States.”  
 
US sanctions against Iran became significantly more damaging when Congress decided 
to sanction foreign banks that deal with Iran’s Central Bank. Section 1245 of the FY2012 
National Defense Authorization Bill, which was signed on December 31, 2011, obliged 
the US President to prevent a foreign bank from opening an account in the US if that 
bank transacts with the Central Bank of Iran.  The law, however, includes an ingenious 
mechanism for placing Iran under even more pressure. As part of the law, the President is 
authorized to grant an exemption from sanction, if the President could certify that the 
parent country of the bank has significantly reduced its purchase of oil from Iran. Such 
exemptions are only valid for 180 days and, once an exemption expires, countries must 
prove that they have “significantly” reduced their import of oil from Iran, relative to the 
previous 180-day period, in order to qualify for a new exception. Therefore, the law has 
provided countries with significant incentives to continuously reduce their purchase of oil 
158 
 
from Iran in order to retain their exemption. This provision of the law, however, was 
waived on January 20, 2014, per the requirements of JPA.   
 
Another US measure adopted against Iran is the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act, which codified Executive Order 13590 and was signed by President Obama 
on August 10, 2012. The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act expands on 
previous sanctions and makes ISA sanctions applicable to any individual or entity that 
would participate in a joint venture with Iran relating to the mining, production, or 
transportation of uranium. The Act also makes ISA sanctions applicable to any firm that 
would provide Iran with goods and services that could help it maintain or develop its oil, 
gas, and petrochemical sectors. The Act also applies ISA sanctions to any unlicensed 
purchase of Iranian oil and any transaction with the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC), the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), and Naftiran Intertrade Company 
(NICO). The most crippling effect of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
Act came as a result of a provision in the Act that requires any funds owed to Iran as a 
result of a licensed transactions to be only credited to an account located in the country 
that owes Iran money, effectively preventing Iran from bringing earned hard currency 
back to Iran and compelling it to instead buy the products of the countries that owe it 
money.  
 
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act is quite clear in its aim to 
“strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit 
of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities.” The Act asserts that “It is the sense 
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of Congress that the goal of compelling Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability and other threatening activities can be effectively achieved through a 
comprehensive policy that includes economic sanctions, diplomacy, and military 
planning, capabilities and options.” It is quite interesting that under its “diplomatic 
efforts,” the bill makes no mention of pursuing diplomacy with Iran and instead only 
focuses on intensifying diplomatic efforts to persuade US allies, the UNSC, and “each 
member country of the United Nations” to impose more sanctions, trade limits, and 
transportation restrictions on Iran. 
 
Another US law that targets Iran’s nuclear program is the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) under the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013, which was signed on January 2, 2013. IFCA further strengthened the 
previous sanctions by requiring the imposition of at least 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions on 
any individual or entity that would, among other things: 1) provide goods or services to 
the energy and shipping sectors of the Islamic Republic, 2) provide underwriting services, 
insurance, or reinsurance for shipping oil, gasoline, or other refined petroleum products, 
and 3) provide gold or other precious metals, semi-finished metals or industrial software 
to Iran. IFCA hit Iran hardest by preventing Iran’s transaction with foreign firms using 
gold or other precious metals. One of the main objectives of IFAC, as stipulated in the 
Act, is to target “Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities” by limiting Iran’s revenue from its 
energy sector. In doing so, IFAC targets “key element[s] in the petroleum supply chain 
responsible for generating energy revenues that support the illicit nuclear proliferation 
activities of the Government of Iran.”  
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Besides the actions taken by Congress, President Obama has also used his executive 
authority to put in place Executive Orders that target Iran. These executive orders 
stipulate neither the reason behind nor the objective of the orders. On May 23, 2011, 
President Obama issued Executive Order 13574, clarifying that the Treasury Department 
is the responsible party to implement those ISA sanctions that involve the financial 
sector. Executive Order 13599, which was signed on February 5, 2012, imposes sanctions 
on the Central Bank and other entities determined to be owned or controlled by the 
government of Iran. This order, unlike the previous ones, requires such assets be 
impounded by US financial institutions, not just refused or returned as was required prior 
to Executive Order 13599. Executive Order 13608, issued on May 1, 2012, gave the 
Treasury Department the power and the ability to identify and sanction foreign 
individuals or entities who help Iran and Syria evade US and international sanctions. 
Executive Order 13622, signed on July 30, 2012, applies virtually all ISA sanctions to 
any entity that would conduct any transactions with NIOC or NICO or purchase Iranian 
oil or petrochemical products without having received an exception from the US. The last 
of President Obama’s Executive Orders issued to date on Iran, is Executive Order 13645, 
which was signed on June 3, 2013. Executive Order 13645 imposes ISA sanctions on any 
individual or entity that would supply goods or services to Iran’s automotive sector and 
blocks foreign banks from operating in the US if they process transactions for Iran’s 
automotive sector. 
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The US has also sought and championed multiple UNSC sanctions against Iran. To date, 
UNSC has adopted six resolutions against Iran, four of which impose sanctions on Iran. 
The last in a series of UNSC resolutions against Iran, was UNSC Resolution 1929, which 
was adopted on June 9, 2010. UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929 impose a 
wide array of sanctions on Iran. These resolutions prohibit UN member countries from 
transferring any goods and services that may contribute to Iran’s nuclear and missile 
programs and bars countries from trading in dual-use items, except for those used in 
light-water reactors. The resolutions also prohibit Iran from exporting weapons. They 
also bar Iran from exporting technologies related to the manufacturing of WMD. 
Furthermore, the resolutions bar Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining or other 
nuclear weapons or energy related technologies. They also prohibit Iran from launching 
ballistic missiles, even on its own territory. UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 
1929 also place an extensive, albeit not total, arms embargo on Iran. They also call on 
member countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of 
Iran Shipping Lines if there is reason to believe that they are carrying banned items to 
Iran. UNSC Resolution 1929, specifically asks UN member states to be proactively 
vigilant with respect to all Iranian banks and encourages restraint in providing Iran with 
any loans, trade credits, or other financial instruments and services. UNSC Resolutions 
1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929 have also named Iranian persons and entities believed to be 
contributing to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, requiring countries to freeze their 
assets and restrict their travel.  
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UNSC resolutions against Iran have been clear in regards to the three main objectives 
they are seeking to attain. These objectives are: 
1) To persuade Iran to “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing 
activities, including research and development;” 
2) To persuade Iran to “act in accordance with the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency 
measures as the IAEA may request;” 
3) “To constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of 
its nuclear and missile programmes.” 
 
Again, while UNSC sanctions have been adopted by the UNSC, it would be fair to say 
that the US has played a significant role in persuading other UNSC members to adopt 
these measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Had it not been for the efforts of the 
US and its active diplomacy, it is quite doubtful that these punitive measures would have 
ever been adopted by the UNSC. Also, it has been a US policy, expressed both by 
Congress and by successive US administrations, to pursue international sanctions and 
pressure against Iran to persuade it to forgo the aspects of its nuclear and missile 
programs that the US finds threatening to its national security. Moreover, considering that 
the US has also assumed the leadership role in implementation of UNSC sanctions and 
has been the most active member of the UN in not only executing the UNSC sanctions 
against Iran but also ensuring the compliance of other countries as well, it would be 
correct to regard UNSC sanctions against Iran in the category of coercive measures 
employed by the US in its dealing with Iran’s nuclear program.  
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In short, the US has adopted a wide variety of coercive measures to deal with the 
perceived threat from Iran to the national security and interests of the US. Some of these 
measures have been adopted to achieve specific objectives, while others have been 
implemented for more general purposes. The most common objective of US sanctions 
against Iran since the 1990s, however, have been to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-
sensitive technologies and to constraint Iran’s ability to develop and expand its 
capabilities in the field of nuclear technology. Therefore, a necessary component of 
assessing the efficacy of US sanctions against Iran is an evaluation of the degree to which 
such sanctions have: 
1) Persuaded Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear 
program; 
2) Constrained Iran’s ability to develop and expand its capabilities in the 
field of nuclear technology.  
This is the evaluation that will be made in the following section of this chapter. 
Section 3.3: Impact Evaluation of US Use of Coercive Diplomacy in Dealing with 
Iran’s Nuclear Program   
 
Indeed, the US has imposed “the most sweeping sanctions on Iran of virtually any 
country in the world” (Katzman, 2014) and no country has ever been placed under as 
many sanctions for pursuing a nuclear fuel cycle program as Iran. It is therefore, 
important to evaluate the degree to which such sanctions have had an effect on Iran’s 
nuclear fuel cycle activities. It is important to note that in this section, only the outcome 
will be evaluated and the mechanisms that have produced the outcomes will be 
investigated. In essence, in this section two basic questions will be explored: 
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1) Have US sanctions persuaded Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its 
nuclear program? 
2) Have US sanctions constrained Iran’s ability to develop and expand its 
capabilities in the field of nuclear technology?     
 
Since key ingredient of any type of a nuclear weapon is nuclear explosive materials, the 
most proliferation-sensitive aspects of a nuclear fuel cycle program are activities that 
produce nuclear explosive isotopes (Hinderstein, 2010, p. 70). Practically speaking, there 
are two main forms of nuclear explosive isotopes that are suitable for nuclear weapons; 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium. Therefore, uranium 
enrichment, which increases the proportion of uranium-235 isotope with respect to other 
isotopes of uranium, and nuclear reprocessing, which extracts plutonium from irradiated 
nuclear fuel – also known as spent fuel – are the most proliferation-sensitive aspects of 
any nuclear fuel cycle program. Thus, for the purposes of answering the first question of 
this section, it will be determined whether or not the use of coercive diplomacy, as a 
strategy, has persuaded Iranian policymakers to forgo activities related to uranium 
enrichment and nuclear reprocessing.  
 
As for nuclear reprocessing, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never to this date pursued 
industrial scale nuclear reprocessing. All IAEA reports verify that Iran does not have and 
has not pursued industrial scale nuclear reprocessing. Iran did, nevertheless, experiment 
with reprocessing using hot cells on a laboratory scale in the early 1990s. Yet, as the 
IAEA has repeatedly confirmed, even those experiments ceased long before the adoption 
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of various US and international sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and there have 
been “no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran” (IAEA, August 31, 
2006). Therefore, since Iran ceased even its laboratory scale reprocessing 
experimentations long before the US and the UNSC imposed sanctions on Iran, it is not 
reasonable to link Iran’s decision to not engage in reprocessing activity to the US and the 
UNSC demands and sanctions. Indeed, all indications suggest that Iran’s decision not to 
pursue reprocessing activity has been independent of US and UNSC sanctions against 
Iran.  
 
The same story, however, does not apply to uranium enrichment. Iran has actively 
pursued and progressively advanced its uranium enrichment capabilities. All indications 
suggest that progressively stringent US and UNSC sanctions have not been able to 
persuade Iran to even suspend, let alone forgo, its nuclear enrichment activities. To the 
contrary, instead of observing a negative correlation between imposition of increasingly 
tougher sanctions and the advancements of Iran’s enrichment capabilities, a positive 
correlation is observed. Both the severity of US and UNSC sanctions as well as Iran’s 
enrichment capabilities have simultaneously increased during the past decade.  
 
There are two major indicators that could be used to evaluate Iran’s enrichment 
capabilities and its breakout potentials. The first indicator is the quality and quantity of 
Iran’s gas centrifuges. Despite sanctions, Iran has increased both the quantity as well as 
the quality of its gas centrifuges. According to the Director General’s reports to the IAEA 
Board of Governors, Iran has increased the number of its installed centrifuges at its 
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Natanz enrichment facility from less than 20 in February 2006 to more than 15,000 
centrifuges in February 2014. Moreover, Iran currently feeds close to 9000 centrifuges 
with UF6, while in December 2006 – when UNSC imposed its first sanction on Iran – 
Iran was merely experimenting with a single 164-cascate of its IR-1 centrifuges. The 
following chart illustrates the number of IR-1 gas centrifuges that Iran has installed and 
the number of gas centrifuges that have been fed with UF6 at Natanz since 2006:  
 
 
One of the least sophisticated ways of assessing how effective US and UNSC sanctions 
have been in persuading Iran to curtail the proliferation-sensitive aspects of its fuel cycle 
program is see if a negative correlation exists between the number of major US and 
UNSC sanctions and the number of centrifuges that Iran has installed in its primary 
enrichment facility. While correlation does not necessarily imply causation, it is an 
indicator and a necessary component of causation. Therefore, if sanctions have persuaded 
Iran to suspend, if not forgo, the proliferation-sensitive aspects of its fuel cycle program, 
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a negative correlation between the number of major US and UNSC sanctions against Iran 
due to its nuclear program and the number of centrifuges that Iran has installed in its 
primary enrichment facility must be observed. The evidence, however, points in the very 
opposite direction. In fact, as the following chart illustrates, every additional US and 
UNSC sanction is correlated with installment, not dismantlement, of 912 new centrifuges 
at Natanz: 
 
The quality and efficiency of Iran’s centrifuges have also improved since 2007. One of 
the indicators that could be used to evaluate the performance of Iran’s centrifuges is to 
chart over time the average separative work per year per centrifuge (swu/year-centrifuge) 
at Iran’s main enrichment facility. According to the reports of the Director General to 
IAEA’s Board of Governors, the average swu/year-centrifuge of the Fuel Enrichment 
Plant at Natanz (FEP) has increased from approximately 0.47 Kg U swu/year-centrifuge 
in December 2007 to 0.75 Kg U swu/year-centrifuge in February 2014. It is also 
important to mention that Iran has been able to achieved even better centrifuge efficiency 
168 
 
both in its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) and in its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant 
at Natanz (PFEP),  which had until recently been dedicated to enriching uranium to 
19.75%, reaching a Kg U swu/year-centrifuge of 0.92 at PFEP and 0.89 at FFEP. 
 
A third major indicator that could be used to evaluate Iran’s enrichment capability and its 
breakout potentials is the amount of enriched uranium it has been able to produce, 
accumulate, and stockpile. Iran has been enriching uranium to about 5% since it 
commenced its enrichment activities at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. It also 
enriched uranium to 19.75% from February 2010 to January 2014. The following two 
charts illustrate the cumulative amount of 5% and near 20% enriched uranium that Iran 
has thus far produced according to the Director General’s reports to the IAEA Board of 
Governors: 
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At least 25kg of weapons-grade uranium, generally defined as uranium enriched above 
90%, is needed to produce a single nuclear weapon. It takes significantly less time to 
produce weapons-grade uranium from a stockpile of LEU and therefore any addition to 
Iran’s stockpile of 5% and, more importantly, near 20% enriched uranium could be 
perceived as an enhancement of Iran’s breakout potential. Therefore, another way of 
assessing whether or not US use of coercive diplomacy toward Iran has persuaded it to 
forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program, is to see if a negative 
correlation exists between the number of major US and UNSC sanctions against Iran due 
to its nuclear program and the amount of LEU it has stockpiled. As the following chart 
clearly illustrates, not only a negative correlation is not observed but there is in fact a 
statistically significant positive correlation between the number of major US and UNSC 
sanctions imposed on Iran for its nuclear program and the amount of LEU Iran has 
170 
 
stockpiled, with each additional sanction roughly correlating with an additional 
production of 883 kg 5% LEU and 47 kg of 19.75% LEU: 
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Lack of a negative correlation between the number of major US and UNSC sanctions 
against Iran due to its nuclear program and the number of centrifuges that Iran has 
installed in its primary enrichment facility, as well as the amount of LEU that it has 
stockpiled, clearly indicates that US sanctions have failed to persuade Iran to forgo 
proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program. In fact, instead of a negative 
correlation, a very strong and statistically significant positive correlation between 
imposition of increasingly tougher sanctions and the advancement of Iran’s breakout 
capability is observed, suggesting that both the severity of US and UNSC sanctions as 
well as Iran’s enrichment capabilities have simultaneously increased during the past 
decade.  
 
Before moving on to the second major question of this subsection, it is important to 
address one of the most significant arguments that could be made against the 
abovementioned assessment. It could be well argued that what is being observed is a 
classic example of reverse causation and that instead of analyzing the observed 
phenomenon in terms of US sanctions causing Iran’s nuclear advancements, US sanctions 
should be seen as a response to Iran’s march toward a breakout capability. While this 
argument could well be true, it has no effect on the assessment that US sanctions and, by 
extension, US use of coercive diplomacy against Iran have failed to persuade Iran to 
forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program. Whether the US has in fact 
been pursuing, as declared, a change in Iran’s nuclear policies or whether it has been 
merely punishing Iran does not change the reality that despite increasing sanctions Iran’s 
latent capability to manufacture a nuclear weapon has progressively improved and that 
172 
 
Iran has not yet been persuaded to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear 
program.  
 
The second major question of this subsection is more difficult to answer. Simply put, it is 
very difficult to conclusively assess whether or not US sanctions have constrained Iran’s 
ability to develop and expand its capabilities in the field of nuclear technology. Those 
who argue that it has, correctly indicate that US and UNSC sanctions against Iran’s 
nuclear program have made it considerably more difficult for Iran to procure materials 
needed for its nuclear program from foreign sources. At the very minimum, they argue, 
that US and UNSC sanctions have significantly increased the costs of obtaining such 
materials for Iran. They also argue that Iran’s access to nuclear technology and know-
how has also been considerably limited by US and UNSC sanctions and, as a result, 
conclude that relatively speaking, US sanctions have in fact constrained, even if not very 
significantly, Iran’s ability to develop and expand its capabilities in the field of nuclear 
technology.  
 
Those who argue that US sanctions have not constrained Iran’s ability to develop and 
expand its capabilities in the field of nuclear technology, also point to the incentives such 
sanctions have created for Iran to more aggressively pursue indigenization of its nuclear 
program. While prior to the sanctions, Iran relied primarily on foreign suppliers both for 
technology and equipment, as a result of the sanctions, as will be described later, Iranian 
universities and research centers became effectively encouraged to attain more 
sophisticated nuclear know-how and Iranian industries found it quite lucrative to provide 
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for the needs of Iran’s nuclear program. Hence, they argue, that in fact US sanctions have 
prompted Iran to indigenize a technology that was previously heavily dependent on 
foreign suppliers and argue that such indigenization, which has allowed Iran to further 
expand its nuclear program, would have never occurred had it not been because of US 
and UNSC sanctions. 
 
Yet, even assuming that US and UNSC sanctions have in fact constrained Iran’s ability to 
develop and expand its capabilities in the field of nuclear technology, this achievement 
cannot be regarded as a “success” of coercive diplomacy. At the maximum, constraining 
Iran’s ability to develop and expand its capabilities in the field of nuclear technology 
could be conceptualized as a “denial” strategy. Denial “succeeds” when the policymakers 
of the target country “realize that they cannot gain benefits [by pursuing their 
objectionable policy] and will continue to pay costs if they do not concede” (Byman and 
Waxman, 2002, p. 78). Hence, a denial strategy could only be regarded as having 
succeeded in terms of coercive diplomacy, if it achieves a change in the policy of the 
target country in the direction desired by the coercing country. More concretely, in the 
case of Iran’s nuclear program, we could label constraining of Iran’s ability to develop 
and expand its capabilities in the field of nuclear technology as a “success” of coercive 
diplomacy only if such a constraint would persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive 
aspects of its nuclear program. Considering that the constraints have not yet resulted in 
such a change in Iran’s nuclear policies and that the denial strategy has not been able to 
convince Iran that it has nothing to gain from pursuing its nuclear policies, such 
constraints cannot be regarded as a success of US use of coercive diplomacy against Iran. 
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Indeed, even if we agree that the US and UNSC sanctions have placed significant 
constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, such constraints have only been achieved through 
the use of “brute force” and not through an ultimate change in the cost-benefit analysis of 
the policymakers in Iran.  
 
Section 3.4: Conclusion 
 
Since the fall of the Shah, the US has heavily relied on coercive diplomacy in its dealings 
with the Islamic Republic. While the US initially sought to achieve a change in Iran’s 
support for Islamist organizations opposed to Israel, its opposition to the Arab-Israeli 
peace process mediated by the US, and its pursuit of missile and WMD related 
technologies, during the past decade the US has primarily focused on Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions. Soon after the full extent of Iran’s nuclear program was publicized by NCRI 
in the summer of 2002, the US relied on sanctions to, on one hand, impede Iran’s ability 
to advance its nuclear fuel cycle program and, on the other hand, to persuade Iran to 
forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle activities. While it is 
difficult to assess the degree to which US sanctions have actually impeded Iran’s ability 
to advance its nuclear fuel cycle programs, it could be more assertively maintained that 
US sanctions have failed to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its 
nuclear program.  
 
It is, nevertheless, important to note that the failure of US sanctions to persuade Iran to 
forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program should not be regarded as a 
complete failure of US policy. It could well be argued that US sanctions against Iran have 
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dissuaded other nations from following a similar path and have helped maintain an 
international norm that is vital to US national interests. It could also be argued, though 
less authoritatively, that US sanctions against Iran have placed significant constraints on 
Iran’s nuclear program, slowing its march toward a nuclear breakout capability. It is, 
nevertheless, important to note that the abovementioned and other possible 
accomplishments of US sanctions against Iran have been achieved independent of a 
change in Iran’s nuclear policies and at best could be viewed as a testament to US power 
and its ability to use its force to bring about circumstances that favor its national interests.     
 
  
176 
 
Chapter 4: Effect of Coercive Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Policy 
 
The previous chapter showed that US reliance on coercive diplomacy has not persuaded 
Iran to abandon proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle program. Instead a 
strong positive correlation is observed between increasing reliance of the US on coercive 
measures in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program and the expansion of Iran’s nuclear fuel 
cycle activities. This chapter will investigate the effects of coercive diplomacy on Iran’s 
nuclear policy and the reasons behind the failure of the US to persuade Iran to abandon 
proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
The first segment of this chapter evaluates the success odds of US coercive diplomacy 
against Iran’s nuclear program based on the lessons and predictions from the existing 
literature on coercive diplomacy. Since the literature on coercive diplomacy is quite 
extensive, the first segment of this chapter primarily relies on the works of 1) Thomas C. 
Schelling, 2) Alexander L. George, and 3) Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE), who have 
authored the most frequently cited scholarly works on coercive diplomacy. It will use the 
conditions they set for successful employment of coercive diplomacy to see, based on 
what is already known in the literature, how likely it is for coercive diplomacy to 
persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle program.  
 
Then the chapter will explore the effects of coercive diplomacy on various other factors 
that shape and drive Iran’s nuclear policy. Among such factors are the Iranian public 
opinion, Iran’s strategic culture, Iran’s domestic politics, and Iran’s foreign and strategic 
policies. Evaluating the effect of coercive diplomacy on these various factors that drive 
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and shape Iran’s nuclear policy will help one better understand the effects of coercive 
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program and the reasons behind the failure of coercive 
diplomacy to persuade Iran to abandon proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear fuel 
cycle activities. 
 
Section 4.1:  Applying the Lessons from the Existing Literature on Coercive 
Diplomacy  
 
Coercive diplomacy is a highly context-dependent strategy. While some conditions 
enhance the probability of its eventual success, there are situations under which coercive 
diplomacy is unlikely to produce the intended policy outcomes. For this very reason, 
scholars from various fields have long investigated the effects of various contextual and 
tactical variables on the success odds of the strategy. In this segment, an evaluation will 
be made based on some of the main lessons and recommendations provided in the works 
of the most eminent scholars who have closely investigated the various dimensions of the 
strategy to establish the utility of coercive diplomacy in dealing with Iran’s nuclear 
program and its success odds in persuading Iran to abandon proliferation-sensitive 
aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle activities.         
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Section 4.1.1:  Lessons from the Works of Thomas C. Schelling 
 
Thomas Schelling is perhaps the best known theorist who has significantly contributed to 
the body of literature that seeks to create a better understanding of the dynamics of 
coercive diplomacy. Schelling relies heavily on concepts from game theory to evaluate 
how state actors bargain with one another in strategic settings. Schelling (1960) advanced 
the theory that since “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations” where 
each party at least somewhat controls what the other party wants and where there is at 
least some common interest that cannot be achieved without some form of mutual 
accommodation, the strategy of dealing with conflict situations should focus more on 
“exploitation of potential forces” and not so much on “application of force” (pp. 5-7). 
Schelling’s theory in effect revolved around the premise that the coercing party will only 
achieve his aim if and only if he could convince and persuade the target that the costs he 
will suffer if he does not comply will be higher than the benefits of non-compliance and 
resistance. He predicts that coercion would work when the expected costs associated with 
the threat exceed the anticipated gains of defiance.  
 
In line with his theory, Schelling identifies a series of conditions that are necessary to 
credibly persuade a target that it would be better off conceding than resisting. Among 
conditions that Schelling (1966) identifies is the target coming to a belief that should it 
not concede, it would certainly be inflicted with such a pain that would more than offset 
the benefits of defiance (p.89). Schelling (1966) then asserts that for coercive diplomacy 
to work against a target, “whatever is demanded of him must be less unattractive to him 
than the threatened consequences… and must not entail costs in prestige, reputation, or 
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self-respect that outweigh the threat” (p. 89). In case of US demand for Iran to forgo 
proliferation-sensitive aspects of its program, there is an almost consensus view among 
Iran experts, in Iran and abroad, that such a demand is regarded both by Iranian 
policymakers as well as the public, regardless of their political inclinations, as an 
encroachment on Iran’s sovereignty and its rights under the NPT.  
 
What is important to note here is that the existence of such a perception, regardless of its 
validity, is enough to undermine coercive diplomacy. With a fundamental principle 
believed to be at stake, no feasible amount of pain is likely to persuade Iran to forgo what 
it perceives to be its sovereign right, regardless of whether others agree with it or not. In a 
discussion with a foreign policy advisor to a high ranking Iranian official I went through 
various economic problems US and UNSC sanctions have inflicted on Iran and 
questioned whether the economic benefits of having a nuclear fuel cycle program were 
sufficient enough to make defiance a “sensible and rational” policy. In response, the 
advisor pointed to a location on Iran’s map on the border with Pakistan and claimed the 
location to be void of any population and resources and indicated the price of land in that 
location to be near nil. Then he asked me, “how much cost should Iran be willing to 
burden to defend this territory, should Pakistan try to annex a single square meter of it?” 
Without waiting for my response he said, “don’t you think we would and should sacrifice 
a lot more than its material worth to maintain our sovereignty over it?” Indeed, what the 
advisor as well as many others with whom I have discussed the issue try to get across is 
that Iran regards having a full nuclear fuel cycle program as an inalienable sovereign 
right that must be defended like all other sovereign rights of the Islamic Republic.   
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It is precisely because of this perception that Iran, from the time of the Shah up to this 
very day, has outright rejected and have termed as “insulting” any offer that has required 
it to sign off major aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle program. In fact the most major 
stumbling block to a nuclear agreement between Iran and the US during the time of the 
Shah, which prevented effective nuclear collaborations between the two countries beyond 
the purchase of Tehran’s Research Rector, was the “disagreement over the right of Iran to 
reprocess the plutonium and other elements from the spent fuel extracted from its 
reactors” (Poneman, 1982, p. 87). Despite the fact that Iran did not even have a nuclear 
reactor, let alone a reprocessing plant, and despite the fact that Iran did not have any 
plans whatsoever to construct a reprocessing plant in the foreseeable future, the Shah 
refused give up the perceived right of Iran to develop such plants should it chose to do so 
in the future. To preserve that perceived right, Iran turned down lucrative nuclear trade 
agreements with the US and spent years negotiating with the US over a right it never 
intended to invoke. Although those negotiations eventually led to an agreement in 
January 1978 with the US promising Iran the “most favored nation” status for 
reprocessing (Poneman, 1982, p. 88), they dragged on without a conclusion for so long 
that Iran and the US were never able to actualize their high hopes for cooperation in the 
field of nuclear energy.  
 
All recent offers, many of which were quite enticing for a country like Iran, were also 
rejected on the same grounds. Just as an example, when the EU3 countries submitted 
their first offer to Iran on August 5, 2005, promising Iran better relations and trade with 
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the EU in return for Iran signing a “binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle 
activities,” Iranian officials felt insulted. Javad Zarif, who was Iran’s ambassador to the 
UN at that time, said in protest: “Maybe the Europeans are willing to sell out their own 
[sovereign] rights at a cheap price, but not Iran…[The EU3 offer] is absurd, demeaning 
and self-congratulatory” (Linzer, 2005b). In fact, the only reason Iran has been able to 
agree to the November 2013 Joint Action Plan (JPA), is that unlike the previous offers, it 
does not demand that Iran relinquish any of its perceived sovereign rights. Even to make 
the 2003-2005 suspensions possible, Iran insisted on and made sure that both the Tehran 
Declaration and the Paris Agreement would include language asserting that the 
suspensions were voluntary confidence building measures that were not legally binding. 
 
This is precisely why requiring Iran to abandon proliferation-sensitive aspects of its 
nuclear program under Chapter VII of UN Charter made matters so much more difficult 
to resolve. UNSC resolutions turned what Iran was willing to do and had previously done 
on a “voluntary” basis into a “legal obligation,” something Iran could not legitimize 
through its compliance. Hence, in effect, by branding suspension a legal obligation, 
UNSC assured its rejection by Iran and no amount of pain is likely to persuade Iran to 
lend legitimacy to documents that require Iran to indefinitely relinquish what Iran 
perceives as its sovereign right. The fact that Iran was going to perceive such a demand 
as an encroachment on its sovereign rights could hardly been a mystery to those pushing 
for such UNSC resolutions, not least because they were explicitly forewarned by Iranian 
officials and diplomats. Hence, from Iran’s perspective, those pushing for such UNSC 
resolutions against Iran’s nuclear program, knew quite well that Iran could not comply 
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with them and were, therefore, most likely pursuing ulterior motives distantly related to 
Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities. As will be discussed, this perception has also 
undermined the utility of coercive diplomacy in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program in 
other ways as well. 
 
Another condition Schelling (1966) names as a prerequisite for successful employment of 
coercive diplomacy, is to provide the target with enough credible assurance and to 
convince it that compliance would not result in more demands. Unless the target knows 
what it is precisely that would fully satisfy the coercer, it is unlikely to comply with the 
demands since it would not know whether such compliance would end the hostilities or 
bring more costly future demands. (pp. 74-75). In the case of Iran, not only has the US 
refused to clearly articulate its demands and reassure Iranians that cessation of 
proliferation-sensitive activities is all that it seeks from the Islamic Republic, but to the 
contrary, both verbally and through its actions, the US has made it clear to Iran that the 
Islamic Republic’s nuclear program is only one of many issues that are of grave concern 
for the US. Sanctions on Iran were imposed long before the full extent of Iran’s nuclear 
program was exposed in 2002 and most current US sanctions on Iran have not solely 
been adopted as a result of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities. Just as an example, besides 
concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 names, among other US concerns, Iran’s 
“violation of human rights,” “suppression of freedom of expression and religious 
freedom” in Iran, Iran’s “fraudulent presidential election,” Iran’s “unresponsiveness to 
President Obama’s unprecedented and serious efforts at engagement,” “Iran’s ongoing 
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arms exports to, and support for, terrorists,” “involvement of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
Corps in Iran’s nuclear program, international terrorism, and domestic human rights 
abuse,” “the oppressive activities [of IRGC] against the people of Iran,” “support 
received by Hezbollah from the Government of Iran,” and “Hezbollah’s terrorist 
activities and the threat Hezbollah poses to Israel, the democratic sovereignty of 
Lebanon, and the national security interests if the United States.”  
 
Even worse than official US positions and declarations have been the actions the US has 
undertaken against Iran. As Schelling (1966) asserts: 
Actions not only speak louder than words on many occasions, but like words they 
can speak clearly or confusingly. To the extent that actions speak, it helps if they 
reinforce the message rather than confuse it… if the object is to induce 
compliance and not to start a spiral of reprisals and counteractions, it is helpful to 
show the limits to what one is demanding, and this can often be best shown by 
designing a campaign that distinguished what is demanded from all other 
objectives that one might have been seeking but is not. To harass aircraft in the 
Berlin air corridor communicates that polar flights are not at issue; to harass polar 
flights while saying that it is a punishment for flying in the Berlin corridor does 
not so persuasively communicate that the harassment will stop when the Berlin 
flights stop, or that the Russians will not think of a few other favors they would 
like from the airline before they call off their campaign.  Most of the problems of 
defining the threat and the demands that go with it, of offering assurance about 
what is not demanded and of promising cessation once compliance is 
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forthcoming, are aggravated if there is no connection between the compellent 
action (or the threat of it) and the issue being bargained over (p. 88). 
 
Indeed, the coercive measures adopted by the US against Iran confuse the message more 
than they clarify it. US sanctions against Iran are in no way limited to Iran’s nuclear 
program and its proliferation-sensitive activities alone. US sanctions have targeted 
everything from Iran’s hydrocarbon refineries to its automotive industry and from its 
need for imported gasoline to, in practice, medicine for cancer patients. In fact, by cutting 
Iran off from the international financial system, US sanctions have put pressure on all 
segments of Iran’s economy. The range of items, organizations, and activities that US 
sanctions have targeted is so vast that it leaves no question in the minds of Iranians that 
US demand for Iran to cease proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program is only 
the tip of the iceberg of the US demands from the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
Such an Iranian perception, has undermined another condition Schelling names as a 
requirement for coercive diplomacy to succeed. Schelling (1966) indicates that for 
coercion to work, the target must credibly believe that “compliance [would] 
automatically preclude” the threatened or demonstrated pain (p. 89). Since “the object of 
a threat is to give somebody a choice… both sides of the choice, the threatened penalty 
and the proffered avoidance or reward, need to be credible” (Schelling, 1966, pp. 74-75). 
In fact, as Schelling (1966) asserts, a target’s belief that we would inflict pain anyway 
and its disbelief in our willingness or even ability to cease infliction of pain once 
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compliance becomes forthcoming, would only raise its “incentives to do what we wanted 
to deter and to do it even more quickly” (p. 75).  
 
The case of US sanctions against Iran is a clear example of what Schelling forewarns 
against. While most Iranians
17
 as well as Iranian policymakers have confidence in the US 
ability to ratchet up pressure against Iran, there is no trust in US willingness or ability to 
cease the pressure if Iran would suspend proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear 
program. There are several reasons for this. First, as was mentioned, US sanctions against 
Iran have been in place long before Iran had a fuel cycle program. Forgoing the program 
all together, would only put Iran where it was in the 1980s and 1990s, during which 
period the US imposed some of its toughest sanctions against Iran. Secondly, the current 
sanctions against Iran do not limit their demands to a suspension of the proliferation-
sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), for example, 
requires the President to determine and certify that Iran has “ceased its efforts to design, 
develop, manufacture, or acquire a nuclear explosive device or related materials and 
technology, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile 
launch technology; been removed from the list of countries… determined to have 
provided support for acts of international terrorism; and poses no significant threat to 
United States national security, interests, or allies,” before the ISA sanctions against Iran 
could be lifted. Third, from Iran’s point of view, US hostilities toward Iran would not 
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 In a survey conducted by UTCPOR in the Winter of 2013, 61% of Iranians indicated that it was either 
very likely (26%) or somewhat likely (35%) for the sanctions against Iran to increase if Iran would 
continue enriching uranium.   
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cease even if Iran addressed all US concerns.
18
 Many Iranian policymakers and analysts 
point to how the US reacted to Iran’s 2003 offer, which addressed almost all, if not every, 
US concerns, and claim that the ultimate goal of the US is to undermine the Islamic 
Republic and not just change its various policies.  
 
It is important to note, however, that right after the election of President Obama, there 
was a short-lived yet widespread belief that Obama did sincerely wish to accept the 
Islamic Republic as it is and sought to engage with it based on “mutual interest and 
respect.” But even then many believed that even if the President wanted to lift some 
sanctions, he would not be able to do so. One example that is often invoked is that it took 
the US approximately seven years after the ousting of Saddam to lift most US and UNSC 
sanctions against Iraq. Also, considering that most US sanctions against Iran have been 
codified into law by Congress, an entirely new bill will be required to repeal or even 
amend any of these sanctions. As with all pieces of legislation, such a bill would first 
have to be voted out of its relevant committee and then the full House of Representatives 
and Senate would have to approve. Given how Congress works and the influences 
exerted on members of Congress by lobbying entities such as AIPAC, the Arab lobby and 
even the Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organization (MEK), whose State Department designation 
as a terrorist organization was recently lifted, many in Iran do not have much faith in the 
ability of the US to lift sanctions, even in the event of a grand bargain between President 
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 According to a survey of the Iranian people published jointly by UTCPOR and CISSM in September 
2014, “respondents were told to ‘assume that Iran would fully accept and implement U.S. demands in 
regards to its nuclear program.’ They were then asked whether they thought the U.S. would “gradually lift 
most nuclear-related sanctions against Iran,’ or whether the U.S. would ‘continue the sanctions and the 
pressures…for some other reasons and excuses?’ In response, three quarters say the U.S. would continue 
these sanctions for other reasons; just 19% thought the U.S. would gradually lift most of them. Only 7% did 
not answer, which is a low level of non-response for such a speculative question.” (Mohseni, Gallagher and 
Ramsay, 2014). 
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Obama and Iran. Also, past engagements with the US, particularly with respect to the 
assistances Iran has provided to various US Presidents and the Presidents’ unwillingness 
or inability (or both) to reciprocate, have all but discredited US promises of sanctions 
relief in the eyes of Iranians.  
 
In the relationship between Iran and the US, the perception that has oscillated the most, 
primarily in the US but also in Iran, is the degree to which each country has perceived its 
interests to be intertwined with that of the other. As Schelling (1966) asserts: 
Coercion by threat of damage also requires that our interests and our opponent’s 
not be absolutely opposed. If his pain were our greatest delight, and our 
satisfaction his greatest woe, we would just proceed to hurt and to frustrate each 
other. It is when his pain gives us little or no satisfaction compared with what he 
can do for us, and the action or inaction that satisfies us cost him less than the 
pain we can cause, that there is room for coercion. Coercion requires finding a 
bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want – worse off not 
doing what we want – when he takes the threatened penalty into account (p. 4). 
 
It is interesting that while there have been episodes when Iran and the US have truly felt 
to have converging interests, expression of such feelings from one side has often 
corresponded with opposite feelings on the other side. Unfortunately, instead of 
negotiating a win-win bargain, Iran and the US have mostly preoccupied themselves with 
first attaining leverage against the other. It is quite common to hear policymakers in the 
US and, to some extent, those in Iran echo the expressed opinion of former Secretary of 
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Defense, Robert Gates, that “we need to figure out a way to develop some leverage . . . 
and then sit down and talk with [Iranians]” (DeYoung, 2008). Indeed, it has become 
widely accepted by policymakers in both countries that, to use the words of New York 
Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman (2008), “the right question… isn’t whether we talk 
or don’t talk. It's whether we have leverage or don’t have leverage. When you have 
leverage, talk. When you don’t have leverage, get some -- by creating economic, 
diplomatic or military incentives and pressures that the other side finds too tempting or 
frightening to ignore.”  
 
But viewing “leverage” as a prerequisite for talks is unhelpful. If both sides were to 
regard “leverage” as a prerequisite, good-faith negotiations would never ensue, since 
each side would refuse to negotiate without having a net positive leverage against the 
other and, since logically both sides of a negotiation could not simultaneously have a net 
positive leverage against the other, negotiations would never take place. But perhaps the 
bigger danger of seeking leverage first, is what happens when leverage is actually 
attained. The history of US dealings with Iran is full of examples of US refusing to 
negotiate with Iran because it had achieved a perceived leverage against Iran and did not 
see why it should negotiate when it thought it could simply impose its will on Iran. 
Disregarding Iran’s 2003 offer after the US had brought down Saddam is just one 
example.   
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Section 4.1.2:  Lessons from the Works of Alexander L. George 
 
Another distinguish scholar in the field of coercive diplomacy is Alexander L. George. 
Troubled by the inconsistent track record of compellence and bothered by compellence 
failure of the US in Vietnam, George and his colleagues conducted an in-depth case study 
of US involvements in Laos, Cuba, and Vietnam in an attempt to unearth the “many 
variables at play” in actual compellence situations and to create a “policy-relevant” 
theory, geared toward improving foreign policymaking (pp. ix-xviii).  The last chapter of 
George and his colleagues 1971 book, written by George himself, compares the three 
cases and identifies eight conditions that “favor adoption and implementation” of 
coercive diplomacy and the absence of which makes it “difficult and imprudent for 
American leaders to adopt the strong form of coercive diplomacy” (p. 216). In 1994, 
George and his colleagues published the second edition of The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy, covering more than twice as many more cases. The last chapter of that 
edition is also dedicated to lessons policymakers should draw from past US attempts at 
coercive diplomacy and names nine conditions, which are primarily the same as the eight 
conditions George and his colleagues had laid down in their 1971 book, “that, if present, 
favor its success or, if absent, reduce the likelihood of its being effective” (p. 279).   
 
One of the conditions that George and his colleagues (1994) name is “clarity of the 
objective.” George and his colleagues argue that “clarity with respect to what is to be 
achieved through coercive diplomacy is important… [because such clarity] assists 
policymakers in selecting from among several available response options… [and also] 
helps persuade the opponent of the coercing power’s strength of purpose” (p. 280). As 
190 
 
discussed earlier, the objectives of the US with respect to the Islamic Republic are not 
very clear and the US has been seeking to achieve varying outcomes through coercive 
diplomacy. Even on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, US policy objectives have not 
been clear, shifting from opposing the Russians to finish Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power 
plant to merely opposing above 5% enrichment activities. Interestingly, while UNSC 
resolutions demand Iran under Chapter VII of UN Charter to “suspend all reprocessing, 
heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities,” the November 2013 JPA, only 
requires Iran to “not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.” This wide 
degree of change in the position of the US and the coalition that it has put together, 
communicates to Iran that there exists little clarity with respect to what is to being 
demanded with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, let alone other aspects of Iran-US 
relations.     
 
At the very minimum, one reason for such lack of clarity is the length and duration of US 
sanctions against Iran. Although sanctions have remained a fixture of US foreign policy 
toward Iran, various US administrations have followed differing policy aims toward Iran. 
Hence, since successive US administrations have been pursuing differing policy 
objectives without significantly altering the instruments being used, the aims of US 
coercive diplomacy have lost the clarity they needed to be successful. The US is also 
facing the difficult task of keeping together a coalition whose members have vastly 
different policy objectives toward Iran, while at the same time responding to the demands 
of various domestic constituencies and lobby organizations that advocate for policy 
objectives, such as regime change, that are not only opposed by the very coalition the US 
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seeks to preserve. These, along with many other reasons, have caused the US to have 
difficulty forging a coherent strategy toward Iran, which has in turn blurred the objectives 
the US is seeking to achieve through coercive diplomacy.  
 
George and his colleagues also believe that the coercer has to be more motivated than the 
target for coercive diplomacy to have acceptable odds of success. As George and his 
colleagues (1994) argue “the relative motivation of the two sides plays an important role 
in determining the outcome of coercive diplomacy…[it] is critical… that the adversary 
believe the coercing power is more highly motivated than the adversary to achieve its 
crisis objective” (p. 281). In this case, both the US is highly motivated to prevent Iran 
from achieving a viable nuclear weapons capability and Iran is highly motivated to 
preserve what it regards to be its sovereign rights.  
Assessing who is more motivated, however, depends heavily on what is perceived to be 
demanded. Indeed, one way the coercer could achieve an asymmetry of motivation in its 
favor is to demand “of the opponent only what is essential to protect its own vital 
interests and not [make] demands that engage the vital interests of its adversary” (p. 281). 
Iran regards enrichment to be its sovereign right and is determined to defend its “right to 
enrichment” as a way to both preserve its right to national self-determination and 
showcase its autonomy and independence. In comparison the US does not regard a 
nuclear armed Iran, let alone a nuclear weapons capable Iran, as a danger to its national 
self-determination, autonomy, independence, or even vital national interests. Hence, 
while Iran is ready to sacrifice a lot more to preserve what it regards as its sovereign 
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right, it does not regard the US as willing to sacrifice a lot to prevent Iran from having a 
safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle program.  
 
This Iranian perception is sourced in both US actions and US statements. President 
Obama has been very careful in regards to where he has drawn his administration’s red 
line on Iran’s nuclear program. Time and again President Obama has asserted his redline 
to be Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. Attaining a nuclear weapons capability has never 
been President Obama’s redline. This is in stark contrast with where President George W. 
Bush had drawn his administration’s redline, which was Iran attaining the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons.
19
 By drawing America’s redline at Iran obtaining a nuclear 
weapon, the US has been able to make Iranians believe that the US would not tolerate 
Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. What that means to Iranians, however, is that the US is 
not motivated enough to make much sacrifices and undergo severe costs to prevent Iran 
from becoming a nuclear weapons capable state.   
 
US actions have also intensified that Iranian perception. As Iran has marched toward 
becoming a nuclear threshold state, the US has refrained from undertaking any costly 
measure to forestall Iran’s march and has merely resorted to measures that at best impose 
costs but do not prevent Iran from developing the capability to develop nuclear weapons. 
From Iran’s perspective, had the US been really concerned with a nuclear weapons 
capable Iran and had the US truly perceived a nuclear weapons capable Iran to be a 
                                                 
19
 Just as an example of President George W. Bush’s position on Iran’s nuclear program, on October 17, 
2007, President Bush stated in a news conference at the White House that he had told “people that if you’re 
interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing [Iran] from 
having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon” (Stolberg, 2007). 
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source of significant threat to its vital national interests, it would have for sure taken more 
drastic, forceful, albeit costly, measures. In absence of such measures, it is logical to 
assume that Iran has come to the conclusion that the US is not as motivated to prevent 
Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons capable state as Iran is motivated to develop its 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle program.    
 
The target’s sense of urgency to concede is another factor named by George and his 
colleagues. Indeed, “if the state employing coercive diplomacy genuinely experiences a 
sense of urgency to achieve its objective… it is more likely to be able to generate a sense 
of urgency for compliance on the part of the opponent” (George and Simons, 1994, p. 
282). But when such urgency is not credibly conveyed, either through words or actions, 
there is no reason why the opponent would feel that it must concede in a timely fashion. 
In the case of US coercive diplomacy toward Iran, particularly since the US has adopted 
the “gradual turning of the screw” approach, no such urgency is credibly conveyed and 
no such urgency is felt by Iran. From Iran’s perspective, short of military action, the US 
is already inflicting the maximum amount of pain it could inflict on Iran and not 
complying with US demands would at most result in the US seeking ways to further 
increase pressure on Iran. Being inured to sanctions and pressure, however, Iranian 
policymakers seem to have become insensitive to the threat of further sanctions and 
having operated under sanctions for some 30 years, the Iranian economy is believed by 
Iranian policymakers to have become insulated, self-reliant and resilient enough to 
withstand further attempts at its disruption. Hence, even though the sanctions have 
negatively affected Iran’s economy, neither the sanctions nor the threat of more 
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sanctions, have been enough to create a sense of urgency among Iranian policymakers. 
Lack of such an urgency could readily be seen not only in Iran’s disregard for the various 
deadlines set by successive UNSC resolution on Iran’s nuclear program, but also in Iran’s 
expansion of its nuclear fuel cycle activities on those very deadlines.   
   
George and his colleagues (1994) also regard the coercer having adequate domestic and 
international support as being important and indicate that not only “a certain level of 
political support at home is needed for any serious use of coercive diplomacy” but that 
also “[i]nternational support (or lack thereof) is also an important factor” (p. 284). This is 
one of the areas that the US, particularly in recent years, has been quite successful. 
Domestically and internationally, almost all public opinion surveys indicate solid support 
for sanctions on Iran. Just as an example, according to a survey by Pew Research Center 
conducted between March 4 – 18, 2013, 93% of the American public, along with solid 
majorities in eleven of the thirteen countries surveyed, oppose Iran developing nuclear 
weapons. Of those opposed, 78% of the Americans, as well as strong majorities in nine of 
the thirteen countries surveyed, approve imposing “tougher international sanctions on 
Iran to try to stop it from developing nuclear weapons.” (Pew Research Center, 2013). 
Also, while prior to 2002, the US had difficulty persuading other countries to impose 
sanctions on Iran, since 2002, four UNSC resolutions with sanctions have been passed 
against Iran, and the EU and Canada have imposed their own set of sanctions on Iran.  
 
It is, however, important to mention two significant facts. First, both US and international 
public opinion on Iran is not well informed. Just as an example, contrary to all 
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assessments by the US intelligence community as well as the IAEA, according to a 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation survey conducted between February 12 – 15, 2010, 
71% of Americans think that “Iran currently has nuclear weapons.” Also contrary to the 
assessments of most security experts as well as the US intelligence community, there is a 
widespread belief in the US and globally that Iran has decided to develop nuclear 
weapons and does have an active nuclear weapons program. But, perhaps worse, is the 
very pessimistic view held by a solid majority of Americans as well as the publics of 
many other countries, which is in contradiction with the assessment of most security 
experts, that if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, it would use them against Israel and other 
countries in the Middle East, would “supply nuclear weapons to terrorists,” and would 
“threaten Europe with nuclear weapons” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).  
 
Media coverage of Iran’s nuclear program is also not very impartial. A study by the 
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has found US and 
UK media coverage of Iran’s program to have “focused on the ‘he said/she said’ aspect 
of the policy debate, without adequately explaining the fundamental issues that should 
have been informing the assessment,” “lacked precision and was inconsistent over time,” 
“failed to provide adequate sourcing and context for claims,” “generally adopted the 
tendency… to place on Iran the burden to resolve the dispute over its nuclear program, 
failing to acknowledge the roles of… other countries in the dispute,” “paid insufficient 
attention to the broader context… that influence what specific actors say or do about 
Iran’s nuclear program,” and “reflected and reinforced the negative sentiments about Iran 
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that are broadly shared by US, European, and Israeli Publics” (Siegel and Barforoush, 
2013). 
 
Without going into why the public is so pessimistic and why the media, particularly in the 
west, has lacked adequate objectivity on Iran, it is important to know that the support 
provided for more US sanctions on Iran is at least partially, if not completely, based on 
misconceptions about Iran’s nuclear program. Hence, while the needed public and 
international support for US use of coercive diplomacy is currently present and strong, 
just as with the 2003 Iraq war, the level of support for such measures could precipitously 
change once domestic and international public opinion become more informed. 
 
Secondly, when it comes to the support of other governments for US measures against 
Iran, current US policies against countries that wish to, and in some ways need to, trade 
with Iran are not sustainable without some degree of legitimization. Even US allies, let 
alone countries that have significantly different worldviews than the US, have long 
complained about US extraterritorial legislations. In fact, the French Total S.A. oil and 
gas company, was among the first international energy companies to disregard the Iran 
Sanctions Act to sign a multi-billion dollar contract with Iran to develop Iran’s South 
Pars gars field back in 1997, forcing the US to issue an embarrassing waiver. Also, just 
recently, senior British politicians have begun complaining about “US bullying of UK 
banks and hindering legal trade with Iran,” which, according to them, is “costing British 
companies hundreds of millions of pounds in lost sales” (Parker, 2014). It is, therefore, 
questionable how deep and sustainable current level of international support for US 
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sanctions on Iran is and whether the US can prevent alienating even its allies, let alone 
other countries, if it continues to penalize other nations’ companies and financial 
institutions for engaging in internationally legal trade with Iran. 
 
There is, however, another side to enjoying domestic and international support. Although 
George and his colleagues place exclusive emphasis on having domestic and international 
support for the “sticks” side of the strategy, the coercing country must also enjoy 
domestic and international support for the “carrots” and the stipulated terms of 
settlement, for them to be perceived as credible by the target. In other words, if the target 
knows that the coercing country would face considerable domestic and/or international 
opposition should it decide to deliver the promised benefits linked to the target’s 
compliance, then the credibility of both the terms of settlement as well as the promised 
benefits of compliance would become undermined. With the case of Iran, public opinion 
both in the US and internationally does favor diplomatic settlement of the conflict and US 
officials would not face much public opposition should they decide to ratchet down the 
sanctions. The voice of the public opinion as a whole, however, is often overridden by the 
voice of those who feel more strongly about an issue. In the case of Iran, those in the US 
who feel strongly about Iran-related issues tend to also be quite hostile toward adoption 
of any conciliatory policy toward the Islamic Republic.  Not only the Israeli and Arab 
lobby groups but also the Iranian expatriate community living in the US, advocate hostile 
US policies toward Iran and are very sensitive to any signs of rapprochement between the 
US and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has led the Congress to also be quite sensitive 
to any conciliatory US measures toward the Islamic Republic, making Iranians quite 
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doubtful about the ability of the administration to deliver on its promises for sanctions 
relief.  
 
Another factor that is named by George and his colleagues as being important for 
achieving intended outcomes through coercive diplomacy is the target’s fear of an 
unacceptable escalation in the conflict.  George and his colleagues (1994) assert that the 
“impact of coercive diplomacy is enhanced if the initial action and communication 
directed against the adversary arouse his fear of an escalation to circumstances less 
acceptable than those promised by accession to the coercing power’s demand” (p. 285). 
As George and his colleagues emphasize, a fear of escalation alone is not enough; the 
opponent must feel the net impact of escalation on its interests to be costlier than 
conceding for such a fear to be effective. In other words, as an Iranian official who was 
engaged in the nuclear negotiations during the first few years of Ahmadinejad’s first term 
in office told me in a discussion, “no one is going to commit suicide out of fear of death,” 
which is a Persian proverb that captures the essence of what George and his colleagues 
are alluding to. When the US occupied Baghdad and was perceived to be on its way to 
Iran, fear of a military engagement with the US most probably did have an effect on Iran 
sending its 2003 offer to the US, practically promising to address every single US 
concerns with Iran. Yet, when the offer was rejected out of hand and when its receipt was 
not even recognized by the US, Iran arrived at the conclusion that the US is determined to 
overthrow the Islamic Republic, regarded conceding to US demands as more costly than 
possible military engagement with the US, rendering the fear of possible escalation of 
conflict between Iran and the US ineffective. Hence, it is doubtful that Iran currently has 
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fears of an escalation to circumstances less acceptable than those promised by 
acquiescence to US demands. 
 
Finally, as with Schelling, George and his colleagues also emphasize the importance of 
clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement. George and his colleagues (1994) 
indicate: 
Clarity of objectives and demands… may not suffice. In some cases it may also 
be necessary for the coercing power to formulate specific terms regarding the 
termination of the crisis that the two sides can agree on and to establish 
procedures for carrying out these terms and verifying their implementation. 
Obviously, this would not be helpful in cases with extreme demands… where the 
desired terms are more threatening to the opponent’s interests than the 
punishment being inflicted…[s]pecifying terms of settlement in advance of 
formal agreement can also be of major importance to the adversary’s side. It may 
want precise settlement terms to safeguard against the possibility that the coercing 
power has in mind a broader, more sweeping interpretation of the formula for 
ending the crisis or will be tempted to renew pressure and push for even greater 
concessions after the initial agreement for terminating the crisis is concluded. The 
adversary who contemplates succumbing to coercive diplomacy may need 
specific and reliable assurance that the coercing power will carry out its part of 
the termination agreement” (p. 286). 
To this date, the US has not clearly, credibly, and with one voice clarified exactly what it 
would take to fully address all US concerns with the Islamic Republic of Iran, let alone 
200 
 
formulate a clear procedure of how US concerns could be alleviated. Even with respect to 
US concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions, no precise formula for ameliorating the 
crisis has yet been put forward by the US and its allies. Interestingly, even the demands 
formulated by UNSC have not been expressed as terms of settlement but rather as the 
prerequisites for arriving at the terms for the final settlement of the issues regarding 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Hence, without knowing exactly what is credibly requested 
from the Islamic Republic, Iran has had difficulty conceding to terms that, from Iran’s 
perspective, would not necessarily bring it significantly closer to a final settlement of the 
hostilities. 
 
It is, however, important to note that Iran has delivered whenever the US or the IAEA 
have clearly put forth specific terms for resolving the conflict, provided that, from Iran’s 
perspective, they did not violate Iran’s sovereign rights. Iran and IAEA’s agreed upon 
“Workplan” in 2007 is just one such example. Just to recall from the previous chapter, 
IAEA and Iran agreed to a Workplan on August 21, 2007, which, according to the 
Workplan, covered “all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no 
other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran’s past nuclear program and 
activities.” Then, based on the agreed upon Workplan, Iran started to address the IAEA 
concerns and one by one resolved all outstanding issues and ambiguities regarding Iran’s 
past nuclear activities. Finally, in ElBaradei’s Feb 22, 2008, report to the IAEA Board of 
Governors, it was concluded that Iran had answered all 6 outstanding issues listed in the 
Workplan in an acceptable manner and that IAEA no longer considered them as 
outstanding. Indeed, Iran agreed to the Workplan and did its part because the agreement, 
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to use the words of George and his colleagues (1994), did “formulate specific terms 
regarding the termination of the crisis,” did “establish procedures for carrying out these 
terms,” and did “safeguard against the possibility that the coercing power has in mind a 
broader, more sweeping interpretation of the formula for ending the crisis or will be 
tempted to renew pressure and push for even greater concessions” (p. 286).  
 
Another example of how Iran has reacted positively to credible deals with specified 
demands is how Iran responded to the nuclear fuel swap proposal in 2010. Iran was 
initially reluctant to agree to ElBaradei’s swap proposal since, from Iran’s perspective, it 
lacked not only clarity but also the necessary assurances and guarantees. The Obama’s 
April 20, 2012, letter to President Lula of Brazil and Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, 
which not only formulated “specific terms regarding the termination of the crisis,” but 
also provided for the needed guarantees and assurances that were lacking in ElBaradei’s 
deal, gave Iran the confidence it needed to pursue the swap deal. In less than a month 
from Obama’s April 20, 2010, letter, Iran agreed to deliver on every single term that was 
laid out in that letter. On May 17, 2010, Iran, Brazil, and Turkey signed the Tehran 
Declaration, which established the procedures for carrying out the terms specified in 
President Obama’s letter. A day after the signing of the declaration, however, the US 
rejected the deal and, in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton called more UNSC sanctions “as convincing an answer to the 
efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide” (Sanger and 
Landler, 2010).   
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Currently, what Iran is working toward as part of the JPA, is securing a precise and 
mutually acceptable agreement to conclusively end the conflict over Iran’s nuclear 
program. Considering past Iranian experiences with such agreements, however, it is 
likely that Iran will be more concerned with the credibility of the assurances provided in 
the “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution” that is envisioned by the JPA. 
The main question in Tehran, however, is whether the hostile relations between Iran and 
the US would end with even a “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution” on 
the nuclear issue, considering that US concerns about Iran are in no way limited to Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions alone. Any sign that would suggest the initiation of a new conflict over 
a new issue after the termination of the conflict over the nuclear issue, is likely to make 
Iran less motivated to work toward the resolution of concerns over its nuclear program. 
Conversely, any signs that would reassure the policymakers in Iran that by addressing US 
concerns over its nuclear ambitions the US would change its hostile policies toward Iran, 
is likely to make Iran more motivated to actively address concerns about its nuclear 
program.      
 
Section 4.1.3:  Lessons from the Works of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 
 
The work of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE), titled Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, is perhaps the most extensive work that provides policy relevant lessons 
on the contextual and tactical variables that affect successful utilization of coercive. HSE 
published the first edition of their work in 1985, the second edition in 1990, and 
published the third edition in collaboration with Barbara Oegg in 2007, updating each 
edition with the study of more sanction episodes. Like George, HSE offer their own list 
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of conditions that affect the degree to which sanctions are likely to succeed and like the 
study and recommendations that George offers, the policy prescriptions of HSE have 
remained almost intact throughout the three editions of the book. 
 
One of the most important lessons HSE and Oegg (2007) draw from their analysis of 174 
cases is that “sanctions are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend 
on compelling the target country to take action it stoutly resists. In some cases, the 
security, political, or other costs of complying with the sender’s demands may simply be 
higher than any pain that can be imposed with sanctions” (p. 159). Hence, like Schelling 
and George and his colleagues, HSE and Oegg conclude that for sanctions to be effective, 
the coercer’s demand ought to be limited, modest, and clear. HSE and Oegg (2007) assert 
that “at most there is a weak correlation between economic deprivation and political 
willingness to change. The economic impact of sanctions may be pronounced, especially 
on the target, but other factors in the situation often overshadow the impact of sanctions 
in determining the political outcome” (p. 162). Having explained earlier how the US is 
seeking Iran’s compliance with a series of significant yet ambiguous demands, without 
providing it with any assurance that compliance with those demands would not lead to 
further future demands, it suffices to simply emphasize that from Iran’s point of view, the 
costs of complying with US demands are higher than the pain the US has been or credibly 
threatens to inflict on Iran, not least because Iran perceives US demands not only as an 
encroachment on its sovereign rights, but also as perpetual with the ultimate intention of 
severely undermining the Islamic Republic, both domestically and internationally.  
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Another lesson provided by HSE and Oegg is that sanctions work much better against 
friends than against enemies. HSE and Oegg (2007) argue that since “erstwhile friends 
and close trading partners… have more to lose, diplomatically as well as economically, 
than countries with which the sender has limited or adversarial relations,” it is 
significantly easier to coerce them than antagonistic targets (p.163). HSE and Oegg 
(2007) further argue that “a target country that has little economic contact with the 
sender” is also more immune from its economic threats and, hence, less likely to feel 
obliged to comply with the demands of the coercing power (p. 163). Another reason HSE 
and Oegg (2007) give as to why sanctions work better with friends than with enemies is 
that unlike enemies, “allies will not be as concerned as adversaries that concessions will 
undermine the government’s reputation and leave it weaker in future conflicts” (p. 164).  
 
Indeed, the relationship between the US and Iran has been anything but cordial since 
1979. Long before the US sought to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects 
of its nuclear program, various US sanctions had already minimized Iran’s economic 
contact with the US and even, to a lesser degree, with the EU. Hence, current US 
sanctions and threat of future US sanctions on Iran do not factor as much into Iran’s 
nuclear calculations. That is precisely why the US has gone after other countries that do 
have trade relations with Iran and has placed significant pressure on them as a way of 
putting pressure on Iran. While those efforts have proven to impose significant economic 
costs on Iran, they have not been crippling primarily since the price of oil, which is Iran’s 
main export commodity and which is quite fungible and has a global market, has 
remained quite high during the past decade. But US pressure on Iran’s trading partners 
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have in fact imposed significant costs on them as well. Since the US is not compensating 
any of Iran’s trading partners for their losses in trade with Iran and since most of these 
countries do not fully share US views and concerns on Iran, these countries, many of 
which are US allies, are growing more frustrated with US foreign policies on Iran.   
 
The costs that the US is imposing on its domestic constituents, allies and other countries 
as part of its attempt at coercive diplomacy, undermines another lesson which is 
advanced by HSE and Oegg. According to HSE and Oegg (2007), sanctions are less 
likely to succeed if they do “match costs imposed on domestic constituencies (and allies) 
to expected benefits; otherwise public support for the sanctions policy may quickly 
erode” (p. 176). HSE and Oegg (2007) also argue that while “some analysts have argued 
that imposing a high cost on one’s own economy sends a signal of seriousness, the 
intended signal may be quickly drowned out by a cacophony of protests from injured 
domestic parties. Efforts to extend sanction extraterritorially will very likely produce the 
same effect abroad” (p. 177). In the case of sanctions on Iran, since the US does not itself 
have much economic leverage on Iran, it is dependent on other countries to comply with 
its demands not to trade with Iran. To do that, US extraterritorial laws have put in place 
measures that force foreign entities to choose between doing business with the US and 
doing any business with Iran. But such US measures create significant costs for all 
foreign entities that have had close trade relations with Iran. Considering that many 
foreign entities do not fully share US views and concerns on Iran, and considering that 
the main reason they are cutting back on their trade with Iran is their fear of becoming 
penalized by the US, their cooperation with the US, as will be explained, seems 
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impermanent. Also, once foreign entities go back and benefit from their investments in 
Iran’s hydrocarbon and various other sectors and industries, it is quite likely that the 
business community in the US will also start becoming more vocal in its opposition to 
US sanctions that have prevented them from benefiting from Iran’s vast hydrocarbon 
resources and its unsaturated lucrative markets.     
 
HSE and Oegg also warn against trying to coerce a country that is economically 
resourceful and politically resilient. HSE and Oegg (2007) argue that “strong and stable 
countries are less vulnerable to coercion than weak ones” and that “the relative size of the 
target’s economy is less important” (p. 167). HSE and Oegg (2007) assert that: 
In the great majority of cases we have documented, the target country has been 
much smaller than the sender country. Considering the median value, the sender’s 
GNP is nearly 105 times larger than the target’s, and there is little correlation 
between the size of the gap and the odds of a successful outcome. Even when the 
ratio between the sender and the target’s GNP is 10 or less, there is little 
difference in the odds of a successful outcome when compared with the sample as 
a whole… In sum, senders should not expect that sanctions will work as well 
against very large targets that are strong, stable, hostile, and autocratic. (p. 167)    
While, HSE and Oegg (2007) do not clarify what they exactly mean by “strong” and 
“stable,” it could be well assumed that they are referring to countries that are 
economically and politically resourceful and resilient enough to withstand and not 
disintegrate under the pressure of sanctions.   
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By all accounts, Iran is not disintegrating under the pressure of sanctions. According to 
the CIA’s World Factbook, Iran currently has the world’s 19
th
 largest GDP (ppp), its 
GDP per Capita (ppp) stands at 12,800 current US dollars, and it has the world’s 26
th
 
largest Gross National Saving, equaling to 30.3% of its GDP. Iran is also capable of 
domestically producing most of its needs and has held a current account surplus since 
2002. While there is no question that sanctions have negatively affected Iran’s economy, 
Iran is economically resourceful and resilient enough to prevent a debilitating shortage in 
goods and services. Indeed, to use the words of Washington Post columnist David 
Ignatius, “[i]t’s a mistake to underestimate the tensile strength of Iran’s economy. This is 
a country that survived eight years of bloody war with Iraq, and Iranians know how to 
suffer through adversity…They’ll survive” (Ignatius, 2013).  
 
Politically, sanctions have not taken the toll they have taken economically, and they are 
not creating serious dissension among the public or within senior Iranian leadership. As 
will be subsequently explained, Iran’s political system is designed to remain resilient in 
face of foreign pressure or even intervention. Interestingly, contrary to what is sometimes 
claimed, analysis of survey data suggests that the voting behavior of the Iranian public 
has not been significantly affected by US and international sanctions and Iranian people’s 
support for Iran’s nuclear policy has remained strong and widespread despite the toll such 
sanctions have taken on the welfare of ordinary Iranians. Iran has not witnessed any 
significant public strikes in the recent years and the unrest it has experienced in the past 
decade has had no direct links to sanctions or Iran’s nuclear policy. In fact, analysis of 
surveys conducted during and after Iran’s contested June 2009 presidential election, 
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which was followed by the worst domestic unrest Iran has experienced since the 
revolution, clearly show that “[l]ike Iranians in general, a majority of Mousavi
20
 
supporters want to develop nuclear power, while a significant minority want nuclear 
weapons as well. Though Mousavi supporters are even more likely to perceive sanctions 
as hurting Iran, and most expect more sanctions to come, they are no less determined to 
continue Iran’s nuclear program… Among Mousavi supporters, a mere 6% wanted to 
have no nuclear program; a modest majority (57%) wanted to develop nuclear power 
only, but 37% wanted weapons as well. The general public was statistically the same as 
Mousavi supporters (only nuclear power, 55%, weapons also 38%, no program 3%)” 
(Kull, Ramsay, Weber and Lewis, 2010).     
 
Another finding of HSE and Oegg (2007) is that “in cases involving high policy goals” 
multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions. They argue: 
In high policy cases, International cooperation serves three useful functions: to 
increase the moral suasion of the sanctions, to help isolate the target country from 
the global community psychologically as well as economically, and to preempt 
foreign backlash, thus minimizing corrosive frictions within the alliance. 
However, pressing too hard to corral reluctant allies can have the perverse effect 
of undermining the impact of the sanctions, if multilateral agreement takes too 
long to achieve or requires watering down the sanctions imposed... [Yet] 
international attempts to force “cooperation,” using the heavy hand of 
                                                 
20
 Mir Hussein Mousavi was a presidential candidate who opposed the incumbent, President Ahmadinejad, 
during Iran’s June 2009 presidential election. When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of 
that election, Mousavi refused to concede, alleging fraud and vote rigging, and initiated a protest 
movement, which was later dubbed as the Green Movement. For almost a year, the protests crippled the 
city of Tehran, where Mousavi had won the majority of votes.   
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extraterritorial controls, will seldom yield desirable results. Sanctions should be 
either deployed unilaterally, because the need for one’s allies is slight, or designed 
in genuine cooperation with one’s allies in order to reduce backlash and evasion 
(pp. 173-175). 
 
Prior to 2002, the US was not able to persuade other countries to impose sanctions on 
Iran. Since then, however, four UNSC resolutions with sanctions have been passed 
against Iran and the EU and Canada have also imposed their own set of sanctions on Iran. 
So, the US has to some extent been able to internationalize its efforts to sanction Iran. To 
internationalize its efforts, however, the US has been forced to invest much time and 
resources and has been forced to accept severely watered down sanctions. Precisely 
because of the inherent difficulties of securing genuine international cooperation, the US 
has not pursued any other UNSC sanctions against Iran since 2010, despite the fact that 
UNSC Resolution 1929, which was adopted on June 6, 2010, and has been the last UNSC 
resolution on Iran’s nuclear program, only gave Iran 90 days to “suspend all 
reprocessing, heavy water-related, and enrichment-related activities” or face “further 
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.” That 90 days expired some 4 years ago, Iran, to this date, has not suspended its 
enrichment related activities, and UNSC has not adopted any further Chapter VII 
measures against Iran.    
 
The US, however, has pursued another path of forging international “cooperation” on 
Iran and has relied on extraterritorial laws to secure the cooperation of other countries on 
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Iran. This has led even US allies, let alone countries that have significantly different 
worldviews than the US, to become more vocally opposed to US extraterritorial 
legislations. As HSE and Oegg also emphasize, it is simply doubtful that the US can 
sustain coercing the whole international community to refrain from doing perfectly legal 
trade with Iran without suffering a backlash or encouraging evasion. It is, therefore, 
questionable whether the current methods the US has adopted to mobilize international 
pressure against Iran are sustainable and whether they serve long-term US interests.   
 
Finally, another one of HSE and Oegg’s most important lessons is that the more a 
sanctions episode becomes prolonged, the less likely it is to succeed. HSE and Oegg 
(2007) stress that: 
Political leaders value an incremental approach toward deploying sanctions to 
avoid immediate confrontation and to justify the subsequent use of force, if all 
else fails. Our analysis continues to stress the opposite: There is a better chance to 
avoid military escalation if sanctions are deployed with maximum impact… 
When the goal in a sanctions episode is an ambitious one, the speed and 
decisiveness with which sanctions are imposed can also affect the outcome. 
Sanctions imposed slowly and incrementally may simply strengthen the target 
government at home as it marshals the forces of nationalism…[Also t]he longer 
an episode drags on, the more public support for sanctions dissipates [in the 
coercing country]. This is particularly true for sanctions imposed by a coalition of 
sender countries, where views regarding the importance of the objective may not 
be shared equally… [Indeed t]ime affords the target the opportunity to adjust: that 
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is, to find alternative suppliers, build new alliances, and mobilize domestic 
opinion in support of its policies (pp. 168-172)       
 
Cuba and Iran are perhaps the only two countries that have been under sanctions since the 
beginning of their current constitutional order. The Islamic Republic has been under one 
form or another type of sanctions since the very early days of its inception. The Islamic 
Republic has developed its constitutional institutions, has fought eight years of war, has 
conducted its post-war reconstruction efforts while being under sanctions, initiated and 
advanced its nuclear program, and has handed power from one president to the other all 
while being under sanctions. Hence, living under sanctions has become the norm, defying 
sanctions has become a part of Iran’s political identity, and surviving sanctions has 
become Iran’s primary craft. Exactly as predicted by HSE and Oegg, the prolonged 
episode of sanctions against Iran has made Iran inured and less sensitive to pressure, 
making the threat of more future sanctions less likely to produce the intended outcomes.   
 
Also, quite contrary to the advice provided by HSE and Oegg, the US did not initiate 
sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program with maximum impact, not least because 
it was not capable of doing so. For sanctions to impact Iran’s economy, the US needed 
the support of other countries, since the US itself did not have a noticeable economic 
contact with Iran to use as leverage. To gain the support of other countries, however, the 
US was forced to agree to watered down UNSC resolutions, which took months, if not 
years, to negotiate, without imposing the kind of sanctions the US sought. In fact, Iran 
barely noticed the effects of sanctions until the US abandoned its efforts at the UNSC and 
212 
 
instead relied on coercion against global financial institutions to dissuade them from 
doing business with Iran. That single effort, which was undertaken in an abrupt fashion, 
has had the most significant negative impact on Iran’s economy. Besides that effort, US 
sanctions against Iran have in general been adopted in a gradual fashion, giving Iran 
much time and opportunity to find creative ways of minimizing their negative impact. 
 
It must also be noted that imposing sanctions with maximum impact in an abrupt way, 
even if possible, is a very risky endeavor particularly in cases involving high policy 
goals. Such sanctions could easily provoke the target to take preventive measures, even 
when it would calculate them to have a low chance of success. Just as an example, when 
the US imposed an abrupt oil embargo against Japan in 1941, Japan was left only with 
the option of either securing an end to the embargo through diplomacy or going to war. 
After finding US demands to be unacceptable, Japan arrived at the conclusion that it was 
more acceptable to initiate war against the US, even though such an undertaking was 
fraught with incredible risk, than conceding to US demands. Had the US been able to 
abruptly impose sanctions with maximum impact against Iran, through for example 
imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ports and oil docks, it might have prompted Iran to 
adopt stark measures against the US, such as inflicting maximum casualty on US persons 
and interests, through proxies or even mercenaries, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places 
in the world. During a period when the US needed Iran’s active cooperation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the US was simply not in a position to impose abrupt sanctions with 
maximum impact on Iran without itself suffering major consequences.     
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Section 4.1.4:  Lessons from the Works of other Scholars 
 
Besides the seminal works of Schelling, George, and HSE, many other scholars have also 
looked at conditions that favor successful application of coercive diplomacy. While most 
of these scholars have merely approved or disapproved of the conditions mentioned by 
more prominent scholars, some have identified other conditions not mentioned by 
Schelling, George, and HSE.  
 
David Cortright and George Lopez (2000) suggest that sanctions are more likely to 
succeed if they target, pressure, and deny assets and resources of value to the decision-
making elite and avoid measures that cause humanitarian hardship or negatively affect 
opposition constituencies in the target country (pp. 224-228). This is a very important 
lesson. Unfortunately, the more common wisdom is that if sanctions inflict enough pain 
on the citizens of the target country, they would in turn exert pressure on their political 
elite to force either a change in the objectionable policy or their removal from power. 
Indeed, “inflicting civilian pain in order to achieve political gain remains the modus 
operandi of sanctions policy” (Wiss, Cortright, Lopez, and Minear, 1997, p. 4). But when 
policymakers are not personally burdened by the sanctions, they could readily, as they 
often do, mobilize domestic public opinion in support of their policies. Unlike the public, 
however, policymakers are less likely to become influenced by their own propaganda. 
Therefore, if sanctions could directly affect the wellbeing of the decision-making elite, 
one step in the traditionally envisioned sanctions mechanism would be eliminated, 
making a change in policy, if possible, more likely. 
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With respect to Iran, US sanctions have affected the entire population and not just the 
decision-making elite. If anything, as will be discussed, some members of the elites and 
some influential Iranian institutions have in fact benefited from the imposed sanctions. 
Hence, contrary to the recommendation of Cortright and Lopez, US sanctions against Iran 
have caused maximum humanitarian hardship and have not exclusively targeted the 
decision-making elite. US sanctions have also weakened Iranian opposition groups, living 
and operating inside Iran. Time and again Iranian opposition groups have declared that 
US sanctions and hostilities against Iran only deteriorates their standing inside the 
country and places more pressure and restrictions on them. Ali Shakouri-Rad, who is a 
leading member of the banned opposition Islamic Iran Participation Front, has for 
example opposed US sanctions on many occasions arguing that such measures would 
allow the “government… [to] say that critics of their policies are doing the foreigners’ 
bidding and will use sanctions as a pretext to silence [its] opponents” (Erdbrink, 2009). 
Indeed, as sanctions become more stringent and damaging to the welfare of ordinary 
Iranians, the opposition groups are less likely to take actions that may increase their risk 
of being marked as being on the side of the party who is imposing such costs on the 
population. Consequently, as in the case of Iran, sanctions usually undermine opposition 
groups and push the “population to rally behind their leader and resist external pressure” 
(van Genugten and de Groot, 1999, p. 124). This is exactly why, as Bolks and Al-
Sowayel (2000) also maintain, states under sanctions are more likely to “have greater 
internal cohesion” than those who are not under foreign pressure.   
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Another important work on the subject is the work of Willem van Genugten and Gerard 
de Groot. Genugten and Groot (1999) indicate that sanctions are most likely to fail if the 
coercer’s demands and concerns are not shared by a significant constituency within the 
target country. They emphasize that sanctions are more effective if the demanded change 
in the policy or conduct of a country’s decision-making elite is voiced both by external 
and internal forces (pp. 145-146). The finding of Genugten and Groot (1999) 
corroborates what Government Accountability Office (GAO) also found in November 
1994 as it was considering various aspects of imposing an oil embargo against Nigeria. In 
that report, GAO asserted that “[I]f the targeted country has a domestic opposition to the 
policies of the government in power, sanctions can strengthen this opposition and 
improve the likelihood of a positive political response to the sanctions” (p. 12). This 
condition is also missing in Iran. As will be discussed in much more detail, survey after 
survey suggest that Iranians are not willing to accept Iran forgoing proliferation-sensitive 
aspects of its nuclear program, and some eight years after the imposition of the first 
UNSC sanction against Iran’s nuclear program, support for various elements of the 
program remains overwhelming and intact.    
 
Section 4.1.5:  Conclusion 
 
Coercive diplomacy is a very attractive strategy. If successful, it avoids military 
confrontation and brings about the intended outcomes with little cost. Yet, as George and 
his colleagues (1994) emphasize, “not all situations in which a government determines 
that an adversary’s policy must be changed are appropriate for the employment of 
coercive diplomacy” (p. 292). Policymakers, therefore, must carefully study the particular 
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cases in which they are contemplating coercive diplomacy and must evaluate, in light of 
existing literature on the subject, whether the particular situation makes coercive 
diplomacy, relative to other available policy options, more likely or less likely to succeed. 
In making that evaluation, it is also important to keep in mind the urgency with which the 
situation at hand needs to be resolved. Indeed, a policy option that may bring about the 
intended change in the policy of the adversary much later than one’s national interests 
and security requires, might need to be passed on in favor of other policy options that, 
despite their cost, may produce the intended results faster.  
 
Fearing the ramifications of a nuclear armed Islamic Republic, the US has relied on 
coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear 
program. Yet as the above analysis, which is summarized in the following table, 
illustrates, the situation in Iran lacks most of the conditions and requirements identified in 
the literature for successful employment of coercive diplomacy: 
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Source Condition 
Presence of 
Condition? 
Schelling (1966) 
Demand being less unattractive than the threatened 
and/or the inflicted pain  
No 
George et al (1994), 
Schelling (1966) and 
HSE and Oegg (2007) 
The target being convinced that compliance would 
not lead to more demands 
No 
Schelling (1966) and 
George et al (1994) 
The target being convinced that compliance would 
end hostilities  
No 
Schelling (1966) 
Appropriate connection between the compellent 
action and the issue being bargained over 
No 
Schelling (1966) 
Mutual belief that interests are not absolutely 
opposed  
Ambiguous 
George et al (1994) Clarity of objective No 
George et al (1994) The coercer being strongly motivated Yes 
George et al (1994) 
The targets belief in the asymmetry of motivation 
in favor of the coercer 
Ambiguous 
George et al (1994) The target’s sense of urgency to concede  No 
George et al (1994) 
The coercer having adequate domestic and 
international support 
Qualified Yes 
George et al (1994) 
The target credibly fearing that noncompliance 
would unacceptably escalate the conflict 
Ambiguous 
George et al (1994), 
Schelling (1966) and 
HSE and Oegg (2007) 
Clarity and credibility of the precise terms of 
settlement 
No 
George et al (1994), 
Schelling (1966) and 
HSE and Oegg (2007) 
The target perceiving the demand to be limited and 
modest 
No 
HSE and Oegg (2007) 
The target and the coercers having an otherwise 
cordial relationship 
No 
HSE and Oegg (2007) 
The coercion inflicting minimal cost on the 
coercing power’s own domestic constituents, allies 
and other countries  
No 
HSE and Oegg (2007) The target being politically and economically weak No 
HSE and Oegg (2007) The coercion being genuinely multilateral Ambiguous 
HSE and Oegg (2007) The inflicted pain is abrupt and not gradual No 
HSE and Oegg (2007) The sanction episode is short and not prolonged No 
Cortright and Lopez 
(2000) 
The sanctions target the decision-making elite and 
cause minimum humanitarian hardship 
No 
Cortright and Lopez 
(2000) 
The sanctions do not weaken, if not strengthen, the 
opposition 
No 
Genugten and Groot 
(1999) and GAO 
(1994) 
The sanctions seek to change a policy that is also 
unpopular with the populace of the target   
No 
 
What is important to note is that the assessment made above is quite widely shared by 
most analysts and it is doubtful that those deciding to employ coercive diplomacy to 
persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program were and 
have been blind to this reality. Assuming that Iran becoming a nuclear threshold state is 
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really regarded to be detrimental to US national interests and assuming that preventing 
Iran from achieving such a status is in fact regarded as being vital to US national interest, 
relying on coercive diplomacy to achieve that end defies logic, is unwise, and is 
tantamount to ignoring, at one’s own peril, all existing literature on the subject.  
 
Pursuing a policy that does not seem rational has had other effects as well. Just as an 
example, in almost all of my interviews with Iranian officials and academics, I have been 
told that Iranian policymakers are convinced that American officials know, as any 
intelligent person would, that they will not be able to force Iran to forgo its perceived 
nuclear fuel cycle rights through sanctions and coercion. Convinced that US 
policymakers cannot be that “irrational” to pursue policies that are quite obviously 
destined to fail, many Iranian analysts have become certain that the US must be pursuing 
some other policy objectives and that Iran’s nuclear program is just being used as a cover. 
Even if the situation in Iran would have satisfied most of the mentioned conditions, this 
Iranian perception alone is enough to significantly diminish the success odds of US 
coercive efforts.          
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Section 4.2: Effect of Coercive Diplomacy on Iranian Public Opinion Regarding 
Iran’s Nuclear Policy  
 
While much research has been conducted on the efficacy of sanctions, only a few analyze 
sanctions from the vantage point of the target and even fewer use survey data from the 
target country to evaluate the impact of sanctions on the public’s support for the policy, 
behavior, or the government that sanctions have sought to change. One might, however, 
question the impact of public opinion on policymaking, particularly in contexts where 
citizen input into policymaking is limited, and, as a result, see little utility in assessing the 
effect of sanctions on the support or opposition of the public for the policy that sanctions 
aim to change. It must, nevertheless, be noted that the overarching rationale of sanctions 
has indeed been that if the sanctions cause enough pain “the citizens in the target country 
will exert political pressure to force either a change in the behavior of the authorities or 
their removal altogether” (Weiss, Cortright, Lopez, and Minear, 1997, p. 4).  Moreover, it 
has been emphasized by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its November 
1994 report that “[I]f the targeted country has a domestic opposition to the policies of the 
government in power, sanctions can strengthen this opposition and improve the 
likelihood of a positive political response to the sanctions.” It has also been noted that the 
bearing public opinion has on the success odds of sanctions becomes particularly 
significant in instances where the issue at hand gains enough salience to find its way into 
the public discourse of the target (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Genugten and Groot 
(1999) also indicate that sanctions are most likely to fail if the coercer’s demands and 
concerns are not shared by a significant constituency within the target country and 
emphasize that sanctions are more effective if the demanded change in the policy or 
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conduct of a country’s decision-making elite is voiced both by external and internal 
forces (pp. 145-146). 
 
Many scholars believe that public opinion does in fact affect how elites make decisions, 
even in countries that are not fully democratic. Joseph Nye (2010), for example, argues 
that in all systems of government, even in autocracies, “public opinion affects elites by 
creating an enabling or disabling environment for specific policy initiatives.” In other 
words, the more the public is opposed to a particular policy, the more difficult and 
politically costly the elites will find adopting that policy and vice versa. This is by no 
means limited to liberal societies. Indeed, many comparative political scientists have 
argued that even autocratic governments are dependent upon a certain threshold of public 
support to remain in office.
21
 In fact, it could be well argued that while going against the 
flow of public opinion might merely jeopardize the political careers of those in office in 
liberal democracies, doing so would put in jeopardy the whole system of government in 
autocracies, making the costs of going against public opinion even higher under 
autocratic settings. This is perhaps why most autocratic regimes insist on exerting a 
strong control over mass media and maintain a tight control over the flow of information 
into their respective societies. That said, the Islamic Republic is not an autocracy and the 
level of public participation in Iranian politics is quite extensive, making an investigation 
of Iranian public attitudes toward their country’s proliferation-sensitive activities even 
more important.   
 
                                                 
21
 See for example: Geddes, 2003 and Weingast and Wittman, 2006. 
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There exists broad empirical support that the American public responds rationally to 
salient international events and that public opinion does affect how policymakers in the 
US respond to such events (Page and Shapiro, 1983, 1992; Monroe, 1998; Stimson, 
Mackuen, and Erikson, 1995). There are also studies that suggest the same to be true in 
the context of western democracies (Jenkins-Smith et al, 2004). Testing for the existence 
of the same public opinion – public policy dynamic beyond the context of western 
democracies, Cale D. Horne (2009), found that the “existing theory on the determinants 
of public preferences on government policy are salient” in other political contexts as well. 
In particular, Horne (2009) found that in Iran “[c]ore beliefs about the world, in 
combination with domain specific beliefs and preferences, show strong relationships to 
policy preferences across the range of issues examined.” He concludes that Iran is not an 
exception to the general theory and that decision-making in Iran is influenced by public 
opinion. Therefore, it seems even more crucial to investigate how sanctions have 
influenced the Iranian public’s position with regards to Iran’s nuclear program as the US 
and European leaders consider their various options with respect to Iran.   
 
In this section, two nationally representative probability sample public opinion surveys of 
the Iranian publics, one of which was conducted by the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) and the other by University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion 
Research (UTCPOR), are used to assess the effect of sanctions and other factors on the 
Iranian people’s willingness to accept a deal under which their government would agree 
to forgo uranium enrichment in exchange for the lifting of sanctions against Iran.  
 
222 
 
Section 4.2.1:  Research Design and Methodology 
 
This section uses two nationally representative probability sample surveys of Iranians, 
one conducted by PIPA between August 27 and September 10, 2009 (hereinafter ‘PIPA 
2009’) and the other conducted by UTCPOR between March 3 to March 18, 2014 
(hereinafter UTCPOR 2014) to gauge the effect of sanctions on persuading Iranians to 
create an enabling environment for their policymakers to comply with UNSC demands. 
PIPA 2009 used an independent opinion research company, which relied on native Farsi 
speakers calling into Iran from a call center located in Istanbul, to produce a sample size 
of n=1003. The margin of error for a sample of that size is approximately ± 3.2%. 
UTCPOR 2014 used its own call center in Tehran to produce a sample size of n=1216. 
The margin of error for a sample of that size is approximately ± 2.8%. Both surveys 
interviewed Iranian citizens over the age of 18. 
 
Section 4.2.1.1:  Quality of Data 
 
In general, the validity and reliability of the surveys conducted by PIPA in Iran have been 
thoroughly tested and verified by independent scholars. For example, after carefully 
scrutinizing two of the public opinion surveys that PIPA has conducted in Iran, Horne 
and Bakke (2009) conclude that “[t]hough not flawless, the data pass every test of 
reliability, and of demographic and substantive validity to which we have subjected them. 
Where the data are problematic, the problems exhibited are not unique to polling in Iran, 
but are problems nearly ubiquitous in survey research—such as the overrepresentation of 
highly educated persons and the underrepresentation of the illiterate.” The same is also 
true with respect to the surveys conducted by UTCPOR. The surveys conducted by 
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UTCPOR during both the June 2009 and June 2013 Iranian Presidential elections have 
accurately predicted the election results.
22
 The reliability of the results produced by 
UTCPOR as well as PIPA regarding Iran is also corroborated, as will be shown, by the 
results that have been obtained by other survey and research organizations that have 
independently conducted public opinion surveys in Iran.  
 
Indeed, as the following table illustrate, though not flawless, the sample of both PIPA 
2009 as well as UTCPOR 2014, are generally representative of Iran’s population along 
several demographic dimensions: 
 Demographic 
Dimensions 
PIPA 2009 
UTCPOR 2014 
Target (SCI
23
 
2011) 
Gender    (18+) 
Male 50 49 50 
Female 50 51 50 
Urban-Rural    (18+) 
Urban 69 72 73 
Rural 31 28 27 
Age    (18+) 
18-24  26 18 21 
25-39 38 42 39 
40-59 26 32 28 
60+ 10 8 12 
Education    (15+) 
Less than a secondary 
degree 
29 
39 
05 
Secondary degree 36 31 13 
Tertiary education 35 30 39 
 
As the above table illustrates, both PIPA 2009 and UTCPOR 2014 quite closely match 
Iran’s most recent census information, which was conducted in 2011, on gender, age 
composition, and Iran’s urban-rural population proportions. In both PIPA 2009 and 
UTCPOR 2014 surveys, however, those with tertiary education are over-represented and 
                                                 
22
 See for example Marandi, Mohseni and Salahi, 2012 and Mohseni, 2013. 
23
 Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) is the main Iranian governmental agency responsible for collecting 
Census and other official statistical information. The most recent Iranian census was conducted in 2011.  
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those with less than a degree from a secondary institution are underrepresented. Based on 
the information available, however, it cannot be determined how significant this bias is 
since both surveys interviewed only those over the age of 18, while SCI’s census 
information on education provides its estimates for those over the age of 15. Considering 
that normally people in Iran do not graduate from a secondary educational institution 
until after the age of 18, and considering that 6.5% of those over the age of 15 are 
between 15 and 18 years of age, the bias in both surveys in favor of those with higher 
levels of education is not nearly as strong as illustrated in the above table. Nevertheless, 
as will be discussed later, this problem might introduce some other biases since education 
is somewhat correlated with the dependent variable of this study.   
 
The ethnic composition of both PIPA 2009 and UTCPOR 2014’s samples are almost 
identical to the most reliable available data on that issue. While SCI does not collect data 
on the size of Iran’s various ethnic groups, CIA’s World Factbook (2013) estimates 
closely match with those of PIPA 2009 and UTCPOR 2014’s sample: 
 Ethnicity PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014 
CIA World 
Factbook 
Persian 53 56 53 
Turk  or Azeri 23 16 18 
Kurd 7 10 10 
Arab 2 2 2 
Baluch 1 3 2 
Lor 5 5 6 
Gilak / Mazandarani / Shomali 6 7 7 
Other 3 1 2 
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Section 4.2.1.2:  Empirical Methodology 
 
This section uses two econometric techniques to test the hypotheses of this study. First, 
since the dependent variable of this study is binary, with “success” (1) meaning a 
willingness to forgo enrichment and “failure” (0) meaning an opposition to forgoing 
uranium enrichment, logit regression model with robust standard errors was utilized. The 
logit estimation technique allows for estimating a model that describes the relationship 
between the independent variable(s) and a binary dependent variable (Hill and Lewicki, 
2007). Since the dependent variable of this study is binary and since the goal of this study 
is to test for the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the 
independent variables and the respondents’ willingness to forgo enrichment (defined as 
success), a logit regression model was used.  
 
The second method used in this section is the Average effect of Treatment on the Treated 
method (ATT) – using the Nearest - Neighbor Propensity Score Matching technique.  In 
experiments, the group that does not receive a treatment is referred to as the “control 
group” and the group that does receive a treatment is referred to as the “treatment group” 
and for an experiment to be valid, cases must be assigned randomly to either of the 
groups and neither the cases nor the researchers should know to which group each of the 
cases have been assigned. However, in observational studies that lack the benefit of a 
random double blind assignment, the only way to make valid inferences about the effects 
of a treatment is to balance the treatment and control groups across possible confounding 
variables and to make the two groups as similar in as many aspects to each other as 
possible. To do this, the propensity-score method is used to “compare like with like by 
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matching individuals on propensity scores – summary scores based on observed 
variables” (Firebaugh, 2008, p. 147). And to the extent the observable variables that are 
used for propensity score matching are correlated with possible unobservable 
confounding factors, propensity score matching also reduces the potential biases 
generated by unobservable confounding factors and allows one to evaluate how those 
who are given the treatment differ from those who have not been given the treatment as 
far as the dependent variable is concerned.
24
  
 
Since this section is primarily interested in the effect of sanctions on the Iranian people’s 
willingness to forgo uranium enrichment, in addition to a logit regression analysis, the 
Average effect of Treatment on the Treated method (ATT) was also utilized. Through 
propensity score matching, the samples’ of both surveys were divided in two groups and 
the compositions of the two groups were made almost identical to one another in many 
demographic and attitudinal dimensions. The most important difference between the two 
groups, however, was whether or not they regarded sanctions as having a negative impact 
on Iran’s economy and whether or not they thought sanctions against Iran would be 
increased if Iran continued enriching uranium, the two main independent variables of this 
study. Then the two groups’ attitudes toward the dependent variable of the study were 
evaluated to see if: 
1) Those who think that sanctions are negatively impacting Iran’s economy are more 
likely than those who do not think that sanctions are negatively impacting Iran’s 
economy to believe that Iran should forgo uranium enrichment as part of a deal that 
would also lift sanctions against Iran.    
                                                 
24
 For a more detailed explanation of the method see Becker and Ichino, 2002.  
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2) Those who think that sanctions against Iran would be increased if Iran continued 
enriching uranium are more likely than those who do not think that sanctions against 
Iran would be increased if Iran continued enriching uranium to believe that Iran 
should forgo uranium enrichment as part of a deal that would also lift sanctions 
against Iran.    
Section 4.2.2:  The Logit Regression Model 
 
Section 4.2.2.1:  The Dependent Variable  
 
The dependent variable of this study is the willingness to forgo uranium enrichment as 
part of a deal that would also lift all sanctions against Iran, which is measured by an 
identical question in the two surveys. Both PIPA 2009 and UTCPOR 2014 ask Iranians 
“Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby the current sanctions against Iran 
would be removed and Iran would continue its nuclear energy program, except that it 
would agree not to enrich uranium?”  In response, the respondents could either indicate 
that they would favor such an agreement or say that they would oppose such an 
agreement. They were also able to say “don’t know” or decline to answer. As the results 
of PIPA 2009 indicate, when faced with this question, 32% of Iranians favored and 55% 
of them opposed such a deal. Also, 13% of the respondents either said “don’t know” 
(10%) or declined to answer the question (3%). While the results of UTCPOR 2014 are 
somewhat similar to the results of PIPA 2009, UTCPOR 2014 does show a slight 
increase in the proportion of Iranians who would oppose such a deal. In response to the 
very same question, 62% of UTCPOR 2014 respondents said that they would oppose and 
29% said that they would favor such an agreement. Also, 9% of the respondents either 
said “don’t know” (6%) or refused to answer the question (3%).     
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Q. Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby the current sanctions against Iran would be removed 
and Iran would continue its nuclear energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich uranium? 
 PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014 
Would favor such an agreement 32 29 
Would oppose such an agreement 55 62 
Don’t know 10 6 
Refused 3 3 
 
Using this question as a dependent variable, this section will employ the abovementioned 
two econometric methods to evaluate whether or not the belief that sanctions are having a 
negative impact on Iran’s economy as well as the belief that sanctions would increase if 
Iran would continue its enrichment activities do positively and significantly correlate 
with the respondents’ willingness to favor forgoing uranium enrichment in return for the 
lifting of sanctions against Iran.  
 
Section 4.2.2.2:  Main Hypotheses and Independent Variables 
 
The most important hypothesis of this study is that: 
H1: The pain of sanctions is positively associated with Iranian public support for 
stopping Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. 
 
This hypothesis suggests a commonly held perception that the more painful sanctions 
become, the more likely it is that the target will concede. This assumption holds that the 
motivation to persist with an objectionable policy would erode if sanctions could elevate 
the costs of that policy beyond its benefits (George, 1991, p. 11). To test this hypothesis, 
this study uses an identical question in the two surveys. Both PIPA 2009 and UTCPOR 
2014 ask “As you may know, Iran is currently under sanctions for enriching uranium. To 
what degree would you say these sanctions have had a negative impact on our country’s 
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economic situation?” In response, the results of PIPA 2009 show that 23% of Iranians 
said that sanctions have “had a lot of negative impact,” 37% said sanctions have “had 
some negative impact,” 15% said sanctions have “had only a little negative impact” and 
another 15% said sanctions have “had no negative impact” on Iran’s economy. Also, 10% 
of the respondents of PIPA 2009 either said “don’t know” (9%) or refused to answer this 
question (1%).  Understandably, the results of UTCPOR 2014, as compared to the results 
of PIPA 2009, show a significant increase in the proportion of Iranians who believe that 
sanctions are having a greatly negative impact on Iran’s economy. In response to the 
same question, 42% of the respondents of UTCPOR 2014 said that sanctions have “had a 
lot of negative impact,” 26% said sanctions have “had some negative impact,” 17% said 
sanctions have “had only a little negative impact” and another 6% said sanctions have 
“had no negative impact” on Iran’s economy. Also, 9% of the respondents of PIPA 2009 
either said “don’t know” (5%) or refused to answer this question (4%).   
Q. As you may know, Iran is currently under sanctions for enriching uranium. To what degree would you 
say these sanctions have had a negative impact on our country’s situation? 
 PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014 
Has had a lot of negative impact 23 47 
Has had some negative impact 37 23 
Has had only a little negative impact 15 19 
Has had no negative impact 15 7 
Don’t know 9 3 
Refused 1 1 
 
For the purposes of the evaluations of this study, this question is used to split respondents 
in two groups: 1) those who think that sanctions have had “at least some negative impact” 
on Iran’s economy and 2) those who do not think so. Using this question as one of the 
main independent variables, this study is able to evaluate the effect of the perceived pain 
of sanctions on the Iranian people’s willingness to forgo enrichment. Hence for H1 to be 
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substantiated, the perceived pain of the sanctions should be positively and significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable of this study.  
 
Another important hypothesis that this study seeks to test is whether the fear of increased 
future sanctions could make Iran’s enrichment program less attractive to Iranians. Thus 
the second hypothesis of this study is: 
H2: The threat of increased sanctions is positively associated with Iranian public 
support for stopping Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. 
 
This hypothesis is based on the commonly held assumption that “coercive diplomacy can 
succeed only if the opponent accepts as credible the threat of punishment for 
noncompliance with the demands made upon him” (George, Hall, and Simon, 1971, p. 
238). To test whether being credibly fearful of increased sanctions has an effect on 
Iranian people’s attitudes toward their country’s nuclear enrichment program, this study 
uses an identical question in the two surveys as its second main independent variable. 
Both PIPA 2009 and UTCPOR 2014 ask “If Iran continues its current nuclear program, 
including enriching uranium, how likely do you think it is that the current sanctions 
against Iran will be increased?” In response, the results of PIPA 2009 show that 35% of 
Iranians said that sanctions will “definitely be increased,” 35% said sanctions will 
“probably be increased,” 10% said sanctions will “probably not be increased,” and 9% 
said sanctions will “definitely not be increased.” Also, 11% of the respondents to that 
survey either said “don’t know” (9%) or refused to give an answer (2%). The respondents 
of UTCPOR 2014, however, were slightly more doubtful that sanctions would increase, 
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with 25% saying sanctions will “definitely be increased,” 36% saying sanctions will 
“probably be increased,” 17% saying sanctions will “probably not be increased,” and 
11% saying sanctions will “definitely not be increased,” in response to the very same 
question. Also, 11% of the respondents to that survey either said “don’t know” (10%) or 
refused to give an answer (1%) 
Q. If Iran continues its current nuclear program, including enriching uranium, how likely 
do you think it is that the current sanctions against Iran will be increased? Do you think 
they will: 
 PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014 
Definitely be increased 35 25 
Probably be increased 35 36 
Probably not be increased 10 17 
Definitely not be increased 9 11 
Don’t know 9 10 
Refused 2 1 
 
For the purposes of the evaluations of this study, this question will be used to divide the 
respondents into two groups: 1) those who expect that sanctions against Iran would be 
increased if Iran does not comply with the demands of UNSC and 2) those who do not 
have such an expectation. For H2 to be substantiated, the expectation that sanctions 
would be increased should be positively and significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable of this study.  
 
Section 4.2.2.3.1:  Other Independent and Controlling Variables for the Model Using 
PIPA 2009: 
 
In addition to the two sanctions related variables that are used as the main independent 
variables in order to test for the validity of the two hypotheses of this study, the model 
using the data from PIPA 2009 entails other independent and control variables as well:  
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 Confidence in Government 
Two questions from PIPA 2009 were used to control and test for potential effects of the 
respondents’ degree of satisfaction with Iran’s system of government and their 
perceptions of the contested June 2009 presidential election. The inclusion of these two 
variables is important to avoid potential omitted variable bias since some analysts have 
suggested support for Iran’s nuclear program and attitudes toward sanctions to be a 
function of support for Iran’s Islamist government and/or its conservative president.
25
  
 
 Confidence in the United Nations (UN) 
One question from PIPA 2009 survey was used to control and test for the effects of the 
respondent’s confidence in the UN. Many scholars have argued attitudes toward 
sanctions to be a function of confidence in the UN and have maintained that without 
“widespread confidence in its integrity, sanctions are unlikely to serve as an effective tool 
for resolving international conflict” (Farrall, 2007, p. 10).  
 
Unfortunately, however, PIPA 2009 did not include any questions directly asking about 
the respondents’ confidence in the UN. The only question that PIPA 2009 asks that could 
be used as a proxy for the respondents’ level of confidence in the UN asked Iranians “Do 
you think that when there are concerns about the fairness of elections, countries should or 
should not be willing to have international observers from the United Nations monitor 
their elections?” The results of the survey indicate that 37% of Iranians think that such 
countries should, 55% think that such countries should not be willing to accept UN 
                                                 
25
 See for example Waddington, 2010.   
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election monitors, and 8% of the respondents declined to pick one of the two provided 
response options.   
 
It could be well argued that it is problematic to use this variable as a proxy for the 
respondents’ degree of confidence in the UN since the survey was conducted in less than 
three months after Iran’s contested presidential election and as a result how people 
respond to this question might be driven more by their concerns about the fairness of 
elections in Iran and less by their confidence in the UN. But since this model does control 
for the respondents’ degree of satisfaction with Iran’s political system as well as the 
respondents’ degree of confidence in Iran’s June 2009 election, it is reasonable to assume 
that this variable is more likely to capture the effects of general attitudes toward the UN 
than anything else. Therefore, this model took a “should” response as an expression of 
confidence in the UN and a “should not” response as an expression of lack of confidence 
in the UN.  
 
 Attitudes toward the US 
Many policy analysts have argued attitudes toward the US to be a major factor in Iran’s 
decision-making regarding its nuclear program. In fact, the former head of International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, who was at the center of the 
standoff over Iran's nuclear program, maintained from early on that it is difficult to 
envision a final agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program without security 
guarantees from the US (Karen, 2005). To control and test for this effect, three questions 
from PIPA 2009 were used.  
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One of the questions used in this category divides respondents into four different groups 
depending on their opinion of the US government, with (1) denoting having a “very 
unfavorable” opinion of the U.S. government and (4) denoting having a “very favorable” 
opinion of the US government.  The other question used categorizes the respondents into 
4 different groups depending on their perception of US foreign policy objectives, with (1) 
being those who think the US definitely does not seek to “weaken and divide the Islamic 
world” and (4) being those who think the US definitely does seek to “weaken and divide 
the Islamic world”.  The last question used in this category splits people into 4 different 
groups depending on their attitudes toward negotiations with the US, with (1) being those 
who would “oppose strongly “ full unconditional negotiations with the US and (4) being 
those who would “favor strongly” any such negotiations.  
 
 Exposure to Alternative Sources of News and Information 
Many observers contend that the Iranian public’s perception about their nuclear program 
and their attitudes toward sanctions are shaped by Iran’s state-controlled media. These 
observers argue that “since mass media plays a crucial role in forming and reflecting 
public opinion, the Iranian regime’s total control of newspapers, TV and radio 
broadcasting helps it to direct and manipulate the public opinion” (Pedatzur, 2008). If this 
is true, and if public opinion regarding Iran’s nuclear program is primarily shaped by 
Iran’s state-controlled media, individuals who get their information from alternative 
sources should feel differently about Iran’s nuclear program, making access and use of 
alternative sources of information a significant predictor of the dependent variable. To 
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control and test for such an effect, two questions from PIPA 2009 was used. The first 
question used in this category asks the respondents whether or not they follow the 
broadcastings of Voice of America (VOA) or British Broadcasting Company (BBC), and 
the second question used measures the respondents’ degree of access and use of the 
internet.  
 
 Ideology and Demographics  
The study also controlled for the respondents’ age, level of education, economic status, 
and whether or not they had an Islamist approach to governance. 
 
Section 4.2.2.3.2:  Other Independent and Controlling Variables for the Model Using 
UTCPOR 2014 
 
For the same reasons mentioned above, the regression model using data from UTCPOR 
2014, also makes use of other independent and control variable. Besides controlling for 
the respondent’s age, level of education, economic status, and whether or not they had an 
Islamist approach to governance, quite similar to the model using PIPA 2009 data, the 
model using UTCPOR 2014 also included independent variables that test for the effects 
of government support, confidence in the US and UN, and access to alternative sources of 
news.  
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Section 4.2.3:  The Results of Logit Regression Model 
 
Section 4.2.3.1:  The Results of Logit Regression Model using data from 
PIPA 2009 
 
As can be seen in the following table, the logit regression model (with robust standard 
errors) using the data from PIPA 2009 yields some very interesting results: 
Logit, r 
 
 
 
Dependent: Agree to halt enrichment  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0870 
Hosmer-Lemeshow lack of fit test  0.2820 
S
an
ct
io
n
s 
Sanctions have negative impact  
0.2548 
(0.235) 
Sanctions will increase  
0.2968 
(0.239) 
G
o
v
. 
S
u
p
p
o
rt
 
Satisfaction with system of Gov 
0.0327 
(0.826) 
Confidence in June 2009 Election 
-0.1747 
(0.152) 
U
.
N
. Confidence in the UN 
0.4758** 
(0.016) 
A
tt
it
u
d
es
 
T
o
w
ar
d
 U
.S
. Favorability of  the US Gov 
0.2089* 
(0.075) 
Belief that the US aims to weaken and divide Muslim World  
-0.3315*** 
(0.002) 
Favor Negotiations with the US 
0.1342 
(0.124) 
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
N
ew
s 
Follow VOA or BBC 
0.1439 
(0.533) 
Internet use 
-0.0903 
(0.286) 
D
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s 
Has Islamists approach to governance 
-0.0199 
(0.924) 
Age 
-0.0037 
(0.657) 
Education 
-0.1293** 
(0.023) 
Economic Status 
-0.1780 
(0.173) 
* Significant at 0.1 level     ** Significant at 0.05 level     ***Significant at 0.01 level 
 
The results of the logit regression model using data from PIPA 2009 does not provide 
support for H1 or H2 of this study. As the model indicates, all else held constant, neither 
the perceived pain of sanctions nor the perceived likelihood of increased sanctions are 
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significantly predictive of the respondents’ willingness (or lack thereof) to forgo uranium 
enrichment. The model, however, does suggest a significant positive relationship between 
the respondents’ degree of confidence in the UN and their willingness to forgo uranium 
enrichment. Indeed, increased confidence in the UN does positively and significantly 
predict a willingness to negotiate away Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. Also, 
perhaps more interestingly, the model does support the idea that attitudes toward the US 
do predict Iranian people’s willingness to forgo uranium enrichment. As expected, 
holding all other variables constant, increased favorability of the US is positively and 
significantly predictive of the Iranian public’s willingness to turn their back on Iran’s 
uranium enrichment program. Yet, people’s conviction that the US is seeking to “weaken 
and divide the Islamic world,” is significantly and negatively predictive of their 
willingness to support Iran halting its uranium enrichment program. 
 
The results of the logit regression analysis did not provide support for any other 
commonly held views regarding the determinants of the Iranian public’s attitudes toward 
their country’s uranium enrichment program. Neither the degree of satisfaction with 
Iran’s system of government nor people’s confidence in the legitimacy of the June 2009 
presidential election were significantly predictive of the dependent variable. Also, the 
model does not support the suggestion that Iranian people’s support for Iran’s enrichment 
program is a function of where they get their news from. Following the news programs of 
VOA and BBC and increased usage of the internet were not significantly predictive of the 
dependent variable.  
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Interestingly, among the demographic variables, the model did find education to be 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable. The more educated the respondents 
were, the less likely they were to agree to forgo uranium enrichment. Considering that the 
sample of this study was skewed in favor of the more educated segment of the Iranian 
society, it is important to be mindful that the analyses of this study might be somewhat 
tilted in that direction.  
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Section 4.2.3.2:  The Results of Logit Regression Model using data from 
UTCPOR 2014 
 
As can be seen in the following table, the logit regression model (with robust standard 
errors) using the data from UTCPOR 2014 yields very similar results: 
Logit, r 
 
 
 
Dependent: Agree to halt enrichment  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1167 
Hosmer-Lemeshow lack of fit test  0.2424 
S
an
ct
io
n
s Sanctions have negative impact  
-.0165 
(0.862) 
Sanctions will increase  
-.0348 
(0.679) 
G
o
v
. 
S
u
p
p
o
rt
 Confidence in Majlis 
-.1750 
(0.144) 
Confidence in President 
-.1107 
(0.262) 
Confidence in Judiciary 
-.1812 
(0.175) 
U
N
 
Confidence in United Nations 
.3339 
(0.001)*** 
A
tt
it
u
d
es
 
T
o
w
ar
d
 
U
.S
. 
Favorability of United States 
.3239 
(0.004)*** 
Importance of having relations with US 
.1816 
(0.049)** 
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
N
ew
s 
Follow VOA or BBC 
-.0376 
(0.832) 
Use the Internet 
-.0820 
(0.231) 
D
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s 
Has Islamists approach to governance 
-.2496 
(0.186) 
Age 
-.0015 
(0.297) 
Education 
-.0608 
(0.048)** 
Economic Status 
.0966 
(0.161) 
* Significant at 0.1 level     ** Significant at 0.05 level     ***Significant at 0.01 level 
 
Quite similar to the results of the model that used the data from PIPA 2009, the results of 
the model that uses the data from UTCPR 2014 do not support the two hypothesis of this 
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study. As the model indicates, all else held constant, neither the pain of sanctions nor the 
threat of increased future sanctions are significantly predictive of the respondents’ 
willingness (or lack thereof) to forgo uranium enrichment. The model using the data from 
UTCPOR 2014, however, does corroborate the finding from the model that used data 
from PIPA 2009, suggesting there to be a significant positive relationship between the 
respondents’ degree of confidence in the UN and their willingness to forgo uranium 
enrichment. Indeed, increased confidence in the UN does positively and significantly 
predict Iranian people’s willingness to negotiate away Iran’s uranium enrichment 
capabilities. Also, perhaps more interestingly, the model does support the idea that 
people’s willingness to forgo uranium enrichment is predicted by their attitudes toward 
the United States. As with the model using data from PIPA 2009, holding all other 
variables constant, increased favorability of the US as well as attaching importance to 
having diplomatic relations with the US is positively and significantly predictive of the 
Iranian public’s willingness to accept forgo Iran’s uranium enrichment program.  
 
The results of the logit regression analysis did not provide support for any other 
commonly held views regarding the determinants of Iranian public’s attitudes toward 
their country’s uranium enrichment program. Variables relating to the respondents’ 
degree of support for various Iranian institutions did not significantly predict the 
dependent variable. Also, the model does not support the suggestion that people’s support 
of Iran’s enrichment program is a function of where they get their news from. Following 
the news programs of VOA and BBC and increased usage of the internet were not 
significantly predictive of the dependent variable. As with the model that used the data 
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from PIPA 2009, however, among the demographic variables, the model using data from 
UTCPOR 2014 does find education to be negatively and significantly predictive of the 
dependent variable. The more educated the respondents were, the less likely they were to 
agree to forgo uranium enrichment. Again, considering that the sample of this study is 
biased in favor of the more educated segment of the Iranian society, it is important to be 
mindful that the analyses of this study might be somewhat tilted in that direction.  
 
Section 4.2.4:  The ATT – Propensity Score Matching Method 
 
Section 4.2.4.1:  The Dependent Variable  
 
The dependent variable of the ATT analysis is also the willingness to forgo uranium 
enrichment as part of a deal that would lift all sanctions against Iran, which is measured 
by an identical question in the two surveys. As was indicated, both PIPA 2009 and 
UTCPOR 2014 ask “Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby the current 
sanctions against Iran would be removed and Iran would continue its nuclear energy 
program, except that it would agree not to enrich uranium?”  In response, the respondents 
could either indicate that they would favor such an agreement or say that they would 
oppose such an agreement. They were also able to say “don’t know” or decline to answer. 
As the results of PIPA 2009 indicates, when faced with this question, 32% of Iranians 
favored and 55% of them opposed such a deal. Also, 13% of the respondents either said 
“don’t know” (10%) or declined to answer the question (3%). While the results of 
UTCPOR 2014 are somewhat similar to the results of PIPA 2009, UTCPOR 2014 does 
show a slight increase in the proportion of Iranians who would oppose such a deal. In 
response to the very same question, 62% of UTCPOR 2014 respondents said that they 
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would oppose and 29% said they would favor such an agreement. Also, 9% of the 
respondents either said “don’t know” (6%) or refused to answer the question (3%).     
 
Section 4.2.4.2:  The Treatment Variables  
 
The two main independent variables of the logit model presented above are used as 
treatment variables in the ATT analysis. Hence, like the logit model, the two hypothesis 
of the ATT analysis are: 
H1: Those who are made to believe that sanctions has a negative impact on Iran’s 
economy are more likely than those who do not hold that opinion to support 
Iran forgoing uranium enrichment. 
H2: Those who are made to believe that sanctions against Iran would increase if 
Iran continued enriching uranium are more likely than those who do not hold 
that opinion to support Iran forgoing uranium enrichment. 
 
Section 4.2.4.3:  Balancing Variables for the ATT Analysis  
 
As was explained, to conduct an ATT analysis, control and treatment groups need to 
become balanced in as many ways as possible so that the two groups would become 
similar to each other in aspects designated by the balancing variables, with the treatment 
variable remaining as the “only” difference between the two. For the ATT analysis using 
PIPA 2009 data, the treatment and control groups were balanced using the respondents’ 
1) confidence in June 2009 presidential elections, 2) confidence in the UN, 3) attitude 
toward the US government, 4) perceptions about US goals vis-à-vis the Muslim world, 5) 
attitudes toward negotiating with the US, 6) having or not having an Islamists approach 
243 
 
to governance 7) exposure to VOA and BBC, 8) level of internet usage, 9) age, 10) level 
of education, and (11) economic status. For the ATT analysis using UTCPOR 2014 data, 
the treatment and control groups were balanced using the respondents’ 1) confidence in 
Majlis, 2) confidence in the President, 3) confidence in the Judiciary, 4) confidence in 
United Nations, 5) attitudes toward the US and Iran-US relations, 6) exposure to VOA or 
BBC, 7) level of Internet use, 8) having or not having an Islamists approach to 
governance, 9) age, 10) level of education, and 11) economic status. 
 
Section 4.2.4.4:  Results of the ATT – Propensity Score Matching Method 
 
The results of the above two logit regression models are also corroborated by the results 
obtained through the ATT method. After balancing the treatment and control groups 
using a multitude of balancing variables, the ATT method, based on both the data from 
PIPA 2009 as well as UTCPOR 2014, could not support H1, and did not support the 
hypothesis that those who are made to believe that sanctions has a negative impact on 
Iran’s economy are more likely than those who do not hold that opinion to support Iran 
forgoing uranium enrichment: 
Treatment: Pain of Sanctions 
Data n-treated n-controlled ATT value Std. Error t-statistics p-value 
PIPA 2009  415 133 0.074 0.060 1.227 0.22 
UTCPOR 2014  702 171 -0.006 0.062 -0.099 0.92 
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method. 
 
Also, after balancing the treatment and control groups using the abovementioned 
variables, the ATT method, based on both the data from PIPA 2009 as well as UTCPOR 
2014, could not support H2, and did not support the hypothesis that those who are made 
to believe that sanctions against Iran would increase if Iran continued enriching uranium 
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are more likely than those who do not hold that opinion to support Iran forgoing uranium 
enrichment. 
Treatment: Threat of Sanctions 
Data n-treated n-controlled ATT value Std. Error t-statistics p-value 
PIPA 2009  500 100 .096 .061 1.572 0.12 
UTCPOR 2014  598 204 0.017 0.048 0.348 0.73 
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method. 
 
All four of these results obtained through the ATT method, align with and support the 
findings of the two logit regression models, described above.  
 
Section 4.2.5:  Interpretation and Policy Implications 
 
The results presented in this section have extensive policy implications. The most 
important finding of this section is that the negative impacts of the sanctions and the 
threat of increased future sanctions do not appear to have a significant negative effect on 
the public opinion of Iranians regarding Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities. Therefore, if 
the aim of the sanctions on Iran is to “persuade” the Iranian people to forgo uranium 
enrichment, they are indeed failing to have that effect. Another important finding of this 
study is that, when controlled for other factors, feelings toward the Islamic Republic and 
its constitutional institutions are not significantly correlated with how Iranians view their 
nuclear program. The assumption that support for Iran’s fuel cycle program is a 
byproduct of support for the Islamic Republic is not supported by the findings of this 
section. Therefore, supporting opposition groups to the Islamic Republic as a way of 
reducing Iran’s proliferation risks would probably not produce the intended outcomes.  
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The unwillingness of Iranians to forgo uranium enrichment does not appear to be due to 
their lack of exposure to alternative sources of news and information either. The analysis 
of this section does not find exposures to VOA or BBC and use of internet to be 
significantly correlated with a willingness to forgo enrichment. Interestingly, the results 
of this study show that educated Iranians are significantly less likely to be willing to 
relinquish Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. It should also not be assumed that 
Iranians favor uranium enrichment due to ideological commitments. The findings of this 
study find no evidence connecting Islamism to the unwillingness of the Iranian public to 
negotiate away Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Therefore, since the support of 
Iranians for Iran’s fuel cycle program does not seem to emanate from their lack of 
information or from their ideological convictions, efforts that are geared toward exposing 
the Iranian people to alternative sources of news, information, or even ideology will 
probably have an insignificant, if not the opposite, effect on their willingness to forgo 
uranium enrichment. 
 
The findings of this study suggest three ways Iranians could be persuaded to support Iran 
foregoing proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program. The first measure that 
could be taken to persuade Iranians to agree to an enrichment halt is to increase their 
confidence in the UN. This study shows that Iranians who trust the UN are more likely 
than those who do not trust the UN to be willing to forgo uranium enrichment.  
 
Indeed, it is quite logical for confidence in the UN to be significantly and positively 
predictive of the dependent variable. Besides a desire to safeguard what they regard as 
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their sovereign right, there are two other possible major reasons why Iranians would want 
their country to develop the capacity to enrich uranium: 1) to become self-sufficient and 
less reliant on foreign countries for Iran’s growing energy needs and 2) to develop some 
form of a security deterrent. If Iranians could be persuaded to have sufficient confidence 
in the international system to provide for Iran’s energy and security needs without 
discrimination, the utility of investing in uranium enrichment would become significantly 
diminished. Conversely, the more the UN is used to pressure and isolate Iran, the more 
likely it is that Iranians would lose confidence in the international system, become more 
convinced that Iran could not trust the “outside world” to provide for its energy and 
security needs, and, as a result, become more supportive of Iran’s uranium enrichment 
and, for that matter, any other self-sufficiency programs. Indeed when asked whether it 
was more important for Iran “to become more integrated with the global economy, 
because that is the only way for Iran to prosper in the world today,” or to “become 
economically self-sufficient because Iran should not be dependent on other countries,” 
two thirds (66%) of Iranian said that Iran should become self-sufficient (Kull, 2007).  In 
the summer of 2013, a UTCPOR survey also found that 71% of Iranians favored self-
sufficiency over “becoming more integrated with the global economy.” 
 
The second measure that could be utilized to persuade Iranians to support forgoing 
uranium enrichment is to improve their perceptions of the United States. This study 
shows that Iranians who have more favorable views of the US government are more 
likely to support a halt in Iran’s enrichment activities. This is perhaps because having an 
unfavorable feeling toward the US is heavily correlated with feeling threatened by the US 
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military presence in the Middle East. Indeed, in a poll that was conducted by PIPA in 
2008, close to 60% of those who had an unfavorable view of the US government believed 
that US bases in the Middle East pose at least some threat to Iran (Kull et al., 2008).  
 
The effect of feeling threatened by the US military on the US image in the Muslim world 
is well-known and was highlighted in a testimony given by Steven Kull, the director of 
PIPA, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 17, 2007. In that testimony 
Dr. Kull emphasized that “views toward the US have turned sharply negative in the 
recent years [and] a key factor seems to be that the US is perceived as unconstrained in 
its use of military force by the system of international rules and institutions that the US 
itself took the lead in establishing in the post-[world] war [II] period.”  Therefore, the 
more Iranians perceive the US as a threat, the more likely it is that they would support 
any measure that could deter and neutralize US threats, including development of the 
capability to enrich uranium. Hence, if the intention is to persuade Iranians to relinquish 
their support for Iran’s uranium enrichment program, the United States should work 
toward mitigating Iran’s security concerns and their fear of a possible US military action 
against their country.  
 
The third measure that could be adopted to persuade Iranians to support an enrichment 
halt is to reassure them about US intentions toward the Muslim world. This study shows 
that Iranians who think the US is seeking to “weaken and divide the Islamic world” are 
less likely to be willing to relinquish their support for Iran’s uranium enrichment 
program.  This finding of the study is closely linked to and strongly corroborated with 
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other findings of this section. The less Iranians are reassured about US intentions in the 
region and the more they feel threatened by the US, the more likely it is that they will 
oppose Iran giving up its uranium enrichment program.  
 
It must be said, however, that the above three suggested measures, are not something that 
could be achieved through a public relations campaign alone. As Admiral Mullen nicely 
put it, “we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more 
about what our actions communicate” (Mullen, 2009). Indeed, the results of this study 
show that exposure to VOA, which broadcasts official US positions in Farsi, or BBC, a 
western news media, has no significant effect on the Iranian public’s willingness to forgo 
uranium enrichment. This suggests that people in Iran have serious and real concerns that 
need to be concretely addressed before they could consider forgoing a self-sufficient 
nuclear program, and, as again the results of this section shows, much of those concerns 
are closely linked to the policies of the US and the actions of the United Nations. 
Therefore, as long as the US and UN fail to win the confidence of the Iranian people, 
there is little hope that the Iranian people would provide the enabling environment for 
their government to make any serious compromises.  
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Section 4.2.6:  The effect of Coercive Diplomacy on Iranian Public Attitudes 
Toward Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
Unlike most other sanction episodes, Iranian public opinion regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program has been evaluated through a series of surveys conducted by various research 
organization through various methods. All of these surveys show that an overwhelming 
majority of Iranians continue to support Iran’s civilian nuclear program, despite US and 
UNSC sanctions against Iran: 
 
   
As the presented logit regressions as well as the analysis using the ATT method showed, 
the level of support is not negatively affected by sanctions and has remained roughly 
constant despite increasing sanctions against Iran. It is important to note, however, that 
this is not because sanctions have not been debilitating. Indeed, a strong majority of 
Iranians have continuously indicated that sanctions have had a negative impact on Iran’s 
economy: 
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The results shown by WorldPublicOpinion.org
26
 (WPO) and UTCPOR are corroborated 
by Gallup as well. Gallup has asked Iranians using call centers located outside of Iran 
about Iranian people’s attitudes toward sanctions and their nuclear program. On several 
occasions, Gallup has asked Iranians “The United Nations, the US, and Western Europe 
continue to impose sanctions on Iran. Do you think these sanctions have hurt the 
livelihood of Iranians a great deal, somewhat, or not at all?” In response to Gallup’s most 
recent survey, which was conducted between May 24 and June 6, 2013, a solid majority 
(62%) of Iranians indicate that the sanctions were hurting the livelihood of Iranians “a 
great deal,” 28% said that sanctions were “somewhat” hurting the livelihood of Iranians, 
and only 7% said that sanctions were “not at all” hurting the livelihood of Iranians. 
 
                                                 
26
 WorldPublicOpinion.org is an international collaborative project, which was initiated by and is managed 
by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). 
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All available surveys, however, indicate that despite recognizing the severe negative 
impact of the sanctions on Iran’s economy and the livelihood of the Iranian people and 
despite believing that sanctions against Iran would increase if Iran did not suspend 
enriching uranium and did not curtail its nuclear program, the Iranian people oppose their 
government suspending uranium enrichment and believe that Iran “should continue to 
develop nuclear power despite the scale of sanctions against Iran” (Loschky, 2013). WPO 
and UTCPOR have since 2006 asked the Iranian public “Would you favor or oppose an 
agreement whereby all current sanctions against Iran would be removed and Iran would 
continue its nuclear energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich uranium?” 
In response to the most recent survey conducted by UTCPOR, 62% of Iranians indicated 
that they would oppose such a deal, while only 29% of them said they would favor such a 
deal: 
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Again, Gallup surveys corroborate the findings of WPO and UTCPOR. On several 
occasions, Gallup has asked Iranians “Given the scale of sanctions against Iran, do you 
think Iran should continue to develop its nuclear power capabilities, or not?” In response 
to Gallup’s most recent survey, which was conducted between May 24 and June 6, 2013, 
a solid majority (68%) of Iranians said “yes,” Iran should continue to develop its nuclear 
power capabilities. While Gallup does not say what percent of Iranians said “no,” in the 
survey that was conducted in June 2013, when Gallup asked the very same question in 
January 2013, 63% of Iranians said “yes, continue” 17% of Iranians said “no, do not 
continue,” and 19% of the respondents either said “don’t know” or refused to answer the 
question. 
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While, as was shown above, sanctions have not been effective in eroding Iranian public 
support for Iran’s nuclear program and fuel cycle activities, it has eroded the standing of 
the sanctioning countries and institutions in Iran. As the US has pushed sanctions through 
the UNSC and as it has adopted more stringent sanctions against Iran, Iranians have 
developed stronger negative feelings toward the US. Survey data from a variety of 
sources indicate that Iranians have stronger negative feelings toward the US today than 
they did in 2002: 
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The Iranian public’s confidence in the UN has also taken a hit. According to UTCPOR 
2014, while 74% of Iranians have little confidence (27%) or no confidence at all (47%) in 
the UN, only 23% have some (17%) or a lot of confidence (6%) in the United Nations. 
As it is obvious, the primary reason why the US and UN are viewed so negatively in Iran 
is because the Iranian people hold them, and not the government of Iran, responsible for 
the sanctions that have negatively affected their livelihood. According to a Gallup survey 
of the Iranian people, which was conducted between May 24 and June 6, 2013, while 
two-thirds (67%) of Iranians hold the US (46%), Israel (9%), Western European countries 
(6%), and the UN (6%) most responsible for the sanctions against Iran, only 13% of 
Iranians hold the Iranian government responsible.  
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As was shown previously, however, attitudes toward the US and the UN are positively 
correlated with the Iranian people’s willingness to suspend Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle 
activities. In other words, all else held constant, as Iranians develop more favorable 
feelings toward the United States and become more trusting of the UN, they become 
more willing to favor a deal that would require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment in 
return for lifting of the sanctions. But the opposite is also true. Indeed, as Iranians lose 
their confidence in the UN and develop more negative feelings toward the US, the less 
likely it is that they would agree to any deal that would place Iran-specific limitations on 
Iran’s nuclear program. Thus, to the degree that the US and UNSC sanctions make 
Iranians more negative toward the US and the UN, they erode the possibility of the 
Iranian people creating an enabling environment for Iranian policymakers to accept Iran-
specific limitations on Iran’s nuclear program and its fuel cycle activities.  
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Section 4.2.7:  Conclusion 
 
This section sought to measure the effects of sanctions on the Iranian public’s willingness 
to comply with UNSC resolutions, which demand Iran to verifiably suspend its 
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It was argued that it does matter how sanctions 
have affected the position of the Iranian people on this issue since the policies of the 
Islamic Republic are at least somewhat influenced by the Iranian public opinion. Indeed, 
it would certainly be more difficult for the decision makers in Iran to go against the flow 
of public opinion, which creates an enabling or a disabling environment, and it would 
therefore be of value to see where the Iranian people stand and how, if at all, they are 
influenced by sanctions.  
 
The analyses provided in this section found both the perceived pain of sanctions and the 
perceived likelihood of future sanctions to be of no significant utility in persuading 
Iranians to support a deal under which “sanctions against Iran would be removed and Iran 
would continue its nuclear energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich 
uranium.” The two factors, however, that do have the intended effect on the Iranian 
public’s position with respect to Iran’s nuclear program are 1) greater confidence in the 
UN and 2) better attitudes toward the US, both of which are more likely to be 
undermined by further pressure and sanctions against Iran.  
 
While the findings of this section might run counter to the prevalent perceptions in some 
circles, it only highlights what the literature on sanctions has been saying all along. As 
early as 1967, Galtung, who examined the first ever UNSC sanction that was placed on 
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Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe), maintained that sanctions push the population of the 
target states to rally behind their leaders and increase “the political integration” within the 
target, solidifying the leaders’ resistance to pressure. Similarly, Weintraub (1982) asserts 
that “the more public an attempt on coercion, the less likely is the attempt to succeed” 
because such attempts would make the public more intransigent which in turn would 
“increase the pressures on the target state’s policymakers to resist the coercive measures” 
(p. 19). Genugten and Groot also claim the relationship between economic decline and 
nationalism to be well known. They argue that large-scale sanctions are more likely to 
push the “population to rally behind their leader and resist external pressure” (Genugten 
and Groot, 1999, p. 124). Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) have similarly maintained that 
states under sanctions are more likely to “have greater internal cohesion and ability to 
ignore the impact of sanctions.” Furthermore, this study also corroborates Joseph Nye’s 
(2004) assertion that if the US and, for all intent and purposes, the UN become so 
unpopular in a country that being perceived as conceding to them would be a political 
kiss of death, “political leaders are unlikely to make concessions to help us.” Conversely, 
as this study suggests, if the US and the UN could win the confidence of the Iranian 
people through concrete confidence building measures, it is more likely that they would 
provide the enabling environment for their policymakers to become more 
accommodating. 
 
It is important, however, to draw attention to the fact that Iranian people’s attitudes 
toward the US are anything but fixed. Indeed, as far as the effect of sanctions are 
concerned, the available survey data suggests that as the US placed more sanctions and 
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pressure on Iran, the Iranian public’s view of the US also deteriorated. But, quite 
significantly, when the US decided to pause its coercive posture toward Iran and 
negotiate the JPA with the Islamic Republic in late November, 2013, Iranian people’s 
attitudes toward the US also became less negative. Hence, as the survey data suggests, 
engagement, positive inducements, and other less confrontational measures than 
sanctions and coercion are more likely to encourage accommodating behavior in Iran and 
are less likely to evoke opposition and antagonism.  
 
Section 4.3: Logic of Collective Action and the Effect of Coercive Diplomacy on 
Iran’s Nuclear Policy 
   
As George (1991) puts it, the general idea and logic of “coercive diplomacy is to back 
one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will 
consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand” (p. 4). 
The logic of coercive diplomacy, however, is flawed in many aspects. One of its main 
flaws, particularly as it pertains to international relations, lies in its apparent assumptions 
about the adversary. Based squarely on the rational actor model (RAM), the logic 
assumes the adversary to be a utility maximizing unitary actor. In reality, however, no 
country is run by a single rational actor making decisions for the entire country. Rather, 
even when it pertains to high policy decisions, decisions are shaped, even if not “made,” 
by a collective of individuals “who focus… on many diverse international problems…, 
[and] act… according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal 
goals” through a series of legitimizing procedures (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 255).  It 
would be unfair, however, to maintain that eminent scholars like Schelling and George 
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did not recognize this reality when formulating their concepts of compellence and 
coercive diplomacy. Nonetheless, the strong reliance of these and other scholars’ work on 
RAM has blinded those contemplating the utility of coercive diplomacy in particular 
circumstances to the complexities involved in arriving at national-level decisions.  It is, 
therefore, important to disaggregate the logic of coercive diplomacy and independently 
evaluate the validity of each of its components and assumptions.   
 
In this section, one of the most central components of the logic will be evaluated. The 
logic of coercive diplomacy assumes that the target will decide to concede once it finds 
the pain of the threatened or the demonstrated coercive action to be higher than the 
benefits it draws from the objectionable policy. The logic, however, is silent on the exact 
channel of transmission and on how the pain of the coercive measure would actually 
result in a change in the objectionable policy. In fact, the logic almost assumes some 
form of automaticity in this regard and neglects the complexities involved in the shaping 
and making of national-level decisions. It is, therefore, important to evaluate possible 
channels of transmission, and see whether or not they allow for the pain of sanctions to 
be translated into a change in the objectionable policy.  
 
Section 4.3.1: Channels of Transmission 
 
No country has ever been run by a single individual. Even the most despotic dictators 
have depended on advisors, functionaries, military officers, various professionals such as 
engineers and doctors, and at least a grudgingly cooperative general population to govern. 
Hence, at the very minimum, it must be assumed that countries are run by a collective of 
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individuals and that national-level decisions are the resultant of the pulling and hauling of 
those involved in the decision-making process. For coercive diplomacy to work, 
therefore, it must augment the forces that oppose the objectionable policy and/or diminish 
the strength of those who support the objectionable policy in the target country. The 
theory of coercive diplomacy, however, does not go into such details and, as was 
indicated, assumes that decisions in a target nation are made by a well-informed rational 
unitary actor who would abruptly stop his objectionable behavior once he becomes 
convinced that the costs of his behavior outweigh its benefits.  
 
Despite a lack of attention to the involved channels of transmission in the literature, the 
available works imply various channels. Among the implied channels of transmission, the 
two most cited or implied are 1) the pressures applied by the people of the target on the 
decision-making elite in opposition to the objectionable policy; and 2) increased 
dissension within the targets’ senior leadership regarding the objectionable policy.  
 
Indeed, the channel of transmission that is most often alluded to is the actual or the fear 
of political pressure that would be applied by the public in the target country in 
opposition to the objectionable policy. The argument goes that “imposition of economic 
coercion will exercise sufficient ‘bite’ that citizens in the targeted country will exert 
political pressure to force either a change in the behavior of the authorities or their 
removal altogether” (Wiss, Cortright, Lopez, and Minear, 1997, p. 4). Byman and 
Waxman (2002) argue that coercion could lead to political pressure being applied on the 
target by its population either through instigation of public unrest, erosion of the power 
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base of the adversary’s leadership, and/or threatening the decision-making elites’ 
relationship with key supporters (pp. 59-72). This is indeed the most commonly held 
view in regards to how sanctions actually translate into a change in the objectionable 
policy. For example, in response to Senator King when he asked James Clapper, Director 
of National Intelligence, in a hearing held by the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
April 18, 2013, that “It seems to me the problem with sanctions against countries that are 
essentially autocratic is that the sanctions affect everybody in the street and they don’t 
necessarily affect the decision maker. The supreme leader could hang on. He’s not going 
to have any problems getting bread in the marketplace,” Clapper said “Right, it won’t 
affect him that way. What they do worry about, though, is sufficient restiveness in the 
streets that would actually jeopardize the regime. I think they are concerned about that” 
implying actual or the threat of “restiveness in the streets” to be the intended channel of 
transmission of the sanctions against Iran.  
 
It is primarily because of this line of thinking that when addressing the Iranian people, 
US officials, including President Obama and Congress, emphasize that the Iranian people 
are suffering due to the policies of the Islamic republic of Iran. President Obama, for 
example, in his March 20, 2014, video statement to the Iranian people and leaders on 
Nowruz, said “the economic hardship that so many Iranians have endured in recent 
years” are “because of the choices of Iranian leaders.” He made a similar remark in his 
2013 Nowruz statement and said “The people of Iran have paid a high and unnecessary 
price because of your leaders’ unwillingness to address this issue.” US sanction bills 
against Iran usually include similar references as well. While such remarks do imply that 
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the pain being inflicted on the Iranian people is intentional and will persist until a change 
in the objectionable policy, they are generally designed to clear the US of any 
wrongdoing and channel public dissatisfaction and anger into citizen activism in 
opposition to the objectionable policy.       
 
The other channel of transmission that is also alluded to both in the literature as well as 
by policymakers is increased dissention and disunity among the decision-making elites of 
the target country regarding the objectionable policy. In fact, some experts go as far as 
defining “sanction effectiveness as sparking dissention within the senior” leadership of 
the target country (Katzman, 2014). The argument goes that sanction will either directly 
or indirectly negatively affect the economic wellbeing and/or the political standing of 
some of the members of the decision-making elite, giving them more reason to voice 
their opposition to the objectionable policy. In regards to Iran, for example, Hillary 
Clinton said in an interview with BBC Persian on October 26, 2011, that “[sanctions] has 
put a lot of pressure on the regime, which is the first step toward, perhaps, getting some 
within the regime to look at each other and say, ‘Hey, come on. Why are we doing this to 
ourselves and to our people? Our economy is – wasn’t terrific to begin with, and now it is 
under greater stress. Why do we want to continue down a path that we know is not going 
to bring the kind of support for our own development, our own economic future?” 
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Section 4.3.2: The Logic of Collective Action and the Channels of 
Transmission 
 
Indeed, both of the abovementioned channels of transmission are themselves based on an 
assumption that needs to be evaluated. Both the idea that a dissatisfied population would 
organize to put political pressure against their decision-making elite as well as the 
assumption that members of the decision-making elite who become, in one way or 
another, negatively affected by the sanctions will voice their opposition to the 
objectionable policy assumes that when people share a common interest they will unite to 
further that interest. However, the assumption that groups of individuals with a common 
interest will act when necessary to achieve their group objectives, though a popular 
proposition, is at best a dubious assumption.  
 
Section 4.3.2.1: The Logic of Collective Action 
 
As Mancur Olson (1977) elaborates in his seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action, 
“rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve the common or group 
interests… Even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, 
and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest and objective, 
they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest” (p.2). This is 
because individual members of a large group or a society have both common and 
individual interests. Since it is usually the case that the actions of a single individual will 
not have a noticeable effect on the probability of achieving the common interest, and 
since individual members of a society would not be barred from enjoying the benefits of 
the common interest if it becomes achieved by the efforts of other members of the 
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society, no single individual would have the required incentive to voluntarily endure any 
costs to achieve the common interest. As Olson (1982) elaborates: 
The very fact that the objective or interest is common to or shared by the group 
entails that the gain from any sacrifice an individual makes to serve this common 
purpose is shared with everyone in the group…[and thus an] individual in any 
large group with a common interest will reap only a minute share of the gains 
from whatever sacrifice… [he] makes to achieve this common interest. Since any 
gain goes to everyone in the group, those who contribute nothing to the effort will 
get just as much as those who made a contribution. It pays to “let George do it,” 
but George has little or no incentive to do anything in the group interest either, 
so… there will be little, if any, group action. [Hence]… large groups, at least if 
they are composed of rational individuals, will not [voluntarily] act in their group 
interest (p. 18).  
Olson (1977) then goes even further and claims that “these points hold true even when 
there is unanimous agreement in a group about the common good and the methods of 
achieving it” (p. 2).  
 
Olson’s argument, nevertheless, does not, at first glance, appear to be as robust as its 
sounds. While it is true that states rely on coercion to collect taxes instead of relying on 
voluntary donations, even though every member of the society knows that without their 
financial backing the state would not be able to provide for crucial services, it is also true 
that a good proportion of the population participate in elections, knowing full well that 
their individual votes will not affect the outcome of any election. Also, contrary to what 
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Olson would seem to predict, history is full of instances of people joining hands to topple 
despots or protest against the violation of their civil liberties, despite all odds. And we 
have multitude of organizations in any given nation, such as labor unions, lobby 
organizations, cartels, farms organizations, professional associations, and other formal 
and informal groups and organizations, that seek to further the interests of their 
constituencies.   
 
Olson’s argument, which is more generically known as a public goods problem, however, 
has become more nuanced and hence stronger as a result of such criticisms. In his other 
seminal work, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Olson (1982) argues that public actions 
are usually undertaken and supported by individuals not because of the collective good 
such actions achieve, but because of the selective incentive they provide to their 
supporters. Olson further argues that without positive and/or negative selective 
incentives, public action in support of the common good will rarely, if at all, take place 
(pp. 19-23). While Olson does not go into much detail regarding the potency and efficacy 
of various positive or negative selective incentives that could entice individual members 
of the society to contribute to a collective cause, he does make it quite clear that the 
selective incentive has to be both selective, meaning that it would only selectively benefit 
and or harm the individuals depending on whether or not they contribute to the provision 
of the collective good, and that it has to be incentivizing, meaning that its net benefits 
should outweigh the costs of participation to the individuals.  
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With this addition to Olson’s initial argument, it is easy to see how organizations such as 
labor unions form. All such organizations require, in one form or another, their members 
to contribute to the cause of the organization and, when and if possible, block the benefits 
acquired by the organization from going to those who do not contribute. But the addition 
does not clearly suggest how, contrary to what Olson and other Collective Action 
theorists seem to be claiming, social movements in opposition to a policy or even a 
system of government develop. While there is a whole separate academic field that 
investigates this very question, a broader understanding of Olson’s “selective incentive” 
could shed light on how such movements come to being as well.   
 
In most cases involving a public good or a common interest, the common good cannot be 
achieved without the efforts and contributions of enough participants. Under such 
circumstances, the problem becomes further compounded since even those who have the 
incentive to contribute would not because their individual contribution alone would not 
result in achieving of the common good. Indeed, in such cases each individual’s 
willingness to contribute becomes dependent on his/her information regarding the intent 
of others to contribute. Without going into much detail, collective action problems could 
either be perceived as a prisoner’s dilemma or as an assurance/coordination game, or 
both. Olson’s “selective incentive” addresses the problem in both games and incentivizes 
all players to undertake measures that are more beneficial to them and the society as 
compared to the alternative. Through a potent selective incentive, individuals would 
become incentivized to contribute and if it becomes common knowledge that people are 
incentivized to contribute and if the selective incentives do credibly reassure individual 
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members of the society about the intention of other members of the society, then it would 
become rational for every incentivized individual to contribute toward the common 
interest.  
 
Selective incentives, however, need not only be economical and rationality does not 
suggest neglecting the fact that humans are social beings. Indeed, selective incentives 
could also be social, religious, moral and psychological in nature.
27
 While some have 
argued that popular protests take place because the protestors, in particularly their 
leaders, expect to attain selective material gains once their protests bear fruit, this is 
seldom why social activists take part in protest movements. Indeed, “the desire to gain or 
sustain friendships, to maintain one’s social standing, and to avoid ridicule and ostracism 
are all social goals that constitute selective incentives for individuals to participate in 
collective action” (Chong, 1991, pp. 34-35). Also, since people have to live with 
themselves as well, people’s sense of obligation, either to one’s self, the society, and/or to 
God, and their values could readily incentivize them to participate in costly collective 
actions without expecting any future material benefits. Indeed, most people need not be 
pressured to do the “right” thing and will act “morally” even when not doing so would 
entail a net material benefits. For example, most people often do not steal, even when 
they have a chance to do so, and most people do not take advantage of others even when 
they could do so with impunity. Hence, people could be selectively incentivized to 
                                                 
27
 While Olson (1982) recognizes the significance of non-material selective incentives, he maintains that 
such incentives “are available only in certain situations… [and] have little applicability to large groups” 
(pp. 23-25). This judgment, however, seem to primarily be based on Olson’s own cultural upbringing. 
Indeed, while Olson’s judgment about the significance of selective social incentives might be somewhat 
accurate with regards to liberal societies in the west, he seems to underestimate its value with respect to 
more communal and/or religious societies. 
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partake in collective action in support of a common good merely by becoming convinced 
that their lack of participation would entail a cost, be it material, social, religious, moral, 
and/or psychological, that is beyond the expected benefit of not participating and/or 
would entail material, social, religious, moral, and/or psychological benefits that 
outweigh the costs of participation.  
 
Even if individual members of a large group become selectively incentivized to 
participate in a collective action, however, collective action is unlikely to materialize in 
cases where the public good cannot be achieved without the participation of enough 
participants unless the incentivized members of the society become convinced and 
reassured that 1) enough people will partake in the collective action and that 2) the 
collective action will likely achieve the intended public good.
28
 Potential participants in 
such a setting will need to know that the collective action is likely to bear fruit and that 
their efforts will not be in vain before agreeing to endure costs for the sake of the 
common interest. Obviously, different individuals will have different thresholds for 
participation. This is exactly why protest movements often start with a few pioneers, 
who, for a variety of reasons, tend to have lower participation thresholds, and attract 
others as their probability of success goes up and as the cost of participation in the 
movement goes down. Hence, those who initiate and lead a protest movement, tend to 
endure much more costs than those who join them down the road.         
 
                                                 
28
 It is important to note that while certain individuals might feel so obligated and duty bound to partake in 
a collective action without any regards for its outcome or even its popularity, “rationality” does require 
decisions to be made based on expected outcomes. 
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Still, reassurance and coordination problems could “severely impede efforts to initiate 
mass political activism” (Chong, 1991, p. 112). Not only will those who pioneer a protest 
movement will have to accept enduring significant costs than others, but they will also 
need to be able to both reassure sympathizers that the probability of success is worth the 
costs of participation and convince the sympathizers that large enough participants will 
partake to make achieving the common interest possible. Therefore, the probability of a 
collective action actually materializing is dependent on the costs the pioneers have to and 
will be willing to endure, the resilience and the stamina of the pioneers, the credibility 
and standing of the pioneers among other members of the group, number of sympathizers 
with selective incentives to participate, the probability of sympathizers joining the 
collective action in time to share the costs of the collective action before its costs become 
intolerable for the pioneers, and the perceived value of the common good and the 
likelihood of achieving it through collective action. The probability of collective action 
actually materializing is also depended on what those who oppose the materialization of 
the “common good” do as well.       
 
Section 4.3.2.2: Evaluating the Utility of Coercion to Instigate Collective 
Action 
 
As was said, it is often assumed that sufficiently potent coercive action will instigate the 
public in the target country to place political pressure on the decision-making elite to 
change the objectionable policy. It is also assumed that even without an actual political 
pressure from the public, the decision-making elite will concede fearing its actualization. 
These assumptions have led coercers to undertake measures that have imposed 
tremendous costs on the civilian population of the target countries. Just as an example, it 
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is estimated that US and UNSC coercive measures against Iraq since its invasion of 
Kuwait resulted in 400,000 to 500,000 excess deaths of children under the age of five in 
Iraq (Ali, Blacker, and Jones, 2003). It is, therefore, important to evaluate whether and 
under what conditions coercion can push the people of an adversary to place potent 
enough political pressure on their decision-making elites to bring about a change in the 
objectionable policy. 
 
As was mentioned earlier, collective action is very difficult to achieve. It is not enough to 
convince a significant proportion of the population of an adversary that they would be 
better off if their decision-making elite would change their objectionable policy. For 
collective action to materialize, those convinced will also need to become selectively 
incentivized to partake in a collective action. Not only that, but for popular collective 
action to materialize against an objectionable policy, determined, resilient, risk taking, 
and charismatic leaders who would be willing to endure significant costs to spearhead the 
collective action and persuade others to join are also needed. The collective action against 
an objectionable policy would also need to be stronger than other competing collective 
actions for it to ultimately succeed. 
 
Indeed, there is a reason why history is almost void of any examples where external 
coercive pressure, without an actual military intervention, has resulted in public protests 
against the objectionable policy. It simply takes a lot more than just sanctions to instigate 
a popular movement against an objectionable policy. From amongst hundreds of 
sanctions episodes, the case that is often heralded as an example of how sanctions can 
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successfully change an objectionable policy of a target through a popular collective 
action against the policy, is the case of international sanctions against the National Party 
(NP) government of South Africa.  
 
Without going into much detail, the South African case is unique in many aspects. First 
and foremost, it is important to note that sanctions did not instigate a collective action 
against the apartheid policy in South Africa; it merely supported and capitalized on an 
already existing domestic opposition.  While the South African Native National 
Congress, which later became the African National Congress (ANC), was formed in 1912 
with the express goal of leading, mobilizing, and coordinating the domestic opposition to 
the apartheid system and the NP’s discrimination against the black South African 
population, UNSC did not adopt its first legally binding action against South Africa until 
1977. But even more importantly, the ANC welcomed and in fact was the staunchest 
advocate of international sanctions against South Africa and “the call for isolation was 
part of the overall political strategy of the internal black opposition” (Crawford and 
Klotz, 1999, p. 178). In fact, while ANC made isolation of the NP central to its political 
strategy as early as 1969, it was not until the mid-1980s that the anti-apartheid lobbies 
were able to successfully pressure major western countries to adopt sanctions against 
South Africa (Crawford and Klotz, 1999, p. 179). It is also important to note that 
economic sanctions contributed only slightly to the fall of the NP. The most significant 
sanctions that affected the South African racist government were the social sanctions, 
such as exclusion of South Africa from world-class cricket and rugby competitions. Such 
sanctions “inflicted socio-psychological pain and undermined the ideological foundation 
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of the apartheid system, including South Africa’s deeply mythologized ties to European 
culture,” which ultimately delegitimized the apartheid system among the white South 
Africans, further bolstering the already existing anti-apartheid movements in South 
Africa (Crawford and Klotz, 1999, p. 271). Indeed, sanctions against South Africa did not 
“succeed” because it coerced the NP into conceding. They “succeeded” because they 
heartened the domestic opposition about the prospects of their struggles and also because 
they were able to convey a very strong moral message against racial discrimination, 
which ultimately led to the delegitimization of the apartheid system and hence its 
eventual fall (Crawford and Klotz, 1999, p. 275).  
 
Sanctions against South Africa carry many lessons from a collective action point of view. 
One of its most important lessons, however, is that international sanctions are quite 
effective in attracting the attention of the populace of the target country as well as the 
international community to the objectionable policy. To the extent the populace of the 
target country and the international community find the policy to be in fact objectionable, 
sanctions can play a signaling and even a mobilizing role. In the case of South Africa, the 
majority of the South African population had already found the apartheid system to be 
objectionable but needed and advocated for the international sanctions to awaken the 
white South African population as well as the international community to the 
reprehensibility of the apartheid system. But sanctions could also backfire if the populace 
of the target country fail to see why the policy in question is being perceived as 
objectionable by the coercers. In fact, in those cases, sanctions would only add salience to 
the policy and intensify domestic support for the objectionable policy if the coercive 
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measure and not the policy in question is domestically regarded as being illegitimate. 
Under such a situation, considering that the objectionable policy would probably already 
have a constituency of core supporters, one could imagine collective action materializing 
in support and not in opposition to the objectionable policy. Also, since “leaders will give 
closer consideration to the… [political] impact of their decisions the more attentive the 
public is” (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006), and since sanctions could make a public very 
attentive, if the public ends up supporting the objectionable policy, sanctions will also 
make the leaders more attentive to the support of the public for the objectionable policy.    
 
Section 4.3.3: Logic of Collective Action and the Effect of Coercive 
Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Policy 
 
As was shown in the previous section, all surveys from Iran show that despite increasing 
sanctions against Iran, Iran’s nuclear program has remained popular among the Iranian 
public. Consequently, there is no significant political group in Iran that calls for the 
Islamic Republic to concede to US and UNSC demands and there is no evident sign of a 
domestic opposition developing against Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities. To the 
contrary, the program is so popular that it would be a political suicide for any member of 
Iran’s decision-making elite to suggest that Iran should concede to UNSC demands, 
much of which could be attributed to the salience the program has attained as a result of 
US and UNSC sanctions.  
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Section 4.3.3.1: The Effect of Sanctions on Iran’s June 14, 2014, Presidential 
Election 
 
It is important here to clarify a common misconception that has surfaced since President 
Rouhani’s election in June 2013. Many in the West have heralded President Rouhani’s 
election as a collective action that was instigated by US and UNSC sanctions against 
Iran. Just as an example, President Obama in his remarks at the 10
th
 Annual Saban Forum 
hosted by the Brookings Institution on December 7, 2013 asserted that it was “precisely 
because of the international sanctions and the coalition that we were able to build 
internationally that the Iranian people responded by saying, we need a new direction in 
how we interact with the international community and how we deal with this sanctions 
regime. And that’s what brought President Rouhani to power.” There is, however, little 
evidence in support of such claims and most available evidence point to the other 
direction. In fact it could be well argued that it was not until President Rouhani reassured 
the Iranian public that he was not going to suspend Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities as 
he did in 2003 and not until he convinced the Iranian people that the 2003-2005 
suspensions were part of an intelligent scheme to allow Iran to master the entirety of the 
fuel cycle technology, that Iranian people started to seriously consider Rouhani’s bid for 
presidency.   
 
UTCPOR surveys conducted before and after the election show that support for Rouhani 
did not galvanize until about four days prior to Iran’s June 14, 2013, presidential election, 
even though almost the entirety of all US and UNSC sanctions on Iran were well in place 
long before presidential campaigns began in Iran around the end of March, 2013. Hence, 
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something besides the sanctions must have been responsible for Rouhani’s surge during 
the last days of the presidential election campaigns:    
 
 
 
Indeed, President Rouhani used all of his major campaign programs to win back Iranian 
people’s confidence regarding his attitudes toward the nuclear program, a confidence that 
was in question due to Rouhani’s role in the 2003-2005 nuclear suspension. Just as an 
example, in response to the Iranian State TV Channel 2 reporter’s question on May 27, 
2013 regarding Rouhani’s role in the 2003 – 2005 suspensions, Rouhani charged back 
saying that the suspension was tactically necessary and that “we completed the nuclear 
technology… [and by agreeing to the suspensions] we… provided the opportunity for our 
nuclear scientists… to complete Iran’s nuclear [fuel cycle] technology.” But it was not 
until the last TV debate among presidential candidates centering on national security 
issues that people became convinced that Rouhani was not a “sellout.” Rouhani had used 
every opportunity to convince the public that he was not going to turn his back on Iran’s 
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nuclear program and that he was going to use his diplomatic skills to have the program 
and avoid sanctions at the same time. But it was not until Ali Akbar Velayati, another 
presidential candidate who is also the Chief Counsel to the Supreme Leader on 
International Affairs and who was considered to be an opponent of Rouhani, charged 
against Saeed Jalili, who was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator under President 
Ahmadinejad, during the third debate accusing him of missing opportunities to resolve 
the nuclear dispute, that Rouhani’s claim became more widely accepted. 
 
The third presidential election debate, which took place on June 7, 2013, changed a 
public perception that had inhibited the Iranian people from trusting Rouhani. Less than a 
month prior to the June 7, 2013, debate, according to UTCPOR election surveys, a solid 
majority (59%) of Iranians were of the opinion that the only way Iran could avoid 
sanction was to suspend its nuclear enrichment program and only 31% believed that it 
was possible for Iran to avoid sanctions without having to suspend nuclear enrichment. 
The majority belief that it was not possible to avoid sanctions without forgoing 
enrichment, prevented people from trusting Rouhani who was making the contrary claim. 
When Velayati made statements during the third presidential debate that corroborated 
Rouhani’s claim, the public perception regarding this issue underwent a fundamental 
change. In response to the same question after the June 7, 2013, presidential debate, only 
36% of Iranians believed that sanctions could not be avoided unless Iran stopped its 
enrichment activity and a plurality (48%) accepted Rouhani’s position that it was possible 
for Iran to enrich uranium and avoid sanctions at the same time: 
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Hence, from the third debate onward, people started to more seriously consider Rouhani. 
It is no wonder that it is precisely after the third debate that we see Rouhani’s number 
going up. It must be said that Rouhani’s numbers did not only go up solely because of his 
promise to continue with the nuclear program. Obviously there were many other 
domestic reasons. Rouhani’s demonstrated ability to work across Iran’s political divides, 
for example, made Rouhani a very formidable candidate for a public that was tired of 
constant political gridlocks during the presidencies of both Khatami and Ahmadinejad. 
But despite his attractiveness, people could not trust him until they became convinced 
that he had not turned his back on Iran’s nuclear program during the 2003-2005 period. 
Once that barrier was lifted, Rouhani’s other impressive characteristics and credentials 
began to attract supporters and he was finally able to attract 50% of almost all segments 
of Iran’s population. 
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Quite importantly and contrary to what is assumed in the West, Iranian people’s attitudes 
toward sanctions did not have much of an effect on their likelihood to vote for Rouhani: 
 
 
 
Also, those who voted for Rouhani were slightly more likely than the Iranian population 
as a whole to be willing to forgo enrichment in return for the lifting of all sanctions 
against Iran. According to UTCPOR, while at the time of the election 36% of the whole 
sample and 39% of those who said they had voted for Rouhani favored a deal that would 
require Iran to agree not to enrich uranium in return for the lifting of all sanctions against 
Iran, 54% of the whole population and 56% of those who had voted for Rouhani 
indicated in June 23, 2013, that they would oppose such a deal. 
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It is, therefore, important to refrain from drawing the kinds of conclusions that President 
Obama and many other analysts in the west draw from the outcome of Iran’s June 2013 
presidential elections. None of the survey data available support the claim that people 
voted for President Rouhani in order to protest against the nuclear policies of the Islamic 
Republic. If anything, a close examination of the events surrounding that election 
emphasize how symbolically important Iran’s nuclear program has become to the Iranian 
people and how even a doubt about a person’s commitment to the program could 
negatively affect his/her political career.  
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Section 4.3.3.2: Coercive Diplomacy, Special Interest Groups, and Iran’s 
Nuclear Policy  
 
The Collective Action theory has another very important implication as well. As was 
previously indicated, the Collective Action theory suggests that typically “large groups, 
at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest” 
(Olson, 1982, pp. 18-23). Furthermore, due this and other properties of collective action, 
“the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large groups 
are less able to act in their common interest than small ones” (Olson, 1982, p. 31). The 
implication of this is that “[m]embers of ‘small’ groups have disproportionate 
organizational power for collective action,” which in turn means that in any given society 
we would witness more organized groups that actively promote the interests of a few than 
organizations that advocate the interests of the society as a whole (Olson, 1982, p. 41).    
 
When a country is placed under sanctions, it could either concede or resist. If it decides to 
resist, it will have every incentive to find ways to circumvent and mitigate the pain of 
sanctions. The incentive to circumvent and mitigate the pain of sanctions, create groups 
that in one way or another specialize in and significantly profit from activities that are 
geared toward mitigating the negative effects of sanctions on the society and, more 
importantly, on those who are, for one reason or another, better able to pay higher 
premiums for the services of such groups. As the duration of sanctions become more 
extended, such organizations become even more specialized and more efficient in what 
they do, resulting in a reduction of their costs of operation. Also as the sanctions become 
more stringent, the premium such organizations receive for their services also go up. 
Hence, as sanctions episodes become more prolonged and more stringent, the profit such 
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organization attain for their services go up, making the enterprise more and more 
attractive to other entrepreneurs. It is important to emphasize, that such organizations do 
not come to being only inside the sanctioned country. The benefits involved often 
become so significant that nationals and organizations of other countries also begin 
profiting from either the sanctions, by substituting for the commodities that used to be 
exported by the sanctioned country, or by providing sanction busting services to the 
sanctioned country, or both. 
 
Such organizations have several qualities. First, since they provide crucially needed 
services and must operate under the radar to be able to provide such services, to the most 
extent their activities are not usually regulated. Secondly, since they are “helping to 
mitigate” the pain of sanctions, they tend to be admired by the society as well as the 
decision-making elite. Third, since most of their activities require some level of 
cooperation, if not help, from the state, they tend to either be linked to the state or have 
very good relations with the state. Fourth, since organizations that are capable of 
delivering such services are small in number, they are significantly more capable of 
forming coalitions. Finally, due to the abovementioned qualities, they have 
disproportionate power to directly and indirectly influence public policy. 
 
Considering that sanction busting organizations exist and profit because of sanctions, 
they are much more incentivized to promote policies that, in one way or another, 
ultimately prolong the duration of sanctions. Hence, those organizations located inside 
the sanctioned country along with their supporters are more likely to support and 
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advocate the objectionable and other provocative policies and those that are located 
outside of the sanctioned country along with their supporters are more likely to lobby the 
coercing countries to adopt stricter and less accommodating policies toward the 
sanctioned country. Although the two forces need not to coordinate their efforts, they 
collectively escalate the conflict situation and impede or even spoil efforts geared toward 
its resolution.  
 
While the abovementioned dynamic is not sketched by HSE and Oegg (2007), it is 
perhaps an important reason behind one of their most important findings. While HSE and 
Oegg (2007) mainly attribute their key finding, that there exist a strong negative 
correlation between the duration of sanctions and the success odds of sanctions, to the 
ability time affords to sanctioned countries to “martial the forces of nationalism,” “find 
alternative suppliers… and build new alliances,” the fact that time also affords domestic 
and foreign firms that benefit from sanctions with the opportunity to undertake measures 
that hinder conflict resolution should also be taken into account.  
 
Indeed, sanctions against Iran have been in place for such a long time that most Iranian 
industries, which have mushroomed as a result of Iran’s post-revolution import 
substitution policies in response to the sanctions, are in operation precisely because Iran 
is, have been, and is assumed to remain under sanctions. Much of the investments that 
have gone into inefficient Iranian industries only appear rational if the investors did in 
fact count on the sanctions to remain in place for the foreseeable future. In fact, sanctions 
have acted as externally imposed tariffs that protect Iranian industries from foreign 
283 
 
competition. Hence, it is very difficult for Iranian industries to promote policies that 
would result in the lifting of the barriers to trade, just as it is difficult for any country that 
has operated its economy through protectionist measures to accept undergoing major 
liberalizing reforms. In fact, it would only be rational for Iranian industries and business 
elites to use their ability to take collective action to push for the exact opposite. 
 
External profiteers have also played a major role in keeping the sanctions in place. Just as 
an example, Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region have been the staunchest 
opponents of a comprehensive nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 and Iran-US 
rapprochement. The Arab lobby in the US, which is primarily funded by Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the UAE, has in fact joined hands with the Israeli lobby to hinder a deal 
between P5+1 countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Minin, 2013). While 
geostrategic considerations are indeed among the issues that concern Arab countries of 
the Persian Gulf region, the economic effects of sanction reduction on these countries 
should not be neglected. Indeed any easing of sanctions against Iran could only 
negatively affect the economy of these Arab countries. Just to give a few examples, more 
investment in Iran’s energy sector is likely to reduce investments in the energy sectors of 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. But even worse, lifting of sanctions against Iran would 
allow Iran to provide more oil to the world market, which would bring down the global 
price of oil to the detriment of these Arab countries.  
 
Moreover, these very countries have also significantly benefited from providing Iran with 
sanction busting services. Just as an example, after China, UAE is Iran’s biggest trade 
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partner not because UAE produces anything that Iran needs or vice-versa, but because 
UAE provides Iran with sanction busting services. Anything that Iran needs that it cannot 
import directly, it does so through UAE, and more specifically Dubai. Dubai is the 
biggest importer of US products in the Middle East and ranked 17
th
 among all importers 
of US products in 2013. What is interesting is that Dubai re-exports 80% of the materials 
it imports from the US, at least a quarter of which ends up in Iran (Foroohar, 2010). It is 
no wonder that as sanctions against Iran became more stringent, the volume of Iran-UAE 
trade also went up. In fact, according to Dubai Chamber of Commerce, from 2005 to 
2009, trade between Iran and Dubai tripled to $12 billion. Obviously, Dubai charges a 
premium and makes good profit on everything it re-exports to Iran. It is needless to say 
that such lucrative trade with Iran is only possible because of the sanctions against Iran 
and would cease quite rapidly if Iran could import these commodities directly into its 
own ports.  
 
Section 4.3.4: Conclusion 
 
The logic of coercive diplomacy assumes that a target state will capitulate if it would 
become convinced that the pains it is or will suffer because of its objectionable policy are 
going to be greater than the benefits of the objectionable policy. No country, however, is 
run by a single rational unitary actor. Every country has its domestic politics and 
national-level decisions, particularly those with significant ramifications, necessarily do 
need to be adopted through a legitimizing political process. Therefore, national-level 
decisions should be regarded and often times are a mere resultant of the pulling and 
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hauling of multitude of individuals and organizations representing various interests in the 
decision-making process.  
 
While the literature mostly leaves the actual channels through which the pain of sanctions 
translate into a change in policy obscure, the most cited and implied channel of 
transmission is the political pressure the populace of the target country would place on its 
decision-making elite. It is often assumed that if sanctions become crippling enough, 
people in the target country will realize that the benefits of the objectionable policy is not 
worth its costs and will therefore mobilize in its opposition. The argument suggests that a 
mobilized domestic opposition to the objectionable policy and/or the fear of such 
mobilization, will be enough to persuade the decision-making elite in the target country 
to change course. There is also the notion that sanctions may create dissension among the 
decision-making elite regarding the objectionable policy. 
 
Public mobilization, however, is very difficult to achieve and even when members of a 
large group or a society agree on a common interest or a goal, there are prohibitively 
complex barriers to collective action. In fact, large groups are seldom capable of taking 
collective action and when such actions materialize it is rarely because of the common 
benefit they produce and more often because of the selective incentives they were able to 
afford to those who contribute to the collective cause. For this very reason, we do not 
have many good historical examples of sanctions not only convincing the populace of a 
country that they would be better off forgoing the objectionable policy but also 
instigating them to take action in opposition to the objectionable policy. In the case of 
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South Africa, which is often heralded as an example of how sanctions can work, 
sanctions did not instigate, but supported and capitalized on an already existing and 
vibrant domestic opposition to the objectionable policy.  
 
Sanctions, however, can backfire if the populace of the target country does not find them 
to be legitimate. In those cases, sanctions could exacerbate the conflict and make its 
resolution more difficult by elevating the importance and the symbolic significance of the 
objectionable policy among the populace of the target country. Once a policy gains such 
a salience and symbolic significance, changing it as a result of external pressure would 
carry considerable political risk for the decision-making elite of the target country. 
 
But perhaps more significantly, one of the ways sanctions, particularly those that are 
prolonged, can become counter effective is the incentive they create for the target country 
and others to try to circumvent them. Such an incentive often times create opportunities 
for domestic and international actors to seek to profit from the situation, engendering 
enterprises and various forms of economic activity that only exist and are only profitable 
as a result of the sanctions. While it is very difficult for the public, even if they become 
convinced that the objectionable policy is not serving their interests, to mobilize against 
the objectionable policy, entities that profit from the sanctions are small enough in 
number to more easily mobilize and advocate policies that further their own interests, 
even at the cost of the general public.  
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The lesson the theory of Collective Action has for those contemplating to resort to 
coercive diplomacy is that for coercive diplomacy to succeed, it needs to generate special 
interest groups in opposition to the objectionable policy and not in its favor. Indeed, the 
most direct way of bringing about change in a target country’s objectionable behavior is 
to augment the strength of the forces that oppose the objectionable policy and/or diminish 
the strength of those who support the objectionable policy in the target country. 
Whenever sanctions do the opposite, they are most likely to be counterproductive. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the strength of the forces that favor or oppose the 
objectionable policy does not depend only on the number or the wealth of the individuals 
and/or groups in each camp. The reasons they bring to bear for their support or 
opposition, the legitimacy of those reasons, and the ideological sway of those reasons 
from the perspective of the populace of the target country is oftentimes much more 
important. Indeed, while people would be willing to even sacrifice their own lives for a 
legitimate cause, there are very few individuals who would be willing to take any action 
in promotion of a cause they regard as being illegitimate. If sanctions could highlight the 
illegitimacy and moral reprehensibility of a policy, as it did in the case of South Africa, 
then it has a better chance to succeed. Likewise, if the coercing powers make demands 
that are deemed as illegitimate and unjustifiable, those demands are likely to generate 
resistance.     
  
288 
 
Section 4.4: Coercive Diplomacy, Iran’s Strategic Culture, and the Nuclear Policy 
of the Islamic Republic 
 
In the previous section, it was explained, through the prism of the Collective Action 
theory, why coercive diplomacy is unlikely to instigate a popular collective action in 
opposition to Iran’s nuclear policy. The previous section also pointed to a few of the 
reasons, again through the prism of the Collective Action theory, why coercive 
diplomacy was unlikely to create dissension among Iran’s decision-making elites in 
regards to Iran’s nuclear program. It was suggested that since US and UNSC coercive 
postures and their demands are regarded as illegitimate by the public, there is significant 
public pressure on the decision-making elite not to concede to US and UNSC demands. It 
was also suggested that since almost the entirety of Iranian industries as well as a 
significant portion of all economic relations and activities are in one way or another 
dependent on the sanctions, the decision-making elite face little, if any, pressure from 
Iran’s influential business community. It was, therefore, suggested that Iran’s decision-
making elite are not under any significant domestic pressure to change Iran’s nuclear 
policies.  
 
The previous section, however, would be an incomplete explanation of why coercive 
diplomacy is unlikely to instigate either a popular opposition to Iran’s nuclear policy or 
dissension among Iran’s decision-making elite regarding Iran’s nuclear policy without a 
discussion about Iran’s strategic culture and its effect not only on Iran’s nuclear policy, 
but also on Iran’s reaction to US and UNSC demands. Such a discussion is necessary 
because it sheds light on why US and UNSC demands are regarded as illegitimate, why, 
besides the reason explained in the previous section, individual members of Iran’s 
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decision-making elite are unlikely to openly advocate conceding to US and UNSC 
demands even if they become convinced that doing so would be materially more 
beneficial, and why US and UNSC sanctions are ultimately likely to result in more 
resistance.  
 
Section 4.4.1: Strategic Culture and its Significance  
 
Before discussing Iran’s strategic culture, it is first necessary to briefly define strategic 
culture and expand upon its significance. As with most grand concepts, strategic culture 
does not have any single agreed upon definition. Indeed, “strategic culture, no less than 
culture itself, is a contested concept” (Gray, 2006, p. 161). Culture is one of those most 
clearly understood yet most difficult terms to define. If defined too broadly, it is capable 
of becoming so all-encompassing that it would become void of its utility as an 
independent variable. Yet, narrowing its definition would also be problematic since it 
would be almost impossible not to be perceived as being arbitrary in what to include and 
what to exclude in an attempt to develop a narrower definition. Without getting too 
tangled in the fine distinctions between the various definitions that have been provided by 
different scholars, however, this section uses strategic culture to mean “an integrated 
system of shared symbols, values, and customs that, working through perceptions, 
preferences, and governmental processes, impose a degree of order on the ways that 
policymakers conceive and respond to the strategic environment” (Morgan, 2003, p. 28).  
 
As social beings, humans necessarily live within distinct social communities that over 
time become exposed to distinct thoughts, ideals, values, and historical experiences, 
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creating a level of relative homogeneity within communities and making each social 
community somewhat distinguishable from other communities. The shared thoughts, 
ideals, values, and historical experiences of each community constitute its culture, which 
shape how each community and its members give meaning to and interprets strategic 
events and information to which they become exposed and condition how they respond to 
such events and external stimuli. Hence, “everything a security community does, if not a 
manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an example of behavior affected by culturally 
shaped, or encultured, people, organizations, [and] procedures” (Gray, 2006, p. 153).  
 
The strategic culture of a society affects its strategic decisions in several ways. First, as 
was explained, culture influences how people perceive external stimuli and interpret the 
“reality.” When decision-making elites become exposed to an event or information of 
strategic significance, they will inevitably process and evaluate the information based on 
their own understanding and perception of the reality. It is needless to say that how 
decision makers define and understand their surroundings and how they process 
incoming information does form the basis of any decision they make, strategic and 
otherwise. Secondly, culture plays a significant role in defining a society’s strategic goals 
and preferences. When evaluating various policy options, decision makers will often 
weigh them according to their expected contribution, or lack thereof, to long and short 
term goals. A society’s strategic culture provides “the value system that policymakers use 
to rank alternatives when they perceive opportunities or threats in the strategic 
environment” (Morgan, 2003, p. 26). Finally, since culture does frame social interactions 
and hierarchies, and since how individuals within a community relate and interact with 
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one another is at least somewhat cultural, governmental processes and institutions that 
organize and regulate such interactions are also at least to some extent cultural. 
Consequently, strategic decisions are a byproduct of strategic culture to the extent 
governmental processes and institutions that produce and legitimize them are influenced 
by culture. 
 
It is important to note that just like culture, strategic culture both influences and is 
influenced by strategic decisions a society adopts over time. As societies accumulate 
strategic experience, their strategic culture becomes further developed and nuanced. As 
Issa Boullata explains: 
The culture of any human group is its collective experience in time. As the group 
moves in time from generation to generation, it continuously meets with new 
needs that challenge it. The response of the group shapes its experience of reality, 
which in turn, adds to its culture. The group learns to acquire new cultural 
elements and discard others, so that its culture continues to develop in the service 
of group survival and enhancement. Culture is thus continually changing and 
accommodating the group’s institutions, beliefs, and values, to its ever rising 
needs, both material and otherwise. Certain cultures may be more open to change 
than others. But there is no culture that does not change unless it is a dead 
culture” (Sharabi, 1988, p. 148).   
 
Also, certain elements of a society’s strategic culture may become more salient than other 
elements depending on the situation at hand and the society’s most recent strategic 
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experiences. Considering that a nation’s strategic culture is somewhat shaped by that 
nation’s historical experiences, elements of a society’s strategic culture that have been 
affected by more recent historical experiences will generally have greater influence on 
strategic decisions than older ones. Indeed, the attitudes and worldviews of different 
generations of policymakers are shaped by different historical events and strategic 
experiences. While a society’s strategic culture is not usually overwhelmed by any single 
event, policymakers, when processing information, are more likely to be influenced by 
events they have personally experienced than events only traces of which could be found 
in the strategic culture of their respective society.   
 
It is important to note, however, that strategic culture does not dictate, but influences 
policy. A nation’s strategic culture is only one of many variables, albeit an important one, 
that affect strategic policies. While strategic culture may shape how strategic stimuli are 
perceived, they do not produce the stimuli nor do they initiate government processes or 
develop policy alternatives. Strategic culture is the lens through which the strategic 
reality is conceived; it does not create the reality but perceives it. Indeed, strategic culture 
does not determine strategic behaviors or decisions. It does, however, provide for a 
societal common ground that allows for easier legitimization of national-level decisions. 
While there is significantly more to strategic decision-making than culture alone, 
strategic decisions that clearly violate the dominant strategic culture tend to become 
extremely difficult to defend and legitimize and are hence less likely to be adopted. Even 
in circumstances that require adoption of strategic decisions that contradict the dominant 
culture, policymakers often represent them as not being so and when such representation 
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is not possible, “deviant” decisions are portrayed as an expedient exception or temporary 
in nature. Regardless of the circumstances, however, “the effects of strategic culture will 
be more or less strongly stamped upon strategic behavior of all kind” (Gray, 2006, p. 
168).  
 
Section 4.4.2: Iran’s Strategic Culture  
 
Due to its millenniums long history, geographic location, ethnic composition, and 
religious orientation, Iran has a very complex, nuanced, and pervasive strategic culture. 
Indeed, it would be beyond the scope of this section to comprehensively expand upon the 
many elements and aspects of Iran’s strategic culture and their implications. In this 
section, therefore, I will suffice to first explaining how Iran’s political structure as well as 
key national and religious experiences and narratives have shaped and been shaped by 
Iran’s strategic culture. 
 
Section 4.4.2.1: Iran’s Political Structure and its Effect on Iran’s Strategic 
Culture 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has a complex political system that cannot be fully 
understood without some knowledge of the evolving Shiite political philosophy, Iran’s 
political history and the evolving religious identity of the Iranian people. Without such a 
knowledge, the Constitution of the IRI would seem to lack the required coherence and 
practicality to act as the supreme law of a multiethnic and socially diverse country like 
Iran. The challenge of fully understanding the nuances of the political system of Iran is 
further compounded by the fact that throughout the political history of the human race, 
there has been no system of government that could be characterized as being even 
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similar, let alone equivalent to the current political order in Iran. This lack of precedence 
coupled with the difficulty of understanding the subtleties of the political thoughts and 
principles that underlie Iran’s current framework of government, have made IRI 
significantly prone to mischaracterization. This section intends to shed light on and 
explain some of the religious thoughts, political philosophies and historical experiences 
that have interacted with one another to, on one hand, shape Iran’s current political order 
and, on the other hand, form the contemporary Shiite political philosophy.  
 
Section 4.4.2.1.1: The Evolution of the Political Thoughts of Shiite Islam and 
the Role of Shiite Scholars in Iran Until the Islamic Revolution in 1979 
 
Unlike any country in the world, the Iranian population is overwhelmingly Shiite. More 
than 90% of Iran’s population is Shiite and it could be well argued that considering Iran’s 
multiethnic  makeup, the only two factors that unite the Iranian people and keep the 
country together are the Iranian people’s shared Shiite faith and shared historical 
experiences. It is, therefore, important to have some understanding of this major unifying 
factor before seeking to understand the foundations upon which Iran’s current political 
order rests.  
 
The Shiite faith is a branch of Islam that was formed after the death of Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 AD. Shiites believe that 1) Prophet Muhammad had in fact declared 
that it was divinely ordained for Imam Ali, who was the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, 
to succeed him after his death as both the spiritual and the political leader of the Muslims, 
2) regard rulers who were selected instead of Ali as illegitimate, and 3) emphasize the 
family of the Prophet Muhammad as the most authentic source of knowledge about the 
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Prophet’s teachings and way of life. While Shiites, like Sunnis, believe that the Quran is 
indeed the very words of God that ought to be fully heeded by believers, unlike Sunnis 
they allow much more room for human interpretation. Shiites, nevertheless, consider 
honest and sincere interpretation of the Quran to be not only an esoteric academic task 
that requires deep knowledge of a range of disciplines including Arabic literature, Islamic 
hadith, Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic history, philosophy and logic, but also a “purified” 
person free from any prejudices and conflicts of interest (Nasr, Dabashi and Nasr, 1988, 
pp. 26-33).  
 
Initially, the Shiite Imams, who were the direct decedents of the Prophet and Imam Ali 
and are considered to be infallible, were regarded as the only authoritative interpreters of 
the Quran and explainers of the Prophet’s way of life. Shiites also believed that the 
Imams were divinely ordained to rule over Muslims and that anyone who would ever 
assume any form of political leadership without the direct endorsement of the Imam of 
the time was in effect “usurping” an authority that was divinely vested in the infallible 
Imam. Consequently Shiites regarded the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties as “usurpers” 
of authority and thus illegitimate (Sachedina, 1988, pp. 89). But with the death of the 11
th
 
Imam in 874 AD, his son Al-Mahdi, who is considered by Shiites to be the last Imam and 
the ultimate savior of mankind, went into hiding and communicated with the Shiite 
community only through four of his select deputies for a period of 67 years. Before this 
period, which is known by the Shiites as the “minor occultation,” ended in 941 AD, it is 
narrated that Al-Mahdi through his fourth and last deputy informed the Shiites that soon 
all of his communications with the Shiites was going to come to an end, and that his 
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“major occultation,” the length and duration of which is only known to God, was going to 
begin. It is also narrated that he ordered Shiites to refer to the Shiite scholars for guidance 
during his major occultation (Majlesi, V. 53 p. 118).  
 
With the beginning of the major occultation, the Shiites, who since the death of the 
Prophet had challenged the legitimacy of all Caliphs on the basis that the Imams were the 
only divinely ordained legitimate authorities, faced a difficult situation. On one hand, 
considering that they believed Al-Mahdi, the 12
th
 Imam, to be living, they had to continue 
to regard him as the only legitimate authority to rule over Muslims, which in turn meant 
that they had to continue to oppose the authority of all other rulers, including those that 
may rise to power from within the Shiite community itself. On the other hand, 
considering that the 12
th
 Imam himself had indicated that he would be nowhere to be 
found and accessed for an unknown period and considering that he had selected no one to 
represent him, it soon became necessary to develop a mechanism to address the 
leadership void created by the 12
th
 Imam’s major occultation (Sachedina, 1988, p. 93). 
Therefore, soon after the start of the major occultation, the Shiite scholars resorted to the 
Islamic principle of Ejma (consensus), which allows for scholars to authoritatively 
generate new understanding of the religion after reaching a consensus among themselves, 
as well as the last decree of the 12
th
 Imam to his deputy to slowly take charge of the 
responsibilities of the hidden Imam. 
 
The first responsibility the Shiite scholars took upon themselves was to directly answer 
the newly emerging religious questions of the Shiites. While before the major occultation, 
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Shiite scholars would only disseminate answers already provided by the Imams, after the 
major occultation they realized that with the passage of time more and more new 
situations that required new religious decrees were emerging. They thus arrived at a 
consensus that during the major occultation of the Imam, each of the Shiite scholars 
familiar with the Quran, the teachings of the Prophet, and the interpretations of the 
Imams would have the authority to utilized deductive reasoning to arrive at their own best 
judgment as to what the Imam would have decreed if he was presented with a similar 
question (Momen, 1985, pp.185-191). They, nevertheless, did maintain that it would be 
every Shiite’s responsibility to identify and abide by the religious decrees of the scholar 
they regarded to have the deepest understanding of the Quran and the teachings of the 
Prophet and the Imam. They also did not rule out the possibility that a person might think 
of him or herself as being the “most learned” Islamic scholar and determined that such 
individuals must follow their own best judgments. 
 
Another responsibility that Shiite scholars soon assumed was to collect religious taxes. 
During the life of the Imams and the minor occultation all religious taxes were either 
given to the Imams or were spent in accordance to the direct wishes of the Imams. With 
the start of the major occultation, the Shiites could no longer access the Imam and were 
left to wonder what to do with their religious taxes. The Shiites scholars, believing that 
the major occultation of the Imam was not going to last too long, refrained from 
collecting the religious taxes and decreed that the Shiites should deposit their taxes in a 
safe location or leave it with a trusted individual so that the accumulated funds could be 
handed to the Imam once he returns. This position on the taxes remained accepted by 
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religious scholars until about 300 years into the major occultation. Yet in the 13
th
 century, 
a prominent Shiite scholar by the name of Muhaqiq Hilli (1205 - 1277 AD) realized that 
the occultation may not end anytime soon and that it was not wise for Shiites to simply 
accumulate their religious taxes in hopes of ultimately handing it to the 12
th
 Imam. He, 
therefore, decreed that Shiites scholars may collect religious taxes and that Shiite 
believers must pay their religious taxes to the Shiite scholar they regard to be the most 
learned so as to ensure the highest probability that the funds would be spent “in the way 
the Imam himself would have determined” (Sachedina, 1988, pp.241). From that point 
onward, Shiite believers handed their religious taxes, in particular the portion that is 
specified in the Shiite faith for the Imam (10% of annual savings), to the Shiite scholars 
they followed.  This independent source of income, on one hand significantly empowered 
the Shiite scholars and, on the other hand, paved the way for the institutionalization of 
their role in the Shiite society.  
 
Shiite scholars, however, deliberately refrained from assuming any aspects of the 
political responsibilities of the Imam until around early 19
th
 century. While Shiite 
scholars did start to actively collaborate with the governmental institutions during the 
Safavid Dynasty (1507 - 1722 AD), which declared the Shiite faith as the official religion 
of Persia, their role mostly remained limited to the courts, since partaking in politics, let 
alone assuming political responsibilities, were regarded to be in direct violation of the 
Shiite belief. Yet, when northern Iranian territories, which were ethnically Azeri, came 
under attack from Russia in 1804, Abbas Mirza, the heir of the King and the commander 
of Iran’s armed forces, successfully convinced Shiite scholars of the time that they had an 
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Islamic obligation to issue a Jihad decree against the Russian forces in defense of Azeri 
Shiites, making it a religious obligation for all Shiites to participate in Abbas Mirza’s 
military campaign against the Russians (Momen, 1985, pp.138). While the decree was 
instrumental in mobilizing the Shiites against the Russian invasion during the first and 
the second Russo-Persian wars of the early 19
th
 century, relative technological and 
tactical superiority of the Russian forces resulted in Russia’s ultimate victory. This event, 
however, made the Shiite scholars, who had up until then refrained from assuming the 
political leadership role of the Imam, to seriously consider up taking that responsibility as 
well.  
 
Slowly, with the rise of colonialism, Shiite scholars became convinced that they should 
take anti-imperialist stances. They felt quite confident that their Imam would have 
certainly required Shiites to oppose western colonial domination of Muslim territories. 
Having showcased their ability to mobilize the masses in support of a cause, they 
frequently threatened to issue decrees both against the interests of the colonial powers 
and anyone, including the King, who may consider collaborating with them. In 1891 
when the King refused to heed the ultimatum of the Shiite scholars who opposed a 
tobacco monopoly concession deal that was granted by the King to a British company in 
return for a fixed monthly transfers of royalties, the most senior Shiite scholar of the 
time, Ayatollah Mirzayeh Shirazi issued a decree forbidding the use of tobacco in any 
form. The decree resulted in a universal boycott of tobacco across Shiite territories, 
making the concession void of any economic benefits for the British. Shortly after the 
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decree, the King withdrew the concession in an effort to both calm the public and mend 
his ties with the Shiite scholars.  
 
The ordeal, which became known as the “Tobacco Movement,” again showed the Shiite 
scholars as well as Iranian and foreign statesmen and politicians the full extent of 
political power Shiite scholars could exercise and the degree to which they could 
mobilize the masses in support of their cause. The Tobacco Movement also made 
ordinary people realize that Shiite scholars could both act as powerful advocates of their 
interests and effectively protect them against the arbitrary rule of the King. Increasingly 
when the public wished to protest against any of the policies of the government or the 
actions of a governor or a magistrate, they turned to Shiite scholars to voice their 
grievances. Shiite scholars, in turn, being financially independent from the state and 
practically immune from its pressure, openly advocated people’s interests and criticized 
the government when they deemed it to be deviating from Islamic doctrines (Momen, 
1985, pp.143). Consequently, the political influence of Shiite scholars rapidly increased 
and they found themselves on a slippery slope toward fully assuming the political 
leadership role of the Imam.  
 
While Shiite scholars became more politically active around the ends of the 19th century, 
they were careful not to cross any of the traditional boundaries that they had establish for 
themselves. The events of the last years of the 19th century and the early years of the 
20th century, however, changed this all. In 1897 the Prime Minister (PM) of Iran, 
Aminuddula, introduced a series of taxes and tariffs that considerably reduced the buying 
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power of the public and the profits of the merchant class. The taxes and tariffs also 
reduced the revenues of Shiite scholars, since Shiite religious taxes are based on the net 
annual savings of the believers. The taxes and tariffs were hugely unpopular with all 
segments of the society and resulted in protests against Aminuddula. As a result, within 
less than two years, the Shah replaced Aminuddula with Atabak, a seasoned yet brutal 
politician who was a fixture of the Qajar dynasty. Upon becoming the PM, Atabak sought 
the consultancy and assistance of Joseph Naus, a Belgian technocrat, to reorganize Iran’s 
customs and tax system. Naus along with two of his colleagues arrived in Tehran on 
March 15, 1898 and within less than a year were able to augment state revenues by more 
than 35% (Destrée, 1989).  King Mozaferadin and his PM were so pleased with the work 
of Naus that they promoted him to assume the responsibilities of multiple cabinet level 
positions and made him the de facto minister of Commerce and Treasury (Keddie, 1969).  
 
As Naus gained more influence in the government, he introduced stricter tax and customs 
regulations and proposed to rely on Belgian tax collectors who were regarded as being 
generally more immune to bribery and favoritism as compared to their Iranian 
counterparts (Keddie, 1969). Naus’s increased influence and his proposal to use Belgian 
tax collectors were perceived as a threat by all elements of the Iranian society. Not only 
did the merchants and Shiite scholars become wary of Naus’s increased influence, but at 
the administrative level, royal court officials also began to regard Naus as a political 
competitor and a threat to their special interest (Bayat, 1991, pp. 107). Resentments 
against Naus, however, became a public matter when a picture of him dressed in the garb 
of Shiite scholars in a party was spread around during the holy week of Muharram in 
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March 1905. Some of the Shiite scholars regarded this act as being deliberately offensive 
and mobilized their followers to demand the dismissal of Naus. The incident and the 
passions it aroused eventually subsided when the government provided the merchants, the 
Shiite scholars, and the protestors with a vague promise of a thorough investigation.  
 
Yet Naus was never removed from his position. The government’s lack of accountability 
inspired philosophical deliberations among Shiite scholars and the intelligentsia on ways 
of making the monarchy more restrained, accountable and responsive to people’s will. 
Secret societies were formed to discuss the issue and the necessity of deep political 
reform became widely recognized. Consequently, in December of 1905 sit-ins were 
organized by Shiite scholars and merchants, demanding the King to accept the 
establishment of a “House of Justice.” In January 1906, the sit-ins came to an end with 
the King promising the establishment of a House of Justice, the meaning and composition 
of which was never made clear. The King, however, could not fulfill his promise in due 
time, resulting in deep suspicions about the King’s ultimate goals. Consequently, Shiite 
scholars became more critical of the government and prominent lecturers, such as Sheikh 
Mohammad Vaez, held frequent public speeches against the monarchy. As these 
speeches attracted more and more listeners, the government decided to banish Sheikh 
Mohammad Vaez and ordered the security forces to apprehend the Sheikh in July 1906. 
When security forces arrested the Sheikh, seminary students stormed their headquarter to 
free the Skeikh, resulting in the death of a young seminary student from an esteemed 
family by the name of Seyyed Abdol Hamid (Keddie, 2003 pp. 67).   
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The death of Seyyed Abdol Hamid triggered mass protests across Tehran. To void the 
monarchy of any religious legitimacy, Shiite scholars left Tehran en masse in what is 
known as the “Great Migration” on July 16, 1906. A day after the start of the Great 
Migration, the merchants and ordinary people staged a sit-in at the premises of the British 
Embassy, which was immune from possible attacks by state security forces. As the sit-in 
at the British Embassy grew larger by the day, unrest engulfed the whole country and the 
list of demands from the monarchy gradually became lengthier. Among the protesters’ 
demands was the creation of a representative parliament and enactment of a Constitution 
to restrain the authorities of the King. Eventually, after much hesitation, on August 6, 
1906, the ailing King Mozaferadin accepted the demands of the protesters, dismissed PM 
Eynoddoleh and replaced him with Moshiroddoleh, and ordered PM Moshiroddoleh to 
facilitate the creation of Iran’s first constitutional assembly.  
 
With the King’s order, the Shiite scholars, who had led much of the protests against 
Eynoddoleh and the monarchy, found themselves in an awkward situation. Although they 
had advocated for enactment of a Constitution, they had little idea of how they should go 
about taking part in its drafting without crossing the boundaries they had established for 
themselves since the beginning of the major occultation. As prominent leaders of the 
movement, all eyes were on the Shiite scholars and they had to choose the type of 
political system they were going to promote. The ball was in their court and, unlike 
before, there was no way they could refrain from taking a direct political stance. The 
problem, however, was that unlike matters dealing with jurisprudence, Shiite political 
philosophy was a topic that was rarely discussed by Shiite scholars and little scholarly 
304 
 
work had been done on the topic. The lack of religious literature on politics and 
governance, however, was not accidental. The firm Shiite belief that God has only vested 
the Imam with the authority to rule over Muslims and anyone who would assume that 
authority without his direct consent was usurping a power that did not belong to him, had 
prevented Shiites scholars from contemplating politics (Amid-Zanjani, 1998, V2 p. 78).  
 
The deliberations surrounding Iran’s future political system split Shiite scholars into two 
main camps. One camp, most notably led by Ayatollah Nuri, was composed of those 
advocating for the Shiite scholars to actively assume the political responsibilities of the 
Imam. They idealistically argued that Islam “contains all the regulation for administration 
of the state” and that instead of legitimizing man-made legislations, Shiite scholars 
should rely on the teachings of Islam and present the community with laws, regulations, 
and policies that are solely sourced in the canonical texts of Islam (Milani, 1988, pp. 54). 
To be sure, these Shiite scholars did not advocate for a theocracy and did not entertain the 
idea of Shiite scholars assuming political office. Instead they were happy with the 
continuance of the status quo provided that the monarch would fully execute the decrees 
of the Shiite scholars. The other camp, which comprised most of the leading Shiite 
scholars of the time, adopted a more pragmatic approach. Their argument, which was best 
articulated Ayatollah Gharavi Naini, was that in the modern age, governments are either 
tyrannical or constitutional and since during the major occultation no authority can claim 
legitimacy, it is upon Shiites to support the lesser of the two evils, i.e. constitutional 
monarchy.  
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The deliberations among the Shiite scholars eventually resulted in a compromise that was 
much closer to Ayatollah’s Naini’s proposition than to Ayatollah Nuri’s. The Shiite 
scholars agreed to endorse a constitutional monarchy provided that Shiite scholars would 
have a legislative veto power to turn down any law they would deem to be in conflict 
with Islamic laws and principles. The Article II of the amended
29
 Iranian constitution 
stated that: 
At no time must any legal enactments of the sacred National Consultative 
Assembly, which was established as a result of the favor and assistance of His 
Holiness Imam Mahdi (may God Hasten his reappearance), the favor of His 
Majesty the King of Islam (may God maintain his rein) and the vigilance of the 
Muslim scholars (may God multiply their likes), and the whole people of the 
Persian Nation, be at variance with the sacred rules of Islam or the laws 
established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind Prophet Mohammad (on whom 
and on whose household be the Blessings of God and His Peace). It is hereby 
declared that it is and has been for the Shiite scholars – may God prolong the 
blessing of their existence – to determine whether enacted laws are or are not 
compatible to the rules of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there 
shall at all times exist a committee composed of not less than five Shiite jurist and 
devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the time, elected in this 
manner: The senior Shiite scholars shall present to the National Consultative 
                                                 
29
 Iran's first Constitution, which only defined the role of the Parliament, was written hurryingly to ensure 
that constitutionalism would become endorsed by the mortally ill King Mozaferadin before his death. The 
first Constitution, which went into effect after being endorsed by the King on December 30, 1906 (the King 
died on January 8, 1907), was recognized by all to be critically lacking in all aspects and practically only 
served as a document to give rise to the creation of Iran's first parliament. Once the first Majlis opened, the 
work to amend the initial Constitution began. The amendments to the Constitution were finalized within 
less than a year and went into effect on October 7, 1907.  
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Assembly the names of Twenty of the Shiite scholars possessing the attributes 
mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, 
either by unanimous acclamation, or by lottery, designate five or more of these, 
according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that 
they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, 
and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any measure that they would find to be 
at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of 
law. In such matters the decision of this ecclesiastical committee shall be 
followed and obeyed and this article shall continue unchanged until the 
appearance of His Holiness Imam Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance).  
 
The idea that Shiites should engage in a political process that is checked by a veto power 
of Shiite scholars was indeed a revolutionary idea that opened the floodgates of Shiite 
political activism. The jubilance over constitutionalism, however, was short lived. Upon 
King Mozaferadin’s death, his son Mohammad Ali ascended to the throne. Although 
King Mohammad Ali had sworn to defend the Constitution and although the amended 
Constitution was endorsed by him, he was instigated by Russia, which found a 
Constitutional order in Iran destabilizing, to take action against the constitutionalists. 
Under the influence of Russia, King Mohammad Ali took full advantage of a failed 
assassination attempt on his life and a lack of unity and bitter factionalism among the 
constitutionalists to suspend the Constitution and restore what is now referred to as the 
“Lesser Despotism” on June 23, 1908. Major Shiite scholars, however, were quick to 
condemn the King. They simultaneously issued decrees against the “King’s despotism, 
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urging the faithful to support the Constitution as the best means to guard Islam from the 
onslaught of its enemies” (Bayat, 1991, p. 236). The decree of the Shiite scholars and the 
constitutionalist fervor of those living in the provinces impelled the constitutionalist from 
all over Iran to mobilize against King Mohammad Ali. They marched toward and placed 
a siege on Tehran. Finally, on July 16, 1909, the constitutionalists were able to force the 
King into exile and replaced him with his ineffectual nine years old son, King Ahmad. 
 
By ridding the monarchy of any effectual power, however, local and provincial actors 
became immensely powerful, resulting in decentralization of authority which in turn 
resulted in political chaos throughout the country. What made matters worse was that the 
subsequent Majlis took a very secular approach to politics and actively marginalized the 
Shiite scholars fearing their extra-constitutional powers and influence. While the second 
Majlis, which started its work some four months after the fall of King Mohammad Ali on 
November 16, 1909, did ultimately implement Article II of the amended Constitution, the 
committee envisioned by the article did not take shape until December 30, 1910. The 
second Majlis, however, was soon dissolved as a result of the Russian occupation of 
Tehran during the First World War on December 29, 1911 and all subsequent Majlis 
never even tried to implement Article II of the amended Constitution.  
 
In February 21, 1921, with the support of the British, General Reza Khan staged a coup 
and was able to take over Tehran with as little as three thousand men and 18 machine 
guns (Abrahamian, 2008, pp. 62). Reza Khan did not depose King Ahmad and retained 
the Qajar dynasty intact for some four years, during which time he restored central 
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authority over Iran. Once he consolidated the control of central government across Iran, 
however, he deposed of the Qajar dynasty and declared himself the first King of the 
Pahlavi dynasty on December 15, 1925. Political life under King Reza became very 
limited and his reign could well be described as a secular military dictatorship. He was 
unhesitant to suppress dissent and restored a de facto absolutist monarchy. Shiite 
scholar’s influence during his reign was severely limited, Article II of the amended 
constitution was simply ignored, and Seyyed Hassan Moddares, the main politically 
active Shiite scholar who had served on the Article II committee of the second Majlis and 
was an elected MP from Tehran during the third, fourth, and the fifth Parliaments, was 
first imprisoned and then killed (Keddie, 2003, pp. 88).  
 
King Reza, however, overstepped his bounds when he introduced a set of reforms 
confronting a series of Islamic laws and practices he deemed at odds with the 
modernization of Iran. Among them, he banned women from wearing the traditional 
Muslim dress and ordered security forces to forcefully confront women who covered 
their hairs or faces. He also banned traditional clothes of the men and ordered that all 
men, with the exception of state approved clergymen, must instead wear western style 
trousers, coats, and hats.   He then moved on to ban any public display of religious 
symbols and public observance of religious ceremonies (Abrahamian, 2008, pp. 91-97). 
While these measures angered the public and offended Shiite scholars, they found 
themselves helpless in confronting King Reza. In one instance when Shiite Scholars and 
ordinary people took sanctuary in a holy shrine in the city of Mashhad to express their 
309 
 
opposition to the King Reza’s policies, King Reza ordered his forces to storm the shrine, 
killing hundreds of men, women and children (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 94). 
 
King Reza, however, was forced into exile on September 15, 1941, when Allied forces 
occupied Iran during the Second World War and was replaced by his 22 years old son, 
Mohammad Reza. From the time King Reza was forced into exile until the 1953 coup 
against Prime Minister Mossadeq, the central government in Iran remained severely 
weak. Just as an example, between August 1941 to May 1951, the position of Prime 
Minister changed hands eleven times and, at the dismay of the western powers, Iran’s 
communist party became stronger and operated in the open until it was banned after the 
failed assassination attempt against Muhammad Reza Shah (hereinafter the Shah).   
 
The tumultuous political environment of the period, however, provided room for the 
Shiite scholars to reestablish their role in the society and politics. The seminaries grew in 
number and Shiite scholars started to preach in the mosques and other religious 
institutions. During this same period, senior Shiite scholars began to consolidate authority 
and established a more direct link with the believers. Perhaps the most significant event 
that occurred during this period was the publication of an easily understandable book of 
Shiite jurisprudence pertaining to the day to day activities of Shiite believer. The book, 
which was called Tozihol Masael (literally meaning “explanation of questions”), was 
written at the request of Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi (1875 – 1961), who was recognized 
as the most senior Shiite scholar from late 1940s until his death, by mid-ranking Shiite 
scholars and was widely published in 1955 after being endorsed by the Grand Ayatollah. 
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Tozihol Masael explained in layman’s terms the aspects of Shiite jurisprudence that most 
affected ordinary believers and covered everything from the Shiite way of going to the 
bathroom to Shiite inheritance laws in a single volume.  
 
After Ayatollah Burujerdi death, all other senior Shiite scholars followed the tradition 
and have published their own Tozihol Masael.  Through Tozihol Masael, senior Shiite 
scholars found their way into the lives of the believers and dictated every aspect of their 
lives. While before Tozihol Masael believer had to go to their local Shiite scholars on 
their own initiative in case they had a religious question, with Tozihol Masael in every 
house, the practice of turning to the Tozihol Masael for guidance on even the most 
mundane issues became commonplace. This, in turn, paved the way for the believers to 
become stricter followers of senior Shiite scholars and desensitized them to the direct role 
Shiite scholars were playing in their day to day lives. Also, while before the publication 
of Tozihol Masael, Shiite scholars had to present the believers with supporting evidence 
for the responses they were providing, with Tozihol Masael having the endorsement of 
the most senior Shiite scholar of the time, slowly people became less keen about the 
supporting evidence and became more interested in getting answers fast.  
 
The publication of Tozihol Masael also consolidated the authority of senior Shiite 
scholars by weakening the link between the believers and local Shiite scholars. This 
consolidation process was further expedited with the advent and prevalence of new 
communication technologies such as telegraph, telephone, and radio. With the advent of 
these technologies, local Shiite scholars effectively turned into the deputies of senior 
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Shiite scholars, enabling senior Shiite scholars to exercise almost all of the authorities of 
the Imam.  
 
This rapid change in the religious culture of the public and the hierarchy of the Shiite 
religious institutions transformed senior Shiite scholars, the Grand Ayatollahs, into 
figures with unparalleled weight and influence. Were it not for Grand Ayatollah 
Burujerdi’s own reservation about involvement of Shiite scholars in politics, he could 
have easily forced the Shah into exile and formed any type of government he deemed 
appropriate simply through issuing a decree. Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi, however, did on 
several occasions directly intervene and forced the Shah to reverse policies he deemed 
contrary to Islam. For this very reason, the Shah waited until Ayatollah Burujerdi’s death 
in 1961 to introduce his liberal social and economic reforms dubbed as the White 
Revolution, particularly since the corner stone of the White Revolution was a land reform 
policy that was opposed by the Grand Ayatollah (Kiddie, 2003, pp. 139).  
 
During this same period, some Shiite scholars also became active in the political realm, 
the most notable of whom was Ayatollah Kashani. Ayatollah Kashani joined forces with 
the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq to nationalize Iran’s oil and to limit 
British interests in Iran. Yet, the alliance between Mossadeq and Ayatollah Kashani 
withered quickly and their differences became quite apparent after the nationalization of 
Iran’s oil on March 20, 1951. It was not, however, until January 1953, when Ayatollah 
Kashani, who was then the Speaker of the Majlis, opposed Mossadeq’s demands for a 
one year extension of his emergency powers, that the relationship between Ayatollah 
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Kashani and Mossadeq became openly confrontational. Mossadeq, in order to secure a 
one year extension of his emergency powers, relied on his political allies in the Majlis to 
remove Ayatollah Kashani from his post as the Speaker of the Majlis on July 1, 1953, and 
sought to marginalize Ayatollah Kashani in every aspect. Ayatollah Kashani, in return, 
publicly condemned Mossadeq, named him a self-centered despot and completely 
withdrew his support from him. Upon loosing the support of Ayatollah Kashani, 
Mossadeq’s tremendously broad grassroots support precipitously shrank and he was 
ultimately ousted through an effortless CIA sponsored coup on August 19, 1953. As far 
as the Shiite scholars were concerned, this was the second time they had agreed to join 
forces with the nationalists and the intelligentsia only to be quickly marginalized by 
them.  
 
The Shah returned to Iran immediately after the success of the coup, more determined 
than ever to follow the path of his father. Yet, acknowledging the influence of Grand 
Ayatollah Burujerdi, the Shah waited until the death of the Grand Ayatollah to 
consolidate power and implement liberal social and economic reforms much opposed by 
Shiite scholars. In deference to Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi’s quietism, most other Shiite 
scholars also refrained from partaking in politics until the death of the Grand Ayatollah. 
The death of Ayatollah Burujerdi, however, broke open the floodgates of both western 
liberalism and political activism of Shiite scholars in Iran, with both the Shah and Shiite 
scholars becoming convinced that the Shah’s perception of modernism and Islam was not 
reconcilable. As the two battled to gain the upper hand, the Shah relied more and more on 
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US support, the SAVAK, and brute force while Shiite scholars capitalized on the hearts 
and the minds of the Iranian people.  
 
While the Shah’s authoritarianism, brutality and bad economic policies all contributed to 
the public grievances that eventually led to his downfall in February 1979, perhaps 
nothing was more damaging to his rule than the perception that he was subjugating Iran 
to the will of the US. In fact, it was Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s opposition to the Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between United States and Iran that brought the Ayatollah, 
who had remained politically quiet in deference to Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi, to political 
prominence in 1964. On October 26, 1964, in perhaps the most significant sermon 
delivered in modern Iranian history, Ayatollah Khomeini chastised the Shah for 
approving the SOFA and said: 
They have passed a law … according to which … all American military advisers, 
together with their families, technical and administrative officials, and servants - 
in short, anyone in any way connected to them - are to enjoy legal immunity with 
respect to any crime they may commit in Iran! If an American butler or an 
American cook were to assassinate your religious leaders in the middle of the 
bazaar, or were to run over them, the Iranian police no longer has the right to 
apprehend him! Iranian courts do not have the right to prosecute him! The case 
must now be sent to the United States so that our masters there can decide what is 
to be done! They passed [the SOFA] without any shame, and the government 
shamelessly defended this scandalous measure. They have reduced the Iranian 
people to a level lower than that of an American dog. If someone runs over a dog 
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belonging to an American, he will be prosecuted. Even if the Shah himself were 
to run over a dog belonging to an American, he would be prosecuted. But if an 
American cook runs over the Shah, or the religious leaders in Iran, or the highest 
officials, no one will have the right to object (Bill, 1988 pp. 159-160).  
Although the Shah immediately sent Ayatollah Khomeini into exile, this very sermon 
turned Ayatollah Khomeini into a nationally recognized leader and triggered mass 
protests that eventually led to the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Bill, 1988 pp. 261-315).  
 
Section 4.4.2.1.2: Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
and the Constitutional Assembly 
 
After the death of Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi and before being sent into exile on 
November 4, 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini used every opportunity to speak out against the 
liberal reforms of the Shah and his over reliance on the US and other western powers. 
The Ayatollah, however, did not seek or advocated a change in government and refrained 
from suggesting an alternative to Iran’s system of Constitutional Monarchy.
30
 In fact, in 
most of his speeches he would warn the Shah against following the path of his father and 
would demand that he remain loyal to and fully implement Iran’s Constitution. For 
example, in a speech he delivered on April 15, 1964, the Ayatollah criticized the Shah for 
ignoring the Constitution and categorically stated that Shiite scholars would cease their 
protests if the Shah would fully implement the Constitution (Khomeini, 1993, V1 p. 288). 
Yet after being sent into exiled, Ayatollah Khomeini started to conceptualize an Islamic 
alternative to Iran’s constitutional monarchy.     
                                                 
30
 While Iran's system of government was a Constitutional monarchy, many of the articles of Iran's 
Constitution was put in abeyance after the 1953 coup and Iran practically tuned into a military dictatorship 
under direct control of the Shah.    
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While Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was an early believer in the idea that senior Shiite 
scholars could and should assume all of the responsibilities of the Imam, he had never 
conceptualized a system of government based on that idea. As could be witnessed in his 
early writings and speeches, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini did not find the amended 
Constitution of Iran, which had called for a constitutional monarchy overseen by a 
council of religious scholars, to be at odds with his notion of how Shiites should govern 
themselves during the major occultation of the Imam. However, having witnessed how 
the Constitutional Revolution, which was whole heartedly supported by most of the 
Shiite scholars of that time, in effect prepared the grounds for King Reza’s anti-religion 
despotism, and having experienced the events that had led to the 1953 coup, Ayatollah 
Khomeini soon became convinced that the ultimate success of any major political reform 
in Iran depended on senior Shiite scholars playing a more direct, active and sustained 
leadership role. It is important to note, however, that Ayatollah Khomeini never 
advocated for the institutionalization of the role of Shiite scholars in government. In fact, 
he regarded any such efforts as a limitation on the full range of real powers senior Shiite 
scholars have and ought to be able to exercise.  
 
While in exile in Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini articulated his thoughts about the 
characteristics of an Islamic government in a series of thirteen lectures delivered between 
January 1 and January 20, 1970, that were eventually collected into a book called 
Velayat-e-Faghih (meaning “the Authority of the Jurist”) and published a year later in 
Arabic and Farsi. In this book Grand Ayatollah Khomeini unequivocally states that 
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during the major occultation of the 12
th
 Imam, senior Shiite scholars have “the same 
authority and can carry out the same functions as the Imam” (Momen, 1985, p. 196). 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, moreover, unlike his predecessors asserted that while Shiite 
scholars must become satisfied that their decrees and practices are based on the Quran, 
the teachings of the Prophet and the Imams, they are not necessarily bound by the letter 
of these sources. In other words, while previous Shiite scholars heavily emphasized on 
Islamic jurisprudence, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, placed more emphasis on the role and 
the supreme authority of senior Shiite scholars. Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s Velayat-e-
Faghih, however, never discussed the practical processes through which senior Shiite 
scholars should go about exercising their supreme authority (Gheissari and Nasr, 2006, 
pp.86-87) 
 
After the fall of the Shah on February 11, 1979, the first and most pivotal step taken 
toward establishing a new form of government was to abolish constitutional monarchy 
and have it be replaced by a form of government that had not yet been well 
conceptualized. While all segments of the society and revolutionary elites agreed that the 
monarchy had to be abolished, there was some debate about the system of government 
that should take its place. In general, however, it was clear that any system of government 
that was going to replace the monarchy had to be both based on Shiite religious beliefs, 
which Grand Ayatollah Khomeini represented as the main leader of the revolution, as 
well as republican ideals. Consequently, main revolutionary leaders as well as Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini decided to bring closure to such debates and called for a referendum 
on whether the monarchy should be abolished and replaced by an “Islamic Republic.” 
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While some factions argued for the inclusion of more alternatives to the monarchy on the 
ballot, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini opposed such proposals and argued that if anyone 
wished to have any other system of government besides an Islamic Republic, they could 
simply vote “No” on the referendum. Hence a yes/no referendum “to replace the previous 
regime with an Islamic Republic, the Constitution of which would be subject to people’s 
approval” was held on April 1, 1979. The referendum, which attracted 20.4 million 
Iranians, resulted in 98.2% vote in favor of replacing the monarchy with an Islamic 
Republic.  
 
The next step, which was unequivocally predicted in the referendum, was drafting a new 
constitution that would precisely clarify what it meant for a system of government to be 
an Islamic Republic. While in France, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had asked Dr. Habibi 
and five other legal experts to draft a preliminary Constitution. The draft Constitution had 
160 articles and had refrained from institutionalizing the role of Shiite scholars beyond 
Article II of the amended pre-revolution Constitution. In fact, it could be well argued that 
what was envisioned in the draft Constitution as a way to safeguard against passage of 
laws deemed to be contrary to Islam was much weaker than the Article II of the amended 
pre-revolution Constitution. Chapter ten of the draft Constitution envisioned a “Guardian 
Council of the Constitution” composed of six legal experts and five Islamic jurists that 
would passively vet laws for constitutionality and/or adherence to Islam. The envisioned 
council, however, was only allowed to look into laws that were objected to by the 
President, the Chief Justice, the Chief Prosecutor, and/or one of the senior Shiite scholars 
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on Constitutional or Islamic grounds within at most a year from their passage (Article 
144 of the draft Constitution).  
 
What is interesting is that a detailed review of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s comments, 
which he wrote directly onto the draft Constitution, reveals that he had no serious 
objection to the draft Constitution. From this, one can well deduce that before returning 
from exile, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was not envisioning a formal Constitutional 
process through which senior Shiite scholars would exercise their supreme authority and 
in fact was opposed to any efforts that would officially define, and thus limit, the role and 
political capacity of senior Shiite scholars. While the Ayatollah never explained how 
senior Shiite scholars were practically going to undertake the responsibilities of the 
Imam, from his various speeches during this period one can arrive at the conclusion that 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini much preferred for Shiite scholars to play a strong advocacy 
and supervisory and not a direct policymaking role. For this very reason, he departed 
Tehran soon after returning from exile, went to Qom and refrained from assuming any 
formal political positions. Therefore, it could be understood that while institutionally 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was quite satisfied with the existing non-governmental Shiite 
religious institutions established by Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi but unlike Grand 
Ayatollah Burujerdi he was envisioning a much more active utilization of the full 
capacity of those institutions in support of political objectives.  
 
At any rate, after the finalization of the draft Constitution, which again had not 
institutionalized the role of Shiite scholars beyond what was envisioned in the pre-
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revolutionary Constitution, and its endorsement by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
Council of Revolution of Iran (CRI) and the Interim Government of Iran (IGI), a debate 
ensued on whether the finalized draft Constitution should be directly put to referendum or 
whether a large Constitutional Assembly composed of people’s representatives should be 
established to review the draft Constitution before it would be put to a referendum. It is 
interesting that Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and most other Shiite scholars in the CRI who 
wanted to quickly restore order and bring an end to the tenure of IGI argued against a 
Constitutional Assembly, fearing that it might take a while before such an Assembly 
could form and finalize a constitution. The more liberal elements of the revolution, 
however, insisted that the draft Constitution lacked the required legitimacy and was at 
best a working document that needed to be further refined by a Constitutional Assembly 
composed of people’s representatives. A compromise was finally reached in late June 
1979 between the various political factions of the revolution to form a small 73 member 
Constitutional Assembly composed of the people’s representatives to finalize the 
constitution (Milani, 1988, pp.262). 
 
The compromise worked against the aspiration of the liberals. While hundreds of 
candidates from a wide variety of ideological persuasions
31
 freely competed against each 
other in an election that was held on August 3, 1979, being more organized and 
resourceful and having built much closer relationship with the general public as 
compared to the liberals, Shiite scholars and their conservatives allies were able to secure 
an overwhelming majority of the seats in the Constitutional Assembly.  In fact the 
                                                 
31
 Even communist ideologues such as Ehsan Tabari were allowed to present themselves as candidates in 
this election (Milani, 1988, p.262) 
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Constitutional Assembly, which held its first session on August 19, 1979, was composed 
of 41 high-ranking Shiite scholars, 12 mid-ranking Shiite scholars, 5 low-ranking Shiite 
scholars, and only 15 non-clerics.    
 
The Constitutional Assembly opened its first session with Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
pronouncement that it must speedily review the draft Constitution and prepare a finalized 
version to be put to a national referendum. Yet, the very first debates of the Assembly 
centered on whether they were obliged to only review the draft Constitution or whether 
the draft Constitution should be regarded as a non-binding guideline as they drafted a 
Constitution from scratch. Soon the Assembly decided to regard the draft Constitution as 
only a guideline and embarked on drafting the Constitution for a unique system of 
government that had to be based on republican ideals and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
concept of the supreme authority of Shiite jurists. 
 
Section 4.4.2.1.3: Institutionalizing the Role of Shiite Scholars  
 
The Constitutional Assembly deliberated for almost four months, convened a total of 67 
sessions, and concluded its work on November 15, 1979. During this period many 
contentious issues were discussed both on the floor of the Assembly as well as in the 
seven working committees that were established by the Constitutional Assembly. 
Considering the composition of the Assembly, however, much attention was paid to the 
role that religion and Shiite scholars were going to play in the new system of government. 
In fact, the draft Constitution was most heavily criticized for its lack of clarity on the role 
of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors in Iran’s new system of government.  
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Though a contentious issue, an overwhelming majority of the delegates in the Assembly 
arrived at the conclusion that the new Constitution should institutionalize the role of 
senior Shiite scholars and define a mechanism though which a single senior Shiite scholar 
would be selected as the most supreme authority in the country (hereinafter “the Supreme 
Leader”). What is interesting, however, is that different delegates sought to 
institutionalize the role of senior Shiite scholars for quite different reasons. Some feared 
that the country would come to a standstill if the exact mechanisms through which Shiite 
scholars were to influence policy and the administration of the country was left 
undefined.
32
 The fear was that if more than one senior Shiite scholar was to become 
recognized in the society as the most learned, each would want to influence policy 
through issuing binding decrees for their followers, creating chaos in the country. 
Another group of delegates were primarily interested in engaging the most senior Shiite 
scholar in the political process framed by the Constitution in order to make him a stake-
holder of the new system of government and accountable for the direction of the country 
take while limiting his extra-Constitutional powers and means of influence.
33
 Others had 
a historical perspective and argued that historically Iran has best been able to stand 
against despotism and foreign interventions when led by a senior Shiite scholar and that 
by institutionalizing the role of senior Shiite scholars, the country would be safeguarded 
against both despotism and imperialism.
34
 Yet others argued from an ideological 
                                                 
32
 Refer to the transcript of the 39th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Yazdi. 
33
 Refer to the transcript of the 40th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of Dr. 
Ayat. 
34
 Refer to the transcript of the 39th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Sobhani. 
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perspective and indicated that since people - through the April 1, 1979, referendum - have 
asked for an Islamic system of government, a necessary component of a Shiite 
government is the recognition of the principle that the Imam alone has the right to rule 
over the believers and that “logically” during his occultation, Shiite scholars, as people 
who are most familiar with the teachings of the Imams, are burdened with the 
responsibility to assume the leadership role of the Imam.
35
 Another group argued that it 
was necessary to make a senior Shiite scholars be the most supreme authority of the 
country in order for all legislated laws, even trivial traffic laws, to be regarded as both 
legitimate and as having the full force of the Shaira law.
36
  
 
The only person who argued against the institutionalization of the role of Shiite scholars 
was a delegate by the name of Moghadam Maraghei, a non-cleric from the Province of 
Eastern Azerbaijan. Mr. Maraghei argued that while it made a lot of sense to give Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who was popularly recognized as an exceptional leader without 
whom the revolution would not have succeeded, special authorities and powers, it did not 
make much sense to institutionalize his role since it was very unlikely that upon his death 
anyone could rise to his stature and qualify to assume his responsibilities. He particularly 
warned the Constitutional Assembly, which was primarily composed of Shiite scholars, 
against enacting Articles that could be perceived as being self-interested.
37
 Mr. 
Maraghei’s comments, however, drew angry responses from other delegates. The acting 
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 Refer to the transcript of the 15th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Beheshti. 
36
 Refer to the transcript of the 3rd session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Rabani Amlashi. 
37
 Refer to the transcript of the 15th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of Mr. 
Moghadam Maraghei 
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chair of the Assembly was so infuriated by the accusation that he went as far as taking an 
informal vote from the delegates on whether they thought their quest for institutionalizing 
the role of Shiite scholars was in fact self-interested. When the delegates almost 
unanimously rejected the accusation, the acting chair ended the debates and took a formal 
vote.
38
 Out of 65 members present, 53 voted in favor, 4 abstained, and 8 voted against 
Article 5 of the Constitution, which stated that “During the occultation of Vali Asr (Imam 
Mahdi( - May God hasten his reappearance - in the Islamic Republic the leadership of 
the people rests with a just and pious Shiite scholars who is aware of the circumstances 
of the time, and who possesses good leadership skills and is also wise, and who is also 
recognized and accepted by a majority of the people as the leader. In case a single 
individual did not possessed such a majority, leadership will rest with a council of Shiite 
scholars possessing the abovementioned qualification.” 
 
Upon passing Article 5 of the Constitution, the delegates opened up a new chapter in the 
Constitution to detail the institutional role and capacity of the Supreme Leader. The 
debates on the powers of the Supreme Leader were quite contentious. The main debate 
was on whether the Constitution should or should not detail the powers of the Supreme 
Leader. The opponents of detailing the powers of the Supreme Leader contended that the 
Assembly did not have the authority to define and thus limit the powers of the Supreme 
Leader
39
 since by doing so it would in effect be rejecting Article 5 of the Constitution, 
which recognized the Supreme Leader as the acting deputy of the Imam, who is divinely 
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 Refer to the transcript of the 15th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Beheshti. 
39
 Refer to the transcript of the 40th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of Mr. 
Nourbakhsh 
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vested with absolute authority over the believers. They argued that since the authority of 
the Imam is absolute, so should the authority of the Supreme Leader and there would be a 
contradiction in the Constitution if the powers of the Supreme Leader becomes in anyway 
limited. In response, the proponents argued that by mentioning the powers of the 
Supreme Leader in the Constitution the Assembly was not limiting his powers and was 
only emphasizing on what it entailed.
40
 Yet, by passing Article 113 of the constitution, 
which stated “After the Supreme Leader, the President is the highest official in the 
country and is responsible for implementing the Constitution, coordinating the relations 
between the three branches and heading the executive branch, except in affairs that is the 
direct prerogative of the leader,” they did in effect limit the Constitutional powers of the 
Supreme Leader to items explicitly mentioned in Article 110 of the Constitution. 
 
The belief that the Supreme Leader would safeguard the nation against despotism and not 
become a despot himself, was strongly held by an overwhelming majority of the 
delegates. It again seems quite likely, as opponents of institutionalization of the role of 
Shiite scholars pointed out,
41
 that this belief was much influenced by the perceived 
charisma, humble personality, and, strong republican convictions of Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini. This is not to say, however, that the delegates assumed that Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the subsequent Supreme Leaders were destined to remain qualified for the 
duration of their lives. In fact, on more than one occasion it was stated by the proponents 
of Article 5 that the Supreme Leader, “as with all officials and citizens, is first 
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 Refer to the transcript of the 40th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of Mr. 
Taheri Khoram Abad 
41
 Refer to the transcript of the 15th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of Mr. 
Moghadam Maraghei 
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accountable to God and then to the people. The people can hold the leader accountable 
and oversee his conduct to see whether or not he is fulfilling his duties.”
42
 The delegates 
also called for establishment of a body composed of the people’s delegates to actively 
oversee the conducts of the Supreme Leader and called it the Assembly of Experts. 
Article 111 clearly stated that “If the Leader or any of the members of the leadership 
council become incapable of fulfilling his Constitutional duties or loses one of the 
qualifications stated in Article 109, he will be dismissed. The authority of determination 
in this matter is vested with the experts specified in Article 108”
43
 
 
The Constitutional Assembly, however, did not settle with institutionalizing Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of supreme authority of Shiite jurists. Building on the 
Article II of the amended pre-revolution Constitution, the Assembly passed Article 72 of 
the Constitution, stating that “The Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws 
contrary to the official religion of the country or to the Constitution.  It is the duty of the 
Guardian Council to determine whether a violation has occurred, in accordance with 
Article 96.” This Article was passed without much debate and only one of the delegates 
voted against it. The Guardian Council was established per Article 91 of the Constitution. 
Article 91 of the constitutions stated that “With a view to safeguard the Islamic 
ordinances and the Constitution, in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation 
passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the 
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 Refer to the transcript of the 41th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Taheri Khoram Abadi 
43
 Article 108 of the Constitution stated " The law setting out the number and qualifications of the experts, 
the mode of their election, and the code of procedure regulating the sessions during the first term must be 
drawn up by the religious men on the first Guardian Council, passed by a majority of votes and then finally 
approved by the Leader of the Revolution.  The power to make any subsequent change or a review of this 
law, or approval of all the provisions concerning the duties of the experts is vested in themselves." 
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Guardian Council is to be constituted with the following composition: 1.six just Shiite 
scholars, conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day, to be selected by the 
Leader of the Leadership Council, and 2. six legal experts, specializing in different areas 
of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists 
nominated by the Head of the Judiciary.” A handful of delegates objected to this Article 
and argued that it was not necessary to have legal experts in the council since Shiite 
scholars are jurists themselves and could ascertain whether or not an enactments of the 
Majlis runs at odds with the Constitution.
44
 Most other delegates, however, agreed that it 
was beneficial for legal experts to also be a part of this council in order to prevent 
unconstitutional enactments of the Majlis from turning into law. 
 
The Assembly gave the Guardian Council the power to actively vet all enactments of the 
Majlis to insure their compatibility with Islam and the constitutions. In this aspect, the 
council was quite similar to the council envisioned by Article II of the amended pre-
revolutionary Constitution and hence the idea did not face much opposition in the 
Assembly. The Assembly also gave the council the power to interpret the Constitution. 
The argument was that it was not only natural but necessary for the body tasked with the 
responsibility to ensure the constitutionality of the enactments of the Majlis to also have 
the ability to interpret the Constitution since without the power to interpret the 
Constitution, the council would effectively be unable vet enactments of the Majlis for 
their compatibility with Islam and the Constitution. This idea too did not result in much 
controversy in the Assembly. Though some members of the Assembly argued that the 
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 Refer to the transcript of the 36th session of the Constitutional Assembly, particularly the remarks of 
Ayatollah Khamanei. 
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power to interpret the Constitution should be given to the Majlis, as had the amended pre-
revolutionary Constitution, the idea was overwhelmingly rejected on the grounds that 
such a power would on one hand result in the erosion of constitutional principles, and on 
the other hand, enable the Majlis to effectively fix the decisions of the Guardian 
Council.
45
  
 
Section 4.4.2.1.4: The New Constitution in Action 
 
The Constitutional Assembly held its last session on November 15, 1979. In that session 
the Constitution was read Article by Article and, at the very end, delegates put their 
signatures onto the Constitution. As promised, the Constitution was printed in national 
newspapers and a two-day long referendum was held on the 2nd and 3rd of December 
1979 and an overwhelming majority of the participants voted “Yes” to Iran’s first ever 
Constitutional referendum, which asked “Do you approve of the Articles of the 
Constitution, which was passed by the Council of Experts?” 
 
Soon, however, the Constitution’s shortcomings became apparent. Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini was frequently asked to intervene using both his Constitutional and extra-
Constitutional influence and power to mediate and adjudicate between various branches 
and to personally resolve deadlocks not envisioned by the Constitution. One such area 
was the conflict between the Majlis and the Guardian Council. When the new Majlis 
started its work on May 28, 1980, it soon realized that it was forced to pass laws that “on 
the surface appeared” to be at odds with the Sharia. All such enactments of the 
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 Refer to the transcripts of the 62nd and 63rd sessions of the Constitutional Assembly. 
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Parliament, however, were rejected by the Guardian Council whose responsibility was to 
reject such laws without concerning itself with its importance for the nation. In time, the 
conflict between the Majlis and the Guardian Council became evermore frequent. 
Consequently, on September 27, 1981, the speaker of the Majlis officially requested 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini to intervene using both his Constitutional and extra-
Constitutional religious authority to resolve such deadlocks. In response, Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree that allowed the Majlis to override the religious veto 
of the Guardian Council provided that they would establish the necessity of the 
enactment through a two-thirds majority.   
 
Through Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s decree, for the first time in the history of Shiite 
Islam, laws that were at odds with Islamic principles attained the endorsement of Shiite 
scholars on grounds of expediency. Through his decree, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini 
established that expediency was often more important than the letter of the Sharia law 
and that Sharia law could “temporarily” be put in abeyance if so required. Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s decree, however, opened a Pandora’s box and the Majlis began to 
abuse the decree to bypass the Guardian Council by labeling most laws that enjoyed a 
two-thirds majority as “necessary.” As a result, on June 25, 1984, the Chair of the 
Guardian Council requested Grand Ayatollah Khomeini to allow the council to determine 
whether in fact such enactments did qualify to be named a necessity. Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini, however, refused to grant the Guardian Council such a power but signaled his 
dismay of the Parliament’s abuse of his decree. Eventually, on February 6, 1988, Grand 
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Ayatollah Khomeini established an extra-Constitutional council to mediate between the 
Guardian Council and Majlis and called it the Expediency Council.      
 
As with any new system of government more and more loopholes of the Constitution 
became apparent, requiring Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s direct extra-Constitutional 
interventions. While Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s direct extra-Constitutional 
interventions where deemed necessary by most officials, it was apparent to all, including 
the Ayatollah, that it was not a viable way forward. As a result, on December 1, 1988, a 
group of Parliamentarians wrote a letter to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, complaining 
about the erosion of the Parliament’s powers due to his frequent extra-Constitutional 
interventions. In response, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini blamed the shortcomings of the 
Constitution and the Iran-Iraq war for his frequent interventions and indicated his 
determination to “bring about a situation under which in every area all of us would act is 
accordance to the Constitution” (Khomeini, 1993, V21 p. 202-203). 
 
To fulfill his promise, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree to the President on 
April 24, 1989, ordering him to form a committee to amend the Constitution. In his 
decree, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini indicated that the committee should look into and 
revise Articles of the Constitution that had resulted in deadlocks requiring his extra-
Constitutional interventions. In response, the committee amended the Constitution 
primarily by:  
1) Emphasizing that the Supreme Leader has absolute authority over all affairs of the 
country (Article 57 of the amended Constitution);     
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2) Institutionalizing the mediating role of the Expediency Council (Article 112 of the 
amended Constitution); 
3) Doing away with the Office of the Prime Minister and concentrating executive 
powers in the Office of the President; 
4) Doing away with the Judicial Council and concentrating judicial power in a 
Judiciary headed by a person selected by the Supreme Leader; 
5) Doing away with possibility of having a Leadership council;  
6) Amending the qualifications of the Supreme Leader such that it would not be 
necessary for him to be the most senior Shiite Scholar (Article 109 of the 
amended Constitution); 
7) Creating a Supreme National Security Council (Article 176 of the amended 
Constitution); 
8) Making the Guardian Council responsible for supervising the Assembly of 
Experts elections as well (Article 99 of the amended Constitution); 
9) Envisioning a process through which the Constitution could be amended (Article 
177 of the amended Constitution). 
 
The amended Constitution, which was put to a referendum during the Presidential 
election some two months after the death of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini on July 28, 1989, 
was endorsed by 97% of the voters. The referendum had a participation rate of 55%.  
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Section 4.4.2.1.5: Iran’s Constitution and its Strategic Culture 
 
As was discussed above, the Islamic Republic, though a novel experience, has been the 
Iranian people’s response to a millennium old Shiite conundrum. It seeks to, on one hand, 
remain loyal to a Shiite thought that reserves political power only for the divinely 
ordained Imams and, on the other hand, recognize the people’s right to self-determination 
and self-governance. Relying on Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of Velayat-e-
Faghih, the Islamic Republic brought an end to the cognitive dissonance that Shiites had 
been suffering from since the beginning of the major occultation.  
 
The Islamic Republic, however, has come to being through a long historical and 
philosophical process, the traces of which could readily be identified in Iran’s 
Constitution and its current governmental processes. The Islamic Republic is a system of 
government that bridges the two elements of the Iranian people’s identity and seeks to 
create a synergy between the Iranian people’s national and religious identities in support 
of both national and religious goals and aspirations. Yet, contrary to what is often 
assumed, when national and religious goals and aspirations cannot be reconciled, the 
Islamic Republic attaches more significance to doing what is “expedient” than following 
the Sharia or even the constitution. This emanates from the Shiite thought that 
emphasizes, as a matter of religious belief, that the true interests of the believers and the 
true understanding religious tenets can never be in contradiction. In fact, human intellect 
and reason, or Aghl in Arabic, is one of the sources of law in Shiite legal tradition, 
alongside with the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet and the Imams, and consensus 
among religious scholars. Also, a very important principle in Shiite legal tradition is that 
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“whatever is dictated by human intellect and reason is also dictated by the Sharia and 
whatever is dictated by Sharia is also dictated by human intellect and reason.” One of the 
utilities of this principle is that when there is a contradiction between what intellect and 
what Sharia dictate on issues requiring moral judgment, the source that arrives at a more 
certain conclusion is given more weight than the source which is less certain. For this 
very reason, again as a matter of religious principle, the Shiite school of thought 
forewarns against arguments that require the sacrifice of people’s interests for the sake of 
religion or vice versa. To emphasize this point, in a lecture that Grand Ayatollah 
Khamenei delivered on January 29, 1990, less than a year after being selected by the 
Assembly of Experts to become Iran’s Supreme Leader after the death of Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini, he stated before an audience composed of Iranian officials and 
policymakers that: 
The values we will pursue through our revolution are based on two pillars: 
religious ideology and the people. We cannot conceive of ideology absent of the 
people. Our ideology is not an ideology that could separate itself from the people. 
In fact, the notion of separating ideology from the interests of the people and the 
saying that we should forsake the people and their destiny in order to adhere to 
the religion, God and Islam is nothing but a sheer deceit… This is something that 
the Imam (Grand Ayatollah Khomeini) fought against from the early days of the 
resistance… Islam is for and by the people. If you ever come across an issue that 
you thought to be Islamic, knowing that it does not satisfy the interests of the 
people, know that you have either misunderstood Islam or have certainly 
misunderstood the issue at hand.        
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The Islamic Republic, therefore, requires all laws and policies not to contradict Islam and 
in cases where there seems to be a contradiction between the interests of the people and 
the Sharia, requires the recognition of the contradiction and its resolution based on 
expediency. Hence, the Constitution gives policymaking authority to the Majlis and the 
President, requires the Guardian Council to monitor laws to ensure that no law 
contradicts Islam or the Constitution, and gives the Expediency Council the power to 
determine what is expedient when the Majlis and the Guardian Council fail to bridge their 
differences. What is important to recognize, however, is that since the actions, writings, 
statements, and consent of the Supreme Leader all have the weight of religious 
pronouncements, the Supreme Leader has to ensure that all outputs of the system could 
be proven to be in  accordance to the tenants of Shiite Islam. Indeed, considering that the 
Islamic Republic is based on a relatively contemporary and evolved understanding of 
Shiite political thought, measures that could not be defended according to the tenants of 
Shiite Islam could undermine the validity of the contemporary understanding with 
adverse consequences for the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and, much more 
importantly, the evolved Shiite school of thought.    
 
Another important feature of the Islamic Republic, contrary to what is often assumed, is 
that it is not a strictly hierarchical system. Indeed, because the Islamic Republic came to 
being as a result of a popular revolution against the Shah’s despotism, the system is 
designed so as to ensure that most important decisions in Iran would be adopted through 
a consensus building process among key stakeholders. In short, while the Constitution 
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gives the Supreme Leader absolute authority over all affairs, his political capacity, mostly 
because of how the system is set up, falls way short of his legal capacity. Not only is his 
conduct supervised by the Assembly of Experts, which is composed of elected high 
ranking Shiite scholars, but the constitution has also vested much authority in the 
presidency and also in Majlis, forcing the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Majlis 
to coordinate their activities with one another and to adopt policies of strategic 
significance only after achieving a consensus among themselves. Again, while the 
Supreme Leader could legally dictate policy, doing so would not only carry much social 
and political cost but would also result in his decision not being fully and efficiently 
implemented on the ground. For this very reason, per Article 176 of Iran’s Constitution: 
In order to safeguard the national interests and preserve the Islamic Revolution, 
the territorial integrity, and the national sovereignty, a Supreme Council for 
National Security presided over by the President shall be constituted to fulfill the 
following responsibilities: 
1. Determining the defense and national security policies within the 
framework of general policies determined by the Leader; 
2. Coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, 
social, cultural and economic fields in regard to general defense and 
security policies; and; 
3. Exploitation of materialistic and intellectual resources of the country 
for facing the internal and external threats.    
 
335 
 
While all of the decisions of the Council have to be approved by the Supreme Leader 
before they take effect, the Supreme Leader has never rejected any of the Council’s 
decisions. In fact it could be said that the requirement for the Supreme Leader’s approval 
is more to give legitimacy to the Council’s decisions and make the Supreme Leader a 
stakeholder of the decisions, than to ensure that the decisions are in line with the Leader’s 
way of thinking. The composition of the Council is also established by the Constitution. 
According to the same Article: 
 The Council shall consist of: 
 the heads of three branches of the government, 
 the chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, 
 the officer in charge of the planning and budget affairs, 
 two representatives nominated by the Leader, 
 Ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and information, 
 a Minister related with the subject, and 
 the highest ranking officials from the Armed Forces and the 
Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps.     
 
Accordingly, six members of the Council are individuals who are most associated with 
the Supreme Leader, six members are from the Executive branch, and one is from the 
Majlis.  As the composition of the Council suggests, considering that the President 
presides over the Council, it would be very difficult for one power center in Iran to 
formulate and execute decisions of strategic importance.    
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Besides the abovementioned issues and their implications, the Islamic Republic came to 
being through a historical process that has left a lasting impression on its identity. Being 
used for sheer instrumental purposes both during the constitutional revolution as well as 
the nationalization of Iran’s oil by the liberal elites, religious elements of the Iranian 
society not only articulated the values and principles of the Islamic Republic in the 
Constitution, but also established institutions to look after their realization and 
empowered the Guardian Council to block individuals that do not wholeheartedly agree 
with the constitution or refuse to adhere to the values and principles of the Islamic 
Republic from assuming high political office.  
 
Considering that the Islamic Republic was born out of an opposition to what was 
perceived as US domination of Iran, it is also a very anti-imperialistic system of 
government. The Iranian Constitution has a whole section on the foreign policy principles 
of the Islamic Republic. Article 152, which is the first Article of the chapter that covers 
the foreign policy principles of the Islamic Republic, asserts: 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of 
all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the 
preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial 
integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, nonalignment with respect to 
the hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations 
with all non-belligerent States.    
This article is then followed by Article 153, which unequivocally asserts: 
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Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, 
economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national 
life, is forbidden. 
 
Again, mostly because of historical reasons alluded to in this and previous chapters, the 
Islamic Republic is also a system of government that is very sensitive to any form of 
foreign intrusion on its sovereignty. Article 6 of the constitution reads: 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one another, and their 
preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens. 
Then, in two other Constitutional Articles, Article 145 and Article 146, the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic asserts: 
No foreigner will be accepted into the Army or security forces of the country. The 
establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful 
purposes, is forbidden. 
Not only does the Constitution of the Islamic Republic forbid foreign military bases on 
Iranian soil, it also makes it very difficult for Iran to hire foreign advisors, military and 
otherwise. Article 81 of the Constitution states: 
The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of necessity and 
with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Majlis).  
 
The founding leaders of the Islamic Republic, being mostly composed of Shiite scholars 
who espoused ideals that transcended Iran’s national boundaries, also regarded the 
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Islamic Republic as a model for the peoples of other countries that were also in a struggle 
against world powers. Hence, as part of its foreign policy principles, the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic indicates in its Article 154: 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human 
society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of 
justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world.  Accordingly, while 
scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of 
other nations, it supports the just struggles of the freedom fighters against the 
oppressors in every corner of the globe. 
 
It is important to recognize that the abovementioned ideals are not sheer rhetoric. While 
most of the abovementioned strategic values and principles emanate from Iran’s 
historical experiences and past interactions with the outside world, Iran’s post-
revolutionary experiences have not provided Iran with any fundamentally different 
experience that would require it to reevaluate its strategic worldview and principles. To 
the contrary, Iran’s post-revolutionary experiences have mostly reinforced Iran’s strategic 
worldview and, as will be discussed, have emphasized on the efficacy of these principles. 
It is also important to remember that these ideals are based on the very same principles 
that have allowed for the very establishment of the Islamic Republic and rejecting anyone 
of them is perceived to be tantamount to rejecting the foundational principles of the 
Islamic Republic. 
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For those who believe in the Islamic Republic, the Islamic Republic is not just a system 
of government. The Islamic Republic is an answer provided by Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini to a Shiite conundrum that prevented Shiite communities from achieving self-
determination. Indeed, it was also through his leadership and teachings that Shiite 
believers, for the first time since the death of the fourth Caliph in 661 AD, were able to 
exercise their political will to bring about a form of government that was respective of the 
core elements of their national and religious identities. This is not to say, however, that 
the Islamic Republic, as it stands today, is the end point of Shiite ideological evolution. 
Though costly and often difficult, the realities of governing a strategically positioned 
country like Iran has forced Shiite scholars and believers in Iran to consider practical 
ways of closing the gap between abstract ideological convictions and real life political 
and economic considerations and to pragmatically modify the political process in such a 
way to most effectively arrive at legitimate collective decisions. But were it not for the 
Islamic Republic and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s insistence of merging Islamic and 
republican ideals, the Shiite religious ideology would have not evolved to a degree to 
recognize, as does Article 56 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, that while 
“Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God… it is He Who has made 
man master of his own social destiny.  No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor 
subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group.” 
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Section 4.4.2.2: Key Religious Narratives that have Shaped Iran’s Strategic 
Culture 
 
Iran is the only country in the world where Shiites compose more than 90% of its 
population and where Shiite narratives have had the most significant influence on its 
culture and politics. These narratives and the lessons they carry are frequently invoked by 
all segments of the Iranian society as they seek to corroborate or disprove a claim or 
legitimize or delegitimize a policy. It is, therefore, important to review the key religious 
narratives that have and continue to shape the value system and the strategic culture of 
the Iranian people. Since it would be beyond the scope of this section to comprehensively 
cover all key religious narratives that have shaped Iran’s strategic culture, I will suffice 
with a cursory summery of some of the most important ones. It is important to note, 
however, that since the objective of this section is to discuss how various religious 
historical events, as perceived by the Shiites, have influenced Iran’s strategic culture, the 
narratives are all from the Shiite perspective and sources.  
 
Section 4.4.2.2.1: Imam Ali 
 
Most of the political religious narratives that have become commonplace in Iran emanate 
from the lives and times of the three initial Imams in Shiite Islam. These three Imams, 
who are also much venerated in Sunni Islam, lived during significant historical episodes 
of the Islamic civilization. The first of these Imams is Imam Ali. Shiites believe that he 
was divinely selected, as pronounced by Prophet Muhammad, to succeed the Prophet 
after his death. According to Shiite tradition, however, immediately after the death of the 
Prophet, Muslims reverted back to their tribal way of life and contrary to the Prophet’s 
wish and order, tribal leaders relied on their tribal, and not Islamic, principles to select 
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Abu Bakr to succeed the prophet. How Imam Ali responded to Abu Bakr’s selection as 
the first caliph is a narrative that has influenced Shiites since that episode. It is said that 
fearing division among Muslims and, most importantly, realizing that people have 
abandoned the Prophet’s instructions, Imam Ali despite his dismay, swore allegiance to 
Abu Bakr and did not contest his caliphate. Imam Ali is narrated as having said after he 
became the fourth caliph that: 
Be Aware! By Allah, Abu Bakr dressed himself in the gown of caliphate knowing 
full well that [I was more qualified and that] my position in relation to the 
caliphate was the same as the position of the axis in relation to the hand-mill. He 
knew that the flood water of knowledge flows down from me and the birds cannot 
ascend up to my intellectual stature. So I let go of the caliphate and kept myself 
detached from it. Then I began to think whether I should rise to attain what justly 
belonged to me with an empty and injured hand or calmly endure the blinding 
darkness of tribulations wherein the grown up are made feeble and the young 
grow old and the true believer become depressed until they meet Allah upon their 
death. After evaluating the situation, I decided to remain patient while feeling as 
though a torn was in my eyes and bone in my throat.
46
     
  
The Shiites believe that Imam Ali consented to Abu Bakr’s rule primarily because 1) he 
wanted to prevent division among Muslims, 2) was fearful that a division at that pivotal 
point in Islam’s history may lead to its demise, and, more importantly, 3) because he did 
not wish to rule over Muslims without their request and consent. Imam Ali is narrated as 
having said: 
                                                 
46
 First part of the third sermon in Nahjul Balaghah. 
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When the Prophet passed away, the Muslims quarreled about power after him. By 
Allah, it never occurred to me, and I never imagined, that after the Prophet the 
Arabs would snatch away the caliphate from the family of the Prophet, nor that 
they would take it away from me after him. But I suddenly noticed people 
surrounding the man (Abu Bakr) to swear allegiance to him. I therefore withheld 
my hand until I saw that many people were reverting from Islam and trying to 
destroy the religion of Muhammad. I then feared that if I did not protect Islam and 
its people and there occurred in it a breach or destruction, it would mean a greater 
blow to me than the usurpation of caliphate.
47
  
 
The need to have the support of the people in order to govern is also present in Imam 
Ali’s sayings. In explaining why he assumed the caliphate after the assassination of the 
third caliph, Imam Ali is narrated as having said: 
[After the assassination of the third caliph] nothing took me by surprise, but the 
crowd of people rushing toward me. They advanced toward me from every side… 
such that [my two sons] Hassan and Hussein were getting crushed and both the 
ends of my shroud were torn. They collected around me like a herd of sheep and 
goats… if people had not come to me and supporters had not exhausted the 
argument… I would have cast the rope of caliphate on its own shoulders, and 
would have given the last one the same treatment as to the first one [and would 
not have accepted the caliphate. Indeed…] in my view this world of yours is not 
much more valuable than the saliva of a goat.
48
  
                                                 
47
 Letter 62 in Nahjul Balaghah 
48
 Sermon 3 of Nahjul Balaghah 
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These narrations from the life of Imam Ali have carried many lessons for the Shiites. 
From the perspective of Shiites, governance is a means to an end and not the end itself. 
When Imam Ali came to the conclusion that the end, i.e. the preservation and promotion 
of Islam and its principles, would be jeopardized if he would contest the caliphate of the 
first three caliphs, he decided to accept their caliphate and work alongside them to attend 
to the needs of the Muslim community. To Shiites this only highlights the significance of 
expediency and that sometimes it might be necessary to sacrifice one’s own rights for the 
greater good of the society. Perhaps more importantly, however, Shiites take two other 
important lessons from Imam Ali’s refusal to take power until people requested and 
demanded from him to become the caliph. Shiites believe that through his action, Imam 
Ali showcased the significance of popular support and that Muslim leaders should refrain 
from imposing anything onto the public that is not welcomed by them. When Imam Ali 
lacked popular support, he did not try to attain what was rightly his through other means, 
and when he enjoyed popular support, he did not hesitate to assume the leadership role of 
the Muslim community.  
 
Section 4.4.2.2.2: Imam Hassan 
 
After Imam Ali came to power, he decided to correct the wrongs of the past caliphs. 
Consequently, one of the first things he did was to replace the governors that were 
selected by the previous caliphs. One of the governors he sought to change was 
Muaviyeh. Muaviyeh was appointed as the governor of Damascus by the second caliph. 
According to Shiite narrations, Muaviyeh, as the head of the Umayyad Clan, was more 
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interested in promoting the interests of his tribe than the interests of the Muslim society. 
When Muaviyeh refused to abdicate in favor of the governor that was selected by Imam 
Ali, Imam Ali waged an indecisive war against Muaviyeh. Before Imam Ali could 
subdue Muaviyeh, however, he was assassinated. Upon Imam Ali’s assassination, his 
son, Imam Hassan became the fifth caliph. Muaviyeh, however, declared himself the 
caliph as well. Consequently, Imam Hassan put together an army to coerce or defeat 
Muaviyeh in order to bring back Damascus under his rule. Muaviyeh, on the other hand, 
bought off many of Imam Hassan’s commanders and used spies to spread rumors against 
the Imam. The civil war in the Muslim Empire, empowered the Byzantines, the main 
external enemy of the Muslims, and afforded them with the required breathing room to 
shore up and strengthen their forces (Treadgold, 1997, pp. 314-318). 
 
As the armies of Imam Hassan and Muaviyeh came closer to a war, Imam Hassan arrived 
at the conclusion that a decisive victory against Muaviyeh was impossible. Also, many of 
Imam Hassan’s commanders and supporters were either deceived or bought by Muaviyeh 
and could not be trusted by Imam Hassan. Furthermore, due to Muaviyeh’s trickery and 
massive propaganda campaign, the Muslim society was also at loss over who they should 
regard as the legitimate caliph after the assassination of Imam Ali. Consequently, when 
Muaviyeh dispatched two respected men to extend his peace offer to Imam Hassan, 
fearing senseless bloodshed as well as the external threat of the Byzantines and also 
sensing that the Muslim society needed to become exposed to Muaviyeh’s hypocrisy, 
Imam Hassan decided to sign a peace treaty with Muaviyeh. The treaty, which was 
signed by Imam Hassan and Muaviyeh in 661 AD, mainly stipulated that: 
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1) Hassan the son of Ali relinquishes caliphate in Muaviyeh’s favor on the 
condition that Muaviyeh would rule in accordance to the Quran and the 
tradition of the prophet. 
2) After the death of Muaviyeh, Hassan would become the caliph and should an 
accident befall Hassan, Hussein would become the caliph. Muaviyeh is not 
allowed to select a successor for himself. 
3) The cursing of Imam Ali during prayers should cease and his name should 
only be used with respect. 
4) The money in the treasury of the city of Kufa, which is a total of five million 
dirham, will not be handed to Muaviyeh and will be used under Hassan’s 
discretion. Also, Muaviyeh should distribute one million dirham among the 
sons of those who were killed in Imam Ali’s war against Muaviyeh.  
5) Muaviyeh commits that all people, regardless of their tribe and race, would be 
protected against any form of persecution. No one should be punished due to 
his past opposition to Muaviyeh. The companions of Imam Ali should also be 
safe wherever they may be. Muaviyeh should not plan or direct any covert or 
overt action against Hassan or Hussein or any member of the prophet’s 
family.  
6) Muaviyeh declares that he would remain true to this treaty and bears Allah 
witness that he would fulfill it to the best of his ability.   
 
In Shiite tradition, the peace treaty of Imam Hassan is termed as the “most glorious 
heroic flexibility of history.” History has it, as will be discussed later, that Muaviyeh did 
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not remain true to the treaty and discredited himself and the whole Umayyad dynasty by 
openly violating its terms. Through the peace treaty, Imam Hassan not only awakened the 
Muslim society to Muaviyeh’s hypocrisy and insincerity, but also unified the Muslim 
Empire, prevented bloodshed among Muslims, protected Muslim territories against a 
possible Byzantine incursion, made Muslims realize their mistake in forsaking their 
Imams, and protected the lives of himself, his brother, and his companions to advocate 
and promote the true Islam and to more effectively confront Umayyad rulers in the 
future. 
 
Shiites draw many lessons from Imam Hassan’s peace treaty with Muaviyeh. First, while 
they do see the treaty as something that the Imam was forced to accept out of necessity, 
the fact that the Imam did accept the treaty and did relinquish power when the situation at 
hand necessitated it, is regarded as a testimony to the Imam’s tactical pragmatism. Hence, 
Shiites believe and regard tactical pragmatism to be a legitimate way of pursuing one’s 
ideals, provided that the means used to achieve a legitimate end are not illegitimate 
themselves. Second, Shiites believe that Imam Hassan, just like his father, was forced to 
concede because his followers did not remain true to him. Hence, one of the lessons 
Shiites draw from the life of Imam Hassan is to proactively remain loyal to their religious 
leaders. Third, Shiites believe that one of the reasons Imam Hassan signed the treaty was 
because he was certain that Muaviyeh would openly violate it and by doing so would 
expose his true face to those who were beguiled by him and his propaganda machinery. 
Hence, another lesson Imam Hassan’s peace has had for the Shiites is the importance of 
internal cohesion and the necessity of forming a unified perception of the enemy before 
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initiating a confrontation against it. Fourth, Shiites believe that one of the most important 
reasons why Imam Hassan abdicated in favor of Muaviyeh was the present and clear 
danger of an incursion into the Muslim territories by the Byzantines. Hence, the Shiites 
conclude that when face with an external enemy, one must do its utmost to resolve 
internal differences, regardless of the sacrifices needed, to forge a unified front against 
the external enemy. 
 
Section 4.4.2.2.3: Imam Hussein and the Battle of Karbala 
 
Soon after Imam Hassan abdicated in favor of Muaviyeh and once Muaviyeh 
consolidated his control over the Muslim Empire, he publicly announced that he would 
not respect the terms of the treaty. While the treaty did have a moderating effect on his 
posture toward those who opposed him, he did, nevertheless, overtly and covertly kill key 
opposition figures, including Imam Hassan himself. He also established the Umayyad 
dynasty by appointing his son, Yazid, as his successor in contravention to the treaty. 
Imam Hussein, the younger brother of Imam Hassan, however, remained true to the treaty 
and did not contest Muaviyeh’s caliphate until his death. Once Muaviyeh died in 680 AD, 
his son assumed the throne and demanded the allegiance of tribal leaders and other men 
of influence. Yazid sent letters to all of his father’s governors across the Muslim Empire 
and instructed them to secure the allegiance of all influential individuals through 
whatever means possible.  
 
Among individuals Yazid specifically named was Imam Hussein. In fact, it is said that 
Yazid had instructed the governor of Medina, the city in which Imam Hussein was 
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residing, to behead Imam Hussein if he refused to swear allegiance to Yazid. When the 
governor of Medina informed Imam Hussein of Muaviyeh’s death and of Yazid’s order. 
Imam Hussein, however, refused and immediately left Medina and went to Mecca. While 
most other tribal leaders did swear allegiance to Yazid out of fear for their lives, they did 
start sending Imam Hussein their letters of support and requested him to revolt against 
Yazid’s despotism and illegitimate rule. As more and more people secretly swore 
allegiance to Imam Hussein, Imam Hussein left Mecca along with his family and children 
and marched toward Kufa, a city in current day Iraq, in response to the invitations of its 
residents.  
 
Yazid fearing that the fall of Kufa could domino into his worst nightmare, sent one of his 
trusted commanders, ibn Ziyad, to Kufa to subdue its residents and prevent Imam 
Hussein from setting foot in Kufa. Through buying off those who could be bought off, 
threatening others with an imaginary huge army that was supposedly on its way to Kufa 
from Damascus, and killing those who remained true to Imam Hussein, ibn Ziyad was not 
only able to subdue the unrest in Kufa but also mobilize them against Imam Hussein. 
When Imam Hussein neared Kufa, the forces of ibn Ziyad intercepted the Imam, 
prevented him from going to Kufa, and forced him to set camp in Karbala, near the banks 
of the Euphrates River. There, Imam Hussein along with his close companions and 
family members were offered to either swear allegiance to Yazid or face his army. When 
Imam Hussein refused to swear allegiance to Yazid, ibn Ziyad’s army first cut Imam 
Hussein’s access to water, leaving the Imam and his family thirsty for three days. The 
Imam was then given a final ultimatum to either swear allegiance to Yazid or be killed. 
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On the 10
th
 of Muharram,
49
also known as Ashura, ibn Ziyad’s army, which was 
composed of tens of thousands of warriors, waged war against Imam Hussein and his 
companions. As was customary in those days among the Arabs, each of the seventy-two 
companions of Imam Hussein fought one by one with members of ibn Ziyad’s army until 
they were all killed. Ibn Ziyad’s forces then charged against Imam Hussein, killed him 
and took his women and children and the women and children of his companions as 
captives.  
 
From the time Imam Hussein left Medina to the time he was killed in Karbala on the day 
of Ashura, Imam Hussein is narrated as having explained why he could not swear 
allegiance to Yazid, regardless of the consequences. Some of his declarations, however, 
are more frequently cited than others and are thus more known to lay Shiites. Among 
commonly known narrations from Imam Hussein is his reply to the governor of Medina 
when he demanded the Imam to swear allegiance to Yazid. It is narrated that when the 
governor of Medina demanded him to swear allegiance to Yazid, Imam Hussein 
responded by saying: 
O’ Governor. I am a member of the Prophet’s family and we the family of the 
Prophet are the sources of knowledge and revelation. We are the destination of the 
angels and God’s never ending blessings. God began the creation with us and will 
end it with us. Yazid, on the other hand, is a lewd transgressor who is a drunkard. 
He has murdered the innocent and openly commits sins with impunity. A person 
like me cannot swear allegiance to a person like him. 
 
                                                 
49
 Muharram is the 1 month in the Arabic lunar calander. 
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It is also famously narrated that when the Imam rejected to swear allegiance to Yazid and 
decided to leave Medina, he declared: 
I revolt not out of vanity and pride, nor to incite corruption or oppression. I revolt 
to correct the deviations in the affairs of the followers of my grandfather 
Mohammad. I aim at commanding virtues, and prohibiting vices and seek to 
follow the traditions and conduct of my grandfather Muhammad and my father 
Ali.  
 
Also, there are some short and famous narrations from Imam Hussein that Shiites often 
cite. They include: 
 “If the religion of Muhammad would not be upheld except through my blood, O’ 
swords come toward me.” 
 “Death in the path of God is nothing but salvation and living alongside the 
oppressors is nothing but sheer humiliation.” 
 “A heroic death is better than living in humiliation.” 
 “Never shall I accept humiliation.”  
Indeed, it could be well argued that among various religious occasions that Shiites 
commemorate, none is more important than the commemoration of the martyrdom of 
Imam Hussein and among shrines that Shiites go to for pilgrimage, none is more 
significant than the Shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala. Most Shiites, regardless of their 
level of religiosity, participate in the 10 day public processions, from the 1
st
 to the 10
th
 of 
Muharram, to commemorate the anniversary of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom. Also, each 
year, on the 40
th
 day after the Martyrdom anniversary of Imam Hussein, known as 
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Arbaeen, millions of Shiites go to Karbala, many of them on foot, to pay homage to 
Imam Hussein. Despite the security situation in Iraq and numerous suicide bombings 
against Shiite pilgrims, during this year’s Arbaeen, which took place in December 2013, 
“20 million people from some 40 countries made pilgrimages to Karbala… Last year 
around 18 million people made pilgrimages to Karbala” (AFP, December 24, 2013).   
 
All of these processions include lectures on the reasons behind Imam Hussein’s revolt 
against Yazid and the lessons his revolution carries for Shiites today. While Shiites draw 
many lessons from the life of Imam Hussein, his willingness to sacrifice not only his own 
life but also the life of his most dear ones and the safety of his women and children in 
order to resist something he deemed illegitimate under coercion, is perhaps the single 
most prominent narrative that Shiites extract from the life of Imam Hussein. Imam 
Hussein’s refusal to swear allegiance to Yazid and his resistance against Yazid despite all 
odds and costs, has glorified resistance against illegitimate demands in the eyes of 
Shiites. In fact the symbolism of the battle of Karbala has so captivated Shiites that they 
view many world events through the prism of that battle. The famous saying from a 
Shiite poet, who lived during the times of the sixth Imam, that “everyday is Ashura and 
everywhere is Karbala” is regarded by Shiites as an article of faith. Shiites believe that 
every person at the juncture of every decision, could either decide to side with Imam 
Hussein and resist evil, despite all costs, or side with Yazid and oppose the cause of 
Imam Hussein. The narrative also divides the world into oppressors, on one side, and the 
oppressed on the other. This worldview has had tremendous impact on Iran’s foreign 
relations and is in fact one of the reasons why Article 154 of Iran’s constitution asserts: 
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The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human 
society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of 
justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world.  Accordingly, while 
scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of 
other nations, it supports the just struggles of the freedom fighters against the 
oppressors in every corner of the globe. 
   
The other very strong narrative that emerges from the life of Imam Hussein, is again the 
significance of rallying behind and actively supporting and not betraying the legitimate 
leader of the Shiite community. As Shiites condemn the residents of Kufa for betraying 
Imam Hussein out of fear for their lives, they also remind themselves that forsaking their 
current day “Imam” would be equally reprehensible. Hence, one of the slogans that is 
often chanted in gatherings before the Supreme Leader is that “we are not the people of 
Kufa. Ali
50
 will not be left unaided.”     
 
Section 4.4.2.2.4: Conclusion 
 
While at first glance the drawn lessons from the lives of the first three Imams of the 
Shiite faith may seem somewhat contradictory, the Shiites have worked hard to reconcile 
them. From the Shiites point of view, all Imams are infallible and their conducts during 
various historical episodes serve as an ideal model for their followers. Shiites further 
believe that had the Imams been in one another’s places, they would have acted and 
performed exactly the same way. Hence to reconcile the lessons they draw from the lives 
                                                 
50
 In this slogan “Ali” both refers to Imam Ali and Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. 
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of the three Imams, they argue that the situation with Abu Bakr was different from the 
situation with Muaviyeh and the situation with Muaviyeh was different from the situation 
with Yazid. First, while both in the case of Abu Bakr and Muaviyeh, the Imams were 
facing individuals who proclaimed to uphold Islam and the tradition of the Prophet, 
Yazid openly scorned Islamic teachings and did not abide by them. Second, while both in 
the case of Abu Bakr and Muaviyeh, not conceding would have had adverse 
repercussions for the Muslim community and the Empire, Yazid was not facing any 
external threats and no one was following Yazid out of admiration. Hence, while Imam 
Hassan needed to sign a treaty with Muaviyeh to expose his true face, Imam Hussein 
needed to inspire the Muslim community and instigate them to actively oppose a leader 
they already hated but feared. Third, unlike Yazid, neither Abu Bakr nor Muaviyeh 
forced the Imams to choose between an unconditional capitulation and death. Imam 
Hussein is narrated as having said to the forces of ibn Ziyad that: 
Your commander has forced me to choose between death and humiliation. But 
we, the family of the Prophet, shall never accept humiliation and disgrace. God 
has forbidden us, the family of the Prophet, and the believers to accept 
humiliation. People like us, who have lived pure lives can never prefer 
legitimizing the rule of the impious over an honorable death.  
 
Yet, perhaps the most significant difference between the conditions under which Imam 
Hussein and the first two Imams lived is that while consenting to the rule of Abu Bakr or 
abdicating in favor of Muaviyeh under the terms of the abovementioned treaty did not 
entail an indefinite deviation from the path of Islam, swearing allegiance to Yazid, who 
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besides being openly impious had assumed power illegitimately and in contravention to 
Imam Hassan’s treaty with Muaviyeh, would have legitimized a deviation with perpetual 
and perverse consequences for Islam and the Muslim community. 
 
Religious narratives, three of which were briefly described above, have for centuries 
influenced how Shiites view the world and the realities it entails. Much of these 
narratives, however, could not be used to mobilize collective action until quite recently. 
Though the stories were continuously narrated and commemorated through various 
rituals, the fact that no one could legitimately assume the political responsibilities of the 
Imam, effectively neutralized the political ramifications of these narratives. Shiite 
political thought, however, began to evolve around the end of the 19
th
 century and during 
the 20
th
 century. During this period, Shiite scholars began to openly contemplate how 
during the major occultation, Shiites could both remain true to the basic tenants of Shiite 
Islam and exercise their right to self-determination. Once Shiite scholars, through various 
formulations that were previously discussed, allowed Shiites to become politically active, 
these religious narratives took center stage and have since affected many of the debates 
within the Shiite communities. Just as an example, according to court transcripts, during 
the 17
th
 session of his trial in the military court on November 28, 1953, the ousted Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq declared in his defense: 
I declare and admit in this court that I am a Shiite Muslim. My way of life, path 
and manner of conduct is the path and the manner of conduct of his holiness the 
leader of all martyrs, Imam Hussein. This means that when truth and rights are at 
stake, I oppose all forces and will sacrifice everything in my possession. [When 
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truth and rights are at stake] I will act as if I have no wife, no son, and no 
daughter! Nothing! I will only have [the rights of] my country before my eyes. 
The Prophet says: “stand up and resist.” Of course, he did not say resist without 
having studied the situation at hand. But when one realizes the truth, he must 
stand, resist, and advocate it. And now I am pursuing the path of my leader, Imam 
Hussein, as I have done throughout my life, until my last breath. (Bozorgmehr, 
1990, p. 413)     
 
Also, as Iran was negotiating with P5+1 and before the JPA was agreed to in Geneva, 
Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, in a lecture he delivered on September 17, 2013, alluded to 
Imam Hassan’s peace treaty and said: 
I am not opposed to logical and correct diplomatic moves. Both in the realm of 
domestic and foreign policy I am a believer in what I named “heroic flexibility” 
some years ago.
51
  Sometimes showing flexibility is very necessary and good. 
There is no problem with showing flexibility, per se. But a wrestler who is 
wrestling with his opponent and sometimes must show flexibility for tactical 
reasons, should never forget who his opponent is and what he is trying to achieve. 
This is the most important principle. He should know what he is doing, who he is 
confronting, and where the opponent has targeted.   
 
When reconciled, Shiites draw many political lessons from the lives and times of their 
Imams. In Shiite faith, resistance and self-sacrifice, particularly when undertaken against 
                                                 
51
 It is important to note that Grand Ayatollah Khamenei used this term to describe the peace treaty of 
Imam Hassan as a subtitle to one of the most authoritative books on the incident, which he translated from 
Arabic to Farsi some eight years before the revolution. 
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stark odds, is glorified. The reason Iranians glorify those who were killed during the Iran-
Iraq war is that they resisted against Saddam’s aggression, despite all odds. Resistance 
and self-sacrifice, however, could legitimately take many forms. From Shiites point of 
view, what is important is to undertake legitimate decisions and actions that best 
contribute to the final noble objective. Hence, when Imam Hussein saw that the best way 
he could contribute to the final noble objective was sacrificing the life of himself and his 
most dear ones, he did just that. Likewise, when Imam Hassan realized that abdicating in 
Muaviyeh’s favor was the best way to promote the interests of the Muslim community, 
he did not allow his ego and the criticisms of others get in the way of signing a peace 
treaty with Muaviyeh. Hence, Shiites view tactical pragmatism as their Imams’ way of 
approaching issues of strategic significance and do not necessarily venerate one 
legitimate mean over another.    
 
The other lesson that Shiites draw from the lives of their Imam is in regards to the 
relationship between the leaders and their followers. As a ritual, Shiites have for centuries 
condemned those who betrayed the Imams and forced them to make painful sacrifices 
that they would have otherwise not needed to make. In fact, many Shiite supplications 
include parts that condemn those who did not remain loyal to the Imams. These very 
supplications also include promises from the supplicater’s behalf that he would certainly 
not leave his Imam unaided. Before the described evolution in the Shiite thought, all of 
these promises of loyalty were directed at Imam Mahdi alone and the believers were 
promising and declaring their loyalty only to the occultated Imam. However, under the 
evolved understanding of Shiite Islam and to the degree people believe in the evolved 
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understanding, considering that senior Shiite scholars have assumed all of Imam Mahdi’s 
powers and responsibilities, and considering that Grand Ayatollah Khamenei is selected 
to undertake the political responsibilities of Imam Mahdi, senior Shiite scholars and, 
particularly, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei have also become the subject of such promises 
of loyalty. 
 
Section 4.4.2.3:  Key National Historical Experiences that have shaped Iran’s 
Strategic Culture   
 
While Iranians are significantly influenced by the abovementioned religious narratives, 
their shared historical experiences as a nation have also significantly affected their 
strategic worldview. Again, without going into much detail since much of Iran’s 
historical experiences have been covered in other parts of this writing, this section will 
suffice to point the effects that various historical experiences of Iran have had on Iran’s 
strategic worldview, values, and culture.    
 
Iranians traced their roots to the 7
th
 century BC and to when Cyrus the Great unified 
various tribes that had settled on the Persian plateau to forge the Achaemenid Empire 
(550 – 330 BC). At its height, the Achaemenid Empire covered the current day territories 
of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria, Palestine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Georgia, Half of Pakistan and parts of Egypt, Libya, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. This glorious past, among other things, have 
provided Iranians with a sense of pride and nationalism that is almost unique in the 
region. According to the World Value Survey, Iranians rank second in being “very 
proud” of their nationality, with 92% of Iranians saying that they are “very proud” to be 
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Iranians. To put this number in context, 75% of Saudis, 72% of Americans, 71% of 
Indians, 64% of Turks, 48% of Indonesians, 40% of the French, 31% of Russians, 26% of 
the Chinese, and 23% of the Japanese people say that they are “very proud” of their 
nationality. 
 
Yet, Iran’s contemporary history has been anything but glorious. While Iran has not 
initiated an attack against any country for some two centuries (Rabkin, 2006), it has lost 
much territory to international conflicts up until quite recently. In fact, current day 
country Bahrain, used to be a part of Iran until 1971, when Bahrain’s Al-Khalifa clan 
declared its UN sponsored independence from Iran. Each loss of territory was and has 
remained a source of humiliation for Iranians. Just as an example, the peace treaties of 
Gulistan (1813) and, more specifically, Turkmenchay (1828), which brought to an end 
the first and the second Russo-Persian wars of the early 19
th
 century by Iran relinquishing 
sovereignty over current day Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia to Russia, are dubbed as 
“shameful” and have turned into Persian literary expressions to denote a humiliating 
surrender and capitulation to external pressure.  
 
Without going into much detail, while Iran was never officially colonized, much of Iran’s 
history since the early years of the 19
th
 century is marked with annexation of Iranian 
territories and perverse foreign intervention in Iranian affairs. In fact, the most important 
reason why Iran was never officially colonized is that the British and the Russian 
Empires had decided to preserve Iran as a buffer zone between themselves. This did not, 
however, mean that the British and the Russians did not annex Iranian territories. During 
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the 19
th
 century Iran lost much of its northern territories to Russian and much of its 
eastern territories to British invasion: 
 
 
 
Besides seizing its territory, the Russians and the British Empires also divided Iran into 
three zones, with the north designated as the Russian sphere of influence, the south as the 
British sphere of influence, and a narrow strip in the middle was preserved as a buffer 
between the two empires. This agreement between Russia and Briton was formalized in 
1907 as part of the Anglo-Russian Entente (Keddie, 2006, p. 69). During this period, the 
British used their influence to extract costly concessions from the Iranian government. 
These concessions included decades long contracts giving the British Empire unlimited 
access and exploitation rights over Iran’s petroleum resources. To preserve these 
interests, Russian and Great Britain violated Iran’s neutrality during the First and the 
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Second World War and invaded Iran. These invasions not only crippled Iran’s economy 
and undermined its political sovereignty, but also led to widespread famine and disease, 
resulting in the death of millions of Iranians, as the occupying forces “requisitioned food 
for their troops” (Kinzer, 2011). After the Second World War, when Iranians tried to gain 
control over their affairs by lending their support to their elected officials, the US and UK 
orchestrated a coup, which resulted in the fall and arrest of the popularly elected Prime 
Minister Mossadeq and twenty-five years of iron fist military rule by the Shah.  
 
All of these burdened heavily on the collective memory of the Iranian people when Grand 
Ayatollah Khomeini initiated his anti-imperialist lectures in Qom. It is very important to 
keep in mind that Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s initial lectures did not target Iran’s 
constitutional order.  In a speech he delivered on April 15, 1964, the Ayatollah criticized 
the Shah for ignoring the Constitution and categorically stated that Shiite scholars would 
cease their protests if the Shah would fully implement the Constitution (Khomeini, 1993, 
V1 p. 288). But Grand Ayatollah Khomeini did unequivocally voice his objection to the 
“domineering” nature of US-Iran relations under the Shah. As the relationship between 
the US and the Shah became more and more indispensable for both, Iranian people 
developed even stronger anti-imperialist sentiments, which eventually led to the fall of 
the Shah. Hence, as was previously emphasized, the Islamic Revolution in 1979, was 
primarily “a rebellion against a regime that was seen to have sold out to a foreign power” 
(Kinzer, 2008). The narrative of the time primarily focused on the Shah’s special 
relationship with the US at the cost of the interests, dignity, independence, and the honor 
of the Iranian people.    
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As was discussed previously, the humiliations Iran suffered during the 19
th
 and much of 
the 20
th
 century generated a deep rooted anger that reached its apex in the 1979 
revolution, resulting not only in the fall of the Shah but also in anti-imperialism, 
independence, and self-reliance becoming fundamental raisons d'être of the newly formed 
Iranian government. These sentiments and worldviews became even more pervasive 
during the Iran-Iraq war. That war, which is still fresh in the collective memory of the 
Iranian people, convinced Iranians that the great powers, in particular the US, are 
determined to undermine the Islamic Republic. This perception about the US as well as 
the international organizations that are perceived to be heavily influenced by the US 
became further crystallized when Iran saw how the international community responded to 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and compared it to how the international community acted 
in response to Saddam’s aggression against Iran.  The war also convinced many Iranians 
and policymakers that they cannot completely rely on any external entity for their safety 
and wellbeing and that the only way they could preserve their independence and 
sovereignty was to become more self-reliant. But, perhaps most significantly, the Iran-
Iraq war showcased the utility of resistance and self-sacrifice, which were already a part 
of Shiite thought, to the Iranian people. In the minds of the many Iranians and 
policymakers, relatively speaking Iran was as weak, if not weaker, as it was during its 
other military conflicts in the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century as compared to its opponents. Yet, 
unlike its wars in the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century, through resistance and self-sacrifice, for 
the first time in Iran’s contemporary history they were able to preserve Iran’s territorial 
integrity, restore their national dignity, and assert their independence, resilience, and 
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sovereignty. Another very important effect the war had on Iran was the international 
relations lesson Iranian diplomats and security officials drew from the war. According to 
a high ranking Iranian Foreign Ministry official who was involved in the war related 
negotiations at the UN, the tone and the substance of UNSC resolutions regarding the 
Iran-Iraq war was heavily influenced by the military accomplishments of Iran during that 
war. What Iranian diplomats observed at that time was that while the advancements of 
the Iranian forces in the battle fields resulted in UNSC resolutions that were more 
favorable from Iran’s perspective, battleground failures often led to obstructions in Iran’s 
efforts at the UN. This observation of Iranian officials, who had no prior diplomatic or 
political experiences, has convinced them that the only way Iran could better its standing 
in the international arena is to be more assertive on the global stage.   
 
Iran’s most recent experiences with the US have only highlighted the lessons and the 
perceptions that Iranians had attained throughout the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century. Iran’s 
various failed attempts to accommodate US interests in hopes that the US would change 
its policies toward Iran have further convinced the Iranian people and policymakers that 
the US is determined to undermine Iran and the Islamic Republic. Also, Iran’s inability to 
provide for some of its most basic needs from the international market, such as the 
P5+1’s refusal to provide Iran with the nuclear fuel it direly needed for TRR, have further 
convinced Iran of its need to be self-reliant. Moreover, as the US shifted its redlines from 
commissioning of the Bushehr light-water reactor in the 1990s to enriching of uranium 
above 5% since the signing of the JPA, Iranians have become more convinced that the 
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only way the US would become more accommodating toward Iran is for Iran to change 
ground realities in its own favor.     
 
Section 4.4.3: Iran’s Strategic Culture, Coercive Diplomacy, and Iran’s 
Nuclear Policy 
 
Section 4.4.3.1: Key components of Iran’s Strategic Culture 
 
Iranians have a very rich history with a deep-rooted sense of national identity. The 
perception that Iran, a previously glorious country, was humiliated during the 19
th
 and 
much of the 20
th
 centuries as a result of foreign meddling in its affairs and weak and 
corrupt leaders who allowed foreign subjugation of Iran, is commonly held by the Iranian 
people and officials. These resentments have contributed to a more evolved 
understanding of the Shiite faith, which not only legitimized but also instigated Shiites to 
become more proactive in their quest for freedom, self-determination, and independence. 
Public resentments against the perceived domination of Iran by the US, the Shah’s 
insensitivity toward people’s national and religious identity, and the rise of Shiite 
political activism, ultimately culminated in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
 
The Islamic Republic, which was born out of the revolution, adopted opposition to all 
forms of imperialism as its most fundamental raisons d'être and promised the Iranian 
people that hence forth foreigners were not going to be allowed to control Iran’s destiny. 
To showcase their anti-imperialist identity, the founding leaders of the Islamic 
Revolution constitutionally required all subsequent Iranian governments to reject “all 
forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it,” and declared, per 
Article 6 of the constitution, that “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the freedom, 
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independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from one 
another, and their preservation is the duty of the government and all individual citizens.” 
It is important to note that the Islamic Republic drives much of its legitimacy from its 
anti-imperialist and anti-domination values, which not only emanate from the historical 
experiences of the Iranian people but are also rooted in and justified by major Shiite 
narratives. Considering that the Islamic Republic itself is a manifestation of an evolved 
understanding of the Shiite Islam, Iranian policymakers are very sensitive to being 
perceived as having abandoned the Iranian people’s quest for independence not only 
because of the ramifications that would have for the Islamic Republic but also because of 
its ultimate negative repercussions on the evolved understanding of Shiite Islam. 
 
To say that the Islamic Republic has a very strong anti-imperialist identity and strategic 
culture, however, is not to say, as many US officials and scholars - including President 
Obama in his June 4, 2009, speech in Cairo - have claimed, that the Islamic Republic is 
so dependent on anti-Americanism for its domestic legitimacy that it cannot contemplate 
improving its relations with the US. If this was true, we should not have witnessed many 
of the unilateral measures adopted by consecutive Iranian administrations since the 
inception of the Islamic Republic to improve Iran’s relations with the US and we should 
not have heard demands from the highest ranking Iranian officials, including Grand 
Ayatollah Khamenei, for the US to cease its hostilities toward Iran. Some of the lectures 
of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei on this issue are noteworthy. In a lecture Grand Ayatollah 
Khamenei delivered in the city of Yazd on January 3, 2008, he said: 
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One of our fundamental policies is to not have diplomatic relations with the US. 
We have never said that our relation should forever be severed. No. There is no 
reason to perpetually have severed relations with any country or any 
government… The day that having relations with the US would be good for our 
interests, I would be the first person to ask for the relations to be mended.  
 
In another lecture a day after President Obama broadcasted his first Nowruz video on 
March 20, 2009, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei in his annual New Year speech that he 
delivers in the city of Mashhad said: 
Changes in words are not adequate…[this change] should not come with 
unhealthy intentions. You may say that you want to change policies, but not your 
aims, that you will change tactics. This is not change. This is deceit. There can be 
true change, which should be seen in action… If the US government continues its 
same behavior, methods, course, and policies against us, as in the past thirty 
years, we are the same people, the same nation that we have been for the past 
thirty years… We do not have any experience with this new US president and 
government. We shall see and judge. You change, and we shall change as well.     
 
In another very telling speech on the issue, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei in his annual New 
Year speech on March 21, 2013, said: 
If the Americans sincerely wish to end the issue, I present the solution [and that 
is] for the Americans to stop their hostilities against the Islamic Republic. To stop 
their hostilities against the Iranian people. Having sheer negotiations is not a 
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reasonable, sound, and well-founded proposition. This is the correct way forward. 
If they want there to remain no problems between our two countries – as they 
claim – they should cease their hostilities. For over thirty-four years, successive 
US administrations, due to their incorrect understanding of Iran and the Iranian 
people, have planned and undertaken many hostile actions against us, against our 
territorial integrity. They have supported our big and small opponents against us 
through all these years. They have acted against our economy and have used 
every instrument in their disposal against the people of Iran. And thank God they 
have failed to achieve their goals in all these efforts and they will continue to fail 
if they would continue their enmity against the people of Iran. I am therefore 
guiding the American officials: If you are pursuing a sound policy, a sound policy 
is for you to correct your policies, correct your actions, and cease your hostilities 
against the people of Iran.  
  
Indeed, there is also very little evidence that anti-Americanism is a value that is cherished 
by the Iranian people. In a survey conducted by PIPA in 2009, when Iranian people were 
asked: “To what degree do you favor or oppose Iran and the United States restoring 
diplomatic relations?” in response, 63% of Iranians indicated that either they would favor 
strongly (18%) or would favor somewhat (45%) a rapprochement with the US. Also, 
according to the same survey, a majority of Iranians have favorable views of the 
American people.  
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Therefore, considering the Islamic Republic’s past and current efforts to develop a 
relationship, based on mutual respect and interests, with the US and the statements of 
high ranking Iranian officials, some of which was quoted above, as well as positive 
public attitudes toward Iran-US rapprochement, it is necessary to draw a very sharp 
distinction between being anti-imperialist and anti-domination and being anti-American. 
Indeed, the Islamic Republic does draw significant legitimacy from preventing foreign 
influence in Iran. This is very different from being anti-American, which suggests there 
to be no linkage between US policies and the attitudes of the Iranian people and 
policymakers toward the US. So long as the US is perceived as the primary foreign entity 
that seeks to dominate and coerce Iran into complying with its demands, it is only natural 
that Iran’s anti-imperialist identity will become manifested in its resistance toward the 
US.  
 
Closely linked with anti-Imperialism, for reasons explained above, self-confidence, self-
reliance and self-sufficiency are key elements of Iran’s strategic culture. While it could 
be well argued that the excessive emphasis of the Iranian people and policymakers on 
self-reliance is a manifestation of their anti-imperialist worldview, self-reliance is not 
only regarded as a means to fend off foreign influence on Iran but has also become a 
value in its own right. Primarily emanating from Iranian nationalism and its fears of 
domination and its historical experiences, absolute dependence on external sources for 
any needed commodity or service, particularly those that are of strategic significance, is 
deemed irresponsible and senseless.  
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Another element of Iran’s strategic culture is preservation of its internal cohesion and 
adoption of decisions of strategic significance through consensus. Nothing is more 
important to the Islamic Republic than preservation of its internal cohesion. The Islamic 
Republic views internal cohesion as the single most important pillar of its survival and 
ability to resist external pressure. Lack of internal cohesion is regarded as the primary 
reason why the 1905 Constitutional Revolution failed and why the coup against 
Mossadeq succeeded. Conversely, existence of a strong internal cohesion is credited for 
the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s success in repelling Saddam’s 
aggression, and the ability of the Islamic Republic to resist foreign pressures. In order to 
maintain internal cohesion and a as a way to prevent despotism from taking hold in the 
country, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic has decentralized power and has 
required decisions of strategic significance to be adopted in the Supreme Council for 
National Security (SCNS), which is composed of the representatives of Iran’s most 
important formal centers of power.        
 
Closely linked to the significance attached to the preservation of internal cohesion and 
adoption of decisions of strategic significance through consensus building, is the 
significance and the stature of the Supreme Leader. “Although the Supreme Leader has 
the final say on all domestic and foreign policy issues, he governs by consensus - not by 
decree” (Gerami, 2014). He is an agenda setter, the primary mediator between Iran’s 
various formal and informal centers of power, and his ultimate responsibility is to 
formulate policies of strategic significance by building consensus on such issues across 
political divides. The Supreme Leader also provides the adopted decisions with the 
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required legitimacy and religious backing to make it stand. He also plays the very 
significant role of bringing matters to closure. He is recognized to have the final say. To 
be able to play this very crucial role, however, he depends heavily on his popular 
charisma and on being perceived as a fair mediator and a self-less decision maker whose 
only objective is to safeguard and promote the values of the Islamic Republic and the 
interests of the Iranian people. Recognizing the significance of his leadership, his pivotal 
role in preserving the country from degenerating into factionalism, and his religious 
authority, the Iranian people and policymakers attach as much importance to remaining 
loyal to the Supreme Leader as they attach importance to preserving the Islamic 
Republic.  
 
Finally, tactical pragmatism is another significant component of the strategic culture of 
the Islamic Republic. Both emanating from Shiite religious narratives as well as Iran’s 
historical experiences, the Islamic Republic is much more focused on objectives than on 
means. It is often incorrectly assumed that “resistance” forms the basis of Iran’s foreign 
and strategic policy. While it is true that Iran’s strategic culture has come to give more 
weight to resistance than other means of achieving its objectives, they do recognize that 
resistance is a mean and not the objective. The only reason resistance has become Iran’s 
dominant mean to achieve its objectives, is its exhibited efficacy. It is perceived, for 
example, that through resistance Iran was able to preserve its territorial integrity and shift 
US redlines regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, the religious narratives that influence 
Iran’s strategic culture, past Iranian actions, such as accepting the UNSC Resolution 598, 
as well as statements from high ranking Iranian officials suggest that the Islamic 
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Republic is capable of adopting means other than resistance to preserve its independence 
and further its interests.  
 
 
Section 4.4.3.2: Iran’s Strategic Culture and its Nuclear Policy 
 
A country’s strategic culture influences every strategic decision of that country. Iran and 
its nuclear policy are not an exception. Iran’s quest for nuclear technology, besides other 
issues, is also rooted in the Islamic Republic’s desire to showcase its competence, 
preserve its independence and sovereignty, increase its self-reliance and national self-
confidence, and promote its internal cohesion. As a new system of government based on 
an evolved and contemporary understanding of Shiite Islam, the Islamic Republic 
continuously seeks to showcase its competence and ability in advancing the interests of 
the Iranian people. By showcasing its competency and ability to further the interests of 
the Iranian people and preserve Iran’s independence, the Islamic Republic seeks to 
increase Shiites’ confidence in the legitimacy of the evolved understanding of the Shiite 
Islam. As will be discussed in more detail, it also seeks to convince a broader audience 
that it is possible to excel without the support of the world’s sole superpower.  To 
emphasize this point, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei in his annual New Year speech on 
March 21, 2013, said: 
Through our advances our people have proven that not living under the influence 
of the US is not tantamount to deterioration of one’s standing. This is a very 
important point. World powers and imperialists – imperialists when we had direct 
imperialism and, today, the US, wish to convince peoples of the world that if you 
wish to have a good life and excel, you must do so under our shadow. The people 
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of Iran proved that this claim is a lie. Our people proved that not being dependent 
on the US and other great powers will not only not result in the deterioration of 
one’s standing, but will result in one’s advancement. Just as an example, compare 
the Islamic Republic during the past thirty years and the thirty years of other 
countries that live under the shadow of the US; they have satisfied themselves 
with two to three billion dollars of US foreign aid and have surrendered their 
destiny to the US. Just see where they are and where we are?  
 
Besides seeking to showcase its competence, the Islamic Republic seeks to preserve its 
independence and national sovereignty and enhance its security through its nuclear 
program. Iranian officials believe that a nuclear Iran is a stronger Iran and a stronger Iran 
is better able to preserve its independence and national sovereignty. While Grand 
Ayatollah Khamenei has declared development of nuclear weapons to be contrary to 
Islam and while Iranian officials avoid suggesting Iran’s nuclear program to have an 
“intentional” security dimension, “there is consensus across the Islamic Republic’s 
political spectrum that a nuclear weapons option holds deterrent value even without overt 
weaponization” (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, p. 88). In one of my interviews with a high 
ranking presidential advisor, in response to my question about the factors that drive Iran’s 
nuclear policy and whether security considerations have been at play, the advisor rejected 
the idea that Iran is pursuing nuclear technology because of its deterrent value but did say 
that Iranian officials are very cognizant of this “fortunate side-effect” of having an 
advanced nuclear fuel cycle program.      
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But there is another very interesting reason why Iranian policymakers think Iran’s nuclear 
program safeguards Iran’s independence, national sovereignty, and internal cohesion. 
Since Iranian policymakers are convinced that the ultimate objective of the US is to 
undermine the Islamic Republic in whatever way possible, they think Iran’s nuclear 
program has been able to channel US antagonism and hostile actions against Iran toward 
Iran’s least vulnerable program and policy. An Iranian Foreign Ministry official told me 
in an interview that “thank God they have focused their energy on Iran’s nuclear 
program. No one can deny that as a member of NPT Iran has an inalienable right to 
nuclear energy and technology. The more they try to deprive us of this right, the more 
internal cohesion it will generate against them and the less they will be able to put 
pressure on us for issues that may not have as strong as a public backing. They were 
going to sanction us anyways. We are lucky that they are sanctioning us for something 
the people and international law supports. This exposes their imperialistic face and will 
ultimately hurt them more than it hurts us.”   
 
Iran’s nuclear policy, however, is most strongly influenced by Iran’s desire to be self-
reliant. Considering Iran’s strategic culture, it would simply have been implausible for 
Iran to decide to start becoming more reliant on nuclear power without first mastering the 
nuclear fuel cycle. Such absolute dependence on outside suppliers is not something any 
policymaker familiar with Iran’s history could have ever proposed. Since Iran-Iraq war, 
when Iran could not fully use most of the weapons it had purchased from the US because 
it was fully dependent on the US for spare parts, Iranian policymakers, due to their lack 
of trust in foreign suppliers, have adopted as an article of faith the policy of always 
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having a domestic backup plan for any commodity or service that Iran primarily imports 
from abroad. The idea is that a viable backup plan would prevent the suppliers from using 
a commodity or service that Iran imports from abroad as a leverage against it. In fact, 
since the war, Iranians have become extra sensitive to providing any external entity with 
anything that could be used as a leverage against Iran. Consequently, when Iran decided 
to begin relying on nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuel, as a backup plan it also 
invested in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.  
 
Quite closely linked to Iran’s strategic culture of self-reliance, is the goal of elevating 
national self-confidence; the belief that one is capable of doing whatever one can 
plausibly imagine. Many Iranian policymakers assert that self-reliance cannot be 
achieved without a level of self-confidence. They also argue that since self-reliance 
allows a country to fend off foreign intervention, those seeking to have undue influence 
on Iran have targeted the national self-confidence of the Iranian people. To preserve and 
enhance the national self-confidence of the Iranian people, Iranian policymakers have 
invested quite significantly in prestigious and scientific projects with the aim of elevating 
the Iranian people’s sense of self-confidence, elevating Iran’s standing and image in the 
region, and promoting endeavors of Iranian scientists and engineers in a variety of fields 
and sectors. Iran’s nuclear program is only one such project. In fact, Iran’s investment in 
prestigious and scientific projects as well as its determination to become increasingly 
self-reliant, has resulted in Iran having the highest scientific and technological growth 
rate in the world (Cookson, 2011).    
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Section 4.4.3.3: Coercive Diplomacy, Iran’s Strategic Culture, and Iran’s 
Nuclear Policy 
 
Iran’s strategic culture has significantly contributed both to the shaping of Iran’s nuclear 
policy and how Iran responds to the coercive measures of the US. As mentioned, the 
strategic culture of a society affects its strategic decisions in several ways. First, as was 
explained, culture influences how people perceive and interpret external stimuli. 
Secondly, culture plays a significant role in shaping and defining a society’s goals and 
preferences. Finally, culture influences how national-level decisions are adopted and 
legitimized. Considering that coercive diplomacy seeks to change a target’s behavior by 
making the objectionable policy seem less beneficial, it is important to see how a target’s 
strategic culture influences how it perceives and interprets coercive measures, how 
coercion affects a society’s strategic goals and preferences, and how governmental 
processes affect how a nation responds to coercive diplomacy. 
 
As was mentioned previously, the Iranian people and policymakers believe having a full 
nuclear fuel cycle program to be their sovereign right. In fact, they believe that Article IV 
of the NPT does not give, but assert on “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the 
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination.” Hence, the Iranian people and policymakers regard US and 
UNSC demands to be illegitimate and interpret coercive measures of the US as a form of 
imperialism. According to Shaul Bakhash “the memory of foreign intervention in Iran 
runs very deep. It is playing itself out again in today’s stand-off with the United States 
over the nuclear program. Iranians think, ‘Once again the west want to deny us 
technology and modernism and independence.’ It’s a very powerful history. Iran is 
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extraordinarily sensitive to any indication of foreign influence or foreign direction” 
(Kinzer, 2008). What makes matters worse is that the Iranian people and policymakers 
also have difficulty interpreting US demands as something that emanates from a serious 
and legitimate US security concern. Due to Iran’s past history and due to the fact that the 
US had imposed a variety of sanctions against Iran prior to 2002, most Iranians
52
 and 
policymakers believe that Iran’s nuclear program is only an excuse and interpret US and 
UNSC nuclear-related sanctions as measures adopted to ultimately undermine Iran and 
the Islamic Republic. 
 
Interpreting US coercive measures as a form of imperialism and as an indication of the 
US intent to dominate Iran and undermine the Islamic Republic automatically triggers 
Iran’s anti-imperialism. Hence, in deciding how to respond to US coercive diplomacy, 
US demands are not judged nor treated in their own merits but rather as manifestation of 
foreign intent to dominate Iran. Once framed in such a way, it become prohibitively 
difficult for the Islamic Republic and the Iranian public to contemplate conceding to US 
demands on the nuclear issue since doing so would be interpreted as surrendering Iran to 
US domination. This makes Iranian policymakers even less likely to contemplate 
conceding to US demands. Not only are they barred by the Constitution to adopt any 
decision that would submit Iran to foreign domination, but conceding would also make 
them be perceived much the same way the Shah was perceived by the public. The 
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 According to a survey of the Iranian published jointly by UTCPOR and CISSM in September 2014, 75% 
of Iranians believe that “the main reason for the United States to sanction Iran is not concern about 
proliferation, but some other motive… The 75% who think the main American motive is not Iran’s 
potential ability to develop nuclear weapons were then asked an open-ended question: ‘In your belief, what 
is the main goal the United States is pursuing?’…The most common responses were that the U.S. seeks to 
dominate Iran or block its development (amounting to 53% of replies). Another 11% think that the United 
States is trying to change Iran’s domestic political order.” (Mohseni, Gallagher and Ramsay, 2014).  
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consequences of Iranian policymakers becoming perceived as having surrendered Iran to 
foreign domination, moreover, will not be limited to the policymakers alone, but is 
recognized by Iranian officials to also have grave consequences for the evolved and 
contemporary understanding of Shiite Islam, which has allowed the Shiites, after some 
fourteen centuries of religiously dictated political dormancy, to exercise their right to 
self-determination. So in essence, due to Iran’s strategic culture, US demands are 
perceived and ultimately interpreted to have costs that go tremendously beyond just 
forgoing of the benefits of a nuclear fuel cycle program. 
 
For these reasons, no amount of pain is likely to induce the Iranian people and 
policymakers to accept US and UNSC demands. In fact, as US imposes more sanctions 
on Iran, the Islamic Republic has had no other option but to undertake salient measures to 
showcase its ability to resist and disregard US and UNSC demands. This Iranian posture 
is quite evident in how they have responded to each of the US and UNSC sanctions. As 
previously illustrated, each new US and UNSC sanction is correlated with 912 more, not 
less, centrifuges at Natanz and an additional production of 883 kg of 5% LEU. 
 
US and UNSC sanctions have affected Iran’s strategic preferences as well, but not in the 
intended direction. As US and UNSC imposed more sanctions on Iran, Iranians became 
more convinced that they need to become more self-reliant. When, for example, the US 
sanctioned export of gasoline to Iran, a commodity that Iran did not produce enough of it 
domestically, it simply corroborated the Iranian perception that the US and other great 
powers would use any Iranian dependence as a leverage against it. In an interview with a 
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high ranking Foreign Ministry official, he said: “they are using gasoline, which people 
put into their cars to go to work and pick up their children from school, as a leverage 
against us. How can we be assured that they would not use nuclear fuel as a leverage if 
we become absolutely dependent on them.” More specifically, when nuclear fuel 
suppliers refused to provide TRR with its needed fuel, and when Iran was forced to use 
its own expertise and enrichment capacity to refuel the reactor, which produces medical 
isotopes for some 800,000 Iranian patients, Iranians saw the value and importance of 
having an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle program and became further convinced that they 
cannot completely rely on foreign suppliers to provide for Iran’s needs. Considering that 
part of the reason why Iran is pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle program is its 
belief in self-reliance, and considering that Iran’s belief in self-reliance is rooted in its 
past troubling relations with the outside world, the more US and UNSC use any of Iran’s 
dependence on foreign suppliers as a leverage against it, the more convinced Iranians will 
become that they need to become more self-reliant, which will lead Iran to more 
aggressively pursue its various self-sufficiency programs, including in the nuclear field.  
          
In its reliance on coercive diplomacy to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, the US has 
repeatedly implied the possibility of a US military attack on Iran. While Iranian 
policymakers believe that it is unlikely that the US would attack Iran, the possibility of 
such an attack has generated much debate among the Iranian people and policymakers, 
alike. Considering that succumbing to US domination is not regarded as an option, 
deterring the US and Israel through a viable threshold or break out capability is gaining 
more credence as Iran’s only viable option. As the US adopts a more threatening rhetoric 
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and posture, the Iranian people and policymakers are slowly becoming more convinced 
that only a nuclear weapon capable Iran is likely to restrain the US from attacking Iran.  
 
US coercive diplomacy also provides Iran with the opportunity to increase its internal 
cohesion and national self-confidence. As the US highlights its ability to impose 
crippling sanctions on Iran, the Islamic Republic in turn showcases its resilience and 
Iran’s ability to resist foreign pressure and intervention. An Iranian policymaker linked 
with Iran’s SCNC told me in an interview “that it is a win for the Islamic Republic either 
way. It is like a boxing match between a world champion and an amateur boxer. Every 
second that the amateur remains vertical in the ring is a win. He does not need to defeat 
the champion. Surviving alone is a victory for the amateur and a defeat for the 
champion.” Iranian policymakers also use US sanctions as a scapegoat for their own 
shortcomings. An “external enemy making illegitimate demands” has also proven to be 
quite useful for preserving an internal cohesion.  
 
Lastly, it is important to see how Iran’s governmental processes for adopting decisions of 
strategic significance affects its response to US and UNSC sanctions. As was mentioned, 
Iran’s current political order both draws and provides legitimacy to a contemporary and 
evolved understanding of Shiite Islam. If the current political order in Iran fails to deliver 
on its most fundamental promise of protecting Iranians from foreign domination, the 
evolved understanding of Shiite Islam, which has paved the way for Shiite political 
activism, will also lose credibility, resulting in a vicious cycle that would strip both the 
Islamic Republic and the evolved understanding of Shiite Islam of their legitimacy. The 
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stakes are, therefore, quite high for all Iranian policymakers who regard protecting Iran 
from foreign domination and external intervention as their most fundamental religious 
and national responsibility. With such a mental frame, considering that the Islamic 
Republic adopts decision of strategic significance through consensus, even those who 
may have dissenting opinions in regards to how US demands should be perceived and 
responded to, are more likely to moderate their dissention, if not acquiesce to the majority 
opinion, than risk being labeled cowards, sell-outs, or, simply, naïve, or accused of 
“treason” (Mousavian, 2012, pp. 77, 279-285). 
 
Of course, each Iranian policymaker has his own opinion and preferences, but in Iran, 
due to its strategic culture, individual’s preferences must be moderated once a 
“consensus” opinion begins to emerge. Being obsessed with internal cohesion, those 
within the decision-making circles who do not moderate their dissention and, even worse, 
those who endanger the internal cohesion of the society on core national security issues, 
are likely to be marginalized, if not dismissed in utter opprobrium. As with most 
consensus based processes, when a majority opinion begins to coalesce around a specific 
decision, not only do dissenters cease their dissent, but they are also likely to join in with 
the majority and advocate the “consensus” decision they had initially opposed. These 
dynamics makes it very difficult to change the goals, preferences, and the grand strategies 
of the Islamic Republic, once they get adopted and, more importantly, once they attain 
public salience as the consensus decision of the policymakers.  
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Coercive diplomacy, particularly to advance demands that are deemed imperialistic and 
illegitimate and particularly when adopted by an entity deemed to be the archenemy of 
Iran and the Islamic Republic, raises the cost of dissention even higher, making it 
prohibitively costly for anyone to step outside of the realm of the majority opinion for 
three main reasons. First, coercive diplomacy raises the public salience of the 
objectionable policy and if the public favors and supports the objectionable policy, the 
public will demand policymakers to reject the demands of the coercing powers and will 
monitor and become informed if a policymaker dissents, leaving little room for much 
political maneuvering. Second, a person who changes his mind and dissents as a result of 
the coercive measure of an external force is much more likely to be castigated and 
accused of being a “coward,” “not having enough trust in domestic capabilities and 
resilience,” “being a sell-out,” or even a “traitor” both by the public and other 
policymakers. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, when faced with external threats, 
particularly if the threat emanates from one’s archenemy, “putting aside differences,” 
“uniting behind the leader,” and “showing a unified front” turn into values in by 
themselves, making it extremely costly for a dissenting Iranian policymaker to not unite 
behind the leader. 
 
The dynamics governing adoption of tactics, however, are much more flexible. While 
SCNS is charged with devising consensus opinion on the tactics as well, due to Iran’s 
adherence to the notion of tactical pragmatism, Iranian decision makers are capable of 
adopting various tactics to advance Iran’s goals and objectives. While at times the change 
in tactics aim to affect the international political environment and the policies and 
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behaviors of other countries, sometimes the change in tactics are necessitated by internal 
reasons. Iran currently seeks to advance Iran’s nuclear program while limiting and 
mitigating foreign pressure on Iran. The ultimate objective of advancing Iran’s nuclear 
program, however, has not changed since 2002 under the presidencies of Khatami, 
Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani. All changes have been tactical. In fact, as was previously 
explained, the most significant difficulty Rouhani faced during the presidential election 
campaigns was to convince the public that suspension of Iran’s fuel cycle activities 
during his tenure as Secretary of SCNS, was a shrewd tactical move and did not mean 
that he did not agree with the consensus goal of advancing Iran’s nuclear program.  
 
As was said, however, internal cohesion is of utmost importance in Iran’s strategic 
culture. Consequently, sometimes the Islamic Republic adopts some tactical changes in 
order to preserve and enhance Iran’s internal cohesion. Agreeing to the JPA is one such 
instance which was necessitated, at least to some degree, by the events that led to the 
election of President Rouhani. Considering that during the election campaign, two out of 
three chief Iranian nuclear negotiators were presidential candidates, and considering that 
Rouhani had to defend his track-record if he was going to have any chance of winning, 
Iran’s nuclear program and its tactics did become a campaign issue. While prior to the 
campaign the Iranian people and most policymakers were confident that there was very 
little they could plausibly do to prevent and reverse US and UNSC sanctions and hence 
did not think much about adopting any accommodating measures beyond Iran’s treaty 
obligations, Rouhani and Velayati were able to convince the public that it was possible to 
pursue Iran’s nuclear ambitions and avoid sanctions at the same time. This change in 
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public opinion could have resulted in the disintegration of Iran’s internal cohesion had 
Iran not changed its tactics. Hence came the notion of “heroic flexibility,” which Grand 
Ayatollah Khamenei borrowed from the subtitle of a book on Imam Hassan’s peace 
treaty with Muaviyeh that he had translated into Farsi prior to the revolution. 
 
As was discussed earlier, one of Imam Hassan’s primary objectives in signing a peace 
treaty with Muaviyeh was to expose Muaviyeh’s true face and, as a result, create an 
internal cohesion among Muslims in opposition to the Umayyad dynasty. It was a “heroic 
flexibility” because Imam Hassan was willing to sacrifice himself and take an action 
opposite to his own inclinations just to restore the needed domestic cohesion to preserve 
the society from a mortal disintegration. Likewise, it appears from the statements of 
Grand Ayatollah Khamenei and other high ranking Iranian officials, by accepting the JPA 
and by empowering President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif to undertake nuclear 
negotiations in any way they see fit, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei is seeking to expose the 
true face and intentions of the US and its western allies and preserve Iran’s internal 
cohesion by reassuring the public that the Islamic Republic has done everything in its 
power, short of surrendering its sovereign rights, to prevent US and UNSC sanctions. In 
fact, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the powerful IRGC, said in 
an interview that “according to the decision of the Supreme Leader, the [Rouhani] 
administration has entered into negotiations. The objective of these negotiations is either 
for the sanctions against Iran to be removed or for Iranian officials to become 
discouraged by the negotiations and instead focus on exploiting Iran’s domestic capacity 
and capabilities” (Tabnak, February 19, 2014). Grand Ayatollah Khamenei has also been 
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quite clear that “heroic flexibility,” which allowed for the formulation of JPA, is purely a 
tactic. As Iran was negotiating with P5+1 and before the JPA was agreed to in Geneva, 
Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, in a lecture he delivered on September 17, 2013, asserted: 
I am not opposed to logical and correct diplomatic moves. Both in the realm of 
domestic and foreign policy I am a believer in what I named “heroic flexibility” 
some years ago. Sometimes showing flexibility is very necessary and good. There 
is no problem with showing flexibility, per se. But a wrestler who is wrestling 
with his opponent and sometimes must show flexibility for tactical reasons, 
should never forget who his opponent is and what he is trying to achieve. This is 
the most important principle. He should know what he is doing, who he is 
confronting, and were the opponent has targeted.   
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Section 4.5:   Soft Power, the Utility of Resistance, and the Effect of Coercive 
Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Policy  
 
Iranian policymakers do not view US sanctions in fully negative terms. Many of them 
argue that US sanctions have actually helped Iran and the Islamic Republic in many 
ways. They point, for example, to the fact that sanctions have forced Iranian 
policymakers and entrepreneurs to have more trust in Iran’s internal capacities that were 
left unexploited prior to the stiffening of the sanctions. Without sanctions, it is argued, 
Iranian policymakers would have solely relied on purely material, often short-sighted, 
and politically motivated cost-benefit calculations when devising Iran’s economic and 
trade policies. Hence, sanctions are viewed as the chief motivator that pushed Iran away 
from an economy that simply sold oil and used its funds to import all needed goods and 
services from abroad toward an economy that is much more dependent on its internal 
capacities and capabilities. Such dependence on internal capacity and capability has 
allowed for investments in science, technology, and education and has allowed Iran to 
develop, despite its very high investment costs, other sectors with comparative advantage 
besides its hydrocarbon sector.  
 
While it is true that Iran is currently capable of domestically providing for much of its 
needs and has invested in its universities and human capital, it is not at all clear that all of 
the heavy investments that have gone into Iran’s import-substitution programs have 
ultimately been beneficial for Iran. It could be well argued that at least some of these 
“investments” have only gone to subsidize intractably noncompetitive and inefficient 
industries. It is, nevertheless, true that the Islamic Republic is trying quite hard to make 
the best of the situation and has looked at various ways to turn sanctions into an 
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opportunity for Iran. One of the ways it has tried to do so has been to turn its response to 
US sanctions into a source of its soft power. It is, therefore, important to analyze how 
significant soft power is to the Islamic Republic and how Iran’s nuclear policy and its 
response to sanctions both influence and are affected by Iran’s soft power considerations.  
 
Section 4.5.1: What is Soft Power? 
 
As with many grand concepts, there is no single agreed upon definition for power. While 
some scholars have defined power as “the total sum of a nation’s resources” (Rothgeb, 
1993, p. 19), others have adopted a more control-oriented definition. For example, Hans 
Morgenthau (1967) defines power as “control over the minds and actions of other men” 
(p. 26). More recently, however, most scholars have adopted a more general variation of 
the control-oriented definition and argue that “power is the ability to influence the 
behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004, p. 2). Basically speaking, 
there are three ways one can seek to influence the behavior of others. One can try to 
coerce and/or bludgeon others into positively contributing to the outcome one seeks; one 
could also bribe and entice others into doing what one desires; or one can attract and co-
opt others into doing what one wants (Nye, 2004, p. 2). Soft power is concerned with the 
third mechanism of achieving one’s intended outcomes. Soft power is the ability to shape 
the preferences of others and getting others to want the outcomes one wants (Nye, 2004, 
p. 5).  
 
While “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye in the 1980s, it is not a contemporary 
concept. Leaders have long recognized the value of soft power and the power that comes 
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with attraction. If one could get others to want what one wants, then one does not need to 
burden the costs of employing coercion or making payoffs to achieve one’s intended 
outcomes. Conversely, if the outcome one intends to achieve or the values one espouses 
do not attract others and, worse, if others find one’s motives and sought outcomes as 
repulsive, then the costs one has to endure to achieve one’s intended outcomes could 
become prohibitively high. 
 
Yet, contrary to what Nye and others have argued, the soft power of a country does not 
depend on that country’s overall attractiveness. While being generally attractive does 
help countries in their quest to accumulate soft power, it is certainly not a prerequisite of 
engendering soft power. Considering that the aim is to achieve one’s intended outcomes 
and not showcasing one’s ability to get others to positively contribute to one’s intended 
outcomes, a country could very well get other nations to positively contribute to its 
intended outcomes without them even knowing that they are contributing to outcomes 
desired by that country. Hence, contrary to Nye’s (2004) claim, I would argue that just 
like hard power, soft power could very well be accumulated by a country in a stealth 
fashion and even countries that, for a variety of reasons, are not much admired beyond 
their borders, could accumulate soft power to further at least some of their foreign policy 
objectives. 
 
Section 4.5.2: The Significance of Soft Power for the Islamic Republic 
 
The power of the Islamic Republic is constrained in many ways. Although Iran has a 
large military force with considerable “ability to operate in relatively static defensive 
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roles,” it has very limited offensive capability and is not capable of projecting power 
through its military force much beyond its very borders (Cordesman and Kleiber, 2007, 
pp. 196-198). In fact, as compared to many of its neighbors, both in absolute terms and 
relative to GDP, Iran has not heavily invested in its military capabilities. According to 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), while in 2012 Iran’s military 
expenditure was $6.2 billion, which constituted about 1.2% of its GDP, the military 
expenditure of Saudi Arabia was $56.7 billion (8.9% of its GDP), Turkey’s military 
expenditure was $18.2 billion (2.3% of its GDP), Israel’s military expenditure was $14.6 
billion (6.2% of its GDP), the military expenditure of UAE was $14.4 billion (6.9% of its 
GDP), Pakistan’s military expenditure was $7.0 billion (2.7% of its GDP), the military 
expenditure of Oman was $6.7 billion (8.4% of its GDP), and Iraq’s military expenditure 
was $6.1 billion (2.7%) of its GDP.  
 
Economically, while Iran has the 21
st
 largest economy in the world, it only has a very 
limited foreign aid program and trade with other countries. Sanctions, particularly 
financial sanctions against Iran, have severely limited Iran’s ability to pursue its foreign 
policy objectives through its economic leverage. Hence, the only type of power that Iran 
could most viably exploit in favor of its foreign policy objectives is its soft power. Yet, 
Iran’s soft power also faces many constraints. Unlike any country in the world, Iran is a 
predominantly Shiite country. Also, Iran’s political system is both contemporary and 
unique. Consequently, since “parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power” 
(Nye, 2004, p.11), the Islamic Republic has difficulty attracting the admiration of other 
countries, all of which have significantly different cultures and political systems.   
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Furthermore, for a wide variety of reasons, explanation of which is beyond the scope of 
this section, Iran is not a warmly regarded country in the world. According to a survey 
conducted by PEW in spring of 2013, out of the 39 countries surveyed, majorities in 26 
countries (Canada, US, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, 
Britain, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, Japan, Australia, 
Philippines, South Korea, China, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and South Africa) 
and pluralities in 8 countries (Russia, Tunisia, Argentina, El Salvador, Bolivia, Nigeria, 
Ghana, and Uganda)  had an unfavorable view of Iran. Also out of the countries 
surveyed, majority opinion in only Indonesia (55%) and Pakistan (69%) and pluralities in 
Malaysia (48%), Kenya (42%), and Senegal (41%) had favorable views of Iran.     
 
The Islamic Republic and the Iranian people, however, either refuse to recognize these 
trends or blame the US and “Zionist controlled media” propaganda for its poor global 
image (Kull, 2011, p.45). Hence, the poor global image of the Islamic Republic not only 
does not discourage Iran from pursuing its foreign policy objectives through its soft 
power, but makes them even more eager to invest in it. Considering that Iran regards the 
US as the most active global force that seeks to dominate Iran through coercion and 
efforts geared toward the isolation of the Islamic Republic, Iran regards weakening of US 
influence in the region and beyond to be ultimately in its interest. Consequently, knowing 
full well that it could not limit US influence in the region and beyond through coercion or 
enticement of other countries and nations, Iran has heavily relied on its soft power to 
achieve that end.  
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As was mentioned earlier, the most dominant narrative in Iran is that the US is striving to 
either re-impose its domination over Iran and/or turn Iran into a lesson for other nations 
in the region and beyond who may contemplate following Iran’s path. Iran does regard 
many world countries, particularly those in the region, to be in one way or another under 
US domination and influence and does regard the people of US dominated countries as 
oppressed people who either do not realize that they are oppressed or are too weak and/or 
lack enough self-confidence to oppose US control over their destiny. Born out of a 
revolution that was primarily aimed at liberating Iran from US control and domination, 
the Islamic Republic regards the status quo as ultimately illegitimate, considers itself as 
the vanguard of the “oppressed people,” regards its revolution and resistance model as a 
perfect model that other Muslim and non-Muslim nations under “US domination” should 
follow, and, most importantly, does regard the liberation of other countries from “US 
domination” to be in the interest of the Islamic Republic.  
 
What is important to emphasize here is that while Iran would be more than happy to take 
credit for the “liberation” of other countries from “US domination,” it has come to realize 
that seeking such a credit may undermine its efforts to limit “US domination” in the 
region and beyond. Obviously, as in the case of Iran, no nation would like to rid itself 
from the domination of one country to become dominated by another. Hence, the Islamic 
Republic is quite explicit in its rhetoric that, with the exception of the efforts directed 
toward Israel, in helping other nations in their cause, Iran is merely acting as an example 
and is not pulling any particular strings. In the sermons of Tehran’s Friday prayers that 
Grand Ayatollah Khamenei delivered on February 3, 2012, he said: 
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The rulers of Bahrain have claimed that we are intervening in the situation in 
Bahrain. This is a lie. No, we are not intervening. Wherever we intervene, we 
make it be known. We have intervened in efforts against Israel, and its result was 
the victory of the 33-day and 22-day wars. We will continue to back and help any 
nation or any group who would confront and oppose the Zionist regime. We have 
no shame in declaring this. This is the truth. But the claim of Bahrain’s rulers that 
we are intervening in the situation in Bahrain, No, this is not correct. The claim 
contradicts reality. If we would have intervened in Bahrain, the situation in 
Bahrain would have been very different.                
 
Iran’s efforts in the region have a very simple logic: the more Iran can portray the US as a 
domineering force and the more people in the region gain the self-confidence to oppose 
“US domination” of their destiny, the more difficult it will become for the US to 
influence and attain the cooperation of regional leaders. Also, from Iran’s point of view, 
just like the way the Shah was not capable of distancing himself from the US, many of 
the regional leaders who are dependent on the US will also not be able to distance 
themselves from the US and will consequently face the wrath of their people and will 
suffer the same destiny as the Shah. This simple logic not only threatens the interests of 
the US in the region but is also a source of concern for regional leaders with deep 
dependence on the US. It is hence not surprising that, as was explained previously, the 
Arab lobby in the US is heavily invested in pushing for tougher sanctions against Iran. 
 
391 
 
In the initial phase of the abovementioned strategy, it is not at all important and in fact 
would be counterproductive for Iran to portray itself as the source of 1) the negative 
perceptions about the US and 2) the increased public confidence to confront the US. 
Iranian policymakers regard each country that distances itself from the US as a victory 
for Iran in of itself. They are further convinced that as countries distance themselves from 
the US, there would be less US control over their thoughts and perceptions, leading 
nations to become familiar with the “true Islamic Republic,” which would in turn make it 
more likely for them to positively contribute to outcomes desired by the Islamic 
Republic.  
 
As was mentioned before, tactical pragmatism acts as the cornerstone of Iran’s strategic 
culture. During the first decade after the revolution, Iran pursued the abovementioned 
strategy under the rubric of “exporting the revolution.” Grand Ayatollah Khomeini is 
quoted as having said: 
We should try to export our revolution to the world. We should set aside the 
thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard 
various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all oppressed peoples 
of the world. On the other hand, all the superpowers and the [great] powers have 
risen to destroy us. If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely 
face defeat (Ramazani, 1986, p. 24).  
 
Iran, however, soon understood that many nations, for a variety of reasons, were not 
willing to import a revolution that was made in Iran. After the death of Grand Ayatollah 
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Khomeini, Iranian policymakers were able to reformulate Iran’s “anti-oppression” 
foreign policy to address a challenge that had created division among Iran’s more 
nationalist and more Islamist decision-making elites, which is best described by Iran’s 
post-revolution Interim President, Mehdi Bazargan. In his book The Revolution of Iran in 
Two Movements, Bazargan (1984), who was a nationalist affiliated with Mossadeq, 
describes the nationalists’ difference with Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and says: 
The goal that the Interim Government had adopted was to serve Iran through and 
in accordance to the teachings of Islam while Mr. Khomeini had adopted serving 
Islam through Iran as his objective and the objective of the revolution. In his 
opinion, the Iranian people had given their blood to serve Islam (p. 111). 
 
While Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s viewpoint prevailed, forcing Bazargan to resign, the 
question was revisited after his death. It was decided that the tension between the 
nationalists and the Islamist was based on a false dichotomy and that the Islamic 
Republic should neither seek to “serve Iran through Islam” or “serve Islam through Iran”, 
but that the objective of the Islamic Republic should be to “serve Islam through serving, 
building, and empowering Iran.” Consequently, Iranian policymakers more frequently 
proclaimed Iran as the “capital of the Muslim world,” and adopted the building and 
strengthening of the “capital” as the primary objective of the Islamic Republic (Panah, 
2007, p.149). This change also affected Iran’s “anti-oppression” foreign policy tactics. 
Instead of trying to “export the revolution,” the Islamic Republic focused on turning Iran 
into an example and pushing others toward Iran’s desired outcomes by serving as a 
desirable model for its target population. Since then, Iran has heavily invested in a variety 
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of efforts geared at 1) “exposing” US intentions in the region and the “complicity” of 
many regional actors, 2) “injecting” people in the region with the required self-
confidence and vision to confront the US and its regional allies, and 3) portraying Iran as 
the “city on the hill” for other regional nations. 
 
Since 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, the first step of Iran’s regional objectives has been 
fulfilled not because of Iran’s efforts, but due to the actions of the US. Survey after 
survey shows that a significant majority of Arab and Muslim populations do regard the 
US as an oppressing country that “coercively dominates and exploits the Muslim world” 
(Kull, 2011, p. 42).  According to a survey conducted by University of Maryland’s 
Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development in 2011 among the peoples of Egypt, 
UAE, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan, a solid majority (59%) of those surveyed have an 
unfavorable view of the US and 53% think that “controlling oil” is the most important 
goal that drives US policy in the Middle East. Also, according to a PEW survey 
conducted in spring of 2013, 70% of Turks, 81% of Egyptians, 85% of Jordanians, 53% 
of Lebanese, 79% of Palestinians, and 74% of Pakistanis have unfavorable views of the 
United States. According to the same survey, 75% of Turks, 83% of Egyptians, 76% of 
Jordanians, 73% of Lebanese, 81% of Palestinians, and 53% of Pakistanis believe that in 
making international policy, the US does not take their country’s interests into account. 
The same survey also shows that 61% of Turks, 73% of Egyptians, 81% of Jordanians, 
56% of Lebanese, and 78% of Palestinians “disapprove…the international policies of 
President Barack Obama.”  
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Not only have most Muslim majority countries developed negative feelings toward the 
US, but they also see the US as a country that is domineering. According to a survey 
conducted by WorldPublicOpinion.org in 2009, 90% of Pakistanis, 87% of Palestinians, 
86% of Turks, 85% of Iranians, 72% of Iraqis, 63% of Indonesians, 62% of Egyptians, 
61% of Azerbaijanis, and 31% of Jordanians believe that in their governments’ relations 
with the US, the “US more often… abuses its greater power” to make them do what the 
US wants (Kull, 2011, p. 44). The US is also perceived as either opposing democracy in 
Muslim countries or as only favoring democracy in Muslim countries if it produces 
governments that are cooperative with the US. According to a WorldPublicOpinion.org 
survey conducted in 2009, 67% of Iraqis, 74% of Iranians, 68% of Turks, 74% of 
Indonesians, 86% of Palestinians, 82% of Azerbaijanis, 85% of Pakistanis, 81% of 
Jordanians, and 94% of Egyptians believe that the US either opposes democracy in 
Muslim countries or only favors democracy in Muslim countries if it produces 
governments that are cooperative with the US (Kull, 2011, p. 106).               
 
What troubles Iran, however, is that while there are widespread negative feelings toward 
the US in the region and while people have “awakened” to realize that their countries are 
dominated by the US, the people in the region continue to “allow” their governments to 
have extensive cooperation with the US. This is where the second step of Iran’s regional 
strategy comes into play. Iran views the Arab Spring as an Islamic Revivalism and is of 
the opinion that most of the movements against regional dictators are primarily rooted in 
people’s desire to achieve self-determination and limit US influence in their country. In 
their mind, the movements are not as much about the economy or even quest to achieve 
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greater freedoms as it is about confronting US domination of their country and their 
destiny. In the second sermon of Tehran’s Friday prayers that Grand Ayatollah Khamenei 
delivered in Arabic on February 3, 2012, he said: 
The most sensitive areas of the Muslim world are overwhelmed with movements 
that seek to bring back Islam, reassert people’s dignity and identity, and free 
people from various forms of domination… The Arab people no longer want their 
dictators. They can no longer tolerate the rule of those who have been imposed on 
them by domineering entities. They are tired of poverty, humiliation, and 
dependence… Through the slogan of ‘God is Great,’ and relying on spirituality, 
justice, prudence, and religious democracy they are trying to rid themselves from 
a century old humiliation, despotism, imperialism, corruption, poverty, and 
discrimination, and this is the best path to take… Any other claims regarding the 
identity of these movements… would be at odds with the reality… My brothers 
and sisters… do not trust the US and NATO. They will never bear your interests 
and wellbeing in mind. Also, do not fear them. They are a hallow entity on rapid 
decline. The domination over the Muslim world was merely due to our fear and 
ignorance during the past 150 years… Only have confidence and rely on God, the 
Almighty, and your own people. 
 
Iran’s perception regarding the root causes of the Arab Spring does not seem far from 
reality. Many other scholars and analysts have debunked the claim that these movements 
are primarily rooted in domestic grievances such as widespread poverty and inequality. 
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Just as an example, Shibley Telhami in an interview with the Diane Rehm Show on June 
6, 2013, argued that: 
[The unrests in the Arab world] is about a lot of issues, the economy, dictatorship, 
poverty, absence of jobs, all of this. But it was also about raising their head high. 
Raising their head high not only vis-à-vis the rulers but undoubtedly vis-à-vis the 
outside world. This is something that’s not fully understood and it’s not fully 
analyzed in our discourse.  We’ve fallen into this belief that this is all about, you 
know, the economy. Well, let’s look at it this way, look at the past two, three, four 
decades…The economy has been bad throughout. There is no major economic 
crisis the likes of which Arabs hadn’t experienced that took place in 2010 or 
2009. There is no major repression the likes of which Arabs haven’t experienced 
even worse before. So what was it then that was new in 2010? There were two 
things really. One is the information revolution… But the second thing… What 
was the source of that anger over the past decade? Foreign policy! Because you 
look at it, what did it start with? The collapse of the Israeli policy and negotiations 
in 2000, the fighting between the Israelis and Palestinians that captured the 
television screens, that post 9/11 war on terrorism, the Iraq War, the Lebanon 
War, the Gaza War. That was the decade… of foreign policy humiliation. I say 
humiliation because these events… were humiliating to them. And… Arab people 
are angry with their governments, yes for the repression and for not providing for 
sure. But they’re also angry because… they were seen… as subservient on core 
issues like the Iraq War, [which] the overwhelming majority of the Arab people 
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opposed… [And because] the Arab governments not only couldn’t stop it, but 
were seen to be collaborators with Arab enemies on those issues. 
 
Most Iranian policymakers believe that while Muslim nations have become aware of and 
do resent US domination of their countries, they lack the courage and the self-confidence 
required to turn their anger into political action against the US. It is generally believed 
that the prevalent lack of courage and self-confidence in these countries is primarily 
rooted in several fears of failure; fear of failure to stop US domination, fear of failure to 
achieve independence, fear of failure to resist US pressure, and fear of failure to excel 
and advance without US assistance. So in other words, Iranian policymakers believe that 
if other nations came to believe that they could limit US influence, achieve independence, 
resist subsequent US pressure, and excel despite US hindrances, they would not hesitate 
to take political action, despite its risks, to make it extremely difficult for the US to 
impose its will on to them. Hence, as a country that has gone through that process, Iran 
seeks to present itself as a success story. It realizes that as a country that has resisted US 
pressure and “domination,” many contemplating nations are carefully studying Iran’s 
experience to draw judgments on whether or not the benefits of independence are worth 
the costs of opposing the world’s sole superpower. 
 
This view of the world has led Iran to try to be that “city on the hill,” to showcase, among 
other things, the possibility of resisting “US domination” and excelling at the same time. 
Hence, Iran has heavily invested in areas previously deemed to be out of the reach of any 
developing country, let alone one that is heavily sanctioned by the US. Such efforts have 
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indeed transformed Iran. It has allowed Iran to have the world’s fastest scientific growth 
rate, with its scientific output growing 11 times faster than that of the world’s average 
(Archambault, 2009). Iran’s scientific growth rate is particularly noteworthy when 
compared with the scientific growth of other Muslim and non-Muslim countries that have 
had very close relations with the US: 
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Section 4.5.3: Iran’s Nuclear Program and its Soft Power 
 
State legitimacy, prestige, and reputation, in the eyes of its people as well as external 
actors and audiences, are fundamental sources of a state’s power. Even traditional 
realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, hold the view that legitimacy and prestige matter in 
the modern political order. In his seminal work, Politics among Nations, Morgenthau 
(1967) argues that: 
[I]nternational and domestic politics are but different manifestations of one and 
the same social fact. In both spheres, the desire for social recognition is a potent 
dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions. The 
individual seeks confirmation, on the part of his fellows, of the evaluation he puts 
upon himself. It is only in the tribute others pay to his goodness, intelligence, and 
power that he becomes fully aware of, and can fully enjoy, what he deems to be 
his superior qualities. It is only through his reputation for excellence that he can 
gain the measure of security, wealth, and power he regards to be his due. Thus, in 
the struggle for existence and power… what others think about us is as important 
as what we actually are… This is exactly what… prestige is about. Its purpose is 
to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or 
with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses (pp. 
69-70).    
 
From its very inception during the reign of the Shah, Iran’s nuclear program was less 
about immediate economic concerns and more about prestige and recognition. Indeed, the 
Shah openly linked Iran’s nuclear program with “increased Iranian prestige and 
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influence” (Poneman, 1982, p. 126). This is in no way unique to Iran’s nuclear program. 
Nations all over the world and throughout the history have undertaken large and costly 
projects simply to showcase their ability and competence, enhance the self-confidence of 
their populace, and win the respect of external observers. Because of their technological 
sophistication, industrial complexity, and political sensitivity, nuclear programs have 
often been the “project” of choice for many developing countries concerned with prestige 
related issues. Just as an example, the traditional competition between Brazil and 
Argentina for prominence in Latin America undoubtedly contributed to the push in both 
countries for nuclear energy and technology.    
 
Iran’s nuclear program is deemed to serve multiple prestige, influence, and legitimacy 
related goals. First it serves as a testimony to the Islamic Republic’s competence, which 
not only contributes to its legitimacy but also the legitimacy of the contemporary and 
evolved understanding of the Shiite political thought that has made the Islamic Republic 
possible. Second, it serves as a sign and symbol of Iran’s progress despite the obstacles 
created by great powers. Finally, it showcases Iran’s insistence on its independence and 
sensitivity toward issues relating to its national sovereignty. Indeed, developing an 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle program has become an “embodiment of progress and 
regional and international prestige for Iran… The nuclear program has become a symbol 
of national unity, the country’s desire for development and advancement, as well as 
resistance to foreign power’s unacceptable demands” (Kamrava, 2012, p. 229.) During 
the last months of his tenure as the Director General of the IAEA, on November 4, 2009, 
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in a Q&A session at the Council on Foreign Relation in response to a question regarding 
Iran’s nuclear program, Mohamed ElBaradei said: 
Iran’s nuclear program, in many ways,…is an effort to force recognition of its 
role as a regional power…in my view, Iran’s nuclear program is a means to an 
end. It wants to be recognized as a regional power… they believe that the nuclear 
know-how brings prestige, brings power, and they would like to get to see the US 
engaging them. And fortunately or unfortunately, that holds some truth. Iran has 
been taken seriously… since they developed their program and developed the 
technology.   
   
As a new system of government based on an evolved and contemporary understanding of 
Shiite Islam, the Islamic Republic does seek to legitimize and attract others to its political 
thought by showcasing its ability to deliver on multiple regional aspirations, namely 
independence, recognition and prosperity, which other ideologies, alignments and 
alliances have thus far failed to bring for the people in the region. Iran’s nuclear program 
is deemed to serve this objective. As a symbol of the Islamic Republic’s ability to further 
the interests of the Iranian people and enhance Iran’s self-reliance, Iran’s nuclear 
program is believed to be a powerful and salient testimony to the legitimacy and the 
efficacy of the political thought and system that has allowed Iran to ascent to the ranks of 
a handful of countries that have fuel cycle programs.  
 
Through its nuclear program, the Islamic Republic also seeks to convince a broader 
audience that it is possible to excel and advance without the support of the US. Iranian 
402 
 
policymakers believe that the US extends its “domination” over other nations by making 
them feel inferior. Grand Ayatollah Khamenei in his annual New Year speech on March 
21, 2013, said: “World powers and imperialists – imperialists when we had direct 
imperialism and, today, the US, wish to convince peoples of the world that if you wish to 
have a good life and excel, you must do so under our shadow.” Iranian policymakers 
believe that if Iran could belie this assumption, the likelihood of other nations opposing 
US “domination” would increase.  
 
Iranian people and policymakers also believe scientific and technological advancement to 
be a key component of Iran’s international standing and prestige. In fact, many see US 
pressure on Iran as a manifestation of US objective to undermine Iran’s progress and 
power by denying it advanced technology.
53
 Iranians believe that a technologically 
advanced Iran would better be able to win the recognition and admiration of other 
countries and view Iran’s nuclear program as the engine of Iran’s scientific and 
technological growth and advancement. Indeed, when the fast pace of Iran’s scientific 
growth is more closely analyzed, it becomes clear that Iran’s scientific advancements 
have all taken place in parallel to its nuclear program. Iran’s nuclear program has been 
able to mobilize Iranian scientists in various sectors to contribute to Iran’s scientific 
growth. Iran’s nuclear program has also allowed those sectors closely related to the 
nuclear program to advance in a much faster pace. According to Eric Archambault 
(2010), who has conducted an in-depth analysis of Iran’s scientific growth using 
                                                 
53
 According to a survey of the Iranian published jointly by UTCPOR and CISSM in September 2014, 75% 
of Iranians believe that the “main reason for the United States to sanction Iran is not concern about 
proliferation, but some other motive” and of those, 53% think that “the United States seeks to dominate 
Iran or block its development” (Mohseni, Gallagher and Ramsay, 2014). 
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information from the Web of Science (Thomson Reuters) database of scientific 
publications since 1980, while the scientific output in the nuclear energy related fields 
such as of inorganic and nuclear chemistry, nuclear and particle physics, and nuclear 
engineering “has increased by only 34% at the world level between 1990 to 2009, Iran’s 
scientific output [in these fields] has increased 84 times,” allowing Iran’s scientific 
ranking to rise from 53
rd
 in 1996 to 17
th
 in 2012.  
 
But there is another very interesting reason why Iranian policymakers think Iran’s nuclear 
program increases Iran’s soft power. As mentioned before, Iran faces many obstacles in 
its quest for regional prominence. Among them is Iran’s Shiite identity, which 
significantly hinders Iran’s ability to make inroads into Sunni majority societies. Iran’s 
nuclear program and its fuel cycle activities, however, are perceived to address this 
Iranian “weakness” by changing the narrative in the region in Iran’s favor. It is believed 
that because of Iran’s nuclear program, the nations in the region have become more likely 
to identify Iran with its nuclear program, its resistance to the US, and, most importantly, 
with its ability to counterbalance Israel’s regional superiority, than its discordant Shiite 
identity. This perception is not totally misguided, partly because most people in the 
region do not perceive Iran and its nuclear fuel cycle activities as a threat. According to a 
survey conducted by University of Maryland’s Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development in 2011 among the peoples of Egypt, UAE, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan, 
while most (52%) respondents believed that Iran was “trying to develop nuclear 
weapons,” a strong majority (64%) indicated that “Iran has the right to its nuclear 
program” and refused to agree with the suggestion that “Iran should be pressured to stop 
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its nuclear program.” This is perhaps rooted in the threat perceptions of the Arab 
population. While a majority of the respondents regarded Israel (71%) and the US (59%) 
as countries that pose the biggest threat to the region, only 18% of the respondents 
regarded Iran as a source of such threat.  
 
Section 4.5.4: Resistance, Soft Power, and the Effect of Coercive Diplomacy 
on Iran’s Nuclear Policy  
 
US reliance on coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive 
aspects of its nuclear program has failed to have its intended effects at least partly 
because of its audience cost as well as its effects on Iran’s soft power calculus. None of 
Iran’s soft-powered related justifications for its nuclear program are abated through US 
coercion. Iranians policymakers generally perceive that conceding to US and UNSC 
demands would significantly jeopardize Iran’s strategic ambitions, while resisting US and 
UNSC demands would enhance Iran’s ability to advance its goal to expand its regional 
influence and play a more prominent role in the Middle East and beyond. 
   
The reliance of the US on coercive diplomacy has given more credence to Iran’s regional 
goals and soft-power related justifications for its nuclear program. As the US puts more 
pressure on Iran for its nuclear program, Iran’s nuclear program gains more salience, 
allowing Iran to be defined by a program many people in the region think Iran has a right 
to pursue than by its Shiite identity. This significantly raises the stakes for Iran. Should 
Iran concede to US and UNSC demands, the narrative espoused by Iran that it is possible 
to resist “unreasonable US demands” and its “domination” and excel at the same time, 
would significantly lose its footing and regional nations would become further convinced 
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that despite their opposition, the US is and will continue to be able to achieve its strategic 
objectives in the region. This would embolden the US, Israel and other regional US allies 
to play a more assertive role in the region. Iranian policymakers also believe that by 
conceding to US demands, the contemporary and evolved understanding of Shiite 
political thought, which is partly legitimized by its staunch opposition to various forms of 
imperialism, would also significantly suffer.  
 
Conversely, it is believed that resisting US and UNSC demands has positioned Iran as the 
leading defender of the nuclear rights of all non-nuclear states, has given more credence 
to Iran’s narrative that the US cannot impose its will on determined nations and that 
nations can prosper and advance despite oppositions from the US, and has allowed Iran to 
more prominently showcase its competence and ability to further the interests of the 
Iranian people, resist US dominations, and preserve its independence and national 
sovereignty; all to the detriment of the interests and credibility of the US. Moreover, 
Iranian policymakers believe that the more US and UNSC pressure Iran for its 
safeguarded nuclear program while ignoring Israel’s clandestine nuclear activities, the 
more they would undermine their own legitimacy in the region. Indeed, on numerous 
occasions, Iran has exploited western criticism of its nuclear program to draw greater 
attention to Israel’s undeclared nuclear activities, “taking the lead from other regional 
states – especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia – that have been working futilely for years to 
bring world attention to Israel’s nuclear arsenal” (Leverett and Leverett, 2013, p. 90). 
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US reliance on coercive diplomacy has also provided Iran with the opportunity to 
discredit the US and raise its own stature in the region and beyond.  In the sermons of 
Tehran’s Friday prayers that Grand Ayatollah Khamenei delivered on February 3, 2012, 
he said: 
[Western powers] continuously stress in their propaganda efforts that we want to 
impose these sanctions on Iran so as to force Iran to back down, for instance in 
the nuclear issue. So the whole world becomes informed that these sanctions are 
meant to force Iran to back down on its nuclear program and other issues. Well, 
when we do not back down…and Iran will not back down, what happens? In the 
eyes of the people in the region… the credibility of the west and their threats will 
be shattered and the power and the glory of the Iranian people will become more 
admired. And this is in our interest. 
 
By resisting sanctions and pushing ahead its nuclear program despite US and UNSC 
objections, Iran believes that it is “exposing” the world’s sole superpower’s inability to 
impose its will on nations determined to safeguard their sovereignty. Iranian 
policymakers believes that if other nations as well as world leaders recognize the viability 
of Iran’s anti-imperialism and anti-domination resistance methods, they too would 
become inclined to assert their independence to the detriment of US global and regional 
hegemony. Conversely, they believe that by conceding to US and UNSC demands, they 
would disprove their own narrative of resistance, leading to greater US influence in the 
region and beyond. These considerations have significantly affected Iran’s nuclear policy 
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and have pushed Iran to escalate its nuclear fuel cycle activities in response to US 
escalation of coercive measures against Iran.      
    
Section 4.6:   Conclusion 
 
US reliance on coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to forgo proliferation-sensitive 
aspects of its nuclear program has failed to produce its intended outcome. While US and 
UNSC sanctions have had a devastating effect on Iran’s economy, Iran has continued to 
develop and expand its nuclear fuel cycle activities despite being inflicted with 
increasingly more stringent sanctions. In this chapter, the reasons behind Iran’s nuclear 
defiance and the failure of US and UNSC sanctions to persuade Iran to forego 
proliferation-sensitive aspects of its nuclear program was discussed.  
 
First, it was concluded that one of the reasons why US reliance on coercive diplomacy 
has failed to produce its intended outcome is that the policy neglects most lessons and 
recommendations that have been provided in the literature for successful employment of 
coercive diplomacy. Indeed, not only does the situation in Iran lack most of the 
conditions and requirements that are identified in the literature for successful 
employment of coercive diplomacy, but the way sanctions have been employed against 
Iran is also at odds with the recommendations provided in the literature. While the 
literature identifies many conditions that are conducive to effective employment of 
coercive diplomacy, there is wide consensus on at least three of these conditions, the 
lacking of which in the situation in Iran has significantly hampered US efforts to force 
Iran to concede.  
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There is almost a consensus in the literature that target nations are significantly less likely 
to concede to the demands of the coercing power if they believe that conceding to the 
most immediate demand of the coercing power is going to lead to more future demands. 
As it was shown in the case of Iran, there is widespread consensus both among the 
Iranian people and policymakers that US concerns with respect to Iran is in no way 
limited to certain aspects of Iran’s fuel cycle activities, that conceding to US and UNSC 
demands with respect to proliferation-sensitive aspects of Iran’s fuel cycle activities is 
not going to end US pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that Iran’s compliance 
with US and UNSC demands would also lead the US to rely on coercive diplomacy to 
extract concession from Iran in other areas. Grand Ayatollah Khamenei has on numerous 
occasions expressed this perception. Just as an example, on May 28, 2003, in a speech 
addressed to Majlis delegates, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei stated: 
The enemy is a calculating enemy. It thinks about what it must do. One of their 
adopted methods is to not utter their final demand in the initial stages [of a 
negotiation]. Slowly and slowly they indebt others and force them to retreat. 
Immediately after one retreats, they make new demands. Some people say let’s 
give something and get something in return. The “giving” part is true, but the 
“getting” part is not… Beware! If one would retreat, there would be no stopping. 
Once you retreat from one post; for example accepting an [unreasonable] 
agreement, they will raise another issue: such as recognizing an illegitimate 
regime. The pressure and threats would remain constant and only the demands 
would change. The second you would recognize that illegitimate regime, they will 
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make another demand: ‘remove Islam from your constitution.’ They will force 
you to retreat little by little and there is no stopping… I ask! Where is the 
stopping point of US demands and pressure?... [It will only stop] when you 
declare on behalf of the people that ‘we do not want Islam, we do not want 
Islamic Republic, we do not want self-governance. Please identify whomever you 
want to rule over Iran to come and rule.’ This is when the pressure would stop: 
With the surrender of the country. Can we? Could I and you surrender the country 
to the enemy? Who gives us such a right?! The people have not brought us to 
power to surrender the country to the enemy. 
 
There is also unanimous agreement among scholars studying coercive diplomacy that 
sanctions have a better chance of succeeding if the target regards the demand to be 
limited and modest. The Iranian people and policymakers do not regard US and UNSC 
demands to be limited and modest. Iran’s nuclear program, as a result of US and UNSC 
sanctions and demands, has gained much public and international salience and has 
consequently become a symbol of the competence of the Islamic Republic, and the 
sovereignty and independence of Iran. Also, from Iran’s point of view, the costs of 
conceding to US demands significantly outweigh the promised benefits of complying, not 
only because Iran regards US demands as an encroachment on its sovereign rights, but 
also because Iran perceives the ultimate intention of the US to be the undermining the 
Islamic Republic, both domestically and internationally.  
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Scholars studying coercive diplomacy also agree on the importance of clarity and 
credibility of the precise terms of settlement. To this date, the US has not clearly, 
credibly, and with one voice clarified exactly what it would take to fully address all US 
concerns with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even with respect to US concerns regarding 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, no precise formula for ameliorating the crisis has yet been put 
forward by the US and its allies. As was shown, whenever the terms of settlement were 
clarified, Iran has shown significant willingness to follow through. In fact, currently the 
Islamic Republic is seeking to secure a precise and mutually agreeable arrangement to 
conclusively bring an end to the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program as part of the 
“mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution” that is envisioned by the JPA. The 
main question in Tehran, however, is whether US hostilities toward Iran would end with 
even a “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution” on the nuclear issue, 
considering that US concerns about Iran are in no way limited to Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
alone.  
 
Indeed, US policymakers have either neglected or ignored these and many other 
recommendations and predictions that have been laid out in the literature on coercive 
diplomacy. Out of the 22 conditions and recommendations that have been suggested in 
most prominent literature of coercive diplomacy for its effective employment, the 
situation in Iran and the way US has employed coercive diplomacy only satisfies one of 
the conditions and recommendations and clearly fails to satisfy 17 of the other conditions 
and recommendations. Hence, from the point of view of the existing literature on 
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coercive diplomacy, US policymakers should have never expected coercive diplomacy to 
succeed in persuading Iran to forgo its nuclear fuel cycle program. 
 
Second, based on the available survey data from Iran, Iranian people regard Iran’s 
nuclear program and its fuel cycle activities as extremely important for Iran. In fact, 
while they think the sanctions are having a negative impact on Iran’s economy and while 
they expect them to increase if Iran does not concede to US and UNSC demands, they 
reject any deal that would require Iran to forgo nuclear enrichment. US sanctions and 
pressure against Iran have, however, been effective in making the Iranian people more 
resentful of the US and more distrusting of the UN, making it a political suicide for 
Iranian policymakers to concede to US and UNSC demands. 
 
Another reason why US sanctions have failed to produce its intended outcome is rooted 
in the logic of collective action. Even if one were to assume that, contrary to the reality, 
the Iranian people have become convinced that Iran’s nuclear program is not worth its 
costs, it takes a lot more than a mere conviction of a populace for such policies to change. 
For collective action to materialize, those convinced will also need to become selectively 
incentivized to partake in a collective action. Not only that, but for popular collective 
action to materialize against an objectionable policy, charismatic leaders who would be 
willing to endure significant costs to spearhead the opposition would also be needed. 
Furthermore, for the opposition to succeed it has to be stronger in force than the forces 
that favor the objectionable policy. Hence, it would be almost inconceivable to imagine 
412 
 
that US sanctions would instigate the Iranian public to undertake collective action in 
opposition to Iran’s fuel cycle activities. 
 
Sanctions, particularly those that are prolonged, can also become counter effective 
because of the incentives they create for the target country and others to try to circumvent 
them. Such an incentive often times creates many opportunities for domestic and 
international actors to profit from the situation, engendering enterprises and various 
forms of economic activity that only exist and are only profitable as a result of the 
sanctions. While it is very difficult for the public, even if they become convinced that the 
objectionable policy is not serving their interests, to mobilize against the objectionable 
policy, entities that profit from the sanctions are small enough in number to more easily 
mobilize and advocate policies that further their own interests, even at the cost of the 
general public. In the case of Iran, whose entire industry and economy are configured to 
mitigate the pain of a three and half decades long sanction episode, the sanctions have 
acted as an externally imposed tariff that protects currently existing Iranian industries and 
economy from foreign competition. Hence, it is very difficult to imagine Iranian 
industries promoting policies that would result in the lifting of the sanction. If anything, it 
is only rational for them to take collective action to push for the exact opposite. 
 
Fourth, Iran’s nuclear policy and its response to US reliance on coercive diplomacy are 
affected by Iran’s strategic culture. Due to its historical experiences and its religious 
identity, which is based on an evolved and contemporary understanding of Shiite Islam, 
Iran is an extremely anti-imperialist state and the Islamic Republic draws much of its 
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legitimacy from showcasing its ability to resist and defy foreign pressure and influence. 
Considering that the Iranian people and policymakers regard US demands and pressure as 
a form of imperialism, US demands are not judged nor treated on their own merits, but 
rather as manifestations of a foreign intent to dominate Iran. Once framed in such a way, 
Iranian policymakers find themselves having no option but not only to resist, but to 
showcase their unwillingness to concede to US demands.  
 
Finally, it was argued that Iran’s power and influence is heavily rested on its soft power. 
While, for a variety of reasons, Iran is not a warmly regarded country, the Islamic 
Republic believes that acting as an example of a country that has been able to excel, 
progress, and advance without having the backing nor the assistance of the US, would 
push other nations to undertake measures that would significantly constrain US influence 
in the region and beyond. Such a view, has led Iran to heavily invest in areas previously 
deemed to be out of the reach of any developing country, let alone one that is heavily 
sanctioned by the US. Such efforts have transformed Iran and have allowed Iran to have 
the world’s fastest scientific growth rate. Yet, because of the sanctions and the salience it 
provides to Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities have turned into 
the most pronounced sign and symbol of Iran’s progress despite the obstacles created by 
great powers and its ability to resist and defy the unreasonable demands of foreign 
powers. Believing that other countries in the region and beyond are carefully studying 
Iran’s experience to draw judgments on whether or not the benefits of independence are 
worth the costs of opposing great powers, Iran has found it incumbent upon itself, based 
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on national interest considerations, to showcase its defiance by expanding its fuel cycle 
activities in response to US and UNSC demands. 
  
These, however, are only some of the many reasons why US reliance on coercive 
diplomacy in its dealings with Iran has not only failed, but has been counter effective. 
Introduction of each new US and UNSC sanctions on Iran, has left Iran with little option 
but to respond by accelerating and expanding its fuel cycle activities. In the case of Iran, 
the only thing that sanctions have been able to achieve is to undermine the trust and the 
confidence of the Iranian people and policymakers in the US and the post-war 
international order. Iran’s lack of trust and confidence in the US and the post-war 
international order has in turn pushed Iran to adopt self-reliance and self-sufficiency as 
the main pillar of its domestic policy and limiting US influence in the region and 
undermining its global image, as the main pillar of its foreign policy. From Iran’s 
perspective, defying US and UNSC demands and expanding Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle 
capabilities, serve both these ends. 
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Chapter 5: Lessons and Conclusion 
 
As many scholars have warned, coercive diplomacy is rarely a high-confidence strategy. 
Historically, it has failed significantly more frequently than it has succeeded. Yet, despite 
its track record, it has remained an attractive strategy to many policymakers. When faced 
with an objectionable policy that is, on one hand, perceived to be difficult to change 
through cooperative mechanisms and, on the other hand, perceived to have no viable 
military solution, countries with formidable leverages have often relied on coercive 
diplomacy as an intermediate alternative. What needs to be considered, however, is 
whether coercive diplomacy should even be regarded as a viable alternative, considering 
its dismal track record, and if so, under what conditions and in what situations? It is also 
important to remain cognizant of the fact that so long as coercive diplomacy is regarded 
as a viable alternative, both the probability of relying on cooperative mechanisms as well 
as military options to resolve international disputes will be diminished.  
 
This dissertation has analyzed perhaps the most seminal and prominent case of coercive 
diplomacy in the 21
st
 century. Indeed, Iran is currently (and perhaps historically) the most 
sanctioned country in the world and has been under various forms of sanctions almost 
since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Sanctions on Iran became further 
intensified after the full scope of its nuclear program and ambitions were made public in 
2002. Since then, the US and its allies have portrayed Iran’s uranium enrichment and 
plutonium production capability and capacity as a grave threat to US national interests 
and international peace and security. Hence, analyzing how coercive diplomacy has 
affected Iran’s nuclear policy is both of theoretical and practical value. On the theoretical 
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side, US reliance on coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran to suspend, if not forgo, its fuel 
cycle activities serves as a very good case to be analyzed in order to further refine the 
generic knowledge and theory of coercive diplomacy. On the practical side, as an 
ongoing and yet unresolved international dispute, how the US and its allies deal with the 
proliferation-sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program will have significant 
ramifications for US national interests and security, the global nonproliferation regime, 
and international peace. 
 
Section 5.1: The Theory and Utility of Coercive Diplomacy in the 21
st
 Century 
 
This dissertation has many important lessons for the theory of coercive diplomacy in the 
21
st
 century. First of all, while the case of sanctions on Iran does corroborate the 
conclusions of other scholars who have studied the strategy of coercive diplomacy, it 
emphasizes, significantly more than the literature does, the striking importance of taking 
into account the intentions of the target and the forces that drive and shape its 
objectionable policy before considering coercive diplomacy.  While the literature on 
coercive diplomacy does emphasize that coercion is in the eye of the beholder, many 
scholars analyzing coercive diplomacy have not taken the next logical step that has been 
taken by International Relations (IR) theorists.  
 
One of the most debated issues in the IR field, centers on the intentions of the opponent 
and that factors that drive and shape his security policies. Proponents of the deterrence 
theory and the spiral model have long debated this issue in the IR field. Without going 
into the complexities of the deterrence theory and the spiral model, the central argument 
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of the proponents of the deterrence theory is that if an opponent of ‘country A’ believes 
that ‘country A’ is weak in capability and resolve, the opponent will test ‘country A,’ 
starting with a small or even ostensibly unimportant issue. If ‘country A’ concedes by 
retreating, it would send its opponent a signal of weakness, encouraging it to press even 
harder the next time around. To avoid such a situation, as proponents of the deterrence 
theory argue, ‘country A’ should continuously display its ability and resolve to forcefully 
defend its interests and should not judge conflicts on their own merits since even conflicts 
over issues of “little intrinsic value become highly significant as indices of resolve” 
(Jervis, 1976, p. 58). 
 
The proponents of the spiral model, however, contend that the real source of international 
conflict is not necessarily rooted in a desire to test the capability and resolve of one’s 
opponents, but in how opponents perceive attempts aimed at increasing and enhancing 
one’s own security. Since attempts that increase the power and enhance the security of a 
country could often be also used to project power and threaten the interests of other 
countries, any such attempts, regardless of the intentions involved, could also be regarded 
as hostile in nature by an opponent. Indeed, “people perceive what they expect to be 
present. If they think that a state is hostile, behaviors that others see as neutral or friendly 
will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity” (Jervis, 1976, p. 68).  Hence, 
the “self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend automatically (i.e. 
regardless of intention) to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own 
measures as defensive, and measures of others as potentially threatening” (Buzan, 1983, 
p. 3). Therefore, as ‘country A’ attempts to enhance its own security, others will feel 
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threatened, leading them to undertake their own self-help attempts, which in turn makes 
‘country A’ feel threatened, resulting in a costly vicious cycle of mistrust, rivalry, and 
conflict escalation. 
 
This debate is not merely academic. How one responds to an opponent’s security related 
activities depends heavily on what one perceives to be his intention. If one regards the 
intention of the opponent to be offensive and domineering in nature, balancing against it 
is the only option one is left with, which is unlikely to produce peace even if it results in a 
fragile stability. But if one sees the intention of the opponent to be defensive in nature 
and geared toward self-preservation and survival, then a whole range of cooperative 
measures could be adopted to prevent a tragic escalation in hostilities. This requires an 
understanding of the opponent’s actions, behaviors, and intentions that is honest, 
informed, and, to the degree possible, void of prejudice.  
 
As the case of this dissertation shows, the theory of coercive diplomacy could 
significantly learn from this debate in the IR field. It is unfortunate that, in the literature 
of coercive diplomacy, very little attention is paid to the intention of the target and the 
forces that shape and drive its objectionable policy. Just as an example, if the 
objectionable policy of the opponent is shaped by its fear of becoming undermined or 
dominated by ‘country A,’ reliance of ‘country A’ on coercive diplomacy will most likely 
make the opponent more fearful of ‘country A,’ making it even more determined to 
pursue its objectionable policy.  
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Lack of attention to the intentions of the target and to the forces that shape and drive its 
objectionable policy, has led much of the literature on coercive diplomacy astray. Indeed, 
many of the variables mentioned in the literature for effective employment of coercive 
diplomacy are at best proxy variables. In generic terms, considering that coercive 
diplomacy is a very context-dependent strategy, effective employment of coercive 
diplomacy depends a lot more on the context in which it is adopted than on the presence 
or lack of presence of certain isolated conditions and adoption or lack of adoption of 
certain tactics and coercive instruments. This is not to say that the conditions and the 
recommendations mentioned in the literature are futile. Indeed, when the conducive 
conditions mentioned in the literature do not exists, as proxy variables they signal that the 
forces that have shaped the objectionable policy are probably not going to respond to 
coercive diplomacy in the intended and desired way. That said, however, one has to be 
careful not to regard the presence of the mentioned conditions as sufficient for successful 
employment of the strategy. 
 
Considering that the objective of coercive diplomacy is to persuade the opponent to either 
stop or reverse its objectionable behavior, it is possible to envision a broader strategy to 
achieve that very objective. The alternative is strategic empathy, which the author defines 
and uses to mean achieving one’s own objectives through understanding the forces that 
drive and shape the policies of the target and undertaking measures that would augment 
the forces, in the broadest sense of the term, that pull the policies of the target toward 
what one desires and weaken the forces that push the policies of the target away from 
what one desires. Unlike the current theory of coercive diplomacy, which assumes 
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national-level decisions to be the byproduct of rational unitary decision-making, strategic 
empathy regards national-level decisions to be the net resultant of the pulling and hauling 
of various forces, e.g. interests, values, objectives, justifications, concerns, perceived 
threats and opportunities, constituencies and individuals, within the target state. Hence, 
when dealing with an objectionable policy of a target, strategic empathy would require 
one to first understand the involved forces and then seek to weaken the forces that 
promote the objectionable policy and strengthen those that oppose it.  In the context of 
strategic empathy, all available instruments, tactics, policies, and strategies, including 
coercive diplomacy, should be used after being evaluated in terms of their utility for 
weakening the forces that promote and strengthening those that oppose the objectionable 
policy, without any prejudice against and inclinations in favor of a particular instrument, 
tactic, policy, or strategy. 
 
Indeed, the most important lesson this dissertation has is the importance of understanding 
the opponent and the forces that drive and shape its policies, including its objectionable 
policy. Without such an understanding, the actions one takes to deal with the 
objectionable policy of an opponent could readily backfire and make the opponent even 
more determined to pursue its objectionable policy. Just as an example, if the 
objectionable policy of an opponent is shaped by its security concerns, augmenting those 
concerns through coercion and threat of war should not be expected to persuade the 
opponent to change its objectionable policy. Realizing this reality will at least protect 
countries from adopting counter-effective strategies in response to an objectionable 
policy of an opponent. 
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The other lesson of this dissertation is the importance of realizing the dynamic 
environment in which coercive diplomacy is often adopted. Nothing is constant in the 
real world and countries and their policymakers respond and adapt to exogenous stimuli. 
Even if one were to assume the objectionable policy of a target to be the byproduct of a 
rational unitary decision-making, one cannot ignore the fact that the opponent makes 
decisions on a continuous basis, responding to the efforts geared at imposing upon it 
costs for its objectionable policy. Just as an example, the case of Iran shows how a 
country can turn inward to provide for the needs it was previously procuring from 
outside, effectively “disarming” coercing powers of their leverage. Hence, those 
contemplating coercive diplomacy must take into account the full range of actions, from 
compliance to defiance, that the target could adopt in reaction to coercive diplomacy and 
must be able to have the capability to reasonably adapt in response. Just as an example, if 
a country contemplating coercive diplomacy knows that it would not be able to 
precipitously cease or undo its coercive measure if the target complies with its demands, 
then, for the sake of its credibility and its ability to clearly communicate its intentions to 
the target and beyond, it should not employ coercive diplomacy.  
 
Another lesson of this dissertation is to be careful about one’s assumptions in regards to 
the mechanisms through which coercive diplomacy is going to translate into a change in 
the objectionable policy. Unfortunately, the literature lacks a full discussion on this 
important topic. The literature almost assumes some form of automaticity in this regard 
and neglects the complexities involved in the shaping and making of national-level 
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decisions. As the findings of this dissertation illustrate, those contemplating coercive 
diplomacy should evaluate the viability of various possible channels of transmission and 
see whether or not they allow for the pain of the sanctions to be translated into a change 
in the objectionable policy.  
 
This dissertation also corroborates the findings of other scholars that coercive diplomacy 
is likely to raise the salience of the objectionable policy both among the public in the 
target country and, to some degree, at least among some constituencies in the coercing 
country. This is a given. Those contemplating employment of coercive diplomacy, 
therefore, must evaluate whether increasing the salience of the objectionable policy, 
particularly among the public in the target country, is going to help or undermine efforts 
geared at persuading the target country to change its objectionable policy.  
 
This brings forth one of the most important findings of this dissertation, which 
corroborates the findings of other scholars who have evaluated the effect of coercive 
diplomacy in other contexts. If the demand being made of a target country is perceived as 
illegitimate by the public in the target country, raising its salience through reliance on 
coercive diplomacy is likely to make it prohibitively more difficult for the decision-
making elite of the target country to comply with the demand. Conversely, if the demand 
is perceived as being legitimate by the public and if the objectionable policy is opposed 
by at least a core organized constituency within the target country, as in the case of South 
Africa, coercive diplomacy could help highlight the illegitimacy and moral 
reprehensibility of the objectionable policy and bring about a change in the objectionable 
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policy by augmenting the forces opposed to the objectionable policy and abating the 
forces in its favor by merely raising its salience. Indeed, perceived legitimacy, or lack 
thereof, oftentimes has significantly more impact on national-level decisions and policies 
than even the perceived costs.   
 
This dissertation also finds a target’s strategic culture and the sources of state legitimacy 
to be very significant predictors of the success odds of coercive diplomacy. As was 
mentioned, “everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic 
culture, is at least an example of behavior affected by culturally shaped, or encultured, 
people, organizations, [and] procedures” (Gray, 2006, p. 153). Indeed, while there is 
significantly more to strategic decision-making than culture alone, strategic decisions that 
clearly violate the dominant strategic culture tend to become extremely difficult to defend 
and legitimize and are hence less likely to be adopted. Even in circumstances that require 
adoption of strategic decisions that contradict the dominant culture, policymakers often 
present them as not being so and when such representation is not possible, “deviant” 
decisions are portrayed as an expedient exception or temporary in nature. Regardless of 
the circumstances, however, “the effects of strategic culture will be more or less strongly 
stamped upon strategic behavior of all kind” (Gray, 2006, p. 168). It is therefore really 
important for those contemplating employment of coercive diplomacy to evaluate 
beforehand how their demands are going to be perceived, what their indented coercive 
measures are going to communicate, and the net value of the costs and benefits the target 
would associate with conceding, considering its strategic culture. By studying and 
understanding the strategic culture of the target, those contemplating employment of 
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coercive diplomacy could better predict how the target would respond to coercive 
diplomacy and whether coercive diplomacy could persuade it to change its objectionable 
policy. 
 
Finally, this dissertation also corroborates the literature in that Type C (regime change) 
coercive diplomacy, which is by far “the most frequent foreign policy objective of 
economic sanctions” (HSE and Oegg, 2007, p. 67), is significantly more likely to fail 
than to succeed. This is because Type C coercive diplomacy by default raises the stakes 
for the regime of the target country to the highest level possible, leading to an asymmetry 
of motivation in favor of the target. What is important to note here, as illustrated by the 
case of Iran, is that the real intention of the coercing power in employing coercive 
diplomacy is not as relevant as what the target perceives to be the ultimate intention of 
the coercing power. If the target perceives or even suspects the ultimate intention of the 
coercing power to be a dramatic change in its internal political order, even if in reality the 
coercing power does not seek any such change, the target will regard the adopted strategy 
as a threat to its very survival and will most likely use every instrument at its disposal to 
resist and confront the coercing power and its demands. 
 
This highlights something that Schelling has emphasized in his work. According to 
Schelling (2008) “any coercive threat requires corresponding assurances… [and] that 
both sides of the choice, the threatened penalty and the proffered avoidance or reward, 
need to be credible” (p. 74-75). Hence, if the coercing power is not seeking regime 
change, it must credibly reassure the target about its ultimate objective. As the case of 
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Iran illustrates, reassuring a country, which used to be a target of one’s regime change 
and other hostile policies, that one no longer intends to significantly change its internal 
political order, is very difficult and requires significantly more than verbal assurances. 
Those contemplating employment of coercive diplomacy against past or current 
adversaries, therefore, must know that the burden of proof is on them and that they must 
credibly convince the target that regime change is not the sought objective. Those 
incapable of doing so would be better off not relying on coercive diplomacy to begin 
with. 
 
For all of the reasons discussed in this dissertation and presented in the literature, 
coercive diplomacy is rarely an appropriate strategy to achieve one’s foreign policy 
objective and could readily prove counter-effective. Also, when appropriate, i.e. when it 
actually does strengthen the forces that oppose and weaken the forces that promote the 
objectionable policy, coercive diplomacy is a strategy that usually bears fruit very slowly, 
if at all. Hence, even when appropriate, it is not a viable strategy in cases and crisis that 
require speedy resolution. In George’s (1991) words, “although the strategy sometimes 
assumes an attraction that may be difficult to resist, its apparent advantages should not be 
allowed to distort judgment of its feasibility in any particular situation” (p. 84).    
 
It is important to emphasize here that, as was shown, coercive diplomacy is not a strategy 
that at worst might fail and bear no fruit. Rather, it is a strategy that could make matters 
worse and much more difficult to resolve if utilized for the wrong reasons, in 
unconducive circumstances, and/or through ill-picked measures and processes. Hence, 
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considering that coercive diplomacy is a strategy that could undermine the national 
interests and security of those who decide to employ it, much more careful attention 
needs to be paid to its true success odds in any particular situation. This is particularly the 
case since ill-judging its efficacy is likely to make serious consideration of other perhaps 
more inconvenient and/ or difficult policy alternatives, that may be more effective and 
efficacious than coercive diplomacy, less likely. 
 
Before ending this section, it is important to note that maintaining international law, 
norms, and order is indeed a worthwhile endeavor. It is needless to say that no law, norm, 
and order could be maintained without an indiscriminative effective enforcement 
mechanism. As customary in most cultures and legal frameworks, those who break a 
legitimate law, must not only be forced to compensate the victims and rectify the 
damages caused, but also be effectively punished to deter future violations. Moreover, to 
ensure the legitimacy of the law and its enforcement mechanism, it is generally believed 
there should be no discrimination or double standards in how the law is enforced. The 
same logic also applies to international law, norms, and order. It is, however, important to 
distinguish between coercion and punishment. While coercion seeks to persuade a party 
to do something it would otherwise not do, punishment is the cost a party has to endure 
for having done something it should not have done. One should be careful not to conflate 
the two concepts and to refrain from using ‘punishment’ and ‘coercion’ interchangeably. 
Doing so is dishonest and likely to weaken the deterrent effect of punishments.  
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Section 5.2: Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
Iran’s nuclear program confronts the US with many challenges. It must be realized, 
however, that these challenges have at least to some extent been created by the US and 
hence resolving them depends on what the US does as well. Indeed, throughout history, 
world powers have often underestimated, if not failed to see, how their security policies 
have been perceived as threatening by others and “United States statesmen in the postwar 
era have displayed a[n]… inability to see that their country’s huge power, even if used for 
others’ good, represents a standing threat to much of the rest of the world. Instead the 
United States… has believed that others will see that the desire for security underlines its 
actions” (Jervis, 1976, p. 71). 
 
As was described, the US and Iran have had a very difficult history and, contrary to what 
is often implied, Iran does harbor significantly more consequential grievances and 
security concerns. When analyzing much of Iran’s foreign or even domestic policies, it 
becomes apparent that Iran is continuously responding to the external threats it perceives 
emanating mostly from the US and its allies. As explained, Iran’s nuclear program is not 
an exception.  
 
It is a matter of public records that immediately after the 1979 revolution, the US used all 
of its leverage to strangle Iran’s fledgling, peaceful, and fully lawful nuclear program and 
to prevent it from advancing beyond the point it had advanced under the Shah. According 
to Mark Hibbs (2003), Iran requested the IAEA in 1983 to provide it with assistance to 
move Iran’s peaceful nuclear research program forward. When in November 1983 “the 
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recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA’s technical 
cooperation program, the U.S. government then ‘directly intervened’ to discourage the 
IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6” (Hibbs, 2003). Hibbs (2003) 
quotes a former US official saying “we stopped that in its tracks.” In April 1984, the State 
Department openly confirmed that while the US “has no evidence Iran has repudiated or 
violated its pledge under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to place its nuclear 
activities under international safeguards… Previous actions of the Government of Iran do 
not provide us with great assurance that it will always abide by its international 
commitments” and that the US “has asked other nuclear suppliers not to engage in 
nuclear co-operation with Iran, especially while the Iran- Iraq war continues” (Reut, 
1984; Gwertzman, 1984). As a result of US pressures, France unilaterally reneged on its 
contract with Iran to provide it with nuclear fuel, the German contractor, Kraftwerk 
GmbH, refused to fulfill its contract to finish the Bushehr nuclear power plant, despite 
having been paid $4.78 billion in advance, and the IAEA declined to provide Iran with 
any assistance for its civilian nuclear research (Porter, 2014, pp. 26-29).  
 
This use of US power to place a de facto nuclear embargo on Iran, without Iran even 
being suspected of violating its treaty and safeguard obligations, and, perhaps worse, the 
compliance of other countries and international organizations with US demands despite 
having binding nuclear contracts with Iran, convinced Iran that the US was determined 
not to allow Iran to exercise its rights under the NPT. Consequently, Iran believed that it 
was left with two options; either it had to forsake its rights under the NPT or become self-
sufficient. It chose the latter. Considering that Iran lacked the very basics of nuclear 
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technology and know-how, Iran had to rely on reverse engineering to master the 
technology. Hence, Iran went into the black-market and, with the help of the AQ Khan 
network, secretly procured nuclear materials and equipment for its nuclear research 
activity in late 1980s.  
 
So it is important to keep in mind that the reason Iran kept its procurement and nuclear 
research activities secret until 2002, was because the US had shown both its intent and 
capability to deny Iran its rights under the NPT. Moreover, since Israel had not only 
threatened to take military action against Iran’s nuclear centers, but had also 
demonstrated both its military and political capability to take such action when it bombed 
Osirak in 1981, Iranian policymakers became certain that the US and Israel would 
effectively forestall Iran’s nuclear research and activities if Iran disclosed its nuclear 
program and ambitions. Hence, in order to preserve and exercise its rights under the NPT 
and advance its nuclear know-how, technology, and capability without prohibitively 
costly hindrances from the US and Israel, Iran made the strategic decision to pursue its 
nuclear program in secret. 
 
Lacking empathy, however, the US never took this Iranian argument seriously and never 
tried to resolve the security challenges that emanated from a secret Iranian nuclear 
program by addressing the very reasons why Iran was forced to pursue its nuclear 
program in secret. Instead, through threats and coercion, the US has since 2002 
exacerbated the very same factors that had forced Iran to go underground. According to 
ElBaradei (2011): 
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[Iranians] were adamant that…[keeping Iran’s nuclear activities secret] had been 
indispensable: the sanctions imposed on them by the United States and its allies 
prohibited any import of nuclear-related items, including peaceful nuclear 
technology. Despite operating under the radar, they had paid double, triple, or 
more for the technology and material they had purchased abroad. Keeping the 
program secret for as long as possible had been, they insisted, a necessary 
measure. In diplomatic circles, back in Vienna, the Americans did not want to 
consider the Iranian arguments – despite having themselves been in the driving 
seat of the efforts to isolate Iran for more than two decades. The fact that Iran had 
lied was, in their view, proof positive that Tehran intended to produce nuclear 
weapons. This conclusion was, of course, entirely premature in terms of the 
verification process; what the IAEA needed was hard evidence. But the U.S. 
statements of certainty regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions soon began to 
be echoed by others in the West. Many representatives of developing countries 
were, by contrast, more sympathetic to Iran’s need to go underground to evade the 
sanctions (p. 119) 
 
Other Iranian policies that are deemed objectionable by the US are of similar nature. Just 
as an example and without going into much details, Iran’s opposition to and sabotage of 
the various US mediated Middle East peace processes is mostly because these efforts, 
beside their main objectives, are perceived as having been designed to isolate the Islamic 
Republic as well (Parsi, 2007, p. 173-176). It is, hence, plausibly rational for Iran to seek 
to undermine an effort that it perceives to have been designed to challenge Iran’s 
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security, interests, and influence in the region. Likewise, Iran’s support for Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah are meant to extend Iran’s strategic depth and act as a 
deterrent against a possible Israeli attack against Iran. Considering that various Israeli 
officials have since the late 1980s threatened to take military action against Iran, it is also 
plausibly rational for Iran to seek to develop some form of a deterrence against Israel.  
 
As the abovementioned examples illustrate, to deal with the security threats that emanate 
from Iran and, in particular, its nuclear fuel cycle activities, the US first needs to 
understand Iran and the forces that shape and drive its objectionable policies. As this 
dissertation has argued, many of the policies of the Islamic Republic that the US 
perceives as hostile or objectionable, including its nuclear fuel cycle activities, are rooted 
in US threats and hostile postures toward Iran and in Iran’s lack of trust in the US and the 
international political order that it champions.  
 
Indeed, it could be well argued that US threats and hostile postures toward Iran are also 
rooted in Iranian policies that target US national interests and security. While this could 
well be true, the Islamic Republic has taken this possibility quite seriously and, despite 
being the significantly weaker party in the conflict, has taken numerous unilateral, 
concrete, and costly steps to signal its desire for a stable peace with the US. In almost all 
of those instances, however, the US has responded to Iran’s gestures of goodwill with 
more hostility. This has significantly eroded Iran’s trust in the US and the international 
political order that it champions, making Iran less likely to take similar unilateral actions 
in the future.  
432 
 
 
This extreme lack of trust coupled with Iran’s security concerns that emanate most 
directly from explicit US threats as well as US efforts to isolate and undermine the 
Islamic Republic, has pushed Iran to adopt self-reliance and self-sufficiency as the main 
pillar of its domestic policy and limiting US influence in the region and undermining its 
global image, as the main pillar of its foreign policy. From Iran’s perspective, defying US 
and UNSC demands and expanding Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, serve both ends. 
Hence, as the US increases its pressure on Iran and seeks to isolate the Islamic Republic, 
the Islamic Republic resorts to policies deemed objectionable by the US. This has only 
led to increased hostilities, which has in turn pushed Iran to more aggressively pursue its 
nuclear fuel cycle activities and other policies designed to undermine US influence in the 
region and make Iran more self-reliant. 
 
The current situation, which very much resembles the spiral model, however, is a lose-
lose game. The only ones winning in this conflict are Salafi extremists, along with their 
supporters, who are wreaking havoc in the region and beyond. Luckily, while the spiral 
model cannot be abolished, it could be ameliorated. It cannot be ameliorated, however, 
without some level of empathy, recognition of the involved stakes as well as legitimate 
concerns, and, most importantly, a genuine and mutual conviction that they are both 
“caught in a dilemma that neither desires” (Jarvis, 1976, p. 82). Hence, as long as the US 
believes that it could force Iran to capitulate through coercion and as long as Iran believes 
that hostilities would cease if and when it accomplishes a nuclear fait accompli, neither 
sides is likely to pursue a different path forward.      
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Next, either the US or Iran needs to take an initiating step that would not only signal 
goodwill, but concretely increase the security of the other party.  The US, as the more 
powerful country and as the country that can take more risks considering its resources 
and depth of power, is best positioned to take this initial step, particularly since Iran’s 
previous goodwill gestures, be it their assistance to free western hostages from Lebanon, 
their indispensable help to stabilize the post-Taliban Afghanistan, or their deliberate 
move to only install but not feed any more centrifuges with UF6 since 2012, have not 
been reciprocated by the US. To be effective, however, the step the US takes must not be 
perceived as an isolated step. Instead, US initiative must be regarded as being a part of a 
general strategy to credibly reassure the Islamic Republic that it respects Iran’s rights and 
legitimate interests, that it does not wish to dominate Iran, and that it does not seek to 
undermine the Islamic Republic or cripple Iran’s future. Such a step, could go a long way 
to allay some of the security concerns that have led Iran and the US into a hostile vicious 
cycle of coercion and resistance, culminating in a minimum level of trust that is needed 
for any sustainable and fruitful diplomacy.  
 
Cultivating some level of mutual trust should be the goal of any US initiative. Without 
some level of trust, defined and used here to mean “a belief that the other side prefers 
mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation” (Kydd, 2005, p. 6), no 
breakthrough in the nuclear dispute, let alone the decades long conflict between Iran and 
US, should be expected. Cooperation is never possible when one party believes that the 
other party both intends and is capable of undermining its security and legitimate 
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interests. Hence, since all of the objectionable policies of the Islamic Republic is at least 
somewhat rooted in its lack of trust in the US, instead of aggravating Iran’s mistrust 
through coercion and threats, for any US effort aimed at changing Iran’s objectionable 
policies, including its nuclear policy, to succeed, it must positively contribute to Iran’s 
trust and confidence in the US. This is why the author believes that notwithstanding some 
short lived tactical retreats and cooperation, the US should not expect any real change in 
the objectionable policies of the Islamic Republic unless the US changes its strategic 
attitude toward Iran, abandons its hostile policies, and credibly signals to Iran that the US 
is interested in a stable peaceful relationship, based on mutual interests and respect, with 
the Islamic Republic. This was the essence of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei’s statement on 
March 20, 2009, when he said in response to Obama’s outreach that: 
Changes in words are not adequate… If the US government continues its same 
behavior, methods, course, and policies against us, as in the past thirty years, we 
are the same people, the same nation that we have been for the past thirty years… 
We shall see and judge. You change, and we shall change as well.     
 
The US, however, should not expect that Iran would unilaterally forgo what it perceives 
to be its sovereign right, even if it could attain Iran’s trust. Any attempts designed to push 
Iran down such a path is likely to undermine Iran’s trust in the US and precipitously undo 
any past confidence building measures. No country differentiates between its territorial 
integrity and its sovereign rights. Just as one should not expect a country to remain idle if 
an action is taken against its territorial integrity, there is no reason why one should expect 
any country to not resist attempts geared toward undermining what it perceives to be its 
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sovereign right. Iran is not an exception. The only mechanism through which countries 
have agreed to voluntarily put into abeyance their sovereign rights are mechanisms that 
have not only effectively addressed the legitimate concerns of the countries involved, but 
have also enhanced their security and well-being in a multilateral fashion. Hence, the 
only way the US can successfully deal with the security concerns that emanate from 
Iran’s exercise of its sovereign rights is to rely on arrangements that are based on 
mutually acknowledged rights and equitable principles to enhance and strengthen the 
international nonproliferation regime and seek its universal application without 
discrimination or prejudice. 
  
436 
 
Bibliography 
Abdulghani, J. M. (1984). Iraq & Iran : the years of crisis. London, UK: Croom Helm. 
Abrahamian, E. (2008). A history of modern Iran. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Abrahamian, E. (2013). The coup : 1953, the CIA, and the roots of modern U.S.-Iranian relations. New 
York, NY: The New Press. 
Aburish, S. K. (2000). Saddam Hussein : the politics of revenge (1st U.S. ed.). New York, NY: 
Bloomsbury. 
Addis, A. (2003). Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil. Human Rights Quarterly, 25(3), 573-623. 
doi: 10.2307/20069680 
Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2008). Iran in world politics : the question of the Islamic Republic. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. 
AFP. (December 24, 2013). Shiites pack Iraq shrine city for mourning rituals. Agence France Presse.  
Aghaie, K. S. (2005). The women of Karbala : ritual performance and symbolic discourses in modern Shii 
Islam (1st ed.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Ahmed Ali, S. V. (2009). Saving monotheism in the sands of Karbala (2nd U.S. ed.). Elmhurst, NY: 
Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an. 
Albright, D., Walrond, C., & Stricker, A. (February 20, 2014). ISIS analysis of IAEA Iran safeguards 
report. Washington, DC: The Institute for Science and International Security. 
Albright, M. K. (June 17, 1998). Remarks at 1998 Asia Society Dinner. May 22, 2014, from http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980617a.html 
Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2012). Foreign policy analysis : new approaches. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Alerassool, M. (1993). Freezing assets : the USA and the most effective economic sanction. New York, 
NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Alexander, K. (2009). Economic sanctions : law and public policy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Alexander, Y., & Hoenig, M. M. (2008). The new Iranian leadership : Ahmadinejad, terrorism, nuclear 
ambition, and the Middle East. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. 
Alexander, Y., & Nanes, A. S. (1980). The United States and Iran : a documentary history. Frederick, MD: 
University Publications of America. 
Alfoneh, A. (2013). Iran unveiled : how the revolutionary guards is turning theocracy into military 
dictatorship. Washington, DC: AEI Press. 
Ali, M. M., Blacker, J., & Jones, G. (2003). Annual Mortality Rates and Excess Deaths of Children under 
Five in Iraq, 1991-98. Population Studies, 57(2), 217-226. doi: 10.2307/3595749 
Alikhani, H. (2000). Sanctioning Iran : anatomy of a failed policy. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris. 
Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of decision : explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.). 
New York, NY: Longman. 
437 
 
Al-Rodhan, N. R. F. (2007). The five dimensions of global security : proposal for a multi-sum security 
principle. Münster, Germany: Lit. 
Amanpour, C. (January 7, 1998). Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. May 
22, 2014, from http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html 
Amanpour, C. (November 5, 2009 ). U.N. head: Timing key to Iran nuclear deal. May 22, 2014, from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/05/un.iaea/index.html?iref=topnews 
Amid Zanjani, A. A. (1998). Political jurisprudence. Tehran, Iran: Amir Kabir Publications. 
Amirahmadi, H., & Entessar, N. (1993). Iran and the Arab world. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Amirahmadi, H., & Hooglund, E. J. (1994). US-Iran relations : areas of tension and mutual interest. 
Washington, DC: Middle East Institute. 
Andreas, P. (2005). Criminalizing consequences of sanctions: Embargo busting and its legacy. 
International Studies Quarterly, 49(2), 335-360.  
Ang, A. U. J., & Peksen, D. (2007). When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue 
Salience, and Outcomes. Political Research Quarterly, 60(1), 135-145. doi: 10.2307/4623813 
Ansari, A. M. (2007). Modern Iran : the Pahlavis and after (2nd ed.). Harlow, UK: Longman. 
Archambault, E. (2010). 30 years in science: Secular movements in knowledge creation. Montreal, Canada: 
Science-Metrix. 
Arjomand, S. A. (2009). After Khomeini : Iran under his successors. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2007). CSIS Commission on Smart Power : a smarter, more secure America. 
Washington, DC: CSIS Press. 
Armstrong, D., & Trento, J. J. (2007). America and the Islamic bomb : the deadly compromise (1st ed.). 
Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press. 
Art, R. J. (2009). America’s grand strategy and world politics. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Art, R. J., & Cronin, P. M. (2003). The United States and coercive diplomacy. Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
Askari, H., Forrer, J., Teegen, H., & Yang, J. (2003). Case studies of U.S. economic sanctions : the 
Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian experience. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Atwan, A. B. (2006). The secret history of al Qaeda. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Baer, R. (2002). See no evil : the true story of a ground soldier in the CIA’s war on terrorism (1st ed.). 
New York, NY: Crown Publishers. 
Baer, R. (2008). The devil we know : dealing with the new Iranian superpower (1st ed.). New York, NY: 
Crown Publishers. 
Bahgat, G. (2011). Energy security : an interdisciplinary approach. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
 
438 
 
Baker, J. A., & Hamilton, L. (2006). The Iraq Study Group report (1st ed.). New York, NY: Vintage 
Books. 
Baldwin, D. A. (1971). The Power of Positive Sanctions. World Politics, 24(1), 19-38. doi: 
10.2307/2009705 
Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baldwin, D. A., & Pape, R. A. (1998). Evaluating Economic Sanctions. International Security, 23(2), 189-
198. doi: 10.2307/2539384 
Bapat, N. A., & Clifton Morgan, T. (2009). Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions reconsidered: A test 
using new data. International Studies Quarterly, 53(4), 1075-1094.  
Barry, J. A. (1998). The sword of justice : ethics and coercion in international politics. Westport, CT: 
Praeger. 
Bar-Zohar, M., & Mishal, N. (2012). Mossad : the greatest missions of the Israeli Secret Service (1st ed.). 
New York, NY: Ecco. 
Bassett, J. (1886). Persia: the land of the imams. A narrative of travel and residence, 1871-1885. New 
York, NY: Scribner. 
Bayandor, D. (2010). Iran and the CIA : the fall of Mosaddeq revisited. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Bayat, M. (1991). Iran’s first revolution : Shi’ism and the constitutional revolution of 1905-1909. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Bazargan, M. (1984). The revolution of Iran in two movements. Tehran, Iran: Mazaheri Publications. 
Beach, D. (2012). Analyzing foreign policy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Becker, S. O., & Ichino, A. (2002). Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity scores. The 
stata journal, 2(4), 358-377.  
Bennis, P. (2009). Understanding the US-Iran crisis : a primer. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press. 
Berenskoetter, F., & Williams, M. J. (2007). Power in world politics. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Berman, I. (2005). Tehran rising : Iran’s challenge to the United States. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Berman, I. (2007). Taking on Tehran : strategies for confronting the Islamic republic. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
Bernauer, T., & Ruloff, D. (1999). The politics of positive incentives in arms control. Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press. 
Bill, J. A. (1988). The eagle and the lion : the tragedy of American-Iranian relations. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Bill, J. A., & Williams, J. A. (2002). Roman Catholics & Shii Muslims : prayer, passion, & politics. Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
439 
 
Blight, J. G., Lang, J. M., Banai, H., Byrne, M., & Tirman, J. (2012). Becoming enemies : U.S.-Iran 
relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Bohan, C., & Shchedrov, O. (November 15, 2009). Obama presses Iran on atomic deal, Tehran defiant. 
May 22, 2014, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/15/us-nuclear-iran-
idUSLF22565720091115 
Bolks, S. M., & Al-Sowayel, D. (2000). How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the 
Sanctioning Process through Duration. Political Research Quarterly, 53(2), 241-265. doi: 
10.2307/449280 
Bolton, J. R. (2007). Surrender is not an option : defending America at the United Nations and abroad (1st 
ed.). New York, NY: Threshold Editions. 
Bozergmehr, J. (1990). Mossadeq at military trial. Tehran, Iran: Niloufar Publications. 
Branigin, W. (June 18, 1980). U.S. called too eager in wooing Iran. The Washington Post.  
Broad, W. J., Markoff, J., & Sanger, D. E. (January 16, 2011). Israel tests called crucial in Iran nuclear 
setback. The New York Times.  
Brzezinski, Z., Gates, R. M., & Maloney, S. (2004). Iran : time for a new approach : report of an 
independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, NY: Council 
on Foreign Relations. 
Brzezinski, Z., Scowcroft, B., & Murphy, R. W. (1997). Differentiated containment : U.S. policy toward 
Iran and Iraq, report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Buchan, J. (2012). Days of God : the revolution in Iran and its consequences. London, UK: John Murray. 
Burnell, P. (2006). Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters. Third World Quarterly, 
27(4), 545-562. doi: 10.2307/4017723 
Burt, R. (September 10, 1979). SALT II: Space-age science to be used to ensure that Russians honor arms 
limitation treaty. The Globe and Mail.  
Buzan, B. (1983). People, states, and fear : the national security problem in international relations. Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Byman, D., Chubin, S., Ehteshami, A., & Green, J. (2001). Iran’s security policy in the post-revolutionary 
era. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation. 
Byman, D., & Waxman, M. C. (2002). The dynamics of coercion : American foreign policy and the limits 
of military might. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Callanan, J. (2010). Covert action in the Cold War : US policy, intelligence and CIA operations. New 
York, NY: I.B. Tauris. 
Caney, S., George, D., & Jones, P. (1996). National rights, international obligations. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Cartwright, D. (1959). Studies in social power. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Institute for Social 
Research. 
440 
 
Chomsky, N. (1986). Pirates & emperors : international terrorism in the real world (1st ed.). New York, 
NY: Claremont Research & Publications. 
Chong, D. (1991). Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Christopher, W. (2001). Chances of a lifetime. New York, NY: Scribner. 
Christopher, W., & Kreisberg, P. H. (1985). American hostages in Iran : the conduct of a crisis. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Chubin, S., & Tripp, C. (1988). Iran and Iraq at war. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Cimbala, S. J. (1998). Coercive military strategy (1st ed.). College Station, TX: Texas A&M University 
Press. 
Cole, J. R., & Keddie, N. R. (1986). Shi’ism and social protest. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Cook, A. H., & Rawshandil, J. (2009). The United States and Iran : policy challenges and opportunities 
(1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cookson, C. (March 29, 2011). Emerging world on science fast-track. Financial Times.  
Cooper, A. S. (2011). The oil kings : how the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia changed the balance of power in 
the Middle East. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Copeland, D. C. (1997). Do reputations matter? Security Studies, 7(1), 33-71. doi: 
10.1080/09636419708429333 
Cordesman, A. H. (1987). The Iran-Iraq war and western security, 1984-87 : strategic implications and 
policy options. New York, NY: Jane’s. 
Cordesman, A. H. (1999). Iran’s military forces in transition : conventional threats and weapons of mass 
destruction. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Cordesman, A. H. (2005). Iran’s developing military capabilities. Washington, DC: CSIS Press. 
Cordesman, A. H., & Kleiber, M. (2007). Iran’s military forces and warfighting capabilities : the threat in 
the Northern Gulf. Westport, CO: Praeger Security International. 
Cordesman, A. H., & Seitz, A. C. (2009). Iranian weapons of mass destruction : the birth of a regional 
nuclear arms race? Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International. 
Cordesman, A. H., & Sullivan, W. D. (2007). Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Washington, DC: 
CSIS Press. 
Corner, P. (2009). Popular opinion in totalitarian regimes : fascism, Nazism, Communism. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2000). The sanctions decade : assessing UN strategies in the 1990s. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2002). Smart sanctions : targeting economic statecraft. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
441 
 
Cortright, D., Lopez, G. A., & Gerber, L. (2002). Sanctions and the search for security : challenges to UN 
action. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers. 
Cottam, R. W. (1988). Iran and the United States : a cold war case study. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Coughlin, C. (2009). Khomeini’s ghost : the Iranian revolution and the rise of militant Islam. New York, 
NY: Ecco. 
Covarrubias, J., & Lansford, T. (2007). Strategic interests in the Middle East : opposition and support for 
US foreign policy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Cowen Karp, R. (1991). Security with nuclear weapons? : different perspectives on national security. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Crabtree, S. (February 7, 2012). Iranians Expect to Feel Sanctions. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152510/Iranians-Expect-Feel-Sanctions.aspx 
Craig, G. A., & George, A. L. (1995). Force and statecraft : diplomatic problems of our time (3rd ed.). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Crawford, N., & Klotz, A. (1999). How sanctions work : lessons from South Africa. New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Crist, D. (2012). The twilight war : the secret history of America’s thirty-year conflict with Iran. New 
York, NY: Penguin Press. 
Croft, S. (1996). Strategies of arms control : a history and typology. New York, NY: Manchester 
University Press. 
Cromartie, M. (1993). Might and right after the Cold War : can foreign policy be moral? Washington, DC: 
Ethics and Public Policy Center. 
Cumings, B., Abrahamian, E., & Ma’oz, M. (2004). Inventing the axis of evil : the truth about North 
Korea, Iran, and Syria. New York, NY: New Press. 
Daragahi, B. (October 25, 2009). Top Iran official says West’s nuclear plan a cover-up for theft. Los 
Angeles Times.  
Darwish, A., & Alexander, G. (1991). Unholy Babylon : the secret history of Saddam’s war (1st U.S. ed.). 
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Dashti-Gibson, J., Davis, P., & Radcliff, B. (1997). On the Determinants of the Success of Economic 
Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 608-618. doi: 
10.2307/2111779 
Daugherty, W. J. (2001). In the shadow of the Ayatollah : a CIA hostage in Iran. Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press. 
Davis, J. K., & Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (2013). Anticipating a nuclear Iran : challenges for U.S. security. New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Dawisha, A. I. (1980). Iraq: The West’s opportunity. Foreign Policy(41), pp. 134-153.  
De Vaus, D. A. (2001). Research design in social research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
442 
 
Deibert, R. (2013). Black code : inside the battle for cyberspace. Toronto, Canada: McClelland & Stewart. 
DeSouza, P. J. (2000). Economic strategy and national security : a next generation approach. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Destrée, A. (1989). Belgian - Iranian relations. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/belgian-iranian-relations 
DeYoung, K. (May 15, 2008). Gates: U.S. Should Engage Iran With Incentives, Pressure. The Washington 
Post  
Dobbins, J. (2008). After the Taliban : nation-building in Afghanistan (1st ed.). Washington, DC: Potomac 
Books. 
Dobbins, J. (September 10, 2007). Conference Call with James Dobbins. In G. Rose (Ed.): Council on 
Foreign Relations  
Dobbins, J., Nader, A., Kaye, D. D., & Wehrey, F. M. (2011). Coping with a nuclearizing Iran. Santa 
Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation. 
Dobbs, M. (December 30, 2002). U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup; Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed 
Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds. The Washington Post.  
Domke, W. K. (1988). War and the changing global system. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Donaldson, D. M. (1984). The Shi’ite religion. New York, NY: AMS Press. 
Dowd, M. (August 9, 1989). Iran is reported ready for a deal to recover assets. The New York Times.  
Doxey, M. (1972). International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN 
and Southern Africa. International Organization, 26(3), 527-550. doi: 10.2307/2706130 
Doxey, M. P. (1980). Economic sanctions and international enforcement ([2d ed.). New York, NY: 
Macmillian. 
Doxey, M. P. (1987). International sanctions in contemporary perspective. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan 
Press. 
Draper, T. (1991). A very thin line : the Iran-contra affairs. New York, NY: Hill and Wang. 
Dreazen, Y. (September 30, 2013). Can this man bring Iran to a nuclear deal? The Foreign Policy 
Magazine. 
Drezner, D. W. (2003). The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion. International Organization, 57(3), 643-
659. doi: 10.2307/3594840 
Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice. 
International Studies Review, 13(1), 96-108.  
Drury, A. C. (1998). Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research, 35(4), 497-
509. doi: 10.2307/425755 
Drury, A. C. (2005). Economic sanctions and presidential decisions : models of political rationality. New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
443 
 
Dumbrell, J. (1993). The Carter presidency : a re-evaluation. New York, NY: Manchester University 
Press. 
Dunn Cavelty, M., & Mauer, V. (2010). The Routledge handbook of security studies. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Dunning, T. S. (1998). D’Amato in a China shop: Problems of extraterritoriality with the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 19(1), 
31p.  
Durch, W. J. (2000). Constructing regional security : the role of arms transfers, arms control, and 
reassurance (1st ed.). New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Eckert, P. (November 5, 2009). U.S. tells Iran nuclear deal offer won’t be changed. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/05/us-iran-nuclear-clinton-idUSTRE5A45FK20091105 
Ehteshami, A., & Zweiri, M. (2008). Iran’s foreign policy : from Khatami to Ahmadinejad (1st ed.). 
Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. 
ElBaradei, M. (2011). The age of deception : nuclear diplomacy in treacherous times. London, UK: 
Bloomsbury. 
ElBaradei, M. (February 22, 2008). Statements of Director General (Transcript 220208) [Press release] 
ElBaradei, M. (November 4, 2009). A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Illusion or Possibility. In R. Haass 
(Ed.). New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations. 
Ellsberg, D. (1966). The theory and practice of blackmail. Santa Manica, CA: The RAND Corporation. 
Engel, R., & Windrem, R. (February 9, 2012 ). Israel teams with terror group to kill Iran’s nuclear 
scientists, U.S. officials tell NBC News. May 22, 2014, from Israel teams with terror group to kill 
Iran’s nuclear scientists, U.S. officials tell NBC News 
Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of power : framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Erdbrink, T. (January 06, 2010). UN Sanctions Hit Hospitals: Iran Running Out of Life-Saving Isotopes. 
Spiegel Online. 
Erdbrink, T. (May 5, 2010). Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps expands role in sanctions-hit oil sector. The 
Washington Post  
Erdbrink, T. (October 1, 2009 ). Iranian Opposition Warns Against Stricter Sanctions. The Washington 
Post.  
Erlich, R. W. (2007). The Iran agenda : the real story of U.S. policy and the Middle East crisis. Sausalito, 
CA: PoliPointPress. 
Etzioni, A. (2012). Hot spots : American foreign policy in a post-human-rights world. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Farrall, J. M. (2007). United Nations sanctions and the rule of law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
444 
 
Fayazmanesh, S. (2003). The politics of the US economic sanctions against Iran. Review of radical political 
economics, 35(3), 221-240.  
Fayazmanesh, S. (2008). The United States and Iran : sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
Feaver, P. D., & Lorber, E. B. (2010). Coercive diplomacy and the new financial levers. London, UK: 
Legatum Institute. 
Firebaugh, G. (2008). Seven rules for social research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Fischer, F. (1995). Evaluating public policy. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall Publishers. 
Fisher, G. (1972). Public diplomacy and the behavioral sciences. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press. 
Flaherty, M. P. (1981). Iran : the financial aspects of the hostage settlement agreement. Washington, DC: 
U.S. G.P.O. 
FNA. (October 3, 2009). Suspension of Iran’s Enrichment Activities Excluded from Geneva Talks. May 
22, 2014, from http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8807111350 
FNA. (October 9, 2009). Cleric Terms Geneva Talks Victory for Iran. May 22, 2014, from 
http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8807170905 
FNA. (October 29, 2009). Ahmadinejad: Iran Ready for N. Cooperation. May 22, 2014, from 
http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8808070676 
FNA. (October 30, 2009). IAEA Receives Iran’s Response to N. Fuel Deal. May 22, 2014, from 
http://english2.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8808080732 
FNA. (September 30, 2009). President Terms Geneva Talks Opportunity for West. May 22, 2014, from 
http://english2.farsnews.com/printable.php?nn=8807081571 
Forbis, W. H. (1981). Fall of the Peacock Throne : the story of Iran (1st McGraw-Hill paperback ed.). New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Fowler, F. J. (2009). Survey research methods (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Foyle, D. C. (1999). Counting the public in : presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy. New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press. 
Freedman, L. (1998). Strategic coercion : concepts and cases. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Frei, D., & Ruloff, D. (1989). Handbook of foreign policy analysis : methods for practical application in 
foreign policy planning, strategic planning, and business risk assessment. Boston, MA: M. 
Nijhoff. 
French, J. R., & Raven, B. (2002). The bases of social power. Modern classics of leadership, 2, 309-326.  
Friedman, A. (1993). Spider’s web : the secret history of how the White House illegally armed Iraq. New 
York, NY: Bantam Books. 
Friedman, G. (2004). America’s secret war : inside the hidden worldwide struggle between America and its 
enemies (1st ed.). New York, NY: Doubleday. 
445 
 
Friedman, T. L. (May 14, 2008). The new Cold War. The The New York Times.  
Fuhrmann, M. (2012). Atomic assistance how “atoms for peace” programs cause nuclear insecurity 
Cornell studies in security affairs (pp. 1 online resource (xviii, 319 p.)).   
Gallagher, N. W. (1999). The politics of verification. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Galtung, J. (1967). On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of 
Rhodesia. World Politics, 19(3), 378-416. doi: 10.2307/2009785 
Ganji, B. (2006). Politics of confrontation : the foreign policy of the USA and revolutionary Iran. New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Garcia, D. (2011). Disarmament diplomacy and human security : regimes, norms, and moral progress in 
international relations. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Gartzke, E., Li, Q., & Boehmer, C. (2001). Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and 
international conflict. International Organization, 55(2), 391-438.  
Gasiorowski, M. J., & Byrne, M. (2004). Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran (1st ed.). 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
Geddes, B. (1999). Authoritarian breakdown: Empirical test of a game theoretic argument. Paper presented 
at the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta. 
Geddes, B. (2003). Paradigms and sand castles : theory building and research design in comparative 
politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Geddes, B., & Zaller, J. (1989). Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal 
of Political Science, 33(2), 319-347. doi: 10.2307/2111150 
Genugten, W. J. M. v., & Groot, G. A. d. (1999). United Nations sanctions : effectiveness and effects, 
especially in the field of human rights ; a multi-disciplinary approach. Antwerpen, Belgium: 
Intersentia. 
George, A. L. (1991). Forceful persuasion : coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war. Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press. 
George, A. L. (2006). On foreign policy : unfinished business. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
George, A. L., Hall, D. K., & Simons, W. E. (1971). The limits of coercive diplomacy; Laos, Cuba, 
Vietnam. Boston, MA: Little. 
George, A. L., & Simons, W. E. (1994). The Limits of coercive diplomacy (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Gerami, N. (2014). Leadership divided? The domestic politics of Iran’s nuclear debate. Washington, DC: 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Gheissari, A., & Nasr, S. V. R. (2006). Democracy in Iran : history and the quest for liberty. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
446 
 
Ghods, M. R. (1989). Iran in the twentieth century : a political history. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner 
Publishers. 
Gill, S. (2003). Power and resistance in the new world order. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Giumelli, F. (2011). Coercing, constraining and signalling : explaining UN and EU sanctions after the 
Cold War. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. 
Giustozzi, A. (2011). The art of coercion : the primitive accumulation and management of coercive power. 
London, UK: Hurst. 
Glaser, C. L. (1997). The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171-201. doi: 
10.2307/25054031 
Gold, D. (2009). The rise of nuclear Iran : how Tehran defies the West. Washington, DC: Regnery 
Publications. 
Gonzalez, N. (2007). Engaging Iran : the rise of a Middle East powerhouse and America’s strategic 
choice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. 
Goulka, J., Hansell, L., Wilke, E., & Larson, J. (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: 
The RAND Corporation. 
Gray, C. S. (1999). Modern strategy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Gray, C. S. (2006). Strategy and history : essays on theory and practice. London, UK: Routledge. 
Green, J. D., Wehrey, F. M., & Wolf, C. (2009). Understanding Iran. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 
Corporation. 
Greenwald, G. (2007). A tragic legacy : how a good vs. evil mentality destroyed the Bush presidency (1st 
ed.). New York, NY: Crown Publishers. 
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gwertzman, B. (April 26, 1984). U.S. urges ban on atom sales to Iran. The New York Times.  
Haass, R. (1998). Economic sanctions and American diplomacy. New York, NY: Council on Foreign 
Relations. 
Hafezi, P. (October 26, 2009). Iran MP calls for gradual delivery of uranium abroad. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/26/us-iran-nuclear-fuel-idUSTRE59P23T20091026 
Haley, P. E. (2006). Strategies of dominance : the misdirection of U.S. foreign policy. Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Halm, H. (1997). Shi’a Islam : from religion to revolution. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers. 
Hannum, H. (1990). Autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination : the accommodation of conflicting 
rights. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Harris, S., & Aid, M. M. (2013). CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran. Foreign 
Policy Magazine.  
 
447 
 
Hart, R. A., Jr. (2000). Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions. Political Research 
Quarterly, 53(2), 267-284. doi: 10.2307/449281 
Harvey, F. P. (1999). Practicing Coercion: Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and 
Comparative Methods. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(6), 840-871. doi: 10.2307/174607 
Hashmi, S. H. (1997). State sovereignty : change and persistence in international relations. University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Haugaard, M., & Lentner, H. H. (2006). Hegemony and power : consensus and coercion in contemporary 
politics. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Heiberg, M. (1994). Subduing sovereignty : sovereignty and the right to intervene. London, UK: Pinter 
Publishers. 
Henriksen, T. H. (2012). America and the rogue states (1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hersh, S. M. (2006). The Iran Plans. New Yorker, 82(9), 8p.  
Herz, J. H. (1950). Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2(2), 157-180. doi: 
10.2307/2009187 
Herz, J. H. (1959). International politics in the atomic age. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Hewitt, J., Wilkenfeld, J., & Gurr, T. R. (2010). Peace and Conflict 2010. College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management at University of Maryland. 
Hibbs, M. (August 4, 2003). U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6. Platts NuclearFuel. 
Higgs, R. (1987). Crisis and leviathan : critical episodes in the growth of American government. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Hill, T., & Lewicki, P. (2007). Statistics: Methods and Applications. Tulsa, OK: StatSoft. 
Hinderstein, C. (2010). Cultivating confidence : verification, monitoring, and enforcement for a world free 
of nuclear weapons. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 
Hindess, B. (1996). Discourses of power : from Hobbes to Foucault. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Hitchens, C. (1993). For the sake of argument : essays and minority reports. New York, NY: Verso. 
Hoekema, D. A. (1986). Rights and wrongs : coercion, punishement, and the state. Cranbury, NJ: 
Susquehanna University Press. 
Hoffmann, F. (1967). The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis. Journal of Peace 
Research, 4(2), 140-160. doi: 10.2307/423243 
Hogwood, B. W., & Gunn, L. A. (1984). Policy analysis for the real world. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Homans, G. C. (1974). Social behavior; its elementary forms (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace. 
Horne, C. D. (2009). Opinion and Policy Beyond the Democratic West: The Case of Iran. Paper presented 
at the APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 
448 
 
Horne, C. D., & Bakker, R. (2009). Public opinion in an Autocratic Regime: An Analysis of Iranian Public 
Opinion Data 2006-2008. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois (March 2009). 
Hosenball, M. (2005). Mixed Signals on MEK. Newsweek, 145(15), 1/2p.  
Houghton, D. P. (2001). US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hovi, J., Huseby, R., & Sprinz, D. F. (1998). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work? International 
Security, 23(1).  
Howard, R. (2004). Iran in crisis? : nuclear ambitions and the American response. New York, NY: ZED 
Books. 
Howson, R., & Smith, K. (2008). Hegemony : studies in consensus and coercion. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Hudson, V. M. (1997). Culture & foreign policy. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers. 
Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered (2nd ed.). 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic sanctions reconsidered (3rd ed.). 
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
Hunter, S. (1990). Iran and the world : continuity in a revolutionary decade. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
Hunter, S. (2010). Iran’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet era : resisting the new international order. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger. 
Hurst, S. (2009). The United States and Iraq since 1979 : hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh, UK: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Huth, P. K. (1997). Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment. Security Studies, 
7(1), 72-99. doi: 10.1080/09636419708429334 
Huyser, R. E. (1986). Mission to Tehran (1st U.S. ed.). New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Ignatius, D. (December 20, 2013 ). Iran copes with sanctions but wants to bloom. The Washington Post.  
Ignatius, D. (May 31, 2009). Change in the Air in Iran. The Washington Post.  
Indyk, M. (1993). The Clinton administration’s approach to the Middle East Soref Symposium. 
Washington, DC: he Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Indyk, M. (2009). Innocent abroad : an intimate account of American peace diplomacy in the Middle East 
(1st Simon & Schuster hardcover ed.). New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2005). Iran’s strategic weapons programmes : a net 
assessment. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
449 
 
Ioannides, C. P. (1984). America’s Iran : injury and catharsis. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
Jackson, R. H. (2007). Sovereignty : evolution of an idea. Malden, MA: Polity. 
Jacobsen, C. G. (1982). The nuclear era, its history, its implications. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager. 
Jafarzadeh, A. (2007). The Iran threat : President Ahmadinejad and the coming nuclear crisis (1st ed.). 
New York, NY: Palgrave. 
Jahn, G. (February 24, 2010). In letter, Iran reaffirms nuclear swap terms US rejected. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/02/24/in_letter_iran_reaffirms_nucl
ear_swap_terms_us_rejected/ 
Jakobsen, P. V. (1998). Western use of coercive diplomacy after the Cold War : a challenge for theory and 
practice. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Jasjit, S., & Bernauer, T. (1993). Security of Third World countries. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth. 
Javadi-Amoli, A. (2012). Kawthar of Karbala. Qom, Iran: Asra Publishing Center. 
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., Mitchell, N. J., & Herron, K. G. (2004). Foreign and Domestic Policy Belief 
Structures in the U.S. and British Publics. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(3), 287-309. doi: 
10.2307/3176210 
Jensen, L. (1982). Explaining foreign policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Jervis, R. (1968). Hypotheses on Misperception. World Politics, 20(3), 454-479. doi: 10.2307/2009777 
Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167-214. doi: 
10.2307/2009958 
Jervis, R. (2001). Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? Journal of Cold War Studies, 3(1), 36-60.  
Jett, D. C. (2008). Why American foreign policy fails : unsafe at home and despised abroad (1st ed.). New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jing, C., Kaempfer, W. H., & Anton, D. L. (2003). Instrument Choice and the Effectiveness of International 
Sanctions: A Simultaneous Equations Approach. Journal of Peace Research, 40(5), 519-535. doi: 
10.2307/3648359 
Job, B. (1992). The Insecurity dilemma : national security of Third World states. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner 
Publishers. 
Johnson, J. L., Kartchner, K. M., & Larsen, J. A. (2009). Strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction 
: culturally based insights into comparative national security policymaking (1st ed.). New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Johnson, R. (2011). The Iran-Iraq War. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Johnston, A. I. (1995). Cultural realism : strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
450 
 
Jones, J. (2011). The American rhetorical construction of the Iranian nuclear threat. New York, NY: 
Continuum. 
Judis, J. B. (2004). The folly of empire : what George W. Bush could learn from Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson. New York, NY: Scribner. 
Kaempfer, W. H., & Anton, D. L. (1988). The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public 
Choice Approach. The American Economic Review, 78(4), 786-793. doi: 10.2307/1811175 
Kamrava, M. (2012). The nuclear question in the Middle East. London, UK: Hurst & Co. 
Karen, M. (December 13, 2005). Security key to Iran accord, ElBaradei says. The Associated Press.  
Karon, T. (July 26, 2006). Condi in Diplomatic Disneyland. Time. 
Katouzian, H. (2009). The Persians : ancient, medieval, and modern Iran. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Katzman, K. (2013). Iran Sanctions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Katzman, K. (2013). Iran: U.S. concerns and policy responses. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service. 
Katzman, K. (2014). Iran Sanctions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Kazemi Moussavi, A. (1996). Religious authority in shi’ite Islam : from the office of mufti to the institution 
of marja’. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization. 
Keddie, N. R. (1969). Iranian Politics 1900-1905: Background to Revolution. Middle Eastern Studies, 5(1), 
3-31. doi: 10.2307/4282272 
Keddie, N. R. (1990). Neither East nor West : Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Keddie, N. R. (2006). Modern Iran : roots and results of revolution (Updated ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Keddie, N. R., & Matthee, R. P. (2002). Iran and the surrounding world : interactions in culture and 
cultural politics. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. 
Keddie, N. R., & Richard, Y. (1981). Roots of revolution : an interpretive history of modern Iran. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Kedourie, E., & Kedourie, S. (1980). Towards a modern Iran : studies in thought, politics, and society. 
Totowa, NJ: Cass. 
Kelsay, J. (2007). Arguing the just war in Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kemp, G. (1994). Forever enemies? : American policy & the Islamic Republic of Iran. Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Kemp, G., & Gay, J. A. (2013). War with Iran : political, military and economic consequences. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
451 
 
Kessler, G. (June 18, 2006). In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran’s Offer of Dialogue; Some Officials Lament Lost 
Opportunity. The Washington Post.  
Khamenei, S. A. (June 1989 - Present). Lectures and Statements. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanatArchive 
Khomeini, R. (1993). Sahifeh Nur. Tehran, Iran: Center for Collection and Publication of Imam 
Khomeini’s Works. 
Kim, S. Y. (1998). Ties that Bind: The Role of Trade in International Conflict Processes 1950-1992. (PhD 
Dissertation), Yale University.    
Kimenyi, M. S., & Mbaku, J. M. (1999). Institutions and collective choice in developing countries : 
applications of the theory of public choice. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry : scientific inference in qualitative 
research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
King, R. (1987). The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq war : a Ford Foundation conference report. New 
York, NY: Ford Foundation. 
Kinzer, S. (2010). Reset : Iran, Turkey, and America’s future (1st ed.). New York, NY: Times Books. 
Kinzer, S. (December 3, 2011). Iran’s First Great Satan Was England. The New York Times.  
Kinzer, S. (October 2008). Inside Iran’s Fury: Scholars trace the nation’s antagonism to its history of 
domination by foreign powers. Smithsonian Magazine  
Kirchner, E. J., & Sperling, J. (2010). National security cultures : patterns of global governance. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Kissinger, H. (1957). Nuclear weapons and foreign policy ([1st ed.). New York, NY: Council on Foreign 
Relations. 
Knecht, T., & Weatherford, M. S. (2006). Public opinion and foreign policy: the stages of presidential 
decision making. International Studies Quarterly, 50(3), 705-727.  
Knorr, K. (1977). Is International Coercion Waning or Rising? International Security, 1(4), 92-110. doi: 
10.2307/2538625 
Kohlberg, E. (1991). Belief and law in Imami Shiism. Aldershot, UK: Variorum. 
Krepon, M. (2003). Cooperative threat reduction, missile defense, and the nuclear future (1st ed.). New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kuhi-Kermani, H. (1952). A  Shahr var-i 1  0 t  f ji ah-i    arb yj n va  anj n. Tehran, Iran: Mazaheri 
Publications. 
Kull, S. (2007). Declining approval for American foreign policy in Muslim countries: Does it make it more 
difficult to fight Al-Qaeda? Washington, DC: Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives. 
Kull, S. (2011). Feeling betrayed : the roots of Muslim anger at America. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
452 
 
Kull, S., Ramsay, C., Weber, S., & Lewis, E. (2010). An analysis of multiple polls of the Iranian public. 
Washington, DC: The Program on International Policy Attitudes. 
Kull, S., Ramsay, C., Weber, S., Lewis, E., & Mohseni, E. (2008). Public opinion in Iran with comparisons 
to American public opinion. Washington, DC: The Program on International Policy Attitudes / 
Search for Common Ground. 
Kull, S., Ramsay, C., Weber, S., Lewis, E., Mohseni, E., Speck, M., . . . Brouwer, M. (January 24, 2007). 
Public opinion in Iran and America on key international issues. Washington, DC: The Program on 
International Policy Attitudes / Search for Common Ground. 
Kupchan, C. (2010). How enemies become friends : the sources of stable peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies : the social consequences of preference falsification. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kydd, A. H. (2005). Trust and mistrust in international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Lacy, D., & Emerson, M. S. N. (2004). A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of 
Preferences, Information, and Threats. The Journal of Politics, 66(1), 25-42. doi: 
10.2307/3449771 
Lancaster, J. (May 23, 1998). Saudi Absolves Iran of 1996 Bombing That Killed 19 U.S. Soldiers. The 
Washington Post.  
Lando, B. (2007). Web of deceit : the history of Western complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to 
George W. Bush. New York, NY: Other Press. 
Larsen, J. A., & Wirtz, J. J. (2009). Arms control and cooperative security. London, UK: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Lebovic, J. H. (2007). Deterring international terrorism and rogue states : US national security policy 
after 9/11. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Ledeen, M. A., & Lewis, W. H. (1981). Debacle, the American failure in Iran (1st ed.). New York, NY: 
Random House. 
Lektzian, D. J., & Sprecher, C. M. (2007). Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict. American Journal 
of Political Science, 51(2), 415-431. doi: 10.2307/4620074 
Lenczowski, G. (1972). Soviet advances in the Middle East. Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Lenczowski, G. (1978). Iran under the Pahlavis. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 
Lenczowski, G. (1990). American presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Lepgold, J., & Weiss, T. G. (1998). Collective conflict management and changing world politics. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press. 
Leverett, F. L., & Leverett, H. M. (2013). Going to Tehran : why the United States must come to terms with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (1st U.S. ed.). New York, NY: Metropolitan Books. 
453 
 
Lichbach, M. I. (1996). The cooperator’s dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Limbert, J. W. (2009). Negotiating with Iran : wrestling the ghosts of history. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Institute of Peace Press. 
Lindsay, J. M. (1986). Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination. International Studies 
Quarterly, 30(2), 153-173. doi: 10.2307/2600674 
Linzer, D. (August 6, 2005). Iran Discounts Latest Nuclear Proposal; Official Calls ‘Absurd’ a European 
Offer Meant to Halt Fuel-Enrichment Steps. The Washington Post.  
Linzer, D. (May 5, 2005). Iran Says Nuclear Plans on Hold; Leaders Are Frustrated, but Still Hope for 
Progress in Talks. The Washington Post.  
Litwak, R. (2000). Rogue states and U.S. foreign policy : containment after the Cold War. Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Litwak, R. (2007). Regime change : U.S. strategy through the prism of 9/11. Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press. 
Litwak, R. (2012). Outlier states : American strategies to change, contain, or engage regimes. Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Looney, R. E. (2009). Handbook of US-Middle East relations : formative factors and regional perspectives. 
London, UK: Routledge. 
Lord, C. (2006). Losing hearts and minds? : public diplomacy and strategic influence in the age of terror. 
Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. 
Loschky, J. (November 6, 2013). Most Iranians Say Sanctions Hurting Their Livelihoods. May 22, 2014, 
from http://www.gallup.com/poll/165743/iranians-say-sanctions-hurting-livelihoods.aspx 
MacFarquhar, N. (May 29, 2005). Across Iran, Nuclear Power Is a Matter of Pride. The New York Times.  
Mackey, S. (2002). The reckoning : Iraq and the legacy of Saddam Hussein (1st ed.). New York, NY: 
Norton. 
Madani, S. J. (1999). Contemporary Political History of Iran. Qom, Iran: Islamic Publications Press. 
Mærli, M. B., & Lodgaard, S. (2007). Nuclear proliferation and international security. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Mafinezam, A., & Mehrabi, A. (2008). Iran and its place among nations. Westport, CO: Praeger. 
Majchrzak, A., & Markus, M. L. (2013). Methods for policy research : taking socially responsible action 
(2nd Edition. ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Majd, M. G. (2003). The great American plunder of Persia’s antiquities, 19 5-1941. Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America. 
Majd, M. G. (2003). The great famine and genocide in Persia, 1917-1919. Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America. 
Majlisi, M. B. (1983). Bihar al-anwar. Beirut: Al-Wafa.  
454 
 
Maloney, S. (2008). Iran’s long reach : Iran as a pivotal state in the Muslim world. Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Mangold, P. (1990). National security and international relations. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Manheim, J. B. (1994). Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy : the evolution of 
influence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Mansfield, E. D. (1994). Power, trade, and war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Manza, J., Cook, F. L., & Page, B. I. (2002). Navigating public opinion : polls, policy, and the future of 
American democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Marinov, N. (2005). Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders? American Journal of Political 
Science, 49(3), 564-576. doi: 10.2307/3647732 
Marshall, J., Scott, P. D., & Haapiseva-Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra connection : secret teams and 
covert operations in the Reagan era. Boston, MA: South End Press. 
McDermott, R. (1998). Risk-taking in international politics : prospect theory in American foreign policy. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
McFarlane, R. C., & Smardz, Z. (1994). Special trust. New York, NY: Cadell & Davies. 
McLellan, D. S. (1985). Cyrus Vance. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. 
McNutt, P. (2002). The economics of public choice (2nd ed.). Northampton, MA: E. Elgar Pub. 
Menashri, D. (1990). The Iranian revolution and the Muslim world. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Mercer, J. (1997). Reputation and rational deterrence theory. Security Studies, 7(1), 100-113. doi: 
10.1080/09636419708429335 
Milani, A. (2010). The myth of the great Satan : a new look at America’s relations with Iran. Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press. 
Milani, M. M. (1988). The making of Iran’s Islamic revolution : from monarchy to Islamic republic. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Millspaugh, A. C. (1946). Americans in Persia. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Mohammed, A., & Morgan, D. (January 11, 2007). Senators fear Iraq war may spill to Iran, Syria. The 
Washington Post.  
Mohr, L. B. (1995). Impact analysis for program evaluation (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Mohseni, E., Gallagher, N. & Ramsay, C. (2014). Iranian Attitudes on Nuclear Negotiations. CISSM. 
Momen, M. (1985). An introduction to Shii Islam : the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi\02BBism. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Monroe, A. D. (1998). Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 62(1), 
6-28. doi: 10.2307/2749715 
455 
 
Morgan, F. E. (2003). Compellence and the strategic culture of imperial Japan : implications for coercive 
diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Morgan, T. C., & Miers, A. C. (1999). When Threats Succeed: A Formal Model of the Threat and Use of 
Sanctions. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society Ann Arbor, MI.  
Morgan, T. C., & Schwebach, V. L. (1997). Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in 
International Crises. International Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 27-50. doi: 10.2307/2600906 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace (4th ed.). New York, 
NY: Knopf. 
Moses, R. L. (1996). Freeing the hostages : reexamining U.S.-Iranian negotiations and Soviet policy, 
1979-1981. Pittsburgh, PN: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Mousavian, S. H. (2012). The Iranian nuclear crisis : a memoir. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. 
Moussawi, I. (2011). Shi’ism and the democratisation process in Iran : with a focus on Wilayat al-Faqih. 
London, UK: Saqi. 
Mullen, B., & Goethals, G. R. (1987). Theories of group behavior. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
Mullen, M. (2009). Strategic communication: Getting back to basics. Joint Forces Quarterly, 55(4), 2-4.  
Nader, A., Thaler, D. E., & Bohandy, S. R. (2011). The next supreme leader : succession in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 
Nagel, S. S. (1998). Public policy evaluation : making super-optimum decisions. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. 
Nasr, S. H., Dabashi, H., & Nasr, S. V. R. (1988). Shiism : doctrines, thought, and spirituality. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press. 
Nasseri, L. (August 1, 2006). Iran’s Ahmadinejad Says Nuclear Fuel Is a ‘Right’. Deseret Morning News 
(Salt Lake City).  
Nathan, J. A. (2002). Soldiers, statecraft, and history : coercive diplomacy and international order. 
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2000). In-flight Breakup Over The Atlantic Ocean, Trans World 
Airlines Flight 800, Boeing 747-131, N93119, Near East Moriches, New York, July 17, 1996. 
Washington, DC. 
Navazani, B. (2010). Iran and the world : some contemporary developments. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars. 
Newsom, D. D. (1996). The public dimension of foreign policy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Nincic, M. (2010). Getting what you want: positive inducements in international relations. International 
Security, 35(1), 138-183.  
Nincic, M. (2011). The logic of positive engagement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Nincic, M., & Wallensteen, P. (1983). Dilemmas of economic coercion : sanctions in world politics. New 
York, NY: Praeger. 
456 
 
Nolan, J. E., & MacEachin, D. (2006). Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic Surprise    
Nooruddin, I. (2002). Modeling selection bias in studies of sanctions efficacy. International Interactions, 
28(1), 59-75.  
Nossal, K. R. (1989). International Sanctions as International Punishment. International Organization, 
43(2), 301-322. doi: 10.2307/2706704 
Nye, J. S. J. (2004). Soft power : the means to success in world politics (1st ed.). New York, NY: Public 
Affairs. 
Nye, J. S. J. (2004). Soft Power and American Foreign Policy. Political Science Quarterly, 119(2), 255-
270. doi: 10.2307/20202345 
Nye, J. S. J. (2010). Restoring America’s reputation in the world and why it matters. Washington, DC: 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
O’Leary, M. K. (1975). Quantitative techniques in foreign policy analysis and forecasting. New York, NY: 
Praeger. 
Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Olson, W. (1989). The Genesis of the Anglo-Persian Agreement 1919. Javad Sheykh al-Islami, Sima-ye 
Ahmad Shah, Tehran, Iran, 1.  
Oneal, J. R., Oneal, F. H., Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1996). The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, 
Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85. Journal of Peace Research, 33(1), 11-28. doi: 
10.2307/425131 
Oneal, J. R., & Ray, J. L. (1997). New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic 
Interdependence, 1950-85. Political Research Quarterly, 50(4), 751-775. doi: 10.2307/448985 
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (1997). Escaping the War Trap: An Evaluation of the Liberal Peace Within an 
Expected-Utility Framework, 1950-92. Paper presented at the 38th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada.  
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (1999). Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still 
Reduces Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 423-442. doi: 10.2307/425297 
O’Sullivan, M. L. (2001). The politics of dismantling containment. Washington Quarterly, 24(1), 65-76.  
O’Sullivan, M. L. (2003). Shrewd sanctions : statecraft and state sponsors of terrorism. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Paarlberg, R. L. (1978). Diplomatic dispute, U.S. conflict with Iran, Japan, and Mexico. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Center for International Affairs. 
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1983). Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. The American Political Science 
Review, 77(1), 175-190. doi: 10.2307/1956018 
457 
 
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The rational public : fifty years of trends in Americans’ policy 
preferences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Pahre, R. (1998). Domestic Politics, Trade Policy, and Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Model with 
Application to United States-Chinese Relations. Paper presented at the Constituency Interests and 
United States Trade Policy, The University of Michigan.  
Panah, M. (2007). The Islamic republic and the world : global dimensions of the Iranian revolution. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Paolucci, H. (1991). Iran, Israel, and the United States : an American foreign policy background study. 
Whitestone, NY: Griffon House Publications. 
Pape, R. A. (1996). Bombing to win : air power and coercion in war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22(2), 90-136. doi: 
10.2307/2539368 
Pape, R. A. (1998). Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work. International Security, 23(1), 66-77. doi: 
10.2307/2539263 
Parker, G. (March 26, 2014). US ‘bullying’ UK banks and hindering legal trade with Iran. Financial Times.  
Parry, R. (1993). Trick or treason : the October surprise mystery. Lanham, MD: Sheridan Square Press. 
Parsi, T. (2007). Treacherous alliance : the secret dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Patchen, M. (1988). Resolving disputes between nations : coercion or conciliation? Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Patrikarakos, D. (2012). Nuclear Iran : the birth of an atomic state. New York, NY: I. B. Tauris. 
Patton, P. (1919). Why the Peace Conference Should Requite Persia’s Wrongs. Paris, France: George 
Cadet. 
Pedatzur, R. (2008). Checking Public Support for Nuclear Policy – the Inevitable Results. Contemporary 
Security Policy, 29(3), 577-581. doi: 10.1080/13523260802532201 
Peimani, H. (1999). Iran and the United States : the rise of the west Asian regional grouping. Westport, 
CT: Praeger. 
Pelletiere, S. C. (1992). The Iran-Iraq War : chaos in a vacuum. New York, NY: Praeger. 
Pew Research Center. (July 18, 2013 ). America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s May 
22, 2014, from http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Global-Attitudes-Project-
Balance-of-Power-Report-FINAL-July-18-2013.pdf 
Pew Research Center. (June 11, 2013). Global Views of Iran Overwhelmingly Negative May 22, 2014, 
from http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Iran-Report-FINAL-
June-11-2013.pdf 
Picco, G. (1999). Man without a gun : one diplomat’s secret struggle to free the hostages, fight terrorism, 
and end a war (1st ed.). New York, NY: Times Books. 
458 
 
Pinault, D. (1992). The Shiites : ritual and popular piety in a Muslim community. New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Pirseyedi, B. (2013). Arms control and Iranian foreign policy : diplomacy of discontent. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Polk, W. R. (2009). Understanding Iran : everything you need to know, from Persia to the Islamic 
Republic, from Cyrus to Ahmadinejad. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Pollack, K. M. (2004). The Persian puzzle : the conflict between Iran and America (1st ed.). New York, 
NY: Random House. 
Poneman, D. (1982). Nuclear power in the developing world. Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin. 
Porter, G. (2014). Manufactured crisis : the untold story of the iran nuclear scare. Charlottesville, VA: Just 
World Books. 
Potter, L. G., & Sick, G. (2004). Iran, Iraq, and the legacies of war (1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Precht, H. (2004). The Iranian Revolution: An Oral History with Henry Precht, Then State Department 
Desk Officer. Middle East Journal, 58(1), 9-31. doi: 10.2307/4329972 
Quinn, A. (February 09, 2010). U.S. Unveils Offer To Help Iran Get Medical Isotopes. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Unveils_Offer_To_Help_Iran_Get_Medical_Isotopes/1953423.h
tml 
Rabkin, Y. M. (June 30, 2006). Iran: Disinformation that pays. Moscow News (Russia).  
Rafizadeh, M. (1987). Witness : from the Shah to the secret arms deal : an insider’s account of U.S. 
involvement in Iran (1st ed.). New York, NY: W. Morrow. 
Rajayi, F. (1993). The Iran-Iraq war : the politics of agression. Gainesville, FL: University Press of 
Florida. 
Rajayi, F. (1997). Iranian perspectives on the Iran-Iraq war. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. 
Ramazani, R. K. (1986). Revolutionary Iran : challenge and response in the Middle East. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Rawshandil, J., & Lean, N. C. (2011). Iran, Israel, and the United States : regime security vs. political 
legitimacy. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. 
Reardon, R. J. (2012). Containing Iran : strategies for addressing the Iranian nuclear challenge. Santa 
Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation. 
Renshon, S. A. (1996). The psychological assessment of presidential candidates. New York, NY: New 
York University Press. 
Renshon, S. A., & Larson, D. W. (2003). Good judgment in foreign policy : theory and application. 
Lanham, DM: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Renwick, R. (1981). Economic sanctions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International 
Affairs. 
459 
 
Reut, E. (April 26, 1984). Possibility of treaty violation cited U.S. seeks nuclear boycott of Iran. The Globe 
and Mail.  
Reuveny, R., & Heejoon, K. (1996). International Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger 
Causality. American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 943-970. doi: 10.2307/2111801 
Rhodes, E. (1989). Power and madness : the logic of nuclear coercion. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press. 
Rice-Oxley, M. (2006). US cautions Europe on Iran investment. Christian Science Monitor, 98(209), 1/2p.  
Richard, Y. (1995). Shiite Islam : polity, ideology, and creed. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Ridgeon, L. V. J. (2012). Shi’i Islam and identity : religion, politics and change in the global Muslim 
community. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris. 
Riedel, B. (Summer 2013). Lessons from America’s First War with Iran. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 
37(2), 101.  
Risse-Kappen, T. (1988). The zero option : INF, West Germany, and arms control. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 
Ritter, S. (2006). Target Iran : the truth about the White House’s plans for regime change. New York, NY: 
Nation Books. 
Roberts, B. (1996). Weapons proliferation and world order : after the Cold War. Boston, MA: Kluwer Law 
International. 
Robinson, P. F. (2008). Dictionary of international security. Malden, MA: Polity. 
Ronzitti, N. (1985). Rescuing nationals abroad through military coercion and intervention on grounds of 
humanity. Boston, MA: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 
Rose, E. A. (2005). From a Punitive to a Bargaining Model of Sanctions: Lessons from Iraq. International 
Studies Quarterly, 49(3), 459-479. doi: 10.2307/3693603 
Rothgeb, J. M. (1993). Defining power : influence and force in the contemporary international system. 
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Rouhani, H. (2013). National security and nuclear diplomacy. Tehran, Iran: Center for Strategic Research 
at the Expediency Council. 
Rouhani, H. (May 09, 2006). Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Way Out. Time. 
Ryan, D., & Kiely, P. (2009). America and Iraq : policy-making, intervention and regional politics. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Ryan, P. B. (1985). The Iranian rescue mission : why it failed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 
Saad-Ghorayeb, A. (2002). Hi bu’llah : politics and religion. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. 
Sachedina, A. A. (1988). The just ruler (al-sultan al-adil) in Shiite Islam : the comprehensive authority of 
the jurist in Imamite jurisprudence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Salah, M. (2005). The unveiling: Roots, reactions, and consequences. Tehran, Iran: Political Science and 
460 
 
Research Institute. 
Sanger, D. E. (June 1, 2012). Obama order sped up wave of cyberattacks against Iran. The New York Times.  
Sanger, D. E., & Landler, M. (May 18, 2010). Major Powers Have Deal on Sanctions for Iran. The New 
York Times.  
Sartori, A. E. (2005). Deterrence by diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Savoie, D. J. (2010). Power : where is it? Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Scheipers, S. (2009). Negotiating sovereignty and human rights : international society and the 
International Criminal Court. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior (1st ed.). New York, NY: Norton. 
Schelling, T. C. (2008). Arms and influence (2008 ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Schiff, Z. e. (2006). Israel’s War with Iran. Foreign Affairs, 85(6), 23-31. doi: 10.2307/20032140 
Schreiber, A. P. (1973). Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Economic Measures 
Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic. World Politics, 25(3), 387-413. doi: 10.2307/2010117 
Sciolino, E. (1991). The outlaw state : Saddam Hussein’s quest for power and the Gulf crisis. New York, 
NY: Wiley. 
Selden, Z. A. (1999). Economic sanctions as instruments of American foreign policy. Westport, CT: 
Praeger. 
Seliktar, O. (2000). Failing the crystal ball test : the Carter administration and the fundamentalist 
revolution in Iran. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Seliktar, O. (2012). Navigating Iran : from Carter to Obama (1st ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Sharabi, H. (1988). The Next Arab decade : alternative futures. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Sheehan, M. (2005). International security : an analytical survey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Shen, D. (2008). Can Sanctions Stop Proliferation? Washington Quarterly, 31(3), 89-100.  
Shenon, P. (April 29, 1999). U.S. eases policy on some sanctions. The New York Times.  
Shomali, M. A. (2010). Shi’i Islam : origins, faith & practices. London, UK: Islamic College for Advanced 
Studies Press. 
Sick, G. (1985). All fall down : America’s tragic encounter with Iran (1st ed.). New York, NY: Random 
House. 
Sick, G. (1991). October surprise : America’s hostages in Iran and the election of Ronald Reagan (1st ed.). 
New York, NY: Times Books. 
461 
 
Siegel, J., & Barforoush, S. (2013). Media coverage of Iran’s nuclear program. College Park, MD: Center 
for International and Security Studies at Maryalnd. 
Sigal, L. V. (1998). Disarming strangers : nuclear diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Simons, G. L. (1999). Imposing economic sanctions : legal remedy or genocidal tool? Sterling, VA: Pluto 
Press. 
Slackman, M. (July 30, 2006). Iran hangs in suspense as war offers new strength, and sudden weakness. 
The New York Times.  
Slavin, B. (2007). Bitter friends, bosom enemies : Iran, the U.S., and the twisted path to confrontation (1st 
ed.). New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Smith, T. (1994). America’s mission : the United States and the worldwide struggle for democracy in the 
twentieth century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Smith, T. (May 17, 1981). Putting the hostages’ lives first. The New York Times.  
Snyder, C. A. (1999). Contemporary security and strategy. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Sofaer, A. D., & Sofaer, A. D. (2010). The best defense? : legitimacy and preventive force. Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press. 
Solingen, E. (2007). Nuclear logics : contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Solingen, E. (2012). Sanctions, statecraft, and nuclear proliferation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Solomon, H. (2008). Challenges to global security : geopolitics and power in an age of transition. New 
York, NY: I.B. Tauris. 
Springborg, R. (1990). Origins of the Gulf crisis. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 44(3), 221-
235.  
St. Marie, J. J., & Naghshpour, S. (2011). Revolutionary Iran and the United States : low-intensity conflict 
in the Persian Gulf. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Starkey, B., Boyer, M. A., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2005). Negotiating a complex world : an introduction to 
international negotiation (2nd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Steinbruner, J. D. (2000). Principles of global security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Steiner, B. H. (2004). Collective preventive diplomacy : a study in international conflict management. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Stimson, J. A., Mackuen, M. B., & Erikson, R. S. (1995). Dynamic Representation. The American Political 
Science Review, 89(3), 543-565. doi: 10.2307/2082973 
Stolberg, S. G. (October 18, 2007). Nuclear-armed Iran risks ‘World War III,’ Bush says. The New York 
Times.  
 
462 
 
Strong, R. A. (2000). Working in the world : Jimmy Carter and the making of American foreign policy. 
Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press. 
Stuckey, M. E. (2008). Jimmy Carter, human rights, and the national agenda (1st ed.). College Station, 
TX: Texas A&M University Press. 
Sullivan, W. H. (1981). Mission to Iran (1st ed.). New York, NY: Norton. 
Takeyh, R. (2006). Hidden Iran : paradox and power in the Islamic Republic (1st ed.). New York, NY: 
Times Books. 
Tarock, A. (1998). The superpowers’ involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Commack, NY: Nova Science 
Publishers. 
Teicher, H., & Teicher, G. R. (1993). Twin pillars to Desert Storm : America’s flawed vision in the Middle 
East from Nixon to Bush. New York, NY: William Morrow and Co. 
Telhami, S. (2004). The stakes : America in the Middle East : the consequences of power and the choice for 
peace (Updated [ed.]. ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Telhami, S. (2013). The world through Arab eyes : Arab public opinion and the reshaping of the Middle 
East. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Telhami, S. (September 6, 2013). Questioning Credibility. Foreign Policy Magazine. 
Terry, J. P. (1982). Iranian Hostages Crisis: International Law & United States Policy, The. JAG J., 32, 31.  
Timmerman, K. R. (1991). The death lobby : how the West armed Iraq. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
Timmerman, K. R. (2005). Countdown to crisis : the coming nuclear showdown with Iran (1st ed.). New 
York, NY: Crown Forum. 
Tourangeau, R., Rips, L. J., & Rasinski, K. A. (2000). The psychology of survey response. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tower, J., Muskie, E., & Scowcroft, B. (1987). The Tower Commission Report. New York, NY: The New 
York Times. 
Treadgold, W. T. (1997). A history of the Byzantine state and society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Truman, H. S. (1956). Memoirs ([1st ed.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
Tucker, R. W. (1985). The nuclear debate : deterrence and the lapse of faith. New York, NY: Holmes & 
Meier. 
Tyler, P. E. (August 18, 2002). Officers say U.S. aided Iraq in war despite use of gas. The New York Times.  
U.S. Department of State. (1943). Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers (Iran). May 22, 
2014, from http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v04 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research. (1987). The United Nations and the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Boston, MA: M. Nijhoff. 
 
463 
 
United Nations News Centre. (July 21, 2011). UN agency foresees increased collaboration with Iran in 
fight against drugs. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=39101 
UPI. (June 6, 2007 ). Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/06/06/Perry-US-eyed-Iran-attack-
after-bombing/UPI-70451181161509/print#ixzz2tdBIXjBl 
US General Accounting Office. (1994). International trade: Issues regarding imposition of an oil embargo 
against Nigeria. Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office. 
US Government Accountability Office. (2007). Iran sanctions: Impact in furthering U.S. objectives is 
unclear and should be reviewed. Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability 
Office. 
Vance, C. R. (1983). Hard choices : critical years in America’s foreign policy. New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Vick, K. (January 23, 2006). In Iran, power written in stone; Visitors to ancient ruins voice pride in 
country, support for peaceful nuclear ambitions. The Washington Post.  
Vincent, R. J. (1974). Nonintervention and international order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Vittor, L. A., & Morrow, J. A. (2010). Shiite Islam : orthodoxy or heterodoxy? (2nd emended and 
amplified ed.). Qum, Iran: Ansariyan Publications. 
Waddington, L. (July 9, 2010). Support Iran’s internal opposition to nuclear proliferation; Regime change 
is the only road to success. The Washington Times.  
Walbridge, L. S. (2001). The most learned of the Shia : the institution of the Marja taqlid. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Walker, R. B. J. (1984). Culture, ideology, and world order. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Wallace, G. P. (2013). Regime type, issues of contention, and economic sanctions: Re-evaluating the 
economic peace between democracies. Journal of Peace Research, 50(4), 479-493. doi: 
10.1177/0022343313482339 
Wallensteen, P. (1968). Characteristics of Economic Sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 5(3), 248-267. 
doi: 10.2307/423276 
Wallensteen, P., & Staibano, C. (2005). International sanctions : between words and wars in the global 
system. New York, NY: Frank Cass. 
Walsh, L. E. (1994). Iran-Contra : the final report. New York, NY: Times Books. 
Walsh, L. E. (1997). Firewall : the Iran-Contra conspiracy and cover-up (1st ed.). New York, NY: Norton. 
Walzer, M. (2006). Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations (4th ed.). New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
Way, C. (1997). Manchester Revisited: A Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of Commercial Liberalism. 
(PhD Dissertation), Stanford University.    
 
464 
 
Wehrey, F. M. (2009). Dangerous but not omnipotent : exploring the reach and limitations of Iranian 
power in the Middle East. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation. 
Weiner, T. (May 31, 1996). Permitting Iran to Arm Bosnia Was Vital, U.S. Envoys Testify. The New York 
Times.  
Weingast, B. R., & Wittman, D. A. (2006). The Oxford handbook of political economy. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Weintraub, S. (1982). Economic coercion and U.S. foreign policy : implications of case studies from the 
Johnson administration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Weiss, T. G., Cortright, D., Lopez, G. A., & Minear, L. (1997). Political gain and civilian pain : 
humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Whang, T. (2011). Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United 
States1. International Studies Quarterly, 55(3), 787-801.  
White, R. K. (1984). Fearful warriors : a psychological profile of U.S.-Soviet relations. New York, NY: 
Free Press. 
Wijk, R. d. (2005). The art of military coercion : why the West’s military superiority scarcely matters. 
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Mets & Schilt. 
Williams, D., & Lippman, T. W. (April 14, 1995). U.S. Is Allowing Iran To Arm Bosnia Muslims. The 
Washington Post.  
Williams, G. L. (1984). Global defence : motivation and policy in a nuclear age. New Delhi, India: Vikas. 
Williams, P. (2008). Security studies : an introduction. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Wilson, J. Q. (2000). Bureaucracy : what government agencies do and why they do it ([New ed.). New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
Wise, H. L. (2007). Inside the danger zone : the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press. 
Woodward, B. (November 19, 1986). CIA curried favor with Khomeini exiles. The Washington Post.  
Worth, R. F., & Fathi, N. (June 14, 2009). Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote The New 
York Times.  
Wright, R. B. (1989). In the name of God : the Khomeini decade. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Wright, R. B. (2010). The Iran primer : power, politics, and U.S. policy. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace. 
Xinhua. (January 3, 2010). Iran issues ultimatum to West over nuclear fuel swap. May 22, 2014, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/03/content_12748820.htm 
Yeselson, A. (1956). United States-Persian diplomatic relations, 1883-1921. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. 
Yin, R. K. (1993). Applications of case study research. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications. 
465 
 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research : design and methods (4th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Younis, M. (February 7, 2013). Iranians Feel Bite of Sanctions, Blame U.S., Not Own Leaders. May 22, 
2014, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/160358/iranians-feel-bite-sanctions-blame-not-own-
leaders.aspx 
Younis, M. (October 14, 2013). Iranians Mixed on Nuclear Capabilities. May 22, 2014, from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165413/iranians-mixed-nuclear-capabilities.aspx 
Yu, D. S. (2002). The role of political culture in Iranian political development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Zarif, M. J. (2014). What Iran Really Wants. Foreign Affairs, 93(3), 11p.  
Zaum, D. (2007). The sovereignty paradox : the norms and politics of international statebuilding. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
